yugoslavias implosion

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ChApter 4
Koštunica never condemned Milošević’s policy of war and never
made a positive statement about the Hague Tribunal. He opposed
extraditing Milošević to the Hague Tribunal because he regarded it
as a political rather than as a legal institution, as an American tribunal
rather than an international court. While serving as prime minister,
he construed cooperation with the Hague Tribunal as “voluntary
surrender.” 503 Far from distancing himself from the Greater Serbia
agenda, Koštunica he availed himself of every opportunity to refer
to the rs as a Serbian state temporarily separated from Serbia. His
first visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina as president of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia was preceded by the statements “it is not normal that
Serb towns should be abroad” 504and “the Drina is the backbone of
the Serb people.” 505
Prime minister Đinđić and his government did try to harness
the energy generated by October 5. The results were impressive in
view of the tenacity with which the champions of continuity blocked
attempts at reform. Đinđić played a singular role in formulating
pro-reform policies, and sought to distance his government from the
policy of war and war crimes. The government took some concrete
action toward fundamentally transforming the country, as well as
toward ending its isolation from the international community. The
greatest progress was made in the economic and educational spheres,
and the Đinđić government was praised by the West for its liberal
approach. Unfortunately, Koštunica found it easy to halt this progress
after Đinđić’s death because Đinđić’s government lacked strong
political backing.
The assassination of Đinđić on March 12, 2003, was followed by
an involution, a throwback to the policy of ethno-nationalism, and a
rejection of any genuine confrontation with the past and cooperation
503 www.b92.net, 5 September 2004
504 Borba, 3 October 2000
505 Ibid .