yugoslavias implosion

The political and economic system that developed during the
thirteen years of Milošević’s rule, which could be described as
nationalistic and oligarchic, remained dominant. This symbiosis of
state, societal, and private interests was reflected in the existence of
three kinds of property (state, social, and private). Cases of government
ministers doubling as company directors abounded. Arbitrary
economic legislation led to rampant corruption, and monetary and
banking policy in particular were fine-tuned to serve specific state
and private interests.
For several months after the departure of Milošević, Serbia lived
in a state of political suspension characterized by stop-gap measures.
The oligarchy tolerated the new government while opposing internal
political and economic reform.
The ambitious government of prime minister Đinđić enjoyed
no real support because a new constitution and institutional reforms
would upset the closely interwoven network of interests and forces
in Serbia. Attempts to reform the security and judiciary sectors stood
little chance of success for the same reason. 502
International hopes that Koštunica’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, established in 2001, would expose the truth about
Serbian responsibility for the war endured for far too long. Alex
Boraine, who had played an important role in South Africa’s Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (and who founded the International
Center for Transitional Justice in New York), was named a counselor
to the Commission but he soon became aware that its strategy
was not to deal with Serbia’s recent past but to relativize the responsibility
of all sides in the conflict. Thus, for instance, the Commission
looked at events within a very broad historical context, reaching
back to World War I in an attempt to justify the wars of the 1990s.
502 Vladimir Gligorov, “Reforme u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori: Stanje i perspective” (Reforms
in Serbia and Montenegro: The State of Affairs and Prospects) . The study is
discussed in a special supplement of the weekly Ekonomist under the title
“Kako dalje—reforme u Srbiji” (Serbian Reforms—What Next?), 2004 .
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