yugoslavias implosion

CHAPTER 4 brings the discussion of Serbia up to date. The legacy
of Slobodan Milošević remains a burden for the Serbian people and
an obstacle to shaping the new Serbian state. Serbia is slowly completing
the process of settling on territory that is far smaller than
that to which it has laid claims for decades. The frustration is all the
greater because the Serbian elites continue to regard the matter of
the state as an open issue, hoping that a changed international constellation
may result in different attitudes to the Serbian question
and to a redrawing of borders in the Balkans.
Chapter 4 begins by reviewing the damage inflicted by Serbian
nationalists on Serbia as well as on its neighbors over the past
thirty years. The policy of war was Serbia’s response to the unstoppable
process of Yugoslavia’s decentralization and democratization
in the face of the other republics’ increasing autonomy. The Serbian
nationalists were not prepared to make the effort required to create
and maintain so complex a community. Instead of seeking a solution
through negotiation and consensus, Serbia spent the last decade
of the twentieth century waging war to recompose the Balkans—
to wrest control of the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Serbs
believed that by reverting to pre-Communist, antidemocratic traditions,
they could turn the clock back and refashion Yugoslavia in the
self-image of a historically victorious power.
Yet, despite its military superiority, Serbia failed to crush the
resistance of the other Yugoslav peoples, who proved to be more resolute
opponents than Serbia had anticipated and whose democratic
aspirations earned them international sympathy.
The nato intervention in 1999 forced the complete withdrawal
of Serbia’s military and security structures from Kosovo.
Under the terms of the Kumanovo Agreement of June 1999, Serbia
lost all sovereignty over Kosovo and the former provice was placed
under international administration. Un Security Council resolution
1244 later provided that a decision on Kosovo’s future status be
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IntroduCtIon