yugoslavias implosion

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ChApter 3
Belgrade offered no option but the partition of Kosovo, a partition
closely connected with Republika Srpska claiming its right to
unite with Serbia. From the time the status of Kosovo was placed
on its agenda, Belgrade obstructed Bosnia-Herzegovina’s efforts
to become a functional state and used Bosnia-Herzegovina as leverage
in an attempt to accomplish its initial plan: a rearrangement
of national borders in the Balkans. This plan implied a Serbian
resettling from enclaves in Kosovo, which would be ceded to the
Albanians.
The Montenegrin independence referendum in 2006 accelerated
resolution of the status of Kosovo, which Belgrade realized was
entering its final stage. The conservative option, embodied by Koštunica,
emerged triumphant from the confrontation over the future
of Kosovo. The 2006 Serbian Constitution, passed to create a basis for
rejecting Kosovo’s independence, was a key component in Koštunica’s
strategy.
By treating Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia, the 2006 Constitution
canonized the Serbian ethic and confronted the international
community and its intervention in Kosovo. Serbia’s top decision
makers invoked Serbia’s rightful ownership of Kosovo but never
bothered to address the Albanian majority. They insisted on a loose
autonomy for Kosovo, but did nothing to bring the two ethnic communities
closer. The 2006 Constitution affirms that Kosovo is an integral
part of Serbia, but it does not put the Albanians on the electoral
rolls. The political elite of Serbia (barring a few exceptions, notably
the Liberal Democratic Party) formed a unified front for the defense
of Kosovo. Because the constitution binds the state, and consequently
the Serbian elite, to ensure a continued existence of Kosovo in Serbia
by force, the possibility of the introduction of a state of emergency
was frequently mentioned.
In 2007, Ahtisaari put forward a un proposal for “supervised
independence” for the province that would ensure protection for