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yugoslavias implosion

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into the hands of ethnic radicals. Meanwhile, the partition of Kosovo<br />

was incorporated into the state policy of the fry. Goran Svilanović,<br />

the Yugoslav foreign minister, initiated a conference in 2001 on the<br />

immutability of Balkan borders in hopes—paradoxically—of being<br />

able to engineer a territorial swap that would see the part of Kosovo<br />

given to Albanians exchanged for the part of Bosnia (Republika Srpska)<br />

being given to Serbia. Russia supported this idea and continued<br />

to play the role of a broker looking after Serbian interests in the hope<br />

of establishing itself as an unavoidable factor in the Balkans.<br />

Svilanović recognized that he was unlikely to win support for<br />

the idea of an international conference except from Russia, but he<br />

was not greatly perturbed. Serbia’s real but unstated strategy was to<br />

maintain the territorial status quo for the moment only so that, with<br />

the passage of time, the international community would have no<br />

option but to acknowledge that Belgrade controlled only the north of<br />

Kosovo and the Bosnian government controlled only part of Bosnia,<br />

and that therefore the south of the province should be joined with<br />

Albania and Republika Srpska should be joined with Serbia. At the<br />

same time, the Belgrade regime insisted that Montenegrin independence<br />

would cause a domino effect resulting in a union of Serbia and<br />

Republika Srpska.<br />

A variety of proposals for partition played into the hands of<br />

all nationalists. Proceeding from the fundamentally irreconcilable<br />

positions of the two sides and the brutal Serbian repression of the<br />

Albanians, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo—<br />

initiated by the Swedish prime minister Göran Persson, endorsed by<br />

the United Nations, and tasked with providing independent analysis<br />

of a range of issues related to Kosovo before, during, and after the<br />

nato intervention—concluded in a 2001 report that the best available<br />

option for the future of Kosovo would be “conditional independence”—expanding<br />

the autonomy and self-government promised by<br />

Resolution 1244 in order to make Kosovo self-governing outside the<br />

259<br />

ChApter 3

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