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intervention. It took almost a year to organize and unite the Serbian<br />

opposition, civic society, media, and students before any serious<br />

strategy for toppling Milošević could be developed. However,<br />

the icty indictment against Milošević issued in May 1999 did play a<br />

part in persuading Milošević’s own circles to eventually remove him<br />

because he had become an impediment to building ties between the<br />

fry and the European Union and the United States. 445<br />

THE IDEA OF PARTITION PERSISTS<br />

The intervention consolidated the regime, if only briefly,<br />

because the opposition could not capitalize on the political vacuum<br />

created after the signing of the Kumanovo agreement and Resolution<br />

1244. The opposition was unable to dissociate itself from the military<br />

and police offensive in Kosovo. On the contrary, the opposition<br />

viewed the offensive as a prelude to the ultimate partition of Kosovo.<br />

Nato intervention and the entry of nato troops (kfor) into Kosovo<br />

put the Serbian partition plan into jeopardy; Resolution 1244 put an<br />

end to Serbian jurisdiction over Kosovo.<br />

In the new circumstances, the strategy of the Belgrade regime—<br />

of not only Milošević but of also his successor, Koštunica—proceeded<br />

along two tracks: negating and undermining the international mission<br />

and preparing to partition Kosovo. The purpose of the campaign,<br />

first against Bernard Kouchner, special representative of the<br />

secretary-general and the head of unmik, and then against his successors<br />

(Hans Haekkerup, Søren Jessen-Petersen, and Joachim<br />

Ricker), was to discredit the proposed legal framework for Kosovo<br />

(in spite of the fact that it envisaged maximum rights for Serbs and<br />

other minorities) on the grounds that it did not take Serbian rights<br />

into sufficient account and to prove that partition would be the best<br />

solution. The Serbian campaign benefited from the behavior of some<br />

445 Milošević and four other top officials were indicted on 340 counts of murder,<br />

stemming from seven separate massacres, and 740,000 forced deportations<br />

from the embattled Serbian province since the beginning of 1999 .<br />

253<br />

ChApter 3

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