yugoslavias implosion

250
ChApter 3
and the public infrastructure. The absence of a police force created a
law enforcement vacuum that had to be filled by kfor. The destruction
of villages, as well as the slaughter of thousands of civilians and
the expulsion of almost a million Albanians had traumatized the
Albanian community, which upon its return to Kosovo reacted with
astonishing violence. The entire remaining Kosovar Serbian population
was seen as a target for Kosovo Albanians. According to a report
from the osce issued in the fall of 1999:
Violence has taken many forms: killings, rape, beatings, torture,
house-burning and abductions. Not all violence has been physical,
fear and terror tactics have been used as weapons of revenge, substantial
aggression, even without physical injury, exerts extreme pressure,
leaving people not only unable to move outside their home, but unable
to live peacefully within their home.. . .
The result of this has been a continuous exodus of Kosovo Serbs to
Serbia and Montenegro and an inevitable displacement towards
mono-ethnic enclaves, adding fuel to Serb calls for cantonization. 441
The international mission was unprepared for such a turn and
unable to prevent the expulsion of 170,000 Serbs and members of
other minorities from Kosovo. About 70,000 left for Serbia, while
others moved to the northern part of Kosovo.
The Belgrade regime could not reconcile itself to the new situation
and continued to believe that Yugoslav forces would return
to Kosovo. The expulsion of Serbs and other non-Albanians from
Kosovo was used as an excuse for an outright rejection of any cooperation
with the United Nations Interim Administration Mission
in Kosovo (unmik), the new authority in the province. To prove
that the international community was unequipped to deal with
441 OSCE, Human Rights in Kosovo: As Seen, As Told, vol . 2 . 14 June–31 October
1999 (Warsaw: OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,
November 5, 1999), http://www .osce .org/item/17756 .html .