yugoslavias implosion

240
ChApter 3
as well as effective institutional links with the Republic of Serbia.” 418
Vojislav Šešelj, on the other hand, let it be known that Yugoslavia
was ready for bombing because, he said, Serbia was a “respectable
military power, so if they make a grab for our territory they’ll need a
large quantity of coffins in addition to weapons.” 419 If it came to u.s.
aggression, he warned, “We Serbs shall suffer, but there won’t be any
Albanians left in Kosovo. … We’ll endure everything. Having sorted
out the situation at the University and largely in the media, we’ll also
straighten out the judiciary and won’t let foreign troops enter our
territory.” 420 Milošević declared, “We’re not going to give up Kosovo
even at the cost of being bombed.” 421 General Nebojša Pavković said,
“The defense of Kosovo has no price. It is our supreme commandment,
an order we will certainly carry out at the cost of giving up
our lives.” 422
Reaction in Serbia to the proposed Rambouillet agreement
showed that the Serbs—not only the regime but also a large part
of the opposition—were unprepared to negotiate and were determined
to oppose any imposition of a solution as well as nato intervention.
This arrogance was fuelled by goading from some circles
in Russia for Serbia to take up the gauntlet. Russia’s military circles
believed that any intervention would not last more than a week,
after which nato would be embarrassed by its failure to bring Serbia
to its knees and Serbia would emerge the moral victor. There was
a similar assessment in the West regarding the duration of nato’s
intervention, the difference being that Milošević was expected to
knuckle under at the end of a week’s bombing. u.s. State Secretary
Madeleine Albright in cnn’s Larry King talk show said “it’s going to
418 Danas, March 4, 1999 .
419 Danas, February 12, 1999 .
420 Danas, March 1, 1999 .
421 Glas javnosti, February 20–21,1999 .
422 Glas javnosti, March 3, 1999 .