yugoslavias implosion

Unity said it would reactivate itself in the event of a nato attack on
the fry. 402
The Belgrade regime claimed that it was dealing with Albanian
terrorism, and hoped that the international community in general
and the United States in particular would support Belgrade’s fight
against terrorism. 403 Milošević said in a conversation with Knut Vollebæk,
foreign minister of Norway (1997–2000), that the “organs
of power will no longer tolerate terrorist activities.” For his part,
Koštunica said that the “violence of the [kla] is not without plan
and object; it is not random violence but violence directed at bringing
about an independent Albanian state at all costs.” 404
The attitude of the Kosovo Serbs was perhaps best articulated by
Bishop Artemije in response to Walker’s remark that he failed to see
why Serbs objected to being a national minority: “Was he sent here to
make of us what we are not and what we cannot ever be, and to forbid
us to be what we are and have been for over eight hundred years
in these parts— namely, our own masters in our own land?” 405
The racist outlook on the Albanians became more pronounced
daily. Koštunica described Albanians as a “people who have no conception
of the state, as the current situation in their mother country
Albania testifies.” 406 His dss party saw the 1999 exchange of nine kla
members for captured Yugoslav Army (vj) soldiers as a “devastating
truth that vj members have been exchanged for terrorists and the
ovk put on a par with the vj.” 407
The Serbs failed to complete their troop withdrawal as specified
in the Milošević – Holbrooke agreement and continued their
402 Danas, January 19, 1999 .
403 At one point, U .S . envoy Robert Gelbard did make a reference to terrorism, but he later
corrected himself by also condemning the state-sponsored terrorism of Belgrade .
404 Blic, January 12, 1999 .
405 Danas, January 20, 1999 .
406 Politika, January 24, 1999 .
407 Danas, January 25, 1999 .
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ChApter 3