yugoslavias implosion

several visits to Washington and European capitals to canvas support
against a proposal launched by u.s. diplomat Christopher Hill,
on behalf of the international community. The idea was rejected by
the international community on the grounds, noted Ćosić candidly,
that “cantonization runs counter to the efforts of the international
community to build an integral Kosovo.” This rejection did not,
however, deter Ćosić from writing an appeal to the French people
suggesting the territorial partition of Kosovo. 382
Yet another proposal for carving up Kosovo came from Professor
Svetozar Stojanović, a member of the Praxis group in the 1970s.
Stojanović suggested that one-third of the territory of Kosovo be
firmly integrated into Serbia while the other two-thirds secede, provided
that the “Serbian state and its tax authorities were compensated
for the huge amounts of money invested in that part of Kosovo
and Metohija.” He later claimed that, had the West not persistently
rejected the division of Kosovo, the “calamity of both the Albanians
and the Serbs and other non-Albanian population would have been
avoided.” 383
THE CRISIS COMES TO A HEAD
With the refusal of the Dayton negotiators to discuss the future
of Kosovo while rewarding the Bosnian Serbs with Republika Srpska,
the Kosovo Albanians realized that nonviolent protest was less
likely to lead to independence than were military options. Dayton
was a key factor in bolstering support for the Kosovo Liberation
Army.
But the Dayton Accords also brought the renewed involvement
of the United States in the region. The Balkans clearly remained
an arena for further potential conflict, something that the Clinton
administration was eager to prevent, especially in the south—in
382 Dobrica Ćosić, Vreme zmija, Službeni glasnik, 2008, p . 38 .
383 Svetozar Stojanović, Na srpskom delu Titonika (On the Serbian
side of the Titonic), Filip Visnjić Belgrade, 2000 .
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