yugoslavias implosion

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ChApter 3
less nationalistic than the Serbian government) failed to put forward
a solution to the Kosovo question that might have encouraged the
Albanians to join in the demonstrations. The demonstrations weakened
Milošević’s position and temporarily deflected his attention
from Kosovo; he used them as a pretext not to implement an education
agreement he had signed with Rugova shortly before the September
1996 polls.
The Serbian opposition was under pressure from the international
community to formulate a position on Kosovo, but a “broad
autonomy for Kosovo along with European human rights standards”
was all it had to offer. The Serbian insistence on the democratization
of Serbia first, and the solution of Kosovo afterwards, convinced the
Albanians that they had little to hope for from any political faction in
Serbia. They were presented with the dilemma of whether to continue
passive resistance, which had yielded no tangible results, or to
move toward active resistance regardless of the attendant risks; an
increasing number opted for the latter. The bloc in favor of “political
dynamism” led by Adem Demaçi put forward a new program without
spelling out concrete activities that would accelerate Albanian
integration into a Serbian institutional framework.
Albanians grew increasingly frustrated by the protracted crisis
in Kosovo and the apparently interminable postponement of a solution.
Azem Vllasi, a Kosovar Albanian politician, said that “Albanians
not only fail to see any justification for the preservation of the inadmissible
status quo, they also feel humiliated and revolted by the fact
that neither the Serbian regime nor the international factor takes
the Kosovo question and their [the Albanians’] increasingly difficult
position seriously.” 372The political paralysis presented radical factions
with an opportunity to put other methods to the test; the subsequent
emergence of a liberation army galvanized the political scene
in Kosovo.
372 Naša Borba, March 21, 1997 .