yugoslavias implosion

with “policy and practice in the ypa,” relocated 90 percent of his
forces by December 25, 1991. 272
The Serbian leadership also took the decision to pull ypa troops
out of Macedonia in March 1992—Macedonia had voted for independence
in a referendum in September 1991 and was expected to
soon gain international recognition (in the event, Greek opposition
delayed the granting of such recognition)—and to divide the ypa’s
property in such a way that Macedonia was left practically without
arms. Not all Serbs agreed with this move, however.
Jović contended that “their desertion of Yugoslavia is a mistake
for the Macedonian people because their republic faces the overt territorial
claims of Bulgaria and Albania.” 273
THE USE OF PARAMILITARY UNITS
In 1991, the ypa sought to mobilize conscripts but ran into opposition
from, to quote Kadijević, “parents, mothers, sisters, peacemakers,
pacifists, etc.” 274 who campaigned against the mobilization and
tried to get their children out of the army. Many young people left
Serbia to escape being mobilized. Faced with this opposition, the ypa
turned to paramilitary units to bolster its forces.
Political parties in Serbia (with the same goals as Milošević) also
set up similar units. For instance, the Serbian Renewal Movement—a
nationalist political party founded in 1990 by Vuk Drašković created
the Serbian Guards in the wake of the ypa’s defeat in Slovenia in
the summer of 1991. With the ambition of growing into an all-Serbian
army, the Serbian Guards first operated under the command of
the First Army, and later under the Territorial Defense command in
Gospić (the Territorial Defense had been disarmed elsewhere but it
continued to exist in Serb-controlled territories).
272 Ibid ., pp . 420–421 .
273 Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ, p . 423 .
274 Veljko Kadijević, Mije viđenje raspada, p . 142 . (he mentioned it in several other places)
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