yugoslavias implosion

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ChApter 2
In that way the un peace force would establish a buffer zone
and separate the parties to the conflict until the Yugoslav crisis is
resolved, with the engagement of the United Nations, in a peaceful
and just manner based on international law. That would create the
necessary conditions for the Presidency of the sfry, as the supreme
commander of the armed forces of the sfry, to decide to disengage
the ypa in the prevention of interethnic conflicts on the territory of
the Republic of Croatia. 271
The un secretary-general responded by sending a special envoy,
Cyrus Vance, to Belgrade to negotiate the possibility of sending international
troops to Croatia. On November 27, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 721 regarding deployment of the un peacekeeping
operation in Croatia. Under the terms of an agreement known as the
Vance Plan and reached on January 2, 1992, the un Security Council
sent 14,000 peacekeeping troops to Croatia.
With the entry of international troops into Croatia on February
21, 1992, the ypa and the Serbian leadership realized their objective of
establishing the rsk and placing it under ypa protection.
Not only in Croatia but in other parts of Yugoslavia, too, the ypa
was in a process of withdrawal, clearly exposing the fiction that the
ypa represented and served all the republics of the federation.
In December 1991, the Serbian leadership decided on a “timely”
ypa withdrawal from Bosnia-Herzegovina—that is, the evacuation
of military personnel who were not from that republic, so as to provide
political and legal cover for claims that was “Serbia not at war
in Bosnia.”
Anticipating international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Milošević believed that such a move would prevent “total military
chaos by having to move the army about from one part of the
country to another.” Kadijević, who was told that a withdrawal was
“strategically and politically essential,” although not in conformity
271 Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ, p . 410