yugoslavias implosion

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ChApter 2
around Zagreb, Knin, Banja Luka, and in Herzegovina on the model
of those in Kosovo—effectively imposing military rule. 261
At the operational level in Croatia, Ram was the responsibility
of the Air Force‘s intelligence arm (i.e., V Corps and Air Defense). In
the spring of 1990, kos predicted that Ivica Račan’s Social Democratic
Party (spd) would win in Croatia and thus guarantee the survival of
Socialism there. (The ypa viewed the sds, led by Jovan Rašković, as a
Chetnik party.) However, the victory of Croatian nationalist Franjo
Tuđman in the elections in April and May dashed the ypa’s hopes,
and the Army set about cutting Croatia in half in accordance with a
plan code-named labrador.
THE WAR IN CROATIA
A propaganda war to destabilize Slovenia and Croatia was
launched that focused on the alleged resurrection of the Ustaše
movement in Croatia and harping on its World War II role in order
to mobilize the local Serbian population. Among the many incidents
engineered by kos was the desecration of the Jewish cemetery in
Zagreb and the destruction of a Serbian Orthodox church. An intelligence
network centered on Banja Luka and Zagreb was established.
Passions having already been whipped up by means of skilful
propaganda, Croatian Serbs in the Kninska Krajina and Lika regions
rose in rebellion on August 19, 1990, in what came to be known as the
“log revolution”. This was the beginning of the plan to mark the
hypothetical boundary Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica, cutting
Croatia in two. These borders coincided with the borders that
the ypa would define in the 1990s while prominent nationalists such
as Drašković and Šešelj made those goals public.
The ypa changed tack and began to support the sds (Srpska
demokratska stranka, Serbian Democratic Party), Rašković’s party,
on the grounds that it was a “champion of Yugoslavia.” The people
261 Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ, p . 146 .