yugoslavias implosion

on statehood. The hegemonic centralism of Serbian policy coincided
with the centralist attitude of the Army leadership. This position
inspired all future actions of the ypa, which abandoned the principle
(i.e., to defend all the peoples of Yugoslavia) on which it had been
founded, boycotting the federal parliament, subjugating and disarming
the Territorial Defense Forces, taking sides in the wars in Slovenia,
Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and mobilizing volunteers to
replenish the ranks combined to bring about the downfall of the ypa.
According to Martin Špegelj, a former general and the first
minister of defense of the Republic of Croatia, during 1990 and in
the spring of 1991 the ypa leadership was considering a military
coup throughout the entire former Yugoslavia, including against
Milošević. The intention was to “establish some Tito-like Yugoslavia,
imbued with Markovic’s ideas, with Western support. Up to
the attack on Slovenia, this idea was alive in the minds of the Army
leaders in order to put a stop to both radical processes in Serbia and
nationalism in Slovenia and Croatia.” 243
It is instructive to compare the attitudes within the Soviet and
the Yugoslav militaries around this time. Both militaries believed
firmly in preserving Socialism and adamantly opposed depoliticization
of the armed forces. Both were the most reactionary forces
in the society and the biggest obstacles to the emergence of a multiparty
democracy and a free market economy. Yet Mikhail Gorbachev
and, later, Boris Yeltsin managed to control the Soviet/Russian army
despite its conservatism and resistance to change. This was partly due
to a pro-reform faction in the Army that helped Gorbachev dismantle
the Soviet Union. In addition, the West played an important role
(financially and logistically) in depoliticizing the Russian military,
thus helping the military to play a constructive role in the political
development of the country.
243 Telegraf, November 2, 1994 .
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ChApter 2