28.11.2012 Views

yugoslavias implosion

yugoslavias implosion

yugoslavias implosion

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

forces from outside (chiefly, from within the Croatian and Serbian<br />

diasporas) were conspiring with internal forces to disturb the stability<br />

of the Socialist self-governing system, compromise Yugoslavia’s<br />

international prestige and nonaligned policy, and weaken the ability<br />

of Yugoslavia to defend itself. This Special War rhetoric against<br />

Yugoslavia intensified whenever international relations in Europe<br />

and the Mediterranean were tense or Yugoslavia faced internal political<br />

or economic difficulties.<br />

Various groups in the country were engaged in this special<br />

warfare: remnants of the “class enemy” (i.e., nationalists in the<br />

republics), liberals, clerics, and other counterrevolutionary and<br />

reactionary forces. All were united, regardless of their political and<br />

ideological orientation, in organizing opposition in the country, with<br />

overseas support, to prevent the successful development of Yugoslavia<br />

as a socialist country. 227 Although Socialism was collapsing in<br />

the ussr and Eastern Europe, prominent ypa leaders openly accused<br />

those who participated in debates on the transformation of Yugoslavia,<br />

especially after the first multiparty elections in 1990, of being<br />

the “same forces that once brought about the collapse of Yugoslavia.<br />

During the nor [National Liberation War] they collaborated<br />

with the occupier and were politically and militarily defeated.” 228<br />

Kadijević described those who called for foreign military intervention<br />

“traitors,” pointing to Croatia’s and Slovenia’s republican governments.<br />

229 Mamula said that the ypa would intervene if necessary<br />

to protect the integrity and survival of Yugoslavia as a federal state.<br />

He asserted that Yugoslavia would be able to “control the situation<br />

within its borders, even if forced to use repressive measures, including<br />

the force of arms.” 230 Federal Interior Minister Petar Gračanin<br />

227 Dejan Jović, “San o prinudnoj upravi”, Danas, March 19, 1991, p .16 .<br />

228 Veljko Kadijević, in an interview with Narodna armija, December 6, 1990 .<br />

229 Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada, p . 88 .<br />

230 Miroslav Lazanski, “Jugoslavija neće biti Lebanon”, Danas, December 4, 1990, p .11 .<br />

155<br />

ChApter 2

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!