yugoslavias implosion

After the Presidency turned the proposal down, the ypa proposed
a plan to protect and defend the Serbian people outside Serbia and to
concentrate the ypa within the frontiers of a future Yugoslavia. By
adopting such a course of action, the ypa placed itself firmly in the
service of Serbia. From that time on, the ypa communicated only
with those members of the Presidency who were in favor of preserving
Yugoslavia. 219
On March 13, Kadijević secretly left for Moscow (only select
members of the sfry Presidency knew of his departure) to canvas
support for a military-state coup in Yugoslavia, a request Soviet
minister of defense Dmitri Yazov declined. The idea was to carry
out simultaneous coups in Moscow and Belgrade. The object, at least
in Kadijević’s mind, was to preserve Yugoslavia in the form the ypa
desired. But the Soviets would interfere in the Yugoslav crisis only
when they felt the need to bolster their own reputation and influence
in international affairs; they were not in a position to commit themselves.
220 In trying to ensure its long-term influence in the Balkans by
modifying the regional balance of power, the Soviet Union trod cautiously;
it was extremely careful not to commit itself to any newly
created state in the territory of the former Yugoslavia nor to embrace
any ruling team or political option. 221
A COMMON CAUSE AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION
The ties between the ypa and the Serbian leadership were
strengthened by a shared dissatisfaction with the provisions of the
federal Constitution as amended in 1974.
219 Veljko Kadijević, Moje viđenje raspada
220 Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ, p . 295 .
221 The Russian military was less cautious, however, than were the Russian
civilian authorities . Russia’s military security intelligence had regular contacts
with YPA and Serbian politicians (such as Gračanin, Milošević’s brother),
members of the Academy, and the Serbian Orthodox Church .
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ChApter 2