yugoslavias implosion

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ChApter 2
MILOŠEVIĆ AND THE ARMY JOIN FORCES
Slobodan Milošević’s ascension to power unbalanced the fragile
political status quo in Yugoslavia. According to Branko Mamula,
the ypa was not yet on Milošević’s side when Milošević emerged as a
political force, and by late 1987 and early 1988 “there was still no fear
that Serbia with Milošević and the ypa might work in tandem.” 201
Although the ypa was arguing for a federal Socialist Yugoslavia, it
did not dare oppose the putsch-like manner by which Milošević
seized power for fear of raising other issues. As far as the ypa was
concerned, Mamula writes, Slovenia was the Army’s greater challenge
because it directly denied the ypa’s legitimacy. Hoping to create
the impression that he enjoyed the backing of the Army, Milošević
directed the media to circulate the names of some mostly retired
generals from Serbia who “supported” him. General Ljubičić was
involved in Milošević’s installation, so his support was often mentioned,
as was that of General Petar Gračanin, former chief of the
General Staff and, later, federal minister of internal affairs; General
Aleksandar Janjić, formerly in charge of the Army in Niš; General
Milojica Pantelić; and General Pero Lalović.
Milošević did not became Serbia’s leader solely on the wave of
Kosovo Serb revolt or because the intellectual elite called on him to
revive the Greater Serbia project; “There is no doubt that the role of
General Ljubičić was decisive in the tug of war between Milošević
and Stambolić (at that time president of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party in Serbia) at the Eighth Session of the Central
Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia,” which was held
on September 23–24, 1987. 202 Once Milošević became the most powerful
man on the Serbian political scene, he set a strategically important
goal for the preservation of his power: to assert control over the
Army. As soon as he had full control over the Army, Milošević turned
201 Branko Mamula, Slučaj Jugoslavija, p .121
202 Ibid . p .112