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yugoslavias implosion

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in accordance with cpsu general-secretary Leonid Brezhnev’s doctrine<br />

of limited sovereignty. The events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 had<br />

a great effect on Yugoslavia, particularly in terms of its effort to preserve<br />

its national sovereignty. Yugoslavia strongly supported Czechoslovakia,<br />

and the concept of a system of “total national defense”—the<br />

militarization of society “to strengthen the influence of the military<br />

factor in all spheres of life”—began to evolve. 176<br />

Aware of the complexity of intercommunal relations in Yugoslavia,<br />

the ussr adopted an ever more hostile attitude toward Yugoslavia.<br />

The Soviet Union was especially worried by the growing<br />

demands for decentralization in Yugoslavia as well as the liberalization<br />

of the party structure. The Soviet leadership had always been<br />

apprehensive of the Yugoslav model, which as far back as 1948 had<br />

raised questions about the monolithic structure of the cpsu and its<br />

incontestable vanguard role in the world Socialist movement. The<br />

Soviet troop buildup near the Yugoslav border and military exercises<br />

in neighboring countries in 1968 were signals that the Soviets<br />

meant business. In 1971, Brezhnev insisted on the replacement of<br />

the reform-minded leadership in Croatia and—as Savka Dabčević<br />

Kučar, 177 then Croatian prime minister, testified—the Soviet leader<br />

told Tito: “If you won’t do that, we will do it ourselves. We are in<br />

favor of the status quo regarding Yalta. ” 178 Kučar said that Tito told<br />

her explicitly that “the Army is getting ready around Zagreb”—<br />

readying itself to move against the Croatian government if it<br />

did not abandon its aims of economic decentralization and other<br />

steps designed to give Croatia greater control over its own affairs. 179<br />

Czechoslovakia, Croatia, and Slovenia were all part of the same<br />

syndrome: They all expected support from the West, but that support<br />

176 Marko Milivojević in Yugoslavia’s Security Dilemmas .<br />

177 Kučar was one of the most prominent Croatian communist political<br />

leaders in 70s . A leading factor in the Croatian Spring .<br />

178 Interview with Savka Dabčević Kučar, HTV, May 7, 2001 .<br />

179 Ljudi iz 1971 . – Prekinuta šutnja, Biblioteka VRIJEME, 1990 .<br />

133<br />

ChApter 2

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