yugoslavias implosion

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ChApter 1
rallies made possible the functioning of the blocked institutions, as
well as airing the commitments on which our social reform is based
today.” 129
The West’s insistence on democratic elections as a precondition
for a multiparty system was problematic for the Serbian régime and
Milošević, though in all probability the former Communists turned
Socialists in the sps would have won even in a multiparty election.
Nonetheless, as Borisav Jović testifies, Milošević was sceptical about
the idea of such elections because “in that case, an Albanian party
would be formed.” Because there were nearly two million Albanians,
Milošević argued, “whatever name they might give that party
of theirs, they would take over power in their environments and we
would lose Kosovo. ” 130
Milošević saw to it that neither his program nor his rhetoric
contained nationalist undertones despite the fact that he had been
articulating a post-Communist nationalist agenda since 1987. In his
closing address to the Eighth Session, Milošević sharply criticized
Serbian nationalism:
As to Serb nationalism, I think it politically unacceptable that the
leadership of the League of Communists of Serbia should be threatened
with charges of Serb nationalism. The Serb Communists and the
Serb people have never been kind-hearted towards their nationalists.
They [the nationalists] have never been spared punishment—neither
criminal, nor political, nor moral. … Serb nationalism today is not
only intolerance and hatred of another people or of other peoples, it is a
viper in the very bosom of the Serb people who has always, throughout
its history, aspired to its unification with all southern Slav peoples. …
Today the Serb people would be harmed most by what the Serb nationalists
say is best for it, namely intolerance and suspicion of others,
129 NIN, October 16, 1988 .
130 Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFR (The Last Days of the SFRY), (Kragujevac: Prizma, 1996) p . 61.