Turkey Watch: EU Member States' Perceptions on ... - SInAN - METU

<strong>Turkey</strong> <strong>Watch</strong>: <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Member</strong> States’ <strong>Perceptions</strong> on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s Accession to
the <strong>EU</strong>
ISBN: 978-605-89751-2-5
A publication of the Center for European Studies, Middle East Technical
University
© Any part of this publication may be fully reproduced in any form for
educational or non-profit uses with appropriate acknowledgement. No use of
this publication may be made for resale or other commercial purposes without
prior written permission of the Center for European Studies, Middle East
Technical University, Ankara, <strong>Turkey</strong>.
SInAN logosu ve Strengthening and Integrating Academic Networks(SInAN)
Publication funded by the Strengthening and Integrating Academic
Networks(SInAN) project (Grant Contract Nr. TR0604.01-03/092) which is
implemented by the Center for European Studies, Middle East Technical
University under the Programme ‘Promotion of Civil Society Dialogue between
the <strong>EU</strong> and <strong>Turkey</strong>: Universities Grant Scheme’ in coordination with the
Secretariat General for <strong>EU</strong> Affairs. The contracting authority for this project is
the Central Finance and Contracts Unit
The contents and publications of the SInAN project are the sole responsibility of
the Center for European Studies, Middle East Technical University and can in
no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.
The opinions expressed herein are only those of the authors and do not reflect
any institutional views.
Page and Cover design by
Yılmaz Alaşahan
First Published: November 2009
Printed in <strong>Turkey</strong> by
Zeplin İletişim Hizmetleri Ltd. Şti.
6. Cadde 45/2, Birlik Mahallesi, Çankaya 06610 Ankara-<strong>Turkey</strong>
Center for European Studies,
FEAS B-Building, Middle East Technical University, 06531, Ankara, <strong>Turkey</strong>
1

Acknowledgments
First of all, we are grateful to all our authors of this volume for
putting a lot of effort and time in preparing their contributions. We
would like to thank, Aimée Lindenmayer Ay, who worked very
hard to edit and proof read all the chapters in this volume on ‘<strong>EU</strong>
<strong>Member</strong> States’ <strong>Perceptions</strong> on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s Accession to the <strong>EU</strong>’.
And also, we are thankful to Berat Taşpınar, who helped us in
preparing the volume for publication, at the Center for European
Studies, METU.
Last but not least, we are all obliged to our families and friends
who have been there for us in all desperate and stressful times
throughout the project. Thank you all for your patience and
understanding...
2

Contents
Sait Akşit, Çiğdem Üstün
Introduction: In Search of an <strong>EU</strong>-wide Debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>..........6
Nicolas Monceau
French <strong>Perceptions</strong>.....................................................................16
Katrin Böttger, Eva-Maria Maggi
German <strong>Perceptions</strong>...................................................................32
Yvonne Nasshoven
Belgian <strong>Perceptions</strong> ...................................................................46
Emiliano Alessandri with Sebastiano Sali
Italian <strong>Perceptions</strong>......................................................................58
Eduard Soler i Lecha & Irene García
Spanish <strong>Perceptions</strong> ...................................................................74
Athanasios C. Kotsiaros
Greek <strong>Perceptions</strong> ......................................................................90
Gunilla Herolf
Swedish <strong>Perceptions</strong> ................................................................ 104
Cengiz Günay
Austrian <strong>Perceptions</strong> ................................................................ 118
4

Costas Melakopides
Greek Cypriot <strong>Perceptions</strong>.......................................................132
Petr Kratochvíl, David Král, Dominika Dražilová
Czech <strong>Perceptions</strong>....................................................................150
Adam Szymański
Polish <strong>Perceptions</strong>....................................................................166
Iulia Serafimescu, Mihai Sebe
Romanian <strong>Perceptions</strong> .............................................................186
Marin Lessenski
Bulgarian <strong>Perceptions</strong> ..............................................................204
Özgehan Şenyuva, Sait Akşit
<strong>Turkey</strong> Seen from the <strong>EU</strong>: Conclusions ..................................218
5

Sait Akşit, Çiğdem Üstün 1
Introduction: In Search of an <strong>EU</strong>-wide Debate
on <strong>Turkey</strong>
<strong>Turkey</strong> was accepted as an eligible candidate for <strong>EU</strong>
membership at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, and began
her negotiations process for membership in October 2005. This
was a period with very positive developments in the relations
between <strong>Turkey</strong> and the <strong>EU</strong>, leading to a series of reform packages
in <strong>Turkey</strong> with an aim to fulfil the needs and requirements of
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s aspiration of membership. The same period corresponded
to an important era of developments and attempts, first by the
Ecevit government and then by the Gül and Erdoğan governments,
to transform <strong>Turkey</strong>’s internal and external policies. At times,
these attempts provided serious challenges on very sensitive issues.
Some of the important developments of the period are the
reconsideration of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s foreign policy priorities and attempts
at solving long-standing disputes, such as the problematic relations
with Greece and the question of Cyprus.
Things have changed since the start of the negotiations
process, and the period between 2006 and 2009 has had its ups and
downs; in fact, more downs than ups. This has various reasons.
One of the most expressed criticisms of this period has been the
1
Research Fellows, Center for European Studies, Middle East Technical
University.
The opinions expressed herein are only those of the authors and do not reflect
any institutional views.
6

assessment that <strong>Turkey</strong> has not accomplished much since 2006. In
fact, the reform process was argued to have slowed down, and at
times to have come to a halt. On the European Union side, the lack
of progress in <strong>Turkey</strong>’s reform process is cited as an important
reason for lack of progress in the negotiations process.
Shortly after the start of the negotiations process, these
claims were coupled with calls, on the <strong>EU</strong> side, for alternatives to
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s full membership. This corresponded with the change of
leadership, first in Germany and then in France. German
Chancellor Angela Merkel, who came to power in November
2005, strongly advocated a privileged membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>
rather than full membership. This position was also asserted by
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who was elected to the French
presidency in May 2007, first during his election campaign and
later during his presidency. The election of the adamantly-opposed
Sarkozy to the presidency meant a turning point in France’s
official position on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership to the <strong>EU</strong> 2 , and was
followed up by what was perceived in <strong>Turkey</strong> as an alternative for
full membership: the proposal of the Union for the Mediterranean.
Thus, in <strong>Turkey</strong>, the picture seems more mixed. First, it is
believed that there is an increasing ambiguity in the messages
given to <strong>Turkey</strong> by the institutions of the European Union as well
as by the leaders of some <strong>EU</strong> member states, including Merkel and
Sarkozy. The proposals for an alternative to membership, plus
political statements and comments on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s sensitive internal
and external policy issues, have reinforced the feeling of
ambiguity; this has led to a commonly held belief that some of the
2
As also put forward by Nicolas Monceau in his chapter for this book.
7

leaders of <strong>EU</strong> member states are creating new conditions and
obstacles which are not officially part of the accession negotiations
process, with an aim to keep <strong>Turkey</strong> out. Indeed, in <strong>Turkey</strong> it was
expected that the accession process would not be easy after the <strong>EU</strong>
membership of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ 3 , whose citizens largely
perceive <strong>Turkey</strong> as the main party responsible for a lack of
resolution to the Cyprus problem. These concerns proved to be
true, with the unofficial Greek Cypriot blockage of certain chapters
of the negotiations process, and the fears of “a train crash” in
December 2006. Indeed, <strong>Turkey</strong>’s process of negotiations proved
to be more difficult, and the road to membership thornier, than
envisaged. The calls for a privileged partnership, the proposal of
the Union for the Mediterranean, the pressure on the extension of
the protocol of the Ankara agreement to include ‘Cyprus’, and the
calls for the opening of air and sea ports to ‘Cyprus’ are all
strongly perceived in <strong>Turkey</strong> as trials intended to create new
obstacles or promote an alternative relationship with <strong>Turkey</strong>.
Furthermore, the <strong>EU</strong>’s ongoing debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
‘Europeanness’ and repeated questioning of the nature of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
candidacy only reinforce the myths and prejudices regarding the
<strong>EU</strong>, in <strong>Turkey</strong>.
We believe that there are serious, damaging myths and
prejudices in <strong>Turkey</strong> about the <strong>EU</strong>, on the one hand, and in the <strong>EU</strong>
member states about <strong>Turkey</strong>, on the other. One of the starting
points of the project on Strengthening and Integrating Academic
3
As officially named, the ‘Republic of Cyprus’, although accepted by the <strong>EU</strong> to
represent the whole island in the <strong>EU</strong>, is not representative of the Turkish Cypriot
Community on the island. The ‘Republic of Cyprus’ in this volume therefore
refers to the Greek Cypriot administered part of the island, and perceptions in
‘Cyprus’ refers to Greek Cypriot perceptions.
8

Networks (SInAN) was to question the myths and prejudices
embedded in this ambiguous relationship. This edited volume is an
attempt to outline how <strong>Turkey</strong>’s candidacy is perceived by
different actors in a number of <strong>EU</strong> member states. While Turkish
membership to the European Union, its opportunities and
challenges for all parties are widely discussed, it is rather difficult
to find comprehensive analysis that brings together the positions
and arguments of different actors in different countries. In fact, at a
very general level, it is argued that <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession into the
European Union is one of the most controversial and divisive
topics deeply dividing both the <strong>EU</strong> governments and their citizens.
Indeed, there is very limited literature on the European perceptions
on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership into the <strong>EU</strong>, and almost none that tries to
tackle all relevant stakeholders, such as the government, the
opposition, the public and the elites, by exploring their views and
examining the media coverage of those views within different
countries. 4
This volume is an output of the project on Strengthening
and Integrating Academic Networks (SInAN), funded by the
European Union under the ‘Promotion of Civil Society Dialogue
between the <strong>EU</strong> and <strong>Turkey</strong>: Universities Grant Scheme’. <strong>Turkey</strong>
<strong>Watch</strong> has its origins in the early stages of the SInAN proposal
aiming to follow the example of <strong>EU</strong>-27 <strong>Watch</strong> 5 , prepared under the
4
One exception to this is the TEPAV-IAI Talking <strong>Turkey</strong> series; Natalie Tocci
(ed.), Talking <strong>Turkey</strong> in Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication
Strategy, Quaderni IAI, December 2008. Also, for some detailed analysis on
European public opinion, see Antonia R. Jiménez and Ignacio T. Payá,
European Public Opinion and <strong>Turkey</strong>’s Accession: Making Sense of Argument
For or Against, EPIN, European Policy Institutes Network Working Paper no.
16, 2007.
5
http://www.eu-consent.net/content.asp?contentid=522
9

<strong>EU</strong>-CONSENT project which was coordinated by our partner, Jean
Monnet Centre, University of Cologne. With this publication, the
Center for European Studies, Middle East Technical University, as
the main coordinator of SInAN, intends to question the myths that
characterise the terms of the current debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong>
integration process and to facilitate better knowledge and
understanding of <strong>Turkey</strong> within the <strong>EU</strong> and of the <strong>EU</strong> within
<strong>Turkey</strong>. Although the envisaged content of the volume has
changed over time, resulting in views from different <strong>EU</strong> member
states on Turkish candidacy to the <strong>EU</strong>, the main objectives
remained the same. <strong>Turkey</strong> <strong>Watch</strong> addresses one general question,
which is the following: How has <strong>Turkey</strong>’s candidacy been
perceived in <strong>EU</strong> member states between the years 2006 and 2009?
We asked different experts from the member states to take up the
question, and to give qualitative insights by considering the
perceptions of some of the main actors in their respective
countries: the governments, the opposition parties, the civil society
organisations and the media.
Different experts provided us with insights on France,
Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Greece, Sweden, Austria,
‘Republic of Cyprus’ 6 , Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and
Bulgaria. This particular group of <strong>EU</strong> member states reflects a
number of concerns. First, it represents a wide geographical
distribution, including member states from southern, northern,
central and eastern Europe. Second, the group includes member
states from each successive enlargement process of the European
Union. Third, it includes core, old, new, small and large member
states. Fourth, it includes <strong>EU</strong> neighbours of <strong>Turkey</strong>, and states
6 See footnote 3.
10

which have good economic relations with <strong>Turkey</strong>. Fifth, it includes
states which officially have a supportive position for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s bid
for membership, although some show only conditional support,
and states which have a negative position on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
membership. These scholarly attempts to tackle all relevant
stakeholders collectively support our assumption: Although
perceived and long accepted as an elite-driven process, the <strong>EU</strong>
integration process must take into consideration the perceptions of
different actors for a better understanding of the various
dimensions of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s bid for membership. 7
With the various country studies, we have tried to find
answers to the following questions, through a consideration of the
period between 2006 and 2009:
• How strong is the debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>?
• How informed is the debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>?
• What forms the basis of the perceptions of the
different actors?
• Are there certain myths and prejudices that
dominate the debate on <strong>Turkey</strong> in these countries?
• What are the reasons and motives in support for or
opposition to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership?
• What are some of the perceived opportunities and
challenges presented by <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership?
• Is there convergence of arguments in favour of or
against <strong>Turkey</strong> on a cross-country basis?
• Should perceptions on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership be
7
See Özgehan Şenyuva, “<strong>Turkey</strong> European Union Relations: A Quest for Mass
and Elite Opinion” SInAN Newsletter 2, 2009.
11

considered within a broader context such as that of
future of Europe?
Indeed, comprehensive answers to these questions need
further exploration. This volume is an endeavour to contribute to
such studies.
Overview of the Book
In his analysis of the French perceptions on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
accession to the <strong>EU</strong>, Nicolas Monceau points out that France is
one of the <strong>EU</strong> members where the public debate on <strong>Turkey</strong> is the
most intense and controversial. Monceau presents the main factors
that explain the opposition in France, at the elite and the public
level, and looks at whether there are any dividing lines across the
parties and the leaders.
Katrin Böttger and Eva-Maria Maggi argue that there are
diverging positions on the question of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession in
Germany, and point to different lines of argumentation which raise
a comprehensive list of questions. Yvonne Nasshoven, on the other
hand, spotlights a limited debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s candidacy in
Belgium, due largely to its internal difficulties. However, the
Belgian stance deserves exploration due to the country’s large
Turkish population, and the fact that Belgian Prime Minister
Hermann von Rompuy is to take the office of the President of the
European Council for two and a half years, between 2009 and
2012.
Emiliano Alessandri’s contribution, with Sebastiano Sali,
on Italian perceptions is particularly interesting, as Italy is one of
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s strongest supporters when it comes to integration into the
12

<strong>EU</strong>. As such, the perceptions of different actors and the interlinkages
between them remain interesting issues to be explored.
Similar to Italy, Spain is one of the most supportive states of
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s entry into the <strong>EU</strong>. Eduard Soler i Lecha and Irene García
evaluate the Spanish position, and question whether this official
support is reflected at different levels. Athanasios C. Kotsiaros, on
the other hand, points to a supportive but reluctant position in
Greece, in his evaluation of the elements of support and opposition
to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession. Swedish contributor Gunilla Herolf draws a
picture of conditional support for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership, revealing
that her country’s interest largely lies in <strong>Turkey</strong>’s reform process.
Alongside Germany and France, Austria and the
‘Republic of Cyprus’ can be counted among the most ardent
opponents of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the European Union. Cengiz
Günay discusses various elements and concerns with respect to the
Austrian opposition, and links these to concerns in Austria which
go beyond the simple debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>. Costas Melakopides’
evaluation of the Greek Cypriot perceptions raises very
controversial points and issues for <strong>Turkey</strong>, and shows how
prejudicial a community, the Greek Cypriot community, can be in
this particular issue
The debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s candidacy is more limited in
some of the new members of the <strong>EU</strong>, as expressed by different
experts. The Czech contribution by Petr Kratochvíl, David Král
and Dominika Dražilová, and the Polish contribution by Adam
Szymański both point to the limited nature of debate, while
questioning the determinants of support and opposition for
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership. Iulia Serafimescu and Mihai Sebe, on the
other hand, take up the question for Romania by largely
13

concentrating on regional factors. Bulgaria is a most interesting
case, given the large Turkish minority in the country and the
political role it has played since the early 1990s. In this final
contribution, Marin Lessenski looks at the factors that inform and
influence the Bulgarian perception, by concentrating on the images
created by the Turkish minority, the bilateral relations, and the
historical and cultural context that has shaped the relations
between the two neighbouring countries.
14

Nicolas Monceau *
French <strong>Perceptions</strong>
Abstract
France is one of the European countries in which the
issue of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong> has sparked off the most
intense public debate, often controversial in tone, during recent
years. This may initially seem surprising, insofar as for centuries
<strong>Turkey</strong> and France have shared close ties in many historical,
political and economic areas. This report first draws the evolution
of the French public opinion dealing with <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to
the <strong>EU</strong> in the past years. It presents the main factors – political,
economic, cultural and social – explaining French majority
opposition, both in the elites and the public. Then the report
focuses on the political field in France, underlining the strong
divide between French political parties and leaders facing <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
accession to the <strong>EU</strong>. It shows how French political perceptions of
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong> are linked to different conceptions of
Europe and presents the evolution of France’s official position on
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership to the <strong>EU</strong> since the election of Nicolas
Sarkozy as French President in 2007. The report concludes with
the role of the French media in launching a public debate in France
on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong>.
*
The opinions expressed herein are only those of the author and do not reflect
any institutional views.
16

Introduction
France is one of the European countries in which the
issue of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong> has sparked off the most
intense public debate, often controversial in tone, during recent
years. This may initially seem surprising, insofar as for centuries
<strong>Turkey</strong> and France have shared close ties in many historical,
political and economic areas.
Three main steps can be identified in the development of
French perceptions about <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong>. First of
all, the year 2002 marks a milestone in the media coverage of the
Turkish issue in France. In November 2002, Valéry Giscard
d'Estaing, then chairman of the Convention on the future of
Europe, launched the debate in France on the subject of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
“Europeanness”, asserting that as <strong>Turkey</strong> is not located in Europe,
its accession would mark the end of the <strong>EU</strong>. In the same month,
the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, or
AKP)'s victory in <strong>Turkey</strong>’s general elections led to the formation
of a new government described by the French media as “moderate
Islamist”. In 2004 and 2005, <strong>Turkey</strong>’s application came under
debate as a political issue during the French campaign for the
European elections, followed in May 2005 by the referendum on
the European Constitution and the membership negotiations
between <strong>Turkey</strong> and the <strong>EU</strong> begun in October. Finally, in 2007,
the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as French President marks a
17

turning point in France’s official stance towards <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
accession to the <strong>EU</strong> 1 .
A Majority of French Citizens Against <strong>Turkey</strong>’s Accession to
the <strong>EU</strong>
Most of the opinion polls tend to show the same findings:
at the European level, France, along with Germany, Austria and
Greece, demonstrates the strongest popular opposition to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
accession to the <strong>EU</strong>. According to the Eurobarometer 2 , a majority
of French citizens expressed reservations about the prospect of
<strong>Turkey</strong> joining the <strong>EU</strong>. In autumn 2006, 69% of French citizens
interviewed were opposed to <strong>Turkey</strong> becoming a member of the
<strong>EU</strong> in the future, while 22% expressed the opposite view 3 . Other
international public opinion surveys, such as the Transatlantic
Trends, confirm the same tendencies.
French opposition appears stable over time, even tending
to increase in recent years: varying from 64% to 69% between
spring 2002 and autumn 2006, and reaching 71% in spring 2008.
During the same period, the proportion of positive opinion also
increases, but only slightly (from 19% to 22%). The decrease of
“No opinion” since 2002 is also an indicator of the impact of the
1
Bruno Cautrès et Nicolas Monceau, La Tentation du refus ? Européens,
Français et Turcs face à l’adhésion de la Turquie à l’Union européenne, Paris,
Presses de Sciences Po, 2010.
2
When another source is not mentioned, all the percentages quoted in the report
are from the Eurobarometers.
3
Eurobaromètre 66. L’opinion publique dans l’Union européenne. Automne
2006. Rapport national France, Brussels, january 2007.
18

public debate about the Turkish issue on the shaping of public
opinion.
French opposition to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s full accession to the <strong>EU</strong>
can be viewed within the more general opposition to <strong>EU</strong>
enlargement expressed in recent years. In spring 2007, 60% of
French respondents are opposed to the <strong>EU</strong> enlargement while 32%
expressed the opposite view 4 . In national opinion polls carried out
by IFOP in December 2002, June 2003, and in June and September
2004, between 56% and 61% of French respondents expressed
negative opinions concerning <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong> 5 .
What are the main factors explaining French majority
opposition to <strong>Turkey</strong>'s accession to the <strong>EU</strong>? The political,
economic, cultural and migratory dimensions of Turkish-European
relations play an important role in French perceptions of Turkish
membership to the <strong>EU</strong>. In autumn 2006, economic and political
conditionality is supported by a large majority of French
respondents, particularly in the issue of human rights. Fears of
encouraging immigration from <strong>Turkey</strong> are also widely shared by
the French. Last but not least, cultural non-compatibility, an
argument often raised in the debates about <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
“Europeanness”, features among the main concerns of the French.
In June 2008, <strong>Turkey</strong>'s accession to the <strong>EU</strong> appeared not
to represent a priority in the opinions of French citizens or leaders.
4
Eurobaromètre 67. L’opinion publique dans l’Union européenne. Printemps
2007. Rapport national France, Brussels, july 2007.
5
The main resultats of these surveys are available on the Website of IFOP
(www.ifop.com), in particular the following : Les Européens et la Turquie,
survey carried out by IFOP in December 2004 in five European countries
(France, Germany, England, Italy and Spain).
19

Indeed, <strong>Turkey</strong>’s potential accession to the <strong>EU</strong> was ranked in
thirteenth position among the three topics of most concern to the
French (with 6% of respondents), while no leader interviewed
expressed concern about this issue. Similarly, as a matter of
foreign policy, Turkish membership was ranked respectively at
sixth and fourth place among the concerns of the population (14%
of respondents) and of the elite (13%). Finally, <strong>Turkey</strong>’s potential
accession to the <strong>EU</strong> was not regarded by the French as one of the
two priority topics to be handled by President Sarkozy during the
French Presidency of the <strong>EU</strong> in 2008 6 .
Both the French population and the elite adopt similar
positions, which translate as a majority opposition to <strong>Turkey</strong>
joining the <strong>EU</strong>. In June 2008, 62% and 63% of respondents from
the general public and among the "Top Leaders" do not support
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong>, of which 36% not at all among the
general public. In contrast, 35% and 37% were in favour, of which
6% very favourable, among the citizens and leaders interviewed.
An analysis based on social categories reveals significant
variations. Older generations are more reluctant to accept <strong>Turkey</strong>'s
membership than the new ones. Indeed, opposition to <strong>Turkey</strong>'s
accession appears higher, the older the population. Similarly,
political orientations seem to play a significant role in the French
perception of <strong>Turkey</strong>'s application. The supporters of Ségolène
Royal in the 1 st round of the 2007 presidential election are more
likely to favour <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession (54%) than those who voted
for François Bayrou (36%) or Nicolas Sarkozy (21%). However,
6
Survey on the image of <strong>Turkey</strong> in France, commissioned by the Turkish
Embassy in Paris and carried out in June 2008 by OpinionWay, to a
representative sample of the population and a panel of French leaders.
20

these results merit explanation, insofar as nearly half of all French
citizens surveyed (42%), who in June 2008 declared themselves
opposed to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession (that is, 62% of the sample), would
nevertheless be in favour of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership to the <strong>EU</strong> in the
future if it meets all the criteria (legal, economic and political) as
defined by the European Council. The same goes for 25% of
leaders surveyed who expressed their opposition in 2008. We
observe here again that time plays an important role in the
perception of <strong>Turkey</strong>'s application. Among the reasons for
opposition to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong>: <strong>Turkey</strong> is not
considered to be a European country either geographically or
culturally for 48% of citizens and 74% of the leaders interviewed.
Political and legal arguments prevail for the general public -
<strong>Turkey</strong> will never be a truly secular country (19%) or a true
democracy (14%) – while the elite place emphasis on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
over-preponderance in the <strong>EU</strong> owing to its population (13%).
French popular perception of <strong>Turkey</strong> also throws light on
the respective places of these arguments in the national
imagination. For the majority of respondents, <strong>Turkey</strong> is a country
with a rich history (84% of citizens and 100% of leaders). It is also
perceived as a young country, culturally vibrant, turned towards
the future and economically dynamic. Nearly half of the people
and one third of the elite polled believe ultimately that <strong>Turkey</strong> can
make an important contribution to Europe. But <strong>Turkey</strong> is
considered by only a minority of respondents to be democratic
(38% of residents and 32% of leaders), secular (37% and 55%) and
respectful of human rights (27% and 10% of positive opinions). In
conclusion, other findings show that the French public has limited
knowledge of <strong>Turkey</strong> as a country, its history, culture, political
21

system and economic and social realities. A “Turkish Season”
launched in France between July 2009 and March 2010 should
encourage citizens to gain more insight into this country.
In 2009, French perceptions of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> candidacy
seem to be evolving more positively. After President Obama’s
statement in favour of <strong>Turkey</strong>'s accession to the <strong>EU</strong> at the <strong>EU</strong>-
United States summit in Prague in April 2009, 50% of French
citizens interviewed said that they were against and 35% in favour.
Supporters of the Centre-Right Democratic Movement expressed a
majority of negative opinions to Turkish accession (71%),
followed by right-wing (67%) and left-wing supporters (41%).
Among the French respondents in favour of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession,
49% are left-wing supporters, 21% are MoDem sympathizers and
19% from the right. These results reflect an increase in the French
support of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong> in comparison to previous
opinion polls. In June 2005, a survey on the same topic obtained
results of 66% against, 28% in favour and 6% no opinion.
Finally, the French viewpoint on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to
the <strong>EU</strong> can also be explained by additional factors not regularly
gauged by opinion surveys. The role of secularism in French
society is certainly a factor to take into consideration and in
particular the impact of public debates raised in the past about the
wearing of Islamic headscarves in public. In 2004, a law adopted
according to the recommendations of the “Stasi commission”
banned religious symbols in French state schools. Such debates are
likely to have an influence on French public opinion towards
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s application, which is seen as a Muslim country where
issues of secularism and religion in the public domain are regularly
22

discussed. France’s perception of the Islamic religion, due to its
colonial past (especially in North Africa), plus the importance
given to the “devoir de mémoire” (duty of remembrance), which
led France to officially recognize the Armenian genocide in 2001,
are also significant factors which may explain French views on
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong>.
A (Strong) Divide Between Political Parties and Leaders
In the political field, French perceptions of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
accession to the <strong>EU</strong> have created a split within French political
parties and leaders since the early 2000s. <strong>Turkey</strong>’s application for
full membership to the <strong>EU</strong> has gone beyond national political
divisions, resulting in opposition from both right and left. The
table below shows the - positive or negative - stances of the main
French political parties, and of their leaders, towards <strong>Turkey</strong>'s
accession to the <strong>EU</strong>.
Nationalist parties
In favour Against
National Front Jean-Marie Le Pen
Conservative parties
Union for a Popular
Movement (UMP)
Movement for France
(MPF)
Hunt, Fish, Nature,
Traditions (CPNT)
Jacques Chirac, Pierre
Lellouche
23
Nicolas Sarkozy, Alain
Juppé, Jean-Pierre
Raffarin, Jean-François
Copé
Philippe de Villiers
Frédéric Nihous

Arise the Republic Nicolas Dupont-Aignan
Centrist parties
Democratic Movement
(MoDem - formerly
Union for French
Democracy)
24
François Bayrou,
Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing, Jean-Louis
Bourlanges
New Center (NC) Hervé Morin
Green parties
The Greens Dominique Voynet,
Daniel Cohn-Bendit
Parliamentary left
parties
Socialist Party (PS) Michel Rocard, Pierre
Moscovici, Dominique
Strauss-Kahn,
Ségolène Royal,
Martine Aubry
French Communist Party Marie-Georges Buffet
Far-left parties
Revolutionary
Communist League, New
Anticapitalist Party
(NPA)
Olivier Besancenot
Workers’ Struggle (LO) Arlette Laguiller
Laurent Fabius, Hubert
Védrine, Robert
Badinter, Max Gallo
Nationalist, right-wing and centrist parties are mostly
against <strong>Turkey</strong>'s accession to the <strong>EU</strong>, while the far-left and leftwing
parties seem to be more divided. The Greens and the French
Communist Party support <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong> within the
framework of the conditions set up by the Copenhagen criteria.
The geographical, cultural and religious arguments are more
favoured by the right-wing parties while the political conditionality

(respect for human rights and minorities) - and the Armenian issue
for the Socialist Party - are underlined by the left-wing parties.
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was one of the first French political
leaders to reject <strong>Turkey</strong>'s accession to the <strong>EU</strong> on geographical
grounds. In November 2002, in an interview published by Le
Monde that provoked a vigorous public debate in France about
<strong>Turkey</strong>, he stated : “<strong>Turkey</strong> is a country with close ties to Europe,
an important country with a real elite, but it is not a European
country. (...) Its capital is not within Europe, 95% of its population
is outside of Europe: this is not a European country”. The cultural
and religious arguments, which focus on the threat of a “conflict of
civilizations” between Islamic and Western cultures and values,
were also often cited by many right-wing and centrist political
leaders, such as François Bayrou, chairman of the Democratic
Movement, or Jean-Pierre Raffarin, former Prime Minister in
2002-2005.
Beyond the divide between left and right sides, the issue
of <strong>Turkey</strong>'s accession to the <strong>EU</strong> has also created divisions within
French leading political parties and the government. Within the
Gaullist movement, former President Jacques Chirac has supported
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s "European vocation" for years. He played an important
role in supporting <strong>Turkey</strong>’s application on the European scene, in
particular in the decision of the Helsinki European Council in
December 1999 to grant the status of candidate country to <strong>Turkey</strong>.
However, in October 2004, President Chirac stated that he wished
to submit any further <strong>EU</strong> enlargement to a compulsory
referendum, so hoping to dissociate the Turkish issue and the
debate on the European Constitution. In this way, the French
would be consulted by referendum on <strong>Turkey</strong>'s accession to the
25

<strong>EU</strong>. The issue of a compulsory referendum about <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
accession to the <strong>EU</strong> was raised again in summer 2008 on the
occasion of the debate about the revision of the French
Constitution. While the abolition of a compulsory referendum for
the ratification of any new accession to the <strong>EU</strong> was considered,
MPs voted for a provision rendering a referendum compulsory for
<strong>EU</strong> accession of countries whose population represents more than
5% of the total <strong>EU</strong> population, which is true in <strong>Turkey</strong>’s case. In
the end, the French Senate decided to cancel the provision.
In the years 2002-2007, President Chirac’s support for
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s application to the <strong>EU</strong> appears to have been at odds with
the presidential party stand (UMP) and the parliamentary majority.
During the campaign for European Parliament elections, <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
application was used as a major campaign argument by some
political parties. In April 2004, the UMP and its then chairman
Alain Juppé distanced itself from Jacques Chirac and stated its
opposition to <strong>Turkey</strong>'s accession to the <strong>EU</strong>. The presidential party
formulated a "privileged partnership" with <strong>Turkey</strong> as an alternative
to full membership. This kind of partnership has been promoted in
Europe, especially in French and German public debates in recent
years. It aims to maintain the cohesion of the <strong>EU</strong> while ensuring
the stability of its borders.
The election of Nicolas Sarkozy as French President on 6
May 2007, inaugurated a turning point in France's official position
on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership to the <strong>EU</strong>. Throughout the presidential
campaign, particularly during the debate between the two
candidates Ségolène Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy, the latter
reasserted his opposition to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession in the event of his
26

election. Quoting geographical arguments - "<strong>Turkey</strong> is Asia
Minor" - he proposed an alternative in the form of a Union for the
Mediterranean, which was officially launched in Paris in July 2008
with the participation of Turkish Prime Minister Recep T.
Erdogan. In reaction to the support given by U.S. President Barack
Obama to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong> at the <strong>EU</strong>-United States
Summit in Prague in April 2009, President Sarkozy reiterated his
opposition to this prospect.
Beyond the left-right division, positions on <strong>Turkey</strong> differ
along with the visions of the future of the <strong>EU</strong>. Indeed, <strong>Turkey</strong>'s
candidacy goes beyond the partisan opposition to bring together,
on both sides, those who defend the idea of a European power. The
latter, Laurent Fabius and François Bayrou among them, oppose
the entry of <strong>Turkey</strong> into the <strong>EU</strong> on the pretext that it would
severely threaten the political construction of Europe. On the other
hand, <strong>Turkey</strong>'s application is championed by both the right and the
left for geopolitical reasons. In this way, Pierre Lellouche, one of
the few representatives of the UMP to support <strong>Turkey</strong>'s accession
to the <strong>EU</strong> who was appointed as Secretary of State for European
Affairs in June 2009, and Dominique Strauss-Kahn for the PS
concur in their analysis of the geopolitical significance of <strong>Turkey</strong>
in Europe. <strong>Turkey</strong>'s candidacy also raises objections within the
current French government. President Sarkozy’s opinions are not
shared by a number of ministers, such as the minister of Foreign
Affairs, the socialist Bernard Kouchner, and the Secretary of State
for European Affairs from 2007 to December 2008, Jean-Pierre
Jouyet, who have both reiterated their support for <strong>Turkey</strong>'s
accession to the <strong>EU</strong>.
27

If nowadays right-wing and centrist parties are mostly
opposed to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership of the <strong>EU</strong>, the Socialist Party
seems to be more divided on the issue. In recent years, the PS has
provided a measured support to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession in the long run,
and its status of candidate country was recognised by the European
Council in 1999 when Lionel Jospin was Prime Minister.
However, the Turkish issue raises significant opposition within the
party. Some of its members, such as Laurent Fabius, Hubert
Védrine or Robert Badinter, are openly opposed to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
accession for a variety of reasons. Others are more supportive of
the prospect, such as Dominique Strauss-Kahn, currently director
of the IMF, or Pierre Moscovici, former minister of European
affairs and PS national secretary for international relations, who is
in favour of a "reasoned yes" to <strong>Turkey</strong>'s accession if it meets the
Copenhagen criteria. Out of all the French Socialist leaders,
Michel Rocard, former Prime Minister, has shown the most
support for the Turkish candidacy in recent years. He participated
in an Independent Commission on <strong>Turkey</strong>, which in September
2004 issued a report supporting the opening of accession
negotiations with the <strong>EU</strong> if <strong>Turkey</strong> fulfilled the Copenhagen
political criteria. Similarly, Rocard has engaged in public debate
on numerous occasions for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong>,
defending his views in the book Yes to <strong>Turkey</strong>, published in
September 2008. Ségolène Royal has long declared that the issue
of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership should be left to the French people to
decide. During the 2007 presidential campaign, she then claimed
that she was in favour of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession on principle but that
the <strong>EU</strong> needed to put the procedure on hold. Finally, several
leading politicians from both left and right who previously
supported <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership, have also changed their minds
28

about <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the UE, including Alain Juppé, former
Prime Minister, Michel Barnier, former Minister of Foreign
Affairs and more recently Bernard Kouchner.
In Spring 2009, the Turkish issue came back strongly into
the French political arena on the occasion of the campaign for the
European elections. President Sarkozy played a major role in
making <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong> a major issue in the
European elections. He stated his opposition to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession
to the <strong>EU</strong>, both in a speech at a UMP meeting in Nîmes in May
and during a joint declaration with the chancellor of Germany,
Angela Merkel, in Berlin on 10 May 2009. Sarkozy’s stance
provoked a number of reactions within the <strong>EU</strong>, in particular from
European countries whose governments support <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
membership to the <strong>EU</strong>, such as Poland, Portugal or Sweden.
As regards the French media, in particular radio and
television, one may say that they do not have a specific stand
concerning <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong>. In recent years, the
national press has mostly broadcasted the positions held by the
opinion leaders, such as the academics or the politicians, especially
in specific sections such as “Opinions” (in Le Monde or Le Figaro)
or “Rebonds” (Libération). For instance, Le Monde played an
important role in launching a public debate in France when it
headlined on the front page the interview with Giscard d’Estaing in
November 2002, which was then followed with many reactions in
the same sections.
29

Conclusion
In conclusion, French perceptions of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession
to the <strong>EU</strong> have shown a stable and majority opposition, both in the
public and the elites, for the last years. However, some recent
opinion polls may give a more optimistic view of French
perceptions, when more citizens answer that they agree with
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership to the <strong>EU</strong> in the future if it fulfills the
required criteria. In parallel, French perceptions have revealed the
great divide among <strong>EU</strong> countries in the face of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession
to the <strong>EU</strong>. Sarkozy’s stance during the campaign for the European
elections in 2009 has not been followed by many national
governments within the <strong>EU</strong>. In this prospect, the evolution of
French perceptions in the coming years will also be linked to the
place and influence of France within Europe.
30

Katrin Böttger, Eva-Maria Maggi *
German <strong>Perceptions</strong>
Introduction
When analyzing the German perception of Turkish
candidacy for <strong>EU</strong>-membership, diverging positions can be
observed in the media, in the government and opposition parties as
well as in civil society. These diverging arguments mostly follow
the lines of three subjects with opposing positions that are
advanced to different degrees by the actors. The first subject is the
question of identity. Here, the two extremes are the following: On
the one side stands the argument that the relationship between a
Christian European Union and a Muslim <strong>Turkey</strong> is that of a Clash
of Civilizations, while on the other side, humanitarian thinking is
the reference point and being advocated at the same time. The
second subject by which the perception of Turkish <strong>EU</strong>membership
is pervaded concerns institutional (in)stability. Here,
arguments concern either the <strong>EU</strong>’s outdated internal structure or
the Turkish political system. While some argue that <strong>Turkey</strong> is not
ready for accession, other actors stress the fact that <strong>Turkey</strong> will not
enter the <strong>EU</strong> before it is ready and fulfils the necessary criteria
*
Dr. des. Katrin Böttger is Research Associate at the Institut für Europäische
Politik, Berlin; Eva-Maria Maggi is Ph.D candidate at the Helmut-Schmidt
University Hamburg. The article results form the IEP-Programme „Dialogue
Europe of the Otto Wolff-Foundation“.
*The opinions expressed herein are only those of the author and do not reflect
any institutional views.
32

anyway. A third line of argumentation deals with strategic
geopolitics and security. Here, one side argues that a Turkish <strong>EU</strong>membership
would bring the conflicts of Iraq, Iran and
Afghanistan closer – too close – to the <strong>EU</strong>, while the other side
sees <strong>Turkey</strong> as a buffer or even a bridge between Europe and the
Arab world.
It has to be noted however, that not all actors promoting
or opposing Turkish <strong>EU</strong> membership make use of all the
arguments systematized above.
By the Media
Some parts of the German media have been constantly
engaged with the Turkish <strong>EU</strong> accession process during the last
years. The nature of this engagement has changed recently,
whereas the main attitude towards <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession stays
divided. Other print media, TV and radio stations remain notably
quiet. Instead, the integration of Turkish immigrants in Germany is
a steady topic.
Along the lines of their political (party) orientation,
German newspapers are divided into a group of accession
supporters on the one side and critics on the other. The mostly
conservative newspapers Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)
and Die Welt have analyzed the accession process quite sceptically
and would rather prefer an alternative affiliation of <strong>Turkey</strong>, such as
the privileged partnership proposed by the Christian Democratic
Party (CDU) in 2004. Their arguments emphasize the differences
between <strong>Turkey</strong> and the European Union drawing upon cultural
33

heritages, identities and history. 1 In contrast to this, the more
liberal/left-leaning newspapers like the Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ)
and the Frankfurter Rundschau have generally assessed <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
ambitions to join the <strong>EU</strong> positively, dependent on the speed of the
reform-process initiated by the Turkish government to fulfil the
accession criteria. Other newspapers, like the left-leaning
Tageszeitung or the tabloid Bild do not present the issue as a
central topic.
Rather, domestic questions like the integration of Turkish
immigrants in Germany are emphasized.
Interestingly, the argumentative nature of the main
newspapers has moved away from a concentration on the domestic
political situation in <strong>Turkey</strong> towards a closer look at the future and
identity of the <strong>EU</strong> project itself. Especially during the last year,
Turkish <strong>EU</strong> membership aspirations and <strong>EU</strong> internal processes like
the establishing of the new Lisbon Treaty were combined in
commentaries. 2 Using the accession negotiations with <strong>Turkey</strong> as an
example, commentators argue pro and con over an effective <strong>EU</strong>
enlargement policy that has to be linked to the debate on European
identity. Even though the main protagonists, the FAZ and the SZ,
keep their basic opinions to the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>, their
1
Wimmel, A. (2006) ‘Beyond the Bosphorus? Comparing German, French and
British Discourses on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s Application to Join the European Union’, Reihe
Politikwissenschaft/Political Science Series, No. 111,
http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_111.pdf, see also Welt am Sonntag
(2008) ‘<strong>EU</strong>-Beitritt der Türkei: Entspannt euch!’, 25 May 2008, p. 31; Peter
Graf Kielmansegg (2009) ‘Europa braucht Grenzen’, in: FAZ, 27 May 2009, p.
7.
2
Peter Graf Kielmansegg (2009) ‘Europa braucht Grenzen’, in: FAZ, 27 May
2009, p. 7.; SZ (2009) ‘Insel gegen Kontinent’ 30 July 2009, p. 4; Welt am
Sonntag (2008) ‘<strong>EU</strong>-Beitritt der Türkei: Entspannt euch!’, 25 May 2008, p. 31.
34

argumentations are linked to internal affairs of the <strong>EU</strong> rather than
treating both issues separately. The FAZ, for example, commented
on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s disagreement with Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO
general secretary, as an example of a “conflict of civilizations”
which could be enhanced with <strong>Turkey</strong> as a member of the <strong>EU</strong>
system, where “blackmailing often works” and identity plays an
important role in daily political life. 3 Also, the SZ claims that the
problematic signing procedure of the Lisbon Treaty shows the
need to combine the future of enlargement policy with the debate
on European identity. The will of the accession candidates to
contribute to the European Integration process should be an
accession criterion for future enlargements and for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
accession. 4
Taking into consideration all types of media, the debate
mainly remained an issue within the print media. In general,
reports of other media, like TV stations, concentrate on negative
connotations of Islam. 5 The picture drawn emphasizes cultural
differences and the reports concentrated on rather negative
examples of social integration. 6
German media perceive <strong>Turkey</strong>’s ambitions to join the
<strong>EU</strong> differentiated. While the conservative press advocates a
sceptical approach, the liberal orientated newspapers are rather
supportive. Accompanied by the mostly negative reporting on
Islam within the broader media, it can be said that in general the
3
FAZ (2009) ‘Schöne Partner’, 5 April 2009, p. 14.
4
SZ (2009) ‘Insel gegen Kontinent’ 30 July 2009, p. 4.
5
Kai Hafez/Carola Richter (2007) ‘Das Islambild von ARD und ZDF’, in: ApuZ
26-27/2007, pp. 40-46.
6
Gürsel Gür (2005) ‘Das Türkeibild der deutschen Presse’, in: Bürger im Staat
3/2005, pp. 122-129.
35

German media shows little optimism concerning a successful <strong>EU</strong>
accession of <strong>Turkey</strong>.
By the Government and the Opposition
Since there has been a general election in Germany on 27
September 2009 and it is foreseeable that a new government will
be formed shortly, the following section will firstly deal with the
positions of the government of 2005-2009 and the opinions of the
two parties therein. Secondly, the individual positions of the three
smaller parties in parliament (Bundestag) – in opposition between
2005 and 2009 – will be outlined. In a third step, the opinions
voiced during the coalition negotiations in the Fall of 2009 will be
mentioned.
The government of chancellor Angela Merkel comprises
the two largest parties in Germany, namely the conservative
Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and the Social Democratic
Party (SPD).
These two governing parties hold diverging positions in
the grand coalition concerning Turkish candidacy for <strong>EU</strong>membership.
While the CDU wants a privileged partnership, the
SPD advocates <strong>EU</strong>-membership. The CDU argues along the lines
of <strong>EU</strong>-internal and identity reasons, whereas the SPD is of the
opinion that membership can stabilize Turkish democracy and thus
refute the argument that we are heading for a Clash of
Civilizations.
36

The Coalition contract 7 of 2005 foresees that if the <strong>EU</strong> is
not able to absorb another member or if <strong>Turkey</strong> is not able to fulfil
all criteria related to membership, then <strong>Turkey</strong> has to be bound to
Europe as closely as possible and in a way that allows for its
privileged relations to develop. The contract thus comprises both
of the institutional arguments, namely the question of the <strong>EU</strong>’s
internal structures as well as that of the Turkish political system. It
does not give an opinion, however on what should happen if both
prerequisites are met, but only maps out further steps for a
situation in which one or the other – or both – conditions are not
fulfilled.
Concerning the election campaign for the European
Parliament, further enlargements of the <strong>EU</strong> were not an important
subject. There was, however, a mentioning of the subject in the
manifestoes.
In their manifesto 8 for the elections of the European
Parliament, the conservatives (CDU) based their advocating a
privileged partnership on a more general support of a consolidation
phase and a slowing down of all enlargement processes, since they
give priority to the stabilizing of the European identity and the
<strong>EU</strong>’s institutions. Already in 2000, in its updated programme, 9 the
CDU stressed the fact that the question of where the borders of
Europe lie should be answered before it reaches the borders of Iraq
and Iran. It is thus using an argument of fear of the conflicts of the
7
CDU/CSU/SPD (2005) ‘Gemeinsam für Deutschland. Mit Mut und
Menschlichkeit’, 11 November 2005, Berlin.
8
CDU (2009) ‘Starkes Europa – Sichere Zukunft’, 16 March 2009, Berlin.
9
CDU-Bundesvorstand (2000) ‘Programmatische Offensive für Deutschland.
Norderstedter Erklärung’, 7/8 January 2000, Norderstedt.
37

Arab world rather than seeing future membership as a bridge or a
buffer between Europe and countries like Iraq or Iran. In its
electoral programme for post-2009, 10 the CDU stresses the fact
that <strong>Turkey</strong> does not fulfil the prerequisites for <strong>EU</strong>-membership,
such as equal rights, the protection of minorities or freedom of
religion. For that reason they support a privileged partnership
instead of <strong>EU</strong>-membership for <strong>Turkey</strong>.
In addition, the CDU’s Bavarian partner CSU supports
referenda to decide on new <strong>EU</strong>-members. 11 The same opinion has
been voiced by Chancellor Merkel. At a meeting of young
conservatives in May 2009, she stressed the fact that there is no
sense in repeated enlargements if these make it impossible to
handle the <strong>EU</strong>. 12 She thus pointed once more to the inadequate
<strong>EU</strong>-internal structure for further enlargements. Her statements are
backed by another large member of the <strong>EU</strong>, namely France, which
also opposes a Turkish <strong>EU</strong>-membership. The German-Turkish
Forum, a small organisation within the CDU with 400 members
that aims at bringing People of Turkish descent and the CDU
closer together, advocates Turkish <strong>EU</strong>-membership. 13 It especially
opposes arguments aiming for differing and incompatible values.
They see only a minority of CDU members following this
argument, while a majority refers to the country’s size and the
<strong>EU</strong>’s limited absorption capacity. The German-Turkish Forum
10
CDU/CSU (2009) ‘Wir haben die Kraft. Gemeinsam für unser Land.
Regierungsprogramm 2009-2013’, 28. June 2009, Berlin.
11
CSU (2009) ‘Wahlaufruf der Christlich-Sozialen Union zur Bundestagswahl
2009. Was unser Land jetzt braucht: Eine starke CSU in Berlin’, 17/18 June
2009, Nuremberg.
12
Cf. ‘<strong>Turkey</strong> shocked by Franco-German Rhetoric’, in: EurActiv.com, 11 May
2009.
13
Cf. Deutsch-Türkisches Forum der CDU, http://www.dtf-online.de.
38

argues in particular that if these two cultures were incompatible
that an integration of people of Turkish descent into German
society would make any efforts for integrating these into German
society useless. Its goals are being counter-acted by discussions
such as the one following a controversial speech by the Turkish
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Cologne in February
2008 to the Turkish community in Germany, dealing with their
assimilation. In the wake of this speech, the CSU called for
suspending accession negotiations with <strong>Turkey</strong>. 14 What would a
so-called privileged partnership actually look like? A policy paper
of the CSU affiliated Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung that was authored by
the now Minister of Economics, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg maps
out possible alternatives to a full-fledged membership. 15 The
policy paper is based on the assumption that Turkish membership
would overwhelm the European Union and that alternatives have
to be found. It especially stresses the point that not all four
freedoms can be opened to <strong>Turkey</strong>. While it sees no problems in a
deep economic cooperation, restrictions to free movement of
persons and free movement of services, as well as a monetary
union and large-scale financial support in the form of direct
payments to the agricultural sector or in Structural and Cohesion
Policy are foreseen.
14
FAZ (2008) ‘Söder fordert einfrieren der Beitrittsverhandlungen’, 15 February
2008; see also Barbara Lippert (2008) ‘Wait-and-See. Attitudes of German
Stakeholders Towards <strong>EU</strong>-<strong>Turkey</strong>’, in: Nathalie Tocci (ed.) ‘Talking <strong>Turkey</strong> in
Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication Strategy’, Rome, pp. 135-
160, here p. 145.
15
Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (2004) ‘Die Beziehungen zwischen der Türkei
und der <strong>EU</strong> – eine „Privilegierte Partnerschaft“’, Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung:
Aktuelle Analysen 33.
39

The Social Democrats, on the other hand, support Turkish
<strong>EU</strong>-membership if <strong>Turkey</strong> fulfils all the necessary criteria. They
stress the fact that a <strong>Turkey</strong> which is committed to European
values can build a bridge to other Muslim countries, an asset which
lies in the interest of Germany and Europe. In March 2009, the
German foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, stressed the
fact that it is enlargement that is being negotiated with <strong>Turkey</strong> and
nothing else. 16 Concerning referenda, he underlined that those do
not exist in Germany on a national level. He thinks it is thus not
politically correct to hold a referendum on this subject or any
other. He said that it is a question of credibility to fulfil existing
obligations concerning Turkish and Balkan membership
perspectives. He does not deny the fact, however, that internal
reforms are necessary to proceed.
Between the two largest parties, a different approach on
causes and effects in these fields can be observed. While the CDU
stresses the causes and assumes that the lack of internal and
external reforms is the cause for alternative measures other than
enlargement, the SPD stresses the effect, namely membership as
being able to result in stability and peace in the region.
Of the opposition by the three smaller parties, the Green
Party supports serious accession negotiations with <strong>Turkey</strong> to
support the countries democratic and economic transformation. It
assumes that Turkish <strong>EU</strong>-<strong>Member</strong>ship is in the <strong>EU</strong>’s own interest,
since it can be a stabilizing anchor in the region. 17
16
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, interview with Hürriyet, 21 March 2009.
17
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (2009) ‘Volles Programm mit WUMS! Für ein
besseres Europa’, 23-25 January 2009, Dortmund, p. 150.
40

The liberal Federal Democrats (FDP) see the Lisbon
treaty, or an equivalent, as a prerequisite for further enlargement.
Cautiously, they stress the point that Turkish accession is not on
the agenda in the next five years anyway. 18 They see the key for
accession in the implementation of reforms and the absorption
capacity of the <strong>EU</strong>. Party leader Guido Westerwelle said in an
interview in May 2009 that <strong>Turkey</strong> has a right to expect Europe
not to deny <strong>EU</strong>-membership categorically. As has been agreed, a
possible accession has to be considered unprejudiced. He considers
calling off the process as demanded by the CSU would be the “end
of a prudent foreign policy” 19 . However, he does not think an
accession is possible on a short timescale. His main focus is on
reforms in <strong>Turkey</strong>: The country has to show that it is on the right
path in terms of rule of law, society, democracy and economy.
In its party documents, The Left (Die Linke) does not
deal with enlargement in general or <strong>Turkey</strong> in particular. 20 Yet, in
February 2008, their deputy party leader Katina Schubert stressed
the fact that <strong>Turkey</strong> belongs in the <strong>EU</strong> if it fulfils the Copenhagen
criteria. 21
For the coalition consultations between the CDU, CSU
and FDP following the elections on 27 September 2009, the
18
FDP (2009) ‘Ein Europa der Freiheit in der Welt des 21. Jahrhunderts.
Programm der Freien Demokratischen Partei für die Wahl zum VII.
Europäischen Parlament 2009’, 17 January 2009, Berlin, p. 4.
19
Guido Westerwelle, interview with Der Spiegel, 4 May 2009.
20
Die Linke (2009) ‘Solidarität, Demokratie, Frieden – Gemeinsam für den
Wechsel in Europa! Europawahlprogramm 2009 der Partei DIE LINKE’, 28
February 2009, Essen; idem (2009) ‘Konsequent sozial. Für Demokratie und
Frieden. Bundestagswahlprogramm 2009’, 20/21 June 2009, Berlin.
21
Katina Schubert (2008) ‘Europäisierung ist Perspektive gegen Nationalismus’,
press release, 13 February 2008.
41

question of Turkish <strong>EU</strong> accession is a conflictive, albeit not a
central, subject. While the spirit within the FDP leans towards
agreeing with Turkish <strong>EU</strong>-membership, the CDU continues to
advocate a privileged partnership. 22 It will be interesting to see
whether the FDP will change its opinion, converging towards the
CDU’s and CSU’s point of view. The subject led to a conflict
between CSU’s Horst Seehofer, who wants to include a “No”
concerning Turkish <strong>EU</strong>-membership in the coalition contract, and
FDP party leader Guido Westerwelle who opposes this idea on the
basis that the subject will not become relevant during the new
government’s four-year term in office. 23 Since the foreign ministry
combined with the position of deputy chancellor traditionally goes
to the coalition partner and this is expected to be filled by party
leader Guido Westerwelle, this conflict of opinions might continue
to be relevant in the future.
Civil society – Christian churches and Turkish communities
Speaking about the perception of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession
aspirations by German civil society, two groups, the Christian
churches and the Turkish communities in Germany, are of special
interest. Both groups are notably sensitive to the topic, their
positions controversial and their perspectives different.
Two thirds of the German population is affiliated to a
Christian church, even though their membership rates have been
22
Oliver Grimm (2009) ‘Rückkehr der liberalen Pro-Europäer’, in: Die Presse,
28 September 2009.
23
Spiegel Online: ‘Seehofer und Westerwelle verkrachen sich wegen Türkei’,
13 October 2009.
42

constantly declining during the last years. The Catholic and the
Protestant churches are skeptical about <strong>EU</strong>’s enlargement towards
<strong>Turkey</strong> wherein they concentrate on the domestic situation in
<strong>Turkey</strong>. Their main concerns are the freedom of religion, the nondiscrimination
against minorities and the respect of human rights
within the country. During the last years, the Protestant Church
declared the accession negotiations between the <strong>EU</strong> and <strong>Turkey</strong> an
open process with the accession as one possible outcome. 24
Referring to the unacceptable situation of the Christian minority in
<strong>Turkey</strong>, this position changed recently. 25 Alternatives to <strong>EU</strong>
membership, restricted to an intensified economic cooperation, are
now favored and a full-membership is not supported anymore.
Also, the Catholic Church pledges against full membership.
Emphasizing the cultural differences between Europe and <strong>Turkey</strong>,
the Catholic Church in Germany prefers the privileged partnership
proposed by the CDU. 26
Within the Turkish community, the broader perception of
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership aspirations is difficult to access. In Germany
there are several organizations which claim to represent the interest
of the 2.6 million German Turks, who are also divided along
political party lines. Comments on Turkish <strong>EU</strong>-membership from
these organizations are rare. Nevertheless, Cem Özdemir, the
24
Speech of Bishop Wolfgang Huber ‘Religionsfreiheit und Toleranz - Wie
aktuell ist der
Augsburger Religionsfriede?’, 22 September 2005,
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/050923_huber_religionsfriede .
html.
25
Wolfgang Huber, interview with Hamburger Abendblatt Online, 31 May
2009, http://www.abendblatt.de/politik/article1034762/Bischof-Huber-Die-
Tuerkei-gehoert-nicht-in-die-<strong>EU</strong>.html
26
Central Committee of German Catholics, presse release, 17. April 2005,
http://www.zdk.de/pressemeldungen/meldung.php?id=229.
43

German-Turk politician and chairman of the Green Party, sees a
generally positive attitude of the German-Turk population towards
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s ambitions to join the <strong>EU</strong>. 27 The Turkish Community in
Germany (Türkische Gemeinde Deutschlands – TGD) for
example, which represents more than 200 communities in
Germany, pledges for membership and emphasizes the practical
facilitation for the Turks living in Germany and Europe; for
example their right to vote locally. 28 Furthermore, <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
membership could converge the Muslim and Christian
communities within Europe and thus become a geo-political and
cultural bridge between Europe and the Middle East.
Summing up, within the German Christian churches, a
critical attitude towards Turkish membership is dominant. While
concentrating on the domestic situation in <strong>Turkey</strong>, they estimate
the cultural differences between <strong>Turkey</strong> and Europe as too
significant for a successful cooperation within the <strong>EU</strong>. The Turkish
community in Germany emphasizes <strong>Turkey</strong>’s capacity to bridge
cultural differences between the Christian and Muslim community
within and outside Europe. Looking at these two groups, German
civil society seems to be divided over the question of <strong>EU</strong>
membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>.
27
Cem Özdemir (2005) ‘Demokratie und Islam sind vereinbar’, in: Cafe Babel,
25 February 2005, http://www.cafebabel.com/fre/article/1103/demokratie-undislam-sind-vereinbar.html.
28
Turkish community in Germany, activity report 2006-2008,
http://www.tgd.de/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=842&theme=Printe
r.
44

Conclusion: A Mixed Picture
It can thus be concluded that German public opinion
towards Turkish candidacy for <strong>EU</strong>-membership is comprised of
diverging positions and arguments. The virulence of proponents
and/or opponents of Turkish <strong>EU</strong>-membership will depend on the
further development of the accession process but also of the
internal institutional development of the European Union.
45

Yvonne Nasshoven *
Belgian <strong>Perceptions</strong>
Abstract
Belgium has in the debate on the accession of <strong>Turkey</strong> to
the European Union always taken a positive stance. Still, debate
has remained limited as internal problems, mostly due to the
difficult situation between Flemish and Wallonians in the country,
have forced the state to put its emphasis on domestic politics. This
passivity has especially been reflected by the near absence of
debate in the media, which has only for short timeframes gained
importance.
However, throughout 2010 the Kingdom of Belgium is
going to become one of the key players of European politics, as the
country will hold the Presidency of the <strong>EU</strong>. Also its Prime
Minister, Hermann von Rompuy is at the moment one of the
frontrunners for the office of the first President of the European
Council. Under these circumstances, European and foreign policies
are going to figure more prominently in the political landscape,
including <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong>.
*
The opinions expressed herein are only those of the author and do not reflect
any institutional views.
46

Introduction
Belgium has been a founding member of the European
Communities and actively been involved in shaping European
politics since the beginning. Especially for the country’s position
as a small member country of the <strong>EU</strong>, European integration has
always meant an enhancement of its role in the world. Therefore
the country has taken a strong prointegrative view, calling for a
deepening of the European Union.
However, throughout the last years Belgium internal
federalism has suffered from separatist and regionalist movements,
mostly in the prosperous Dutch-speaking Flanders, but also in
French-speaking Wallonia. Those forces, with regard to Turkish
<strong>EU</strong> enlargement opposed to the general line of Belgium politics,
have taken a position against the possibility of a Turkish
membership in the European Union. Although the two main
separatist parties – Vlaams Belang in Flanders, and Front National
in Wallonia – are not involved in government and still provide
only for a small part of the Belgium Assembly, the underlying
problems between the two major regions have paralyzed the
country during the last two years to a large extent.
By the Media
Debate about Turkish membership is largely absent in the
Belgium press. Mostly, discussions are caused by incidents
happening within the country that have an effect on the perception
of <strong>Turkey</strong> by Belgians. Here, especially, two discussions deserve
to be mentioned: The election of a “grey wolf” at the municipal
47

elections in Brussels in October 2006, and the debate following a
statement of the Turkish ambassador to Belgium, Fuat Tanlay, in
2009.
The debate on the election of Murat Denizli, a grey wolf
who has been elected in the Brussels district of Schaarbeek, in this
sense is exemplary as it shows that the discussion on Turkish
membership in Belgium is largely stimulated by events happening
on the ground with regard to the Belgian Turkish community.
Here, especially, the fear of a possible communitarization of
Turkish problems in Belgium has been discussed, linked with a
debate on the overall problem of Turkish ultranationalist parties.
A second incident has been caused lately by the statement
of the Turkish ambassador to Belgium, Fuat Tanlay. In the context
of a court case concerning the Revolutionary People’s Liberation
Front (Devrimci Sol) in summer 2009, the ambassador was quoted
in Hürriyet saying that terrorism one day was going to haunt
Belgium and that then would be understood what the word
« terrorism » means. 1 This, by many, has been understood as a
threat and has been heavily criticized.
In general, debates on Turkish <strong>EU</strong> membership have
rather been reproduced than stimulated by the Belgian media. This
is especially true for the regular perception of progress reports
published by the European Commission, and the debate on a
« privileged partnership », launched by Nicolas Sarkozy and
Angela Merkel in 2009. Belgian media thus can be characterized
as reactive, not proactive on the topic of Turkish accession. This
1
RTBF, L’ambassadeur turc souhaite du terrorisme en Belgique, 20 July 2009.
48

certainly is also due to the fact that Belgium, as seat of many key
European institutions and «capital of the European Union», is
closely watching to keep its own national identity distinct from the
momentum of the European institutions, and to separate those
areas of life distinctively. Still, surprisingly public discussion on
enlargement is less positive on Turkish enlargement than the
government’s view. This is also confirmed by the figures of
Eurobarometer, where only a close majority of 53% are in favour
of a further enlargement. 2
By the Government
Belgian foreign policy in the past years cannot be
discussed without referring to Belgium’s own political situation.
The overall fragmentation of the party system 3 , discontinuity in the
government and increased tensions between the Flemish and
Wallonian population have led to only limited discussion on
foreign policy matters in the government and beyond. Looking into
the situation more closely, since 2006, the Kingdom of Belgium
has seen four governments: Verhofstadt II, composed of a coalition
between four parties from 11 July 2003 to 21 December 2007,
2
Eurobarometer 71, L’opnion publique dans l’Union Européenne, Spring 2009,
p. 50.
3
Political parties in Belgium are organised along the lines of the Flemish and
Wallonian community, so that no overarching Belgian party exists. The main
parties involve the Christian democratic parties (Christian Democratic and
Flemish party and Centre Démocrate Humaniste), the socialist parties
(Socialistische Partij Anders and Parti Socialiste), the liberal parties (Flemish
Liberal Democrats and Mouvement Réformateur) and the green parties (Groen!
and Ecolo). Very important players are the Flemish and Wallonian nationalist
parties Vlaams Belang and Front National, Vlaams Belang gaining around 11%
in the general elections 2007.
49

Verhofstadt III, in place as an interim government from 21
December 2007 to 20 March 2008, the government Leterme from
20 March 2008 until 30 December 2008, and, starting from 30
December 2008 the government with Herman van Rompuy as
Prime Minister. The government formation which followed the
general elections on 10 June 2007 thereby has been the longest
period of establishing a new government in Belgian history. In
addition, in the past governments five parties have been sharing
power in order to form a majority, so that consensus has been
found only at the lowest common denominator. As a consequence,
domestic politics have dominated the government’s agenda.
Nevertheless, the Belgium government has during the
past years shown a favorable attitude towards the accession of
<strong>Turkey</strong> to the European Union. Especially Guy Verhofstadt,
Belgium Prime Minister from 1999 to 2008 has taken a positive
stance on the prospect of Turkish <strong>EU</strong> membership, a position he is
now also continuing to pronounce in the European Parliament as
leader of the group of the Liberals (ALDE), though voicing his
opinion more moderately.
The roots of this positive position are twofold: Internal
policies, especially Turkish population living in Belgium and
domestically informed objectives, especially security, on the one
hand; and the external policies of Belgium and its agenda as
member state of the European Union, on the other hand. Being a
small country, Belgium plays a specific role here; , as one diplomat
50

put it: “Inevitably, as a small country being against Turkish
membership will not change much.” 4
Furthermore, the reasons brought forward for Belgium’s
position diverge depending on the context in which the discussion
takes place, but in general three areas can be identified:
(1) Geopolitical reasons and the role of Europe in the
world: Here the possible function of <strong>Turkey</strong> as a bridge between
Europe and the Near East, even Central Asia, is emphasized.
<strong>Turkey</strong> is expected to be a factor of stability in a troubled region,
also given its membership in NATO since 1951 which was not put
into question by the Cold War, and a potential reorientation
towards Russia. 5 <strong>Turkey</strong> therefore proved to be a reliable partner in
the context of cooperation in international organizations, so that an
atmosphere of trust emerged which can be built upon.
(2) Security from a European perspective: The integration
of <strong>Turkey</strong> in the institutions and policies of the European Union is
seen by the Belgian government as the best way to achieve security
both with regard to militarist and fundamentalist forces in <strong>Turkey</strong>
on the one hand, and energy security for the European Union on
the other hand. Thus, a mixture of internal security and economic
matters is informing this realist position, founded on
instrumentalist and rational choice beliefs.
4
Pourqoi les Belges soutiennent la candidature de la Turquie, in Le Soir, 08
December 2004.
5
Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, Proposition de Résolution relative à
l’adhésion de la Turquie à l’Union européenne, texte adopté par la Commission
des relations extérieures, DOC 502121/004, 10 décembre 2002.
51

(3) Providing a tool for reform in <strong>Turkey</strong>: The Belgian
government also puts forward the need for reform in <strong>Turkey</strong>, for
which it sees enlargement as the main incentive. 6 Thereby,
especially the values of human rights, democracy and minority
rights are put forward. Still, the discourse on minorities features
less prominently than in other countries, given the Belgian
problématique of Flemish-Wallonian relations.
The offspring of the favorable position of the government
consequently results from a mixture of self-interested security
reasons, but also from the strong belief that cooperation and the
existence of joint values is essential for the well-being of the
respective Belgian and Turkish societies. As many people of
Turkish origin already live in the member countries of the
European Union, membership is seen as a natural next step. This
position has been more or less intensively pronounced during the
last governments; however, the Belgian government at the same
time has always been clear that there are clear conditions for
membership which have to be met: First, the Copenhagen criteria,
which have also guided the European Union’s enlargement to the
East, need to be strictly applied. This for Belgium means
especially the political criteria of the respect of the rule of law, of
human rights and of healthy civil-military relations. Comprised is
also the full transposition of the acquis communautaire, whereas
the need for reform on the economic system is only discussed at
the margins by the Belgian government. Secondly, <strong>Turkey</strong> needs to
6
Coalition agreement concluded between negotiators of the Christen
Demokraatisch und Vlaams CD&V, Movement Reformateur (MR), Parti
Socialiste PS, Vlaamse Liberalen and Democraten Open Vld und centre
democratie humaniste, 23/12/2007.
52

solve its difficulties with Cyprus and Greece. This, as Guy
Verhofstadt stated already in 2005, is crucial to the negotiations. 7
Belgium will, from 01 July 2010 onwards, take on the
Council Presidency of the European Union. Preparation is still in
its early stages, but some exchanges of opinion have already taken
place. In this context, the preparatory documents point in the same
direction: In line with the progress made in the accession criteria,
the negotiations with <strong>Turkey</strong> and FYROM shall proceed. Still,
with regard to Cyprus and the situation on human rights it is
remarked in the document that the steps forward have been rather
little. 8
Summing up, although Belgium has not been at the
forefront of lobbying for a Turkish membership among the
member countries of the European Union, it has continuously
supported the Turkish membership, but also demanded clear
standards. Belgium has, in addition, acknowledged the need for a
partnership approach with regard to <strong>Turkey</strong>, as stated by the then
Belgian Foreign Minister Karel de Gucht on 20 January 2009: “
[…] <strong>Turkey</strong> has not been well - or even equally - treated by the
<strong>EU</strong>. […] The time has come for the partnership between <strong>Turkey</strong>
and Europe to mature. It needs to become a permanent and
unbreakable bond. […]<strong>Turkey</strong> is Europe’s ally. As an integral part
of the European family, sharing the same values, it is Europe’s
bridge to the emerging powers in Asia and - let no one forget - the
7
Riccardi, Fernando, Les divergences sur l’adhésion de la Turquie se
radicalisent, dans bulletin Quotidien Europe n° 8861, 07.01.2005, p.3.
8
Sénat et Chambre des représentants de Belgique, Préparation de la présidence
belge de l'Union européenne en 2010 (1), Rapport fait au nom du comité d’avis
federal chargé des questions européennes par Mme Delvaux et M. De Croo,
Document législatif n° 4-986/1, 9 December 2008.
53

Middle East. Even more than that, <strong>Turkey</strong> is a bridge to the
Muslim world and it is the prime example that modernisation,
secularisation and democracy are not anathema to Islam. <strong>Turkey</strong> is,
in short, an essential ally in the most important struggles that the
world will face for years to come. So let Europe rise above its fears
and be as great and as generous as this great game demands.” 9
By the Opposition
Belgian opposition parties for the most part share the
government’s approach of a clear enlargement perspective for
<strong>Turkey</strong>, given that the criteria for membership are met by the
country. One example can here be given by the electoral
programme of the Green Flemish party Groen!, which in its
manifesto for the 2007 general elections wrote that as soon as
criteria for human and minority rights are fulfilled by <strong>Turkey</strong>,
accession negotiations may be advanced. The <strong>EU</strong> in this context
would offer to be an active supporter of Turkish reform. 10
However, opinion in Belgian politics on Turkish
accession is not homogeneous: Especially the Flemish and
Wallonian nationalist parties have taken a strong position against
the inclusion of <strong>Turkey</strong> in the European Union. Looking into a
policy proposal by the deputies Francis van den Eynde and
Alexandra Colen, the main reasons for this position are the belief
9
de Gucht, Karel, An unbreakable bond, in: Europe’s world, 20 January 2009;
available at
http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/CommunityPosts/tabid/80
9/PostID/152/Default.aspx (5 November 2009).
10
Groen!, De toekomst begint nu, Programma Groen! voor de federale
verkiezingen van 10 juni 2007, p. 113.
54

that <strong>Turkey</strong> has no cultural roots in Europe, the situation with
regard to Armenia, the Kurds and Cyprus, the geographical
position of <strong>Turkey</strong> with 97% of its territory on the Asian continent,
and general animosity between <strong>Turkey</strong> and the European continent
during 700 years. Vlaams Belang also refers to civil-military
relations and takes up the position that the European Union would
be acting as an agent of the geopolitical interests of the United
States of America by having <strong>Turkey</strong> accede to the <strong>EU</strong>. 11
It would underestimate the potential Vlaams Belang has
in the Flemish parts of the countries to put aside this position as
marginalized. In contrast, 11% of the people have in the previous
election voted for the Flemish nationalists, who have over the past
years continuously had good election results. Although Belgian
politics have so far had a consensus to not associate the nationalist
party in the federal government, Vlaams Belang continues to be
voted for by a significant number of people.
By the Civil Society
With regard to civil society it is, in the context of
Belgium, even more important to clearly distinguish between the
discussion of civil society taken place in Belgium as seat of the
European institutions, and the Belgian discussion on Turkish
adhesion.
11
Belgian House of Representatives, Proposition de Résolution relative à la
candidature de la Turquie à l’adhésion à l’Union Européenne, déposée par M.
Francis Van den Eynde et Mme Alexandra Colen, DOC 520286/001, 07
November 2007.
55

Looking at the actors closely associated to European
Union action in Belgium, the European Movement Belgium or the
Young European Federalists Belgium are active members of the
discussion. Also “single-issue NGO’s” like the Kurdish and
Armenian associations active in Belgium give input into the
debate.
Still, overall the civil society landscape in Belgium is
rather silent on the issue of the enlargement process of the
European Union; an observation which is true also for trade
unions.
The reason for this abstention is rather easy to explain:
The debate on issues related to the European Union in Belgium is
already covered by civil society organizations and think tanks
active in Brussels as seat of the European institutions. Belgian
citizens interested in the debates will therefore join those debates
or activities and not establish parallel structures to the workings of
transnational civil society organizations that have their
headquarters in the city of Brussels. Reasoning that the silence of
Belgian civil society organizations has to be understood as
disinterest would therefore neglect that in Belgium multiple layers
exist in public life, one being exclusively devoted to covering
European affairs. Here, of course, Belgian and European, yet
international opinions cannot be easily separated – the picture of
civil society opinion in Belgium on Turkish adhesion is thus
oscillating, depending on which actors are being looked at.
56

Conclusion
When Belgium is going to take the <strong>EU</strong> Presidency as of
01 July 2010, the situation in the European Union will have
drastically changed. With the Treaty of Lisbon a new legal
framework is going to be in place, which is aimed at making the
European Union more efficient and more democratic. Its
implementation and the fight of the social and economic
consequences of the financial crisis will be two of the major
challenges for the European Union in 2010. The difficulty and
magnitude of those two issues is likely to not put any decisions on
the enlargement of the <strong>EU</strong> too high on the agenda. However, the
change of the Treaty base which has been awaited since the
Eastern enlargement in 2004, and the hope of overcoming the
effects of the economic crisis may also act as catalyzer for
stimulating the debate on Turkish involvement in the <strong>EU</strong>.
With Belgium being the seat of many of the European
institutions, any debate taking place in the Commission, the
Parliament or the Council is because of the proximity of actors
likely to have repercussions on the main foci of the Presidency.
Should thus the accession of <strong>Turkey</strong> become a major item on the
agenda, Belgium is going to lobby in favor of it rather than
slowing down the process. Still, as is always the case with
Presidencies, many external factors will determine the shape of the
main fields of activities. It is thus always wise to plan for the
unexpected.
57

Emiliano Alessandri with Sebastiano Sali ∗
Italian <strong>Perceptions</strong>
Abstract
Italy is one of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s strongest supporters when it
comes to integration into the <strong>EU</strong>. Governments of both the Center
Left and the Center Right have consistently advocated <strong>EU</strong>
enlargement to <strong>Turkey</strong> on the grounds that it makes sense
commercially and would enhance Europe’s standing in the world
while making the <strong>EU</strong> a more diverse entity. Bipartisanship at the
political level does not reflect in the position of the general public,
though. Although less opposed than other European publics,
Italians remain skeptical about <strong>Turkey</strong>’s European prospects. A
stakeholder which is currently divided on the issue but might one
day turn against it is ‘Christian public opinion’. Identity politics in
Italy has a clear religious flavor and Islamophobia should not be
underestimated. A great obstacle to a healthy debate on the future
of European-Turkish relations is sheer lack of knowledge.
Information provided by Italian media is often incomplete or
distorted by simplifications and stereotypes.
∗
Emiliano Alessandri is Research Fellow at the Institute for International
Affairs (IAI), Rome. Sebastiano Sali is a MSc candidate at Aberystwyth,
International Politics Department.
The opinions expressed herein are only those of the author and do not reflect any
institutional views.
58

Introduction
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s European Union integration process has
traditionally enjoyed wide bipartisan support among Italian
political parties as well as among the most important industrial and
business groups. On the occasion of the last ‘Italian-Turkish
Forum’ held in Rome in November 2008, Italian Foreign Minister
Franco Frattini reaffirmed Italy’s convinced support to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
accession 1 . During his most recent visit to <strong>Turkey</strong>, Prime Minister
Silvio Berlusconi promised that the Italian government will work
“with the <strong>EU</strong>’s Czech and Swedish presidencies so that accession
chapters can pass from two to four each presidency, in order to
halve the accession process” 2 .
Widespread support, however, does not mean that sources
of resistance are lacking. As in other European countries, public
opinion tends to oppose <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> membership. 3 Moreover,
some stakeholders, including some of Italy’s main political parties,
resist the prospect of <strong>Turkey</strong> being fully integrated into the <strong>EU</strong>. A
stakeholder which is currently deeply split on the issue but might
one day turn against it is Italian Catholics, who sometimes have
1
‘Frattini appoggia la Turchia. ‘l’Italia al vostro fianco per l’adesione alla UE’’,
La Repubblica, 6 November, 2008, p. 26. For years, the Italian-Turkish Forum
(‘Forum di dialogo Italo-Turco’) has brought together members of the political,
economic, and intellectual elites of both countries to discuss issues of common
interest and concern.
2
F. Rizzi, ‘Berlusconi: ‘Russia provocata. E la Turchia subito in Europa’, Il
Messaggero, 13 November, 2008, p. 1.
3
Public support for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> membership decreased from 74% in 2004, to
49% in 2006 and 42% in 2007. See, E. Alessandri and E. Canan, ‘Mamma Li
Turchi!: Just an Old Italian Saying’, in N. Tocci ed. Talking <strong>Turkey</strong> in Europe:
Towards a Differentiated Communication Strategy, Quaderni IAI, December
2008,
http://www.iai.it/sections_en/pubblicazioni/iai_quaderni/Indici/quaderno_E_13.
htm
59

expressed concerns about admitting into the <strong>EU</strong> a predominantly
Muslim country.
Political Stakeholders
The Italian government has been among the earliest and
strongest advocates of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> membership. This support has
been seen by both centre-left and centre-right governments as
perfectly consistent with Italy’s more general foreign policy
interests. Since World War II, Italy has looked at Atlantic and
European integrations as highly positive and mutually reinforcing
trends. Allowing <strong>Turkey</strong> to join the <strong>EU</strong> has been viewed as almost
a natural development in consideration of Ankara’s critical
contribution to Western security.
In 2007, former foreign minister Massimo D’Alema well
summarized the main reasons for supporting <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong>
membership from the perspective of the Italian centre-left: 1 – the
common “Mediterranean identity” of Italy and <strong>Turkey</strong> and the
desirability of shifting the <strong>EU</strong> “centre of gravity” from central and
eastern to southern Europe; 2 – <strong>Turkey</strong> as a “hub” between the
Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, especially when it comes
to energy transportation; 3 – <strong>Turkey</strong> as a successful experiment in
combining Islam with secular and democratic institutions, and 4 –
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession as representing the crucial test for the <strong>EU</strong> to
decide upon whether “to define itself according to an ‘exclusive’
identity or as an open political project” 4 .
4
M. D’Alema, ‘L’Italia alleato critico della Turchia in Europa’, Il Sole 24 Ore,
13 June 2007, p.1.
60

The centre-right parties, currently in government, put the
emphasis on other factors: 1 – <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership as a
guarantee of Europe’s continued strategic partnership with the US
through NATO; 2 – <strong>Turkey</strong> as an attractive market for trade and
investment and a key economic partner for Italy (this business
perspective is particularly emphasized by prime minister Silvio
Berlusconi himself) 5 ; 3 – echoing other European conservative
parties (i.e., in the UK), <strong>Turkey</strong>’s entry as a way to “dilute” the
European political and social project and strengthen the prospect of
a “Europe of nations”. Moreover, similarly to the centre-left (but
perhaps with less emphasis), the centre-right seems to attribute
relevance to the argument that <strong>Turkey</strong> could provide a bridge
towards the Middle East and the Muslim world.
Among the political stakeholders that are sceptical about
full integration are Italy’s Communist parties, which underline the
difficult situation of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s ethnic minorities and the poor record
in the field of human rights. The Party of the Re-founded
Communists (PRC) has traditionally supported the political
aspirations and claims of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s Kurds. Last year, the PRC
website hosted a letter by Fayik YAGIZAY, representative of the
Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP), denouncing a police operation
against the DTP in 13 provinces of <strong>Turkey</strong> as a political action
aimed at threatening not only “the Kurdish pacific and democratic
struggle”, but also “democracy, human rights and freedom of
association” 6 . The PRC platform for the 2009 European Parliament
5
See E. Alessandri, Interview with Paolo Quercia, Director of the project: “Fare
Italia nel Mondo”, Fondazione FareFuturo, 8 May 2008.
6
‘Elezioni In Turchia. Una pericolosa operazione contro il DTP’, 14 April 2009,
Rinfondazione.it http://home.rifondazione.it/xisttest/content/view/5541/296/
(last accessed 11-09-2009)
61

elections urged “a political solution to the Kurdish question, asking
<strong>Turkey</strong> to stop the military repression and start a real process of
negotiations” 7 .
The Party of the Italian Communists (PDCI) argues that
<strong>EU</strong> negotiations with <strong>Turkey</strong> are informed by the vision of a
Europe of “markets and capital” as opposed to the ideal of a social
and political <strong>EU</strong> protecting the rights of its citizens and workers.
Moreover, the PDCI has warned against the possibility that, once
admitted, <strong>Turkey</strong> could act as a ‘US Trojan Horse’, preventing the
<strong>EU</strong> from developing a truly independent foreign policy. All these
reasons brought PDCI Foreign Relations spokesperson, Iacopo
Venier to conclude “We are against <strong>Turkey</strong> into the <strong>EU</strong>” 8 .
Yet, while critical, these parties are ready to admit that, if
accession negotiations were accompanied by a more serious
political discussion, they would consider changing their positions.
Indeed, the Communist parties underline that it would be
extremely important for Europe to accept its identity as a
multiethnic and multi-religious polity, a notion they fully subscribe
to. For now, the PRC and PDCI seem to support the notion of a
“privileged partnership” as an alternative to full membership, and
have followed with interest French President Nikolas Sarkozy’s
initiative envisioning a “Union for the Mediterranean” including
<strong>Turkey</strong>.
7
‘Programma Unitario per le Elezioni Europee’, Rifondazione.it, 9 April 2009,
http://home.rifondazione.it/xisttest/content/view/5478/481/. (last accessed 11-
09-2009)
8
I. Venier, ‘Turchia: Testa in Europa’, Iacopovenier.it, 8 June 2007
http://www.iacopovenier.it/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=articl
e&sid=391&pagenum=4&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0 (last accessed 11-
09-2009)
62

Resolutely against membership are the Northern League
(NL) and La Destra. Both oppose <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> membership
mainly on considerations of religion, identity, and ‘culture’. An
article recently published in the newspaper La Padania well
summarizes the NL’s position on <strong>Turkey</strong>: “Without downplaying
several specific reasons [to oppose <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> membership]
(poor human rights record, denial of Armenian genocide,
minorities rights violations, insufficient religion freedom, military
presence in Iraq, military occupation of Northern Cyprus), it has to
be made clear that geographically, but also culturally and socially,
<strong>Turkey</strong> is not a European country and therefore it must not be
admitted into a Union of European countries” 9 .
It is worth emphasizing that the NL is a key component of
the current government and has repeatedly threatened to resort to
referendum if <strong>Turkey</strong> was ever to successfully complete the
accession process. In the last European Parliament elections, the
NL has doubled its support (from 5% in 2004 to 10,2% in 2009),
with peaks of over 20% in the wealthiest regions of Italy’s North.
The words of La Destra leader, Francesco Storace, well
summarize the position of Italy’s far right on <strong>Turkey</strong>. <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong>
membership, he recently argued, would likely divert <strong>EU</strong> funds
away from the South of Italy towards the South of Europe “of
which <strong>Turkey</strong> is another piece”. Denying <strong>EU</strong> membership to
9
‘No all’ingresso della Turchia in Europa’, Giornale Elettorale Europee 2009,
May 2009, p. 2,
http://www.leganord.org/elezioni/2009/propaganda/Giornale_elettora_europee0
9.pdf.
63

<strong>Turkey</strong> is key “to safeguarding the Christian roots of Europe”: “we
refuse the multi-culture” 10 .
The picture is further complicated by the fact that recent
years seem to have registered a cooling off of sections of the
Italian political establishment which were previously in favour of
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> integration. Among the factors that could explain
such a trend, one may cite spreading Euroscepticism (which only
exacerbated after the outbreak of the last economic crisis) and the
growing tendency among Italian conservatives to interpret Italy’s
task in today’s globalising world as a “defence” of threatened
identities, starting with the religious and cultural ones 11 . Political
leaders of the centre-right have made recurrent references to the
centrality of Christian values in domestic and foreign policy.
This strong reaffirmation of Italy’s Christian identity has,
to date, led no parties to significantly alter their official position on
<strong>Turkey</strong> 12 . Within the People of Freedom (Italy’s newly constituted
Center-Right party), however, sceptics seem to be on the rise. 13
Within the Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e di Centro (Union of
Christian and Centrist Democrats), several are firmly opposed to
10
‘Ue: Turchia; Storace, rifiutiamo multiculturalità’, Storace.it, 5 May 2009,
http://www.storace.it/tag/turchia/ (last accssed 11-09-2009)
11
See M. Pera and J. Ratzinger, Senza Radici. Europa, relativismo,
cristianesimo, Islam, Milano, Mondatori, 2004. See also M. Veneziani, Contro i
barbari. La civilità e i suoi nemici, interni ed esterni, Milano, Frecce, editore
Mondadori, 2006.
12
E. Alessandri, Interview with Rocco Buttiglione,12 June 2008, Italian
philosopher and President of the Union of Christian Democrats.
13
E. Alessandri, Interview with Luca Volontè, former Head of the Union of
Christian Democrats group in the Chamber of Deputies, 3 April 2008; E.
Alessandri, Interview with Sandro Magister, Vaticanist from L’Espresso Group
6 May 2008; E. Alessandri, Interview with Andrea Tornielli, Vaticanist from Il
Giornale, 14 May 2008.
64

<strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership, often on considerations of religion and
identity.
Playing against the rise of a massive no-<strong>Turkey</strong>-in-the-
<strong>EU</strong> movement are several factors. First, Pope Benedict XVI’s
reversal on his previously expressed reservations 14 . Second, the
existence of strong economic interests in favour of closer <strong>Turkey</strong>-
<strong>EU</strong> relations, promoted especially by the centre-right leaders.
Third, the propensity among some Italian conservatives to consider
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s ruling party, AKP, as a possible Turkish equivalent of
their own parties. Rocco Buttiglione, the President of the Union of
Christian and Centrist Democrats and one of the leading <strong>Turkey</strong>sceptics
among Italian Catholics, claims the paternity of the
constructive dialogue which has been established between the
European People’s Party and the AKP 15 .
Economic Stakeholders
Italy was <strong>Turkey</strong>’s third largest trade partner in 2008 16 .
Direct Italian investments were estimated at 4,4 billion US dollars
(USD) in 2006. In 2008, they had almost tripled. In 2009, they are
expected to grow even further. At the moment, over 700 Italian
firms and companies are investing or directly operating in <strong>Turkey</strong>.
Italy’s imports from <strong>Turkey</strong> are mainly leather, wood, clothing and
shoes, in addition to a growing amount of machines and electronic
14
See, ‘Cardinal Ratzinger : Identifier la Turquie à l’Europe serait une erreur’,
Le Figaro, 13 April 2004, p.3
15
E. Alessandri, Interview with Rocco Buttiglione, cit.
16
Istituto Nazionale per il Commercio Estero (ICE), country focus: <strong>Turkey</strong>, 4
December 2008,
http://mefite.ice.it/CENWeb/ICE/News/ICENews.aspx?cod=8969&Paese=52&i
dPaese=52
65

applications. For its part, Italy exports plastic and metal products,
agricultural products, hi-tech items, and typical Italian products
(“made in Italy”). The trade balance has been in favour of Italy.
Among economic sectors where interchange is significant, energy
is becoming the main one, especially as regards natural gas
transportation. Bio and nano technologies are fields where
interchange is rapidly growing.
<strong>Turkey</strong> represented an important market for Italy even
before Ankara decided to embark on the <strong>EU</strong> accession process.
Italy’s most powerful business families and groups have exerted
pressure on the Italian government for greater openness towards
the Turkish economy since at least the 1960s, being among the
first to ask the European Communities to sign a customs union
agreement with <strong>Turkey</strong>.
Luca Cordero di Montezemolo, Italy’s former president
of Confindustria, the leading organization representing Italian
industry, recently pointed out that, from the businessman’s
standpoint, “<strong>Turkey</strong> is already in Europe” 17 .
Among key economic stakeholders, one may currently
include some of Italy’s leading energy companies such as ENI and
ENEL; some of Italy’s most prominent banking companies, such
as Unicredit; as well as telecommunication companies such as
Telecom, and aerospace and defence firms, such as Finmeccanica.
FIAT, Italy’s leading automobile company, entered the Turkish
market as early as the 1920s. In 1968, FIAT started a joint venture
with the Koç Group giving birth to the plants of Tofas in Bursa,
17
‘Italia Turchia: Montezemolo, per imprese Ankara già in UE’, Kataweb News,
8 November, 2007, http://news.kataweb.it//item/374601/italia-turchiamontezemolo-per-imprese-ankara-gia-in-ue
66

where FIAT’s “world car”, Palio, is now produced. “At FIAT,
people like to think that <strong>Turkey</strong> is a chunk of Italy that has
somehow slipped towards the Middle East”, says Enrico
Franceschini, a journalist of La Repubblica AUTO 18 .
Such strong and ramified economic interests between the
two countries, including in some of Italy’s strategic sectors,
explains the existence of what might be called an “Italian
economic lobby” which strongly favours <strong>Turkey</strong>’s swift
integration into the <strong>EU</strong>.
To confirm this connection, it is worth mentioning that on
May 22nd, 2008, Italy signed the “Mediterranean Plan” in Istanbul
with the objective to create investment opportunities also in Egypt,
Libya, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Under-secretary for
Economic Development Adolfo Urso underscored during the
ceremony how important it is, even in this phase of economic
recession, that the Turkish market can remain open to Italian
firms 19 .
Some of Italy’s economic stakeholders, however, are
more sceptical about <strong>Turkey</strong>’s full integration into the <strong>EU</strong>. This is
particularly true for some firms in the agricultural sector. The
Customs union agreement with <strong>Turkey</strong> entered into force in 1996
does not apply to agricultural products. Given the existence of
several similarities between the Italian and the Turkish agricultural
markets, there is some fear on the Italian side that <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong>
18
E. Franceschini, ‘La scommessa della Turchia’, La Repubblica, July 1999,
http://www.repubblica.it/online/auto_prima/fiat100anni/otto/otto.html; A.
Ferigo, Interview with FIAT Representative, May 2008.
19
C. Antonelli, ‘Interview to Vice-Minister Urso’, LiberoMercato, 24 May,
2009, p. 27.
67

membership would negatively affect Italy’s competitiveness. The
same applies to the redistribution of the <strong>EU</strong> budget for the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) that <strong>Turkey</strong>’s entry would
entail 20 .
The overview of Italian economic stakeholders would not
be complete without including trade unions. Their opinion seems
in favour of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession, but only if this means more norms
regulating the Turkish market and more rights for Turkish labour.
“I’m in favour of <strong>Turkey</strong> joining the <strong>EU</strong>’, Giorgio Cipriani, trade
unionist at FIAT, declares, “because in my long experience as a
unionist I realized that the interests of Turkish society overlap with
those in Italy, although sometimes they differ in scope and
scale” 21 . “<strong>Member</strong>ship”, he points out, “can be granted only if
social besides economic standards are met […] unions will keep
heading in the direction that we already chose: exchanges of
delegations, education and training, joint campaigns and other
expressions of solidarity”.
Media
Media play a critical role in shaping public opinion,
including on <strong>EU</strong> Enlargement issues. However, Italian public
opinion still seems to be poorly and often badly informed, still
lacking basic knowledge not only on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> integration
20
E. Alessandri, Interview with Maurizio Reale, Head of Coldiretti External
Relations Dept, 17 April 2008.
21
A. Ferigo, Interview with Giorgio Cipriani, trade unionist, FIAT, 12 May
2008.
68

process, but also on modern <strong>Turkey</strong> itself 22 . Among the
consequences of the lack of an informed debate on these issues, is
the presence of misperceptions, stereotypes and also prejudices.
The Speaker of Italy’s House of Deputies (Italy’s lower chamber),
Gianfranco Fini, paid a visit to his homologue in Ankara at the end
of October 2008, openly recognizing the problem and asking to
drop all prejudices which are plaguing the debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>. Fini
said that “<strong>Turkey</strong> is engaged in an effort, and the <strong>EU</strong> must engage
to look honestly and without prejudices to these concrete efforts
made by Ankara” 23 .
Especially in the recent past, news coming from <strong>Turkey</strong>
generally concerned the country’s uncertain future as a secular
democracy (e.g., Don Andrea Santoro’s murder in <strong>Turkey</strong> in 2006,
the headscarf issue in 2007 and the closure case against the AKP in
2008). What is interesting is not the coverage itself, but the way
news have been dealt with. First, even newspapers leaning towards
political parties supporting <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> membership have recently
hosted articles expressing concern about some of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
domestic developments, sometimes interpreting them as instances
of an ongoing religious radicalisation. This is the case of
conservative newspapers, such as Il Giornale and Libero 24 . Second,
so far growing concerns about <strong>Turkey</strong>’s domestic developments
22
E. Alessandri, Interview with Giampaolo Carbonetto, from Messaggero
Veneto and President of Associazione Europa Cultura, 21 April 2008; E.
Alessandri, Interview with Yasmin Taskin, Rome correspondent from Sabah, 7
May 2008.
23
A. Pannullo, ‘Fini: ‘L’Unione Europea dica no ai pregiudizi’’, Il Secolo
d’Italia, 1 November, 2008, p. 6.
24
See articles by F. Facci, from Il Giornale and R. Camilleri, ‘Quell’omicidio
allontana la Turchia dall’Europa’, Il Giornale 27 January 2007, p.10. See also C.
Taormina, ‘Sulla Turchia nella UE l’Italia dia ascolto alla lezione di Sarkozy’,
Libero, 31 August 2007, p.11.
69

have not been systematically extended to the question of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
membership and its future in Europe.
If this were to happen, then the “<strong>Turkey</strong> question” could
become an item of broader domestic debate, where religion-related
issues, as earlier noted, attract growing attention and where
contested questions such as immigration are often approached
from a religious perspective, too. A survey by the Ministry of
Interior shows that the majority of Italians considers “Muslim
immigration” as creating more problems to Italy than immigration
of other groups 25 .
Whether the <strong>Turkey</strong> question will become part of this
debate is still unclear, and much will depend on the reaction of
“Christian public opinion”, a convenient phrase which can be used
to identify those sections of the Italian public that are particularly
sensitive to religious considerations. Christian public opinion is
fairly influential in Italy, being widely represented in the Italian
media (newspapers, TV), and includes among its members leaders
and intellectuals who subscribe to a Christian interpretation of
Europe’s political future. A trigger factor that would consolidate,
perhaps irreversibly, the views of this sector would be the
opposition of the Holy See to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership. As noted
earlier, however, the position of the Pope seems to have grown
more positive lately 26 . As Franca Giansoldati from Il Messaggero
points out, “what the Pope is seeking is juridical recognition of the
25
See Ministero dell’Interno, Report, 29 Apri 2008,
http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/15/0673_Rap
porto_immigrazione_BARBAGLI.pdf
26
See ‘Cardinal Ratzinger: Identifier la Turquie à l'Europe serait une erreur’, cit.
See also E. Alessandri, Interview with Andrea Tornielli, Vaticanist from Il
Giornale 14 May 2008.
70

Christian church in <strong>Turkey</strong> [..] something that is missing today and
is therefore the object of bargaining between the Vatican and
Turkish authorities in the context also of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s negotiations
with the <strong>EU</strong>” 27 .
Civil Society
To complete the picture of Italian stakeholders, one may
include Italian NGOs and national branches of international NGOs
working on <strong>Turkey</strong> or in <strong>Turkey</strong>.
The galaxy of Italian NGOs seems to be overall
supportive of the final goal of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> membership. Many
NGOs, however, prefer not to express an official position on the
current state of the accession process nor on the end result.
Several, moreover, emphasize that in the present situation <strong>Turkey</strong>
is still far from reaching <strong>EU</strong> standards. Concern is expressed about
human rights protection in general as well as on the specific
condition of children, women, and ethnic minorities. Richard
Noury, spokesperson of the Italian branch of Amnesty
International, underscored that “on the basis of our 2009 report, we
witnessed an increasing number of reporting of tortures and illtreatment
to the police, repatriation of refugees … and violence
towards women” 28 .
27
E. Alessandri, Interview with Franca Giansoldati, Vaticanist from Il
Messaggero, 22 May 2008.
28
S. Sali, Interview with Richard Noury, Amnesty International – Italy, 11 June
2009
71

Italian NGOs engaged in the south-east part of <strong>Turkey</strong>,
such as Un Ponte Per.., often lament an escalation of violence
against Kurds 29 .
Environmental issues, too, are often mentioned as a
reason for concern. Laura Cerani, of Green Peace-Italy, expresses
the hope that the accession process will elevate <strong>Turkey</strong> to <strong>EU</strong>
environmental standards 30 .
As to their engagement in <strong>Turkey</strong>, Italian NGOs often
complain about the difficulties encountered in fully and freely
carrying out their missions. Particularly difficult seems the
relationship between NGOs and the local police and sometimes the
Army, too (especially for the NGOs working in the south-east of
the country). A further problem has to do with the collection of
information and data, which does not always seem possible.
During the preparation of a documentary on Kurdish migration in
the 1990s, Matteo Pasini from Un Ponte Per.. reports that he was
detained and interrogated by the police for several hours in
Diyarbakir 31 .
As to the domestic debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>, finally, NGOs
admit that the Italian civil society is not particularly informed
about <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> integration process. There seems to be
insufficient coordination among NGOs working on <strong>Turkey</strong>, and
limited interchange between these and the wider galaxy of Italian
NGOs and the Italian civil society more broadly.
29
S. Sali, Interview with Matteo Pasini, Un Ponte per..,12 June 2009
30
S. Sali, Interview with Laura Cerani, Green Peace Italia, 16 June 2009.
31
S. Sali, Interview with Matteo Pasini, cit.
72

When asked whether they think that the Italian debate on
<strong>Turkey</strong> is well-enough informed and lively, most NGOs express
their dissatisfaction. The afore-mentioned Matteo Pasini points out
that “the debate does not include the correct elements of
information for a real understanding of the situation, thus making it
impossible for the public to formulate a correct and objective
judgment” 32 . Amnesty Italy laments that too often have
misperceptions and prejudices entered the debate and found
resonance in the media.
Conclusions
Italy has been traditionally one of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s main
supporters when it comes to <strong>EU</strong> membership. This support is
unlikely to be withdrawn. However, scepticism seems to be on the
rise even among those political stakeholders which are ready to
recognize the economic and geopolitical benefits deriving from
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession. Public opinion is increasingly against
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> membership. Issues of religion and identity seem to
be at the core of the problem. The business community strongly
supports membership, although some sectors do not hide their
concerns about a possible loss of competitiveness. Lack of basic
information about contemporary <strong>Turkey</strong> and the persistence of old
prejudices and misperceptions prevent a truly open and
constructive debate on <strong>Turkey</strong> from fully developing in Italy.
32
S. Sali, Interview with Matteo Pasini, cit.
73

Eduard Soler i Lecha, Irene García *
Spanish <strong>Perceptions</strong>
Introduction
Hispano-Turkish relations enjoy excellent health.
Internationally, we see how both countries have collaborated in
areas such as promotion of the Alliance of Civilizations since
2004. On the European agenda, Spain fully supports <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
entry into the <strong>EU</strong> and, above all, rejects any discriminatory
treatment to this country. At a strictly bilateral level, the relations
have been upgraded to the highest level since the organization of
the first High Level Meeting, in April 2009.
At a time when other states such as Germany and France
slide into reluctance towards Turkish accession, Spain is one of the
most supportive states. Its support for Turkish entry is clear and
consistent. When Spanish politicians and diplomats are asked
about the reasons behind this position, certain arguments are often
used, such as: <strong>Turkey</strong>’s geo-strategic value, trade links with a
robust economy, the positive impact in <strong>Turkey</strong>’s democratization
process as well as its possible contribution to the strengthening of
the Mediterranean axis within the <strong>EU</strong>, thus helping to move the
<strong>EU</strong>’s centre of gravity southwards 1 .
*
The opinions expressed herein are only those of the author and do not reflect
any institutional views.
1
López Garrido, D., 2009. “España y Turquía: dos países y un destino” in
Afkar/ideas, 22, pp. 30-31.
74

This support is also consistent with the European policy
of Spain. Since its accession to the EEC, or even as a candidate
country, Spain positioned itself as a country committed to
European integration in its dual dimension: deepening and
widening. This logic has determined the Spanish governments’
support to the accession of new member states, even if those
enlargements brought no immediate benefits for Spain. This
support strives from Spain’s own experience, as its accession to the
EEC is perceived as a key element in the process of modernization
and development that Spain has undergone over the last twenty
years. Moreover, the lack of political and social debate on this
issue has given the Spanish executive more leeway to design and
implement its policies towards <strong>Turkey</strong>.
In our analysis of Spain’s approach towards <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong>
accession, we will take into consideration different actors’ views:
the government, the opposition, the media and civil society over
the last five years. Two reasons justify this study. Firstly, we
observe that even if support to the accession has remained constant
to date, reluctance is growing among conservative politicians and
social sectors. Secondly, Spain will assume the rotating Presidency
of the <strong>EU</strong> in January 2010 and, from this stance, it can influence
the evolution of the Euro-Turkish relations in the near future.
The Government and the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party
The elections on March 14 th , 2004 turned the Spanish
political map upside down. The Conservative government led by
José María Aznar since 1996 was replaced by a new
75

administration, headed by the Socialist José Luis Rodríguez
Zapatero. This happened within a context of growing polarization
and tension between the two main Spanish political forces. This
tension was not only felt in the field of domestic policy, but
international affairs were also subject to debate on issues like the
war on Iraq and the relations with Morocco, Cuba and Venezuela.
The European agenda also became a fertile ground for provocation
between the two main parties, in subjects such as the best strategy
to defend Spanish interests in the <strong>EU</strong>. Yet, the governmental
support to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> accession was immune to this
controversial mood and neither the Spanish Socialist Workers
Party (PSOE), nor the main opposition party, the Popular Party
(PP), instrumentalised this question in their political disputes.
The Socialist Party, President Rodríguez Zapatero and the
foreign affairs minister Miguel Angel Moratinos, maintained their
support for <strong>Turkey</strong>, as the Popular Party had done so far. What it
did change were the fundaments and, to a lesser extent, the
justification for such support. While the position of the PP was
marked by the strong Atlantic accent of its foreign policy, the
Socialist executive emphasized other elements, such as <strong>Turkey</strong>'s
contribution to the development of more harmonious relations
between the Union and the Islamic world, or the democratic
progress made in this country.
Despite these nuances, the Spanish government has tried
to stress the great convergence in this field between the main
political forces. According to Moratinos, the reasons for which
Spain has always voiced support for enlargement, are “political
reasons, because we are convinced that enlargement will reinforce
76

stability and security within the European continent; economic
reasons, because we have a new market of 80 million citizens with
economic growth at a high rate; and ethical or moral reasons,
because we can see ourselves reflected in the mirror of the
enlargement when we recall how our entry into the <strong>EU</strong>, after
decades of dictatorship, enabled us to consolidate democracy and a
market economy” 2 .
The Socialist executive has found broad support inside its
own party. For instance, in 2007, Juan Moscoso del Prado, PSOE
deputy and member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
Parliament, underlined the strategic value of Ankara, starting with
the principle of freedom of religion, the need to support the
democratic reforms, and <strong>Turkey</strong>’s contribution in issues such as
the Union for the Mediterranean 3 . In May 2008, during the Europe
Day celebration, the PSOE expressed again its support for <strong>Turkey</strong>'s
entry “when they meet the requirements”. They continued to argue
that “as important as the stability provided by <strong>EU</strong> enlargements is
the one that allows the good neighbourly relations with the
countries around us” 4 .
By the end of the same year, the Socialist Party stressed
again its support for the negotiations with <strong>Turkey</strong>, “based on clear
criteria, and both <strong>Turkey</strong> and the <strong>EU</strong> should fulfil their respective
commitments within this framework”, that is, the <strong>EU</strong>’s credibility
2
Moratinos, M.A., Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados: Comisión
de Asuntos Exteriores, Vol. 8 (24) Madrid: Cortes Generales.
3
Moscoso, J. 2007. “Por el amor laico entre la UE y Turquía” in El País, 30
August
4
PSOE, 2008. Compromiso con la igualdad, la calidad del empleo y el cambio
de modelo de crecimiento:Manifiesto del PSOE con motivo del 1º de Mayo,
Spain: PSOE.
77

is at stake as well as the pacta sunt servanda principle (PSOE,
2008) 5 . A similar commitment with the <strong>EU</strong>’s current enlargement
to <strong>Turkey</strong> and Croatia can be found in this party manifesto for the
European Parliament elections of 2009 6 .
Opposition Parties
Since 2004, the Popular Party is the main opposition
force. During its government, from 1996 to 2004, it opted for the
deepening of bilateral relations with <strong>Turkey</strong>. It also opted for
anchoring this country in the European integration project,
provided it meets the criteria set for any candidate. Representatives
of the Popular Party insisted from the beginning that <strong>Turkey</strong>
should be treated as equally as other <strong>EU</strong> candidate 7 . This was also
the Popular Party’s commitment in the 2004 elections 8 .
5
PSOE, 2008. Motivos para crecer. Programa Electoral 2008. (Programa
electoral 2008) Spain: PSOE.
6
PSOE, 2009. Manifiesto: Programa Electoral PSOE 2009. (<strong>EU</strong> 09 of 2009-17)
Spain: PSOE.
7
See, for instance the following statement by Fernando Villalonga, State
Secretary in 1997: “Spain recognizes <strong>Turkey</strong>'s European vocation, estimates that
the integration of <strong>Turkey</strong> into the European Union is both an aspiration
consistent with the project of European integration and a Turkish legitimate
aspiration. (...) The Spanish support is based on our conception of the European
project, which makes us to bear in mind that enlargement is an open process,
transparent and non discriminatory. Furthermore, suitability to open accession
negotiations and the negotiation process will relate to the objective political
economic conditions of each of the candidates. As you know, the <strong>EU</strong> is a
pluralistic project that fit in all European countries willing to contribute to
European integration and to a more united Europe, safer and more prosperous”
to be found in Diario de sesiones de las Cortes Generales, Comisión de Asuntos
Exteriores, year 1997, n. 352, p.10400.
8
PP, 2004. Avanzamos Juntos: Programa de Gobierno del Partido Popular.
(Programa 2004) Spain: PP.
78

Without completely breaking with its traditional position,
we observe that the Popular Party has gradually nuanced this
stance in favour of Turkish membership since it lost the elections.
For instance, in an election rally in 2005, the new party leader,
Mariano Rajoy, questioned the fact that Spain supports <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
accession without debate, mentioning the need to open a debate on
<strong>EU</strong>’s future external borders 9 . The influential member of the
Popular Party, Gustavo de Arístegui, also stated that although his
party is in favour of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession, the deadlines should be
reconsidered, taking into account the <strong>EU</strong>’s absorption capacity 10 .
Therefore, the messages sent by some PP members start to
converge with those of other conservative leaders in Europe, and
more specifically with France and Germany’s governmental
positions.
In addition, the alliance between the Socialist government
in Spain and the AKP government in <strong>Turkey</strong> regarding some
specific issues has not garnered much support among the Spanish
conservatives. The project of the Alliance of Civilizations has been
heavily criticized. From the very beginning, Mariano Rajoy was
sceptical, saying that it is nothing but a “siren song”, that “nobody
cares about it” and that it is not the appropriate way to combat
radical Islamist terrorism 11 . Another controversy arose with the
9
Segovia, C., 2005. “Rajoy cambia la posición proturca del PP en la UE para
apoyar a Merkel y Sarkozy” in El Mundo, 26 June.
10
Arístegui, G., 2005. “Bin Laden y los suyos quieren convertir Al Ándalus en
un símbolo del islamismo radical”. Heraldo de Aragón, 18 October. Available
at: http://www.jimenez-aybar.com/pdf/sala_lectura/entrevistas/aristegui.pdf
[Accessed 11 October 2009].
11
EFE, 2006. “López Garrido critica el desprecio de Rajoy hacia la Alianza de
Civilizaciones” in WebIslam online, [internet] 15 November. Available at:
http://www.webislam.com/?idn=7779. [Accessed 12 October 2009].
79

“Cartoon crisis” and Zapatero and Erdogan reaction calling for
respect and calm, arguing that “the publication of these caricatures
may be perfectly legal, but it is not indifferent and thus ought to be
rejected from a moral and political standpoint 12 . Rajoy affirmed
that the priority was to defend freedom of expression and showed
his solidarity with those who exercise it 13 .
It is also significant that in the 2008 general election
campaign, the PP did not allude to <strong>Turkey</strong> in its program. It is all
the more relevant as on the agenda for European Parliament
elections of 2009, it is said that “they support the current phase of
the enlargement process” adding that it should also consider “other
possible formulas or frameworks for association with the European
Union”, so that the project of European integration is not
compromised 14 . To put it in a nutshell, despite maintaining its
traditional support, we can observe growing signs that the position
of the PP may be becoming more sceptical. This can be seen in
Jose María’s Aznar present position. Even though he has always
maintained governmental positions favourable to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
membership, now his statements match the conservative stream
that questions <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership. In a recent publication:
Europa: Propuestas para la Libertad, he opposes <strong>Turkey</strong>’s entry
12
Erdogan, R.T., Zapatero, J.L., 2006. “A call for respect and calm” in New
York Times, 5 February.
13
Europapress, 2006. “Polémica por la publicación de caricaturas: Rajoy pide a
Zapatero que “tenga en cuenta” los alteracados al hablar de la Alianza de
Civilizaciones” in El Mundo online, [internet] 6 February. Available at:
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2006/02/06/espana/1139250521.html.
[Accessed 9 October 2009].
14
PP, 2009. Programa Electoral Extenso: Elecciones al Parlamento Europeo 7
junio 2009. Spain: PP.
80

into the <strong>EU</strong>, arguing that the Christian values of Europe are more
important than the Transatlantic Alliance 15 .
The rest of the political forces are less able to shape
Spanish policy vis-à-vis the <strong>EU</strong>’s enlargement. However, it is
important to take them into account, due to their potential capacity
to generate debate and political controversy. For the time being,
unlike what happens in the major <strong>EU</strong> states, we note that smaller
Spanish political parties provide little or scant attention to
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s integration process into the <strong>EU</strong>. However, two trends can
be observed.
The first trend is represented by leftist parties like
Izquierda Unida (IU), Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV) and
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC). These political forces
were positioned in the nineties, and even earlier, as the parties
most critical of violations of human rights in <strong>Turkey</strong> and the
situation of the Kurdish population. However, since 2002 and
especially since 2004, these parties agree that the <strong>EU</strong> provides a
framework to build the necessary democratic reforms in <strong>Turkey</strong>,
while urging <strong>Turkey</strong> to change its policy regarding some
controversial issues. This applies to the demands for the
recognition of Armenian genocide and to the military presence in
Cyprus, as expressed by the MEP and Executive Coordinator of
International Policy of Izquierda Unida, Willy Meyer, to the
Committee of European Parliament's Foreign Affairs 16 . Similarly,
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya showed its support in the
15
Aznar, J.M., Carnero, A., Herrera M., 2009. Europa: Propuestas de Libertad.,
FAES: Madrid.
16
IU, 2009. Tu voz en Europa: Programa Electoral Elecciones Europeas 2009:
Izquierda Unida. Spain: IU.
81

Spanish Parliament to the entry of <strong>Turkey</strong> into the <strong>EU</strong>.
Nevertheless, it also emphasized that the party could not ignore the
under-representation of the Kurdish people and the “great military
occupation taking place now in Turkish Kurdistan” 17 .
A less enthusiastic trend has been followed by centreright
nationalist parties, such as the Catalan group Convergència i
Unió (CiU) and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). <strong>Member</strong>s of
both coalitions have expressed their preference for a privileged
partnership status, in line with the German Christian-Democrats,
with whom they have strong links. For instance, Josep Antoni
Duran i Lleida, member of CiU and chairman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the Spanish Parliament, lamented in a recent
article that no one has sufficiently extolled the benefits of a
preferential relation with <strong>Turkey</strong> instead of full membership.
Duran i Lleida also affirmed that although the <strong>EU</strong> has to be
responsible and cannot break unilaterally its promises, it is also
legitimate to consider that <strong>Turkey</strong> does not meet the requirements
to become a member of the <strong>EU</strong> 18 . In addition, there is a segment of
Convergencia i Unió that, besides these strategic considerations,
has insisted on the need to preserve Catalan production of
hazelnuts from the competition of Turkish products. However,
<strong>Turkey</strong> is not a major issue in the international and European
agendas of these parties, and they have never used their key
17
ERC, 2008. Eleccions 2008 al Congrés dels Diputats: Programa Electoral.
Objectiu: un país de 1ª (per això volem la independència)
18
Duran i Lleida, J.A. 2009. “Reflexiones sobre dos décadas de política exterior
española” in Fundació CIDOB, Anuario Internacional Cidob 2009. Claves para
interpretar la Política Exterior Española y las Relaciones Internacionales en
2008, Fundación CIDOB: Barcelona, 2009, pp. 325-335.
82

position in Spanish politics to shift the Spanish policy of support
for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession.
Media Coverage
In Spain, there has been a persistent lack of knowledge
about <strong>Turkey</strong>. However, the Spanish media increasingly echoes
what happens in the country. Some media - and not necessarily
those with the highest circulation - have correspondents in Istanbul
or regular contributors covering the main political, economic and
social issues of the country 19 . In addition, discussions on the
accession process of <strong>Turkey</strong> into the <strong>EU</strong> are covered by
correspondents from Brussels and even from other capitals such as
Berlin and Paris.
Articles and opinions published in important Spanish
newspapers are often even more influential than the news
coverage. In this case we find few examples, but the vast majority
of columns and editorials support <strong>Turkey</strong>'s entry to the <strong>EU</strong>. Ideas
such as respect, reciprocity, consistency, integration and
democracy are underlined in the texts published by the Spanish
press. As an example, we can quote Antonio Elorza’s article in El
Pais, where this columnist argues that the <strong>EU</strong> should pursue the
accession negotiations if it is willing to promote and consolidate
political reforms in <strong>Turkey</strong> 20 .
19
This is the case of Ricardo Ginés writing in La Vanguardia and Andrés
Mourenza publishing in El Periodico de Catalunya
20
Elorza, A., 2008. “España, Turquía, Alianza” in El País, 26 January.
83

Simultaneously, episodic controversies have come up
when the Turkish question has been associated with issues such as
the Alliance of Civilizations or the cartoons crisis. In these cases,
attacks by conservative media such as ABC and El Mundo have
found their way to question the common impulse of Spain and
<strong>Turkey</strong> in these areas. Instead, media closer to the government,
such as El País, have held different positions and its columnists
have praised the joint work of Erdogan and Zapatero at the
international level. An example of this trend is the article written
by Josep Ramoneda, who criticises the conservative attitude of
France and Germany and considers that “it is time for Spain to pull
<strong>Turkey</strong> towards Europe”, and co-sponsoring the Alliance of
Civilizations is an opportunity to prove that it is not “a self-serving
fiction between two leaders in search of recognition”, as criticised
the opposition to the current government 21 .
Public Opinion and Civil Society
The low intensity of the debate in the political sphere and
the media is clearly reflected in the state of public opinion. The
Spanish population ends up being one of the most favourable in
Europe as regards <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> membership, but it is also one of
the most indifferent. Furthermore, a defining characteristic of
Spanish public opinion, which is well reflected in the chart below,
is that in recent years the support of its citizens to Turkish
membership has increased.
21
Ramoneda, J., 2009. “Alianza por Estambul” in El País 5 July.
84

Source: Eurobarometer 69, 2008
This level of support and indifference of the Spanish
population is closely linked, firstly, to a general misinformation in
relation to European issues and particularly on enlargement.
According to Eurobarometer data, Spanish society (15%) is, along
with Portugal (15%), Greece (17%) and Malta (17%), one of the
least informed about the process of <strong>EU</strong> enlargement 22 . Secondly,
this is related to the fact that the Turkish population residing in
Spain barely exceeds 1,000 people; thus, fears that <strong>Turkey</strong>'s entry
into the <strong>EU</strong> will lead to a massive influx of Turkish population are
much lower than in other European countries. Thirdly, it is related
to the fact that there are no lobbies whose focal point is the defence
or refusal of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession.
22
European Commission, 2006. Eurobarometer Special Survey 255.
85

However, business circles have always been inclined in
favour of that accession, while human rights activists have been
more cautions. For instance, we do find organizations that have
paid attention to the human rights situation in <strong>Turkey</strong> and to the
Kurdish question. There are various information and
documentation centres whose purpose is to reveal the reality of
Kurdish people and denounce the situation. This is the case of the
information centre and cooperation with Kurdistan from Madrid,
or the Catalan NGO Sodepau. Also, Basque organisations place a
strong accent on the struggle for self-determination of Kurdish
movements, with whom they identify. Meanwhile, although in a
more discreet manner, voices of those who demand the recognition
of the Armenian genocide start to be heard 23 . Despite these claims,
none of these organizations are strong enough to influence public
opinion and shape Spanish political debate concerning the Turkish
question.
Although Spanish think-tanks are neither as large nor as
influential as their counterparts in the United States or the United
Kingdom, they have experienced remarkable growth over the last
decade. It is interesting to note that the leading think-tanks, both in
Madrid (FRIDE, Real Instituto Elcano, Fundación Altnernativas)
and in Barcelona (CIDOB, IEMed) have either been engaged on
Euro-Turkish relations or have published analysis regarding the
Turkish question. In all these cases, the position has been in favour
of membership and, above all, against any discriminatory formula.
23
See, for example, the Cultural Armenian Association in Barcelona
(Asociación Cultural Armenia de Barcelona) or the Hispano Armenian
Association “Hokis”.
86

The exceptions are some think-tanks and foundations
close to the most conservative sectors of the Popular Party. FAES
Foundation and Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos (GEES) have
served as platforms, on the one hand, to express the need to keep
<strong>Turkey</strong> anchored in the West and, on the other, to start questioning
Turkish Europeanness and defending the idea of “privileged
partnership” 24 .
Conclusions and Future Prospects
On these pages we have seen, in broad strokes, that Spain
remains one of the <strong>EU</strong> countries that are positioned more clearly
and unambiguously in favour of the prospect of <strong>Turkey</strong> joining the
<strong>EU</strong>. Unlike what happens in other European countries, it is a topic
that generates little political controversy and that is not present
among the concerns of the public opinion. However, we have seen
that in recent years, more sceptical views have been expressed.
Conservative politicians have started questioning an unconditional
support to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> membership, insisting that the <strong>EU</strong>’s
absorption capacity is limited, doubting <strong>Turkey</strong>’s Europeanness,
and proposing an alternative such as a privileged partnership.
Two questions are raised over the future: (1) what can be
expected of Spain during its <strong>EU</strong> presidency in the first half of the
year?; (2) will a change of government in Spain mean a change of
position in relation to Turkish accession?
24 Portero, F. 2006. “¿Es Turquía asimilable?” GEES [internet] 19 September.
Available at: http://temporal.gees.org/articulo/2990/. [Accessed 2 October
2009].
87

Regarding the first question, Spain is expected, to the
extent of its possibilities, to boost the enlargement negotiations. As
important as the opening of new chapters (for this semester it is
expected to work in the chapter on food security), is to dispel
doubts about the ultimate goal of the negotiations. In this sense,
Spanish officials, starting with the Minister Moratinos, are
working to ensure the “irreversibility” of the accession process 25 .
However, there is little that Spain can do to change the position
held by France and Germany on this issue or to resolve the longlasting
Cyprus question.
The answer to the second question is much more
uncertain, and this is not just because the next elections are
scheduled for 2012. If the PSOE wins the elections again, the
support and justification of support will continue as long as the
Turkish government pursues the necessary reforms. Less
predictable is the position which can eventually hold an executive
headed by the Popular Party. So far, this party has proven to hold
different positions depending on whether it is in the government or
in the opposition. If the Popular Party comes to power, Spain’s
governmental position will depend on who is in charge of
European and international politics, since inside the party coexist
different positions towards <strong>Turkey</strong>. The official position will also
depend on the alliances established by the new government and the
European leaders, and whether the issue of <strong>Turkey</strong> is a priority in
their agenda.
25
J.C.S. (2008) “España quiere que el proceso de adhesión de Turquía a la
UE sea irreversible” in El País, 21 October.
88

To sum up, although there is continuity in Spanish policy
towards <strong>Turkey</strong> and it has provoked little controversy among its
citizens, we must not fail to look closely at what happens in Spain.
In the near future, it is quite likely that Spain will still be
considered one of the main supporters of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong>
membership, and that this position will be maintained during
Spain’s <strong>EU</strong> Presidency during the first half of 2010. However,
there is also the possibility of a new and more sceptical stream
growing among conservative circles, and this might nuance
Spain’s unanimous support for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession in the future.
89

Athanasios C. Kotsiaros 1
Greek <strong>Perceptions</strong>
Abstract
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession into the European Union is one of the
most controversial and divisive topics that the <strong>EU</strong> faces. Both <strong>EU</strong>
governments and citizens are deeply divided on whether <strong>Turkey</strong>
should become a member of the European Union or not. In Greece,
after a major breakthrough for Greek diplomacy in the Helsinki
Summit in 1999, political elites consistently support <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
prospect of accession into the European family. On the other hand,
Greek media and public opinion remain reluctant towards this
prospect, even though they support the <strong>EU</strong> policy of enlargement
as a whole. Within this framework, this article highlights Greek
media, citizens’ and political elites’ opinion towards <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
accession into the <strong>EU</strong> in the period 2006-2009 and analyses which
key elements determine the support for or the opposition to the
Turkish membership.
1
Dr. Athanasios C. Kotsiaros is an Advisor in the National Parliament of
Greece, as well as Research Fellow in the Institute of European Integration and
Policy of the University of Athens and an associate of the Greek Centre of
European Studies and Research (EKEME).
The opinions expressed herein are only those of the author and do not reflect any
institutional views.
90

Introduction
The efforts to construct, strengthen and disseminate a
European identity have always been an elite-driven and a top-down
process. This statement applies to the case of <strong>Turkey</strong> too. The
political elites of the country have traditionally generated
modernization efforts and ascertained on every occasion that the
country, being a part of Europe, belongs to the Western world.
Within this framework, <strong>Turkey</strong> first applied for associate
membership in the European Economic Community in 1959, and
on 12 September 1963 signed the “Association Agreement”. Some
decades later, in the Helsinki Summit of 1999, <strong>Turkey</strong> was granted
official candidate status for accession into the <strong>EU</strong>, after a
momentous agreement between the Turkish and the European
political elites. Accession talks with <strong>Turkey</strong> opened symbolically
on the 3rd October 2005, and on the 12 th June 2006, the <strong>EU</strong> started
concrete accession negotiations.
The negotiating framework specifies 35 chapters, which
all need to be opened and closed by a unanimously agreed
common position of all member states and a unanimous agreement
in the intergovernmental conference that includes all member
states and <strong>Turkey</strong>.
The Helsinki Summit Momentum
In a genuine breakthrough for Greek diplomacy, Greece
abandoned at the Helsinki Summit the “veto policy” against
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s prospects for <strong>EU</strong>-membership, thus contributing to
opening the way for granting <strong>Turkey</strong> a candidate status and
91

preparing the main job – working out the conditions under which
membership could be feasible and mutually acceptable. In
Helsinki, it was also agreed that the settlement of the Cyprus
problem is not a precondition for its accession into the <strong>EU</strong> and
moreover, that the European Council will promote the settlement
of any outstanding border disputes and other related issues through
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), at the latest by the end of
2004. 2
Indisputably, Helsinki was a culmination of the new
phase in Greek foreign policy and the outcome of a critical
reevaluation of Greece's national interests. 3 The latter perceived
that it is in its best interest that <strong>Turkey</strong> moves closer to Europe.
More importantly, Helsinki assured a double gain for the Greek
Diplomacy: (a) it secured the entry of Cyprus into the <strong>EU</strong> without
any previous resolution of the political problem and (b) it
promoted the settlement of any bilateral problems between the two
neighbours through the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
With respect to the reference of bilateral issues to the ICJ,
there is one significant difference between the two major political
parties in Greece. The socialists, PASOK, which negotiated
Helsinki, forwarded the idea to refer the issue of the Continental
Shelf to the ICJ. 4 Some years later, the New Democracy
government inserts the phrase “if necessary”, as it starts to balance
2
See: Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 - 11 December
1999, paragraphs 4 and 9a.
3
See: Wendt A., “Anarchy is what states make of it: social construction of
power politics”, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992, pp.
391-425.
4
Greece recognizes the delimitation of the Continental Shelf as the only legal
difference between the two countries.
92

advantages and disadvantages of a judicial process in The Hague. 5
Nowadays, a small minority of the political elites speaks even
about referring all bilateral issues to the ICJ.
The Shift of the Greek Policy and the National Political Elite
Discourse
A study of the Greek national official discourse in the last
years reveals the main concerns on the Greek - Turkish relations,
but also the gradual change of the national political elites’ views.
Until the recent past, the main issues discussed in the
National Parliament were the security problems that <strong>Turkey</strong> poses
to Greece. The common feeling, not only that of the officials, but
that of the public opinion also, was that <strong>Turkey</strong> poses a security
threat to Greece and that its aggressive behavior aims at the
revisionism of the status quo in the Aegean. Even after the
Helsinki Summit, as well as the two earthquakes of 1999 (and the
followed-up so called “Earthquake diplomacy”) that the climate
changes in the course of the bilateral relations, the main Greek
concern remains the issue of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s external (aggressive)
behavior.
Recently, in the new era of cooperation between the two
countries, especially in the period 2005-2009, the Greek official
discourse moves from national security uncertainties to a more
“pro-European” debate, with positive references to the reform
5
Personal interview with G. Glinos, economist and former counselor in the
European Commission.
93

process taking place in <strong>Turkey</strong> and statements of support to the
country’s European candidacy.
In particular, for the government party, New Democracy,
as well as for the main opposition party, PASOK, the view
towards the Turkish membership is rather clear: <strong>Turkey</strong> needs to
accelerate the reform process, remain loyal to its European goal
and gradually implement the “acquis communautaire”. A
“European <strong>Turkey</strong>” equalizes to a less dangerous neighbour, a
more important economic partner and a guarantee for a more
secure regional environment. Similarly, it may provide the context
for a peaceful settlement of a series of bilateral issues (i.e. the
Aegean issue, minority rights and the Cyprus issue).
In the period 2005-2009, the two major political parties,
which traditionally represent roughly 70-75% of the Greek vote,
have consistently supported the Turkish membership. The points of
disagreement and criticism between the two main players of the
Greek political scene relate to the strategy each time adopted, the
priorities set and the way the Greek national interests are being
defended. Nevertheless, both parties stress that the Copenhagen
criteria must be fulfilled and that the full adoption of the acquis,
the signing of the Ankara Protocol, the resolution of the Cyprus
problem and the protection of the Greek minorities in <strong>Turkey</strong> are
undisputable preconditions for entry.
According to the position of the Greek government, the
New Democracy party, Greece supports <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession as a
full member of the <strong>EU</strong>, provided that <strong>Turkey</strong> fully implements the
terms and criteria established. In this respect, Greece asks <strong>Turkey</strong>
to “ensure the irreversibility of the political reform process and its
94

implementation, especially as concerns fundamental freedoms and
full respect of human rights, which include the issues of the
Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek minority”, as well as “the
settlement of any outstanding border differences by peaceful
means”. 6 Moreover, “a priority issue in <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession course
is the need to ratify and implement the Additional Protocol to the
<strong>EU</strong> Association Agreement, as that alone will allow the Customs
Union to operate with the 25, including Cyprus”. 7
Similarly, for the socialist PASOK party, which
motivated the gradual change of the Greek Foreign policy at the
end of the 90’s and opened the way for the start of the <strong>EU</strong> –
<strong>Turkey</strong> accession negotiations, “<strong>Turkey</strong> may have a place in the
European Union, provided that it adjusts to the European criteria,
behaves according to the International Law, contributes to a
resolution of the Cyprus issue and proceeds to the withdrawal of
all Turkish troops from the island”. 8 PASOK also proposes a new
National Strategy for Peace and Security in the region and
forwards the signing of a “Peace and Security Pact” with <strong>Turkey</strong>. 9
The smaller parties of the political spectrum, adopt a
more critical or skeptical stance with regard to the prospect of
6
See: Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Official Positions on <strong>Turkey</strong>:
http://www.ypex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/South-
Eastern+Europe/<strong>Turkey</strong>/Approach/Turkish+Accession+process/
7
Ibid.
8 th
See: Speech by the President of PASOK, G. Papandreou, on the 4 of May
2009 in the Andreas Papandreou Institute of Strategic and Development Studies
(ISTAME), under the title: “The Europe we want”
(http://www.pasok.gr/portal/resource/contentObject/id/9bf211e7-34cc-47daa9e4-9579416132b2).
9
See: Political positions of PASOK:
http://www.pasok.gr/portal/resource/section/TheOpenHorizonsOfGreece.
95

Turkish accession. Especially, the Greek Communist Party, KKE,
is against the Turkish membership and it even rejects the idea of
European integration as a whole. 10 Respectively, it argues that no
country needs the European Union, as the latter stands for
liberalism, capitalist profit, the suppression of workers’ rights and
militarization.
The Coalition of the Radical Left, SIRIZA, stresses in its
political program that it supports the accession negotiations of
<strong>Turkey</strong> with the <strong>EU</strong>. However, it underlines that the candidate
country needs to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, accelerate the
democratization process, as well as protect human and minority
rights. With regard to the bilateral issues, the Party is in favour of
the dialogue based on the International Law and expects positive
gestures from <strong>Turkey</strong>, such as the lifting of the “casus belli”, the
reference of the Continental Shelf in the ICJ and the reduction of
military expenses. 11
Finally, the Party of the radical right, LAOS, adopts a
more nationalistic political discourse towards <strong>Turkey</strong> and openly
rejects the prospect of its accession into the <strong>EU</strong>, if it does not
fulfill the Copenhagen criteria and contribute to the settlement of
the Cyprus issue. 12
10
See: Campaign of the Greek Communist Party for the 2009 European
Parliament Elections.
11
See: Program of the Party Synaspismos, goal 12.
12
See: Program of the Party LAOS, p. 27.
96

The Argument of the Greek Political Elites in favour of the
European Path of <strong>Turkey</strong>
Greece’s support for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> candidacy is based on
the conviction that <strong>Turkey</strong> will be motivated by the prospect of
future membership to work on domestic political and economic
issues, and to act as a responsible member of the European
community. Greece has succeeded in convincing its European
partners that Turkish claims regarding Greece and the Cyprus
problem are European issues, which Greece cannot be expected to
resolve single-handedly. Perhaps, Greek political elites
intentionally omit the fact that the Greek-Cypriots are the ones
who rejected the Annan Plan in 2004, while Turkish Cypriots
agreed, with <strong>Turkey</strong> playing a productive and positive role in the
whole process. Albeit the arguments that the forwarded solution
was not feasible and operational, the Turkish side is not the one to
blame for the failure of the Annan Plan.
According to the Greek argument, bringing <strong>Turkey</strong> closer
to Europe will bring greater security and stability to South-Eastern
Europe and will help achieve a climate of security, economic
development, democratization and enhanced cooperation among
all the countries of the region. Within this framework, the
present New Democracy government, in line with the views of the
previous PASOK governments, apparently hopes to become able
to resolve a number of outstanding issues with Ankara through a
supportive vote (including the ratification of the Ankara Protocol
and the settlement of the dispute over divided Cyprus). With
respect to the above, it has openly manifested goodwill towards the
Turkish bid, while the Greek public expresses its reservations.
97

The View of the Greek Public: the Openly Expressed Rejection
For the Greek public, support for Turkish membership is
not only low, it is also declining. Whereas accession candidates
from the Western Balkans have benefited from increased public
support for enlargement as a consequence of the 2004
enlargement, <strong>Turkey</strong> has been an exception to this trend.
In the period 2005-2009, Turkish membership is proving
to be the least popular among recent <strong>EU</strong> enlargement processes for
the Greeks. According to the relevant Eurobarometers 13 conducted,
Greek citizens support the Enlargement as a whole, but they
disagree with <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> prospects. In particular, in 2005 and
2006 the Greeks supported the Enlargement (56% in 2005 and
71% in 2006), while they were against the Turkish prospect of
accession (only 24% of the Greeks supported it in 2006). In 2007,
56% of the Greek public was in favour of the Enlargement (the
relevant Eurobarometers contain no question on the Turkish
membership). In 2008, 62% of the Greek public opinion was for a
further Enlargement, but 78% (!) was against <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong>
prospect.
The lack of Greek public support for Turkish membership
can be understood along the following dimensions: (a) the public
does not recognize (or comprehend) the benefits of a possible entry
of <strong>Turkey</strong> into the <strong>EU</strong>, (b) it does not regard <strong>Turkey</strong> as qualified
member for entry (the common view of the Greek public opinion is
that <strong>Turkey</strong> needs to develop its economy, accelerate the
democratization process, and contribute to the resolution of the
13
See: Eurobarometer, National Report Greece, Numbers 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70.
98

Cyprus political problem), (c) <strong>Turkey</strong> does not belong to Europe
because of its historical past (83% of the Greeks shared that view,
in 2006 14 ) and not because of its geographical position (41%
considered so, in 2006 15 ) and (d) Greeks expect a continued influx
of mass immigration from <strong>Turkey</strong> (82%, in 2006).
For the Greek public, and contrary to the majority of the
<strong>EU</strong> citizens, religious identity-related arguments play no
significant role. Greece remains a conservative society, where the
role of religion is dominant. Nevertheless, Greek public opinion’s
attitude with regard to the Turkish accession does not derive so
much from the religious element (<strong>Turkey</strong> being a Muslim country),
but from the historic memories of their once-upon-a-time
oppressors who are still perceived as posing a threat. This also
explains why every strategy, especially in the last five years, to
“Europeanize” the national debates on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership has
failed.
Consequently, the more the discourse on <strong>Turkey</strong> is
conducted along security lines, the more likely it is that support for
Turkish accession will remain low. Conversely, the more the
discussion on Greece’s benefits due to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s possible accession
to the <strong>EU</strong>, the more likely it is that support will be rising. Within
this framework, the role of the Greek media is vital.
14 According to the Eurobarometer 66, National Report for Greece, p. 37.
15 Ibid.
99

The Greek Media: Reluctance Towards the Turkish Bid
In the case of Greece and <strong>Turkey</strong>, media have
traditionally played an important role in the bilateral relations.
After 2005, things have changed on both coasts of the
Aegean. With respect to the Turkish candidacy to the <strong>EU</strong>, Greek
media have manifested goodwill, though they remain very
skeptical on the prospect. Every Progress Report on <strong>Turkey</strong>,
published by the <strong>EU</strong> Commission, is being analyzed, every
relevant <strong>EU</strong> Council or <strong>EU</strong> Presidency Conclusions widely
covered. Notwithstanding, in terms of news coverage, Greek media
are far more interested in the developments in the internal political
scene of <strong>Turkey</strong>, rather than the progress of the country’s
negotiations with the <strong>EU</strong>. It is noteworthy that they lately cultivate
a climate of cooperation, adding importance in every bilateral
contact or agreement of the political elites.
Greek Media extensively broadcast the tensions in the
internal political scene of <strong>Turkey</strong>, which are attributed to a “battle”
between the Kemalists and the Islamists and to the powerful
political role of the Turkish military. Respectively, there are
implications that the country lacks a functioning democracy, the
military intervenes in internal political affairs, minority and human
rights are insufficiently protected. Above all, they refer to Greek
Orthodox minority rights, the recognition of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate, the opening of the Halki Theological School 16 , while
16 th
On the 28 June 2009, Culture Minister Ertugrul Gunay said the AKP
government was inclined to re-open the school, even though a final decision was
not yet made.
100

they set importance on security issues, as well as developments in
the Cyprus issue.
With regard to the European membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>,
Greek media remain reluctant. The European debates about
identity issues, the limits of Europe or the consequences of a
possible Turkish accession, are not discussed and as a result have
never reached the Greek audience. The media debate is limited to
the progress of <strong>Turkey</strong> itself (democratization process and
reforms) and to the issues of national concern (i.e. the resolution of
the Cyprus problem, the opening of the Halki Seminary, etc.).
Additionally, Greek media often question the possibility of the
settlement and resolution of the bilateral issues through the
European project of <strong>Turkey</strong>. Respectively, Greek media openly
doubt the rightness of the project itself. Recently, the visit of US
President B. H. Obama to <strong>Turkey</strong> attracted the attention of the
Greek media and emphasis was given to Obama’s support to the
Turkish candidacy to join the <strong>EU</strong>.
Conclusion
Greek political elites strongly support the Turkish
accession into the <strong>EU</strong>, although the matter still remains open
ended. The recent change of the Greek official discourse signifies a
major change in the views of the national political elites, which
nowadays aim at the establishment of a secure environment
between the two countries through <strong>Turkey</strong>’s European
membership. The change of the Greek Parliamentarians’ debate
from “security issues” towards pro-European and supportive
101

statements reveals the support of the Greek political elites to
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession negotiations.
On the other hand, the current analysis clearly indicates
that the Greek public is rather skeptical towards the Turkish
membership. Similarly, Greek media are reluctant and they openly
express their uncertainties on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s “European project”.
Provided that the trend of the public unwillingness to support the
country’s prospect continues and Greek media follow the same
trend, Greek public consensus on the issue will be very hard to
reach. This leaves the political elites as the only official supporters
of the <strong>EU</strong>-<strong>Turkey</strong> negotiations.
This reflection indisputably leads us to our very first
argument: the process of European integration is being driven (and
continues to be) by elite actions. These are the ones who should
support the Turkish membership; these are the ones who should
pave the way for the accession of <strong>Turkey</strong> into the <strong>EU</strong>. And as long
as the issue of the Turkish accession does not directly affect the
setting of the domestic political agenda, Greek public opinion will
not play any vital role in the whole process. Consequently, for
Greece, the “European project” of <strong>Turkey</strong> was, is and will continue
to be, a question of the political elites.
102

103

Gunilla Herolf *
Swedish <strong>Perceptions</strong>
Abstract
The Swedish Government’s view of a Turkish candidacy
to the European Union is positive, and has been so for some time.
A democratic and open <strong>Turkey</strong>, fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria,
will be able to contribute a lot to the <strong>EU</strong> and to serve as a bridge
between Europe and the Muslim world. Since all parties
represented in the Swedish Parliament are positive, there is in
Sweden hardly any debate about Turkish membership. The focus
of interest is therefore on the pace of Turkish reform and on the
importance that the <strong>EU</strong> will not send signals to <strong>Turkey</strong> that will
counteract these reforms. Sweden has taken initiatives to help
<strong>Turkey</strong> in this regard, even though the hoped-for progress in
negotiations during the Swedish presidency will not be possible.
Since Turkish membership is seen in a long term perspective, the
hope is that resistance within Europe and also among the Swedish
population will eventually recede.
Introduction
The Swedish Government, being strongly for continued
<strong>EU</strong> enlargement, sees <strong>Turkey</strong> as a natural member of the <strong>EU</strong> once
*
The opinions expressed herein are only those of the author and do not reflect
any institutional views.
104

it fulfills the Copenhagen criteria. It is also devoting some efforts
to this end. There are, however, several hurdles along the way for a
Turkish membership of the <strong>EU</strong>.
Media
The Swedish media do not have any individual role as
regards the issue of Turkish membership of the <strong>EU</strong>. Generally, the
editorial pages of newspapers reflect the Swedish political parties’
views that <strong>Turkey</strong> should be allowed membership of the Union but
under the condition that the Copenhagen criteria have been
fulfilled. In addition, they give room for discussion on this and
other issues, thus giving persons with contrary views on Turkish
membership the possibility to argue their opinions.
The editorial pages may also contain comments on the
Swedish attitudes. One of the major daily newspapers in May 2007
commented on the discrepancy between the positive views on
Turkish membership held by all the Swedish political parties,
which explains why there has been no real debate, and the attitudes
of the Swedish population, which had recently turned more
negative. There were many good reasons for Turkish membership,
as argued by the editorial commentator, but considering the gap
between the established political parties and people in general,
these arguments had to be voiced openly and lead to an open
debate. 1
1
S. Holmberg and R. Lindahl, ”Positiva opinionsvindar för <strong>EU</strong>” [”Positive
opinion winds for the <strong>EU</strong>”] in S. Holmberg and L. Weibull (eds) Det nya
Sverige, Trettiosju kapitel om politik, medier och samhälle, SOM-
105

The Government
Whether led by the Social Democratic Party (1994 -
2006) or, as now, by an alliance of non-socialist parties (the
Moderates, the Liberals, the Christian Democrats and the Centre
Party), the Swedish Government’s view on Turkish membership of
the <strong>EU</strong> has been positive. The Swedish Governments have been
among the group of governments most positive to enlargement of
the European Union.
The Swedish Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, when
visiting <strong>Turkey</strong> in April 2009, expressed the Swedish position in
the following way: “It is my conviction that the <strong>EU</strong> needs <strong>Turkey</strong>,
and that <strong>Turkey</strong> needs the <strong>EU</strong>. This is why Sweden supports
Turkish membership of the <strong>EU</strong>. <strong>Turkey</strong> is a secular democracy,
which belongs in Europe. <strong>Turkey</strong> brings together East and West
and has unique possibilities to unite different cultures with each
other. The <strong>EU</strong> cannot afford to disregard this.” 2
<strong>Member</strong>ship for <strong>Turkey</strong> has not been seen to be without
preconditions or to be reached quickly. As stated by the Minister
for <strong>EU</strong> Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, “We support membership –
when <strong>Turkey</strong> fulfils the criteria – because we believe that a
undersökningen 2006, SOM-rapport nr 41[The New Sweden, Thirtyseven
chapters on politics, media and society, SOM Survey 2006, SOM Report no.
41], Göteborg: SOM-institutet, 2007, commented in Svenska Dagbladet,
”Massiv opinion mot turkiskt medlemskap” [”Massive opinion against Turkish
membership”], 8 May 2007. See also ref. no. 16.
3 Tal av statsminister Fredrik Reinfeldt i Kulu, Turkiet, den 21 april 2009
[Speech by Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt in Kulu, <strong>Turkey</strong>, 21 April 2009],
http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/11738/a/124859.
106

democratic and open <strong>Turkey</strong> has a lot to contribute to the <strong>EU</strong> and
that the country can serve as an important bridge between Europe
and the Muslim world. <strong>Member</strong>ship is of course very far into the
future but it is important that we forward positive signals to <strong>Turkey</strong>
and to all those who want the Prime Minister and the Government
to approach Europe and bring the country into the <strong>EU</strong>.” 3
In order to further the Turkish process towards the <strong>EU</strong>
and deepen the bilateral relations between Sweden and <strong>Turkey</strong>, the
Swedish Foreign Ministry, in cooperation with the Swedish
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and the
Consulate General in Istanbul, initiated a special “<strong>Turkey</strong>
Programme”. The programme, which started after the start of the
Turkish negotiations on 3 October 2005, aims to support the
democracy process and the work of respecting human rights. 4
The Swedish Government’s positive view on <strong>Turkey</strong> in
the European Union is not shared by, among others, French
President Sarkozy, who visited Sweden on 3 July, just after the
start of the Swedish presidency. Sweden and France agree on a
number of vital <strong>EU</strong> issues, but enlargement, and in particular that
of <strong>Turkey</strong>, is not one of them. Reinfeldt on this occasion declared
that while the Swedish viewpoint was well known, he would
respect the differences in opinion within the <strong>EU</strong> and did not see it
4
C. Malmström, Minister for <strong>EU</strong> Affairs, ”Turkiet och <strong>EU</strong>” [<strong>Turkey</strong> and the
<strong>EU</strong>], Europaforum, Hässleholm 8 April 2008,
www.regeringen.se/sb/d/10173/a/102489.
5
Turkietprogrammet [The <strong>Turkey</strong> Programme],
www.regeringen.se/sb/d/6131/a/60079.
107

as his task to put pressure on countries with other views in order to
push them to share the Swedish ones. 5
<strong>Turkey</strong> and the Criteria
The Turkish reform process, with its positive and
negative aspects, has been commented on in many speeches. The
Minister for <strong>EU</strong> Affairs, in a speech on 8 April 2008, brought up
what she saw as a number of important changes:
The death penalty has been abolished and the government
has declared zero tolerance towards torture and introduced laws to
support this – even though the implementation still has some flaws.
The new penal law includes strengthened rights for women, not
least concerning so called “honour crimes”.
The influence of the military in political life continues to
be substantial, but new laws limit it. Much remains to be done in
this area, however.
The right of free speech is protected by basic law in
<strong>Turkey</strong>, but the many cases in which authors and other intellectuals
have been and continue to be prosecuted demonstrates at the same
time that there are many taboos that need to be addressed. The
almost notorious Article 301 in the penal law needs to be basically
changed or removed. It represents exaggerated protection of the
state and its symbols. During his visit the previous week to
6
I. Hedström, ”Barroso svår nöt för Reinfeldt” [”Barroso tough issue for
Reinfeldt”], Dagens Nyheter, 3 July 2009,
www.dn.se/fordjupning/europa2009/1.904853?rm=print
108

Sweden, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan had assured that the
Turkish Parliament was preparing a change of this law. There
were, however, also other laws of the same character that needed
to be changed.
According to the Swedish Minister for <strong>EU</strong> Affairs, Mr
Erdogan had also promised a proposal for a new basic law and the
issue of freedom of speech, to be brought up on the agenda again.
Furthermore, progress has been made in the area of
cultural rights. Somewhat improved rights now exist for Kurds to
use their language openly. Public and private radio and TV
emissions in Kurdish exist to some degree. At the same time, the
Minister said, discrimination is still known to be very extensive
and the Kurds are not recognized as the large minority that in fact
they are.
The extensive terrorism which has been and continues to
be aimed at <strong>Turkey</strong> has impaired efforts to create dialogue and
confidence. The Minister declared that Sweden counted on the
promise by Prime Minister Erdogan to put into action his words
that “the Kurdish problem is my problem” and to address
sustainable economic and social development in southeastern
<strong>Turkey</strong>.
As regards the issue of a reunited Cyprus, a positive
development is seen as having taken place during the last few
months, such as the opening of the Ledra street in Nicosia (to
recall: this speech was made in April 2008). The Turkish
government deserves credit for siding with the Kofi Annan plan, a
domestically sensitive issue, and it is tragic for the Cypriots
109

themselves, for <strong>Turkey</strong> and for the <strong>EU</strong> that the Greek Cypriots
rejected the plan. Sweden and the <strong>EU</strong> have every reason to support
the development very strongly. For <strong>Turkey</strong>, a solution would mean
an energy injection into the Turkish negotiations. 6
The Turkish Negotiation Process
The Swedish ambition in the spring of 2008 was that
additional chapters should be opened during the 18-month French-
Czech-Swedish team presidency to add to the six chapters opened
at that time and the two-three chapters that were hopefully to be
opened during the Slovenian presidency.. As stated by the Minister
for <strong>EU</strong> Affairs, the speed was, however, ultimately to be decided
by the willingness of Ankara to reform. The Copenhagen Criteria
must be followed. 7
In an interview in connection with Sweden assuming the
presidency of the <strong>EU</strong>, Prime Minister Reinfeldt declared that
continued progress in the negotiations with <strong>Turkey</strong> was a priority
issue, but the success of it would above all depend on the reform
efforts of <strong>Turkey</strong> itself. During the Swedish presidency, the
progress on the implementation of the so called Ankara Protocol
would be followed-up and reviewed. A resolution of the Cyprus
issue would of course have positive effects on the Turkish <strong>EU</strong>
process, as well as for the region and the <strong>EU</strong> in its entirety. 8
7
C. Malmström (see ref.no. 3)
8
C. Malmström, (see ref. no. 3)
9
Det svenska ordförandeskapet kommer att arbeta för en långsiktig ekonomisk
återhämtning i <strong>EU</strong> [The Swedish Presidency intends to start working on a long-
110

The <strong>EU</strong> Attitude to Turkish <strong>Member</strong>ship
Minister Malmström, in her speech in April 2008, was
also critical towards some other <strong>EU</strong> members because of their
attitudes towards <strong>Turkey</strong>. Partly, she said, Turkish skepticism was
a result of the way in which the <strong>EU</strong> had invited <strong>Turkey</strong> to the
negotiation table. In its final conclusions, the Council had declared
that negotiations were no guarantee for membership and that
exceptions to the free movement of labour could become
permanent. The reason, she said, why some countries simply did
not want to see <strong>Turkey</strong> as a member was related to worries about
increasing unemployment and globalization, but als about the
change of power within the Council and the costs for the <strong>EU</strong> that a
Turkish membership would entail. In some cases there was also
xenophobia and islamophobia. The message sent to the Turks was
that it did not matter if <strong>Turkey</strong> did all that the <strong>EU</strong> demanded –
when that day came, the <strong>EU</strong> would still consider if they wanted
<strong>Turkey</strong> and if they could afford letting the Turks in. 9
However, according to Minister Malmström, the
dominating view among <strong>EU</strong> member states was that the <strong>EU</strong> has
promised <strong>Turkey</strong> a fair chance. If <strong>Turkey</strong> would comply with all
the demands of the <strong>EU</strong>, it should be able to become a member.
This was the perspective that had been behind the reform process
in <strong>Turkey</strong> during the last few years. This was also, she said, the
signal that Sweden was sending to <strong>Turkey</strong>. On that day when
<strong>Turkey</strong> fulfilled the criteria, it belonged in the European Union as
a full member. If the <strong>EU</strong> was not clear about this, it risked
term economic recovery of the <strong>EU</strong>],
www.consilium.europa.eu/showFocus.aspx?id=1&focusId=387&lang=EN
10
C. Malmström (see ref.no. 3).
111

weakening the reform process and, in the worst case, rejecting
<strong>Turkey</strong> at a time when we were all depending more than ever on
stability and democracy in the part of Europe bordering on the
world’s possibly most troubled region, the Middle East. Here,
<strong>Turkey</strong> was a partner of immense importance. A <strong>Turkey</strong> cut off
from the <strong>EU</strong> process would threaten not only the reform process in
<strong>Turkey</strong>, but also in all other candidate and potential candidate
countries. This would also lead to a serious crisis between the <strong>EU</strong>
and <strong>Turkey</strong>, with regional and maybe global consequences for the
reputation of the <strong>EU</strong> and its credibility as a negotiating partner. 10
Human Rights
A report by the Swedish Foreign Ministry in 2007 dealt
with the situation in <strong>Turkey</strong> in terms of human rights. The overall
view stated that during the last few years a large number of
reforms had been undertaken as a result of closer relations to the
<strong>EU</strong>. Large parts of the Constitution as well as other laws had been
revised in accordance with the Copenhagen Criteria. The year
2007 was dominated by political crises connected to parliamentary
and presidential elections. Democracy came out stronger after
these crises, among other things as a result of the voters’ clear
disapproval of those who had used undemocratic methods when
trying to prevent the presidential election, and by the Parliament
11 C. Malmström (see ref. no. 3)
112

ecoming more representative after the election. However, reform
work had suffered during this period. 11
The report furthermore referred to the strong promises of
continued reforms, including revision of the Constitution. It was
noted that there existed in Turkish law a tendency to protect the
state, its highest officials, institutions and flag rather than to
protect the individual. Other aspects brought up were the lack of
development in Kurdish areas and the situation of women being
underrepresented in politics and working life. Furthermore, it was
noted that more women than men were illiterate and that violence
against women was a widespread problem. 12
Opposition and Debate about Turkish <strong>Member</strong>ship
Turkish membership is no issue in the Swedish political
discussion, since all the political parties represented in the Swedish
Parliament are positive. Outside the Swedish Parliament (since
they have gathered less than the required four per cent of votes),
the xenophobic Sweden Democrats argue that <strong>Turkey</strong> does not
belong in the <strong>EU</strong>. They refer to the enormous economic costs, the
accelerated increase of Islam in Europe, the strong increase in
immigration leading to lower salaries also for Swedes, and the
12Mänskliga rättigheter i Turkiet 2007 [Human Rights in <strong>Turkey</strong> 2007]
Regeringskansliet,
Ministry]
13
Ibid.
Utrikesdepartementet
113
[Government Offices, Foreign

prospect of Sweden in the future being forced to defend <strong>Turkey</strong> in
a conflict with Iraqi Kurdistan. 13
Opposition to Turkish membership may also be found
among individuals in Sweden, including among members of
parties whose leadership is strongly positive. One such case is
Fredrik Malm, member of the Liberal Party, whose view is that the
Swedish government is too lenient towards <strong>Turkey</strong> on the Kurdish
issue. As he sees it, the main problem causing the lack of progress
in the Turkish negotiations is that <strong>Turkey</strong> does not implement the
reforms demanded by the <strong>EU</strong>. Mr Erdogan’s party, the AKP,
having been in power in <strong>Turkey</strong> for more than six years and with a
majority in Parliament, should have been able to do more. The
problem, Malm argues, is not the fact that <strong>Turkey</strong> is a Muslim
country or a big country, but the fact that the values on which <strong>EU</strong>
cooperation rests are different from those on which the Turkish
state is built. Fredrik Malm, stating that he is positive to a future
Turkish membership, claims that such membership must be
preceded by an honest will to reform and would be helped by a
Swedish Presidency that is stronger in its demands for reforms by
<strong>Turkey</strong>. 14
Among individual members of the political parties a
debate related to Turkish membership takes place, which shows
wide variation in terms of arguments. One example is that the
Swedish Moderates were criticized by a Social Democrat not
because of their own views on Turkish membership but because
their partners within the EPP group in the European Parliament are
14
Sven-Olof Sällström, www.newsmill.se/artikel/2009/06/02/
15Svenska Dagbladet, Fredrik Malm, Stäng dörren för Turkiet [Close the door
for <strong>Turkey</strong>], 28 May 2009.
114

negative towards <strong>Turkey</strong> joining the Union. 15 Other articles on the
same site argue, for example, that “<strong>Turkey</strong> in the <strong>EU</strong> shows that
Islam and democracy can co-exist”, “<strong>Member</strong>ship can turn <strong>Turkey</strong>
into a liberal market economy” and that the “Cyprus conflict must
be solved first”.
The conviction shared by all parties represented in the
Swedish parliament, that <strong>Turkey</strong> should be allowed to join the <strong>EU</strong>
is, however, not shared by the population. In the Göteborg
University SOM Survey of 2008, 48 per cent were against Turkish
membership, whereas only 13 per cent were in favour of it. (These
figures were very similar to those of the survey of 2007, in which
49 per cent were against and 12 per cent for). In both years’
surveys as many as 39 per cent of the respondents were
uncertain. 16 One reason for the large number of uncertain
respondents may be that Turkish membership is an issue for the
future and under many preconditions, an issue on which people
may find it difficult to have an opinion today.
The Civil Society
No form of civil society can be distinguished in Sweden
as having a particular view or being engaged in the discussion on
Turkish membership of the <strong>EU</strong>. As mentioned above, the
established political parties are of the same view and the few
16
Andreas Sjölander, Newsmill,
http://wwwnewsmill.se/artikel/2009/05/31/turkiet-ar-inte-valkomna-i-hogernseu.
17
S. Holmberg, ”Ökat opinionsstöd för <strong>EU</strong>”, [“Increased public opinion support
for the <strong>EU</strong>”] Europapolitisk analys 2008:5; Stockholm: SIEPS; See also S.
Holmberg, and R. Lindahl, 2007, ref. no. 1.
115

dissenting voices are individuals, usually seen in commentaries in
newspapers or blogs.
Conclusion
The Swedish government, while believing that <strong>Turkey</strong>
can contribute much to Europe and also that <strong>Turkey</strong> itself needs
Europe, has made substantial efforts to bring <strong>Turkey</strong> closer to <strong>EU</strong>
membership. The “<strong>Turkey</strong> Programme” is one example, centring
on the Turkish reforms needed. This is a crucial area, since without
it no <strong>EU</strong> membership will take place. While the Swedish
Presidency will not succeed in bringing about the hoped for steps
forward in negotiations, obviously Sweden will continue to further
it during and after the presidency. In time, so is most likely the
thinking, European countries will accept Turkish membership.
Still, major efforts are required in several areas by <strong>Turkey</strong>.
116

117

Cengiz Günay *
Austrian <strong>Perceptions</strong>
Austria, alongside Germany and France, can be counted
among the most ardent opponents of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the
European Union. The issue has been heatedly discussed in the
country. The Austrian discourse on Turkish membership has been
strongly shaped by cultural arguments touching on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
alleged lack of Europeanness. However, a closer look at the
discourse reveals that the issue is less <strong>Turkey</strong> itself but that
arguments rather revolve around unsolved domestic issues, such as
the integration of ever-growing migrant communities. Therefore,
one can draw the conclusion that the discourse on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
integration contains many aspects of Austria’s painful search for a
new multi-cultural identity in a radically changing globalised
world. While the broader Turkish public has been well aware of
the fact that Austria has been highly critical of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession,
and while many have not forgiven the Austrian government’s
tactics to hinder and delay the opening of negotiations back in
2005, only a few know about the issue’s background and how
Austrian attitudes have changed or not changed over the last years,
since the beginning of negotiations.
*
The opinions expressed herein are only those of the author and do not reflect
any institutional views.
118

Background
Over the last 15 years, since its own accession to the
European Union, the Austrian public has not only become
increasingly critical of any further enlargement processes, but also
of the <strong>EU</strong> itself. While back in 1995 more than 66 percent had
endorsed membership to the <strong>EU</strong> in a referendum held that year,
approval of <strong>EU</strong> membership dramatically diminished over the last
14 years, reaching a new high in the debates on the Lisbon Treaty
in 2008. However, the current global financial crisis seems to have
shown Austrians that being a part of the European Union, instead
of being alone, does indeed have advantages. Consequently,
support for <strong>EU</strong> membership is on the rise once again. 1
Generally speaking, one can say that in the face of
tremendous economic changes, triggered by globalization and
liberalization, many Austrians have deemed the country simply too
small to have a say, and the double-talk of politicians using
Brussels as a scapegoat for unpopular decisions and claiming
success for themselves, has increased feelings of uncertainty and
distrust in the Union and its institutions. 2 Thus, in the domestic
debate Brussels was held responsible for rising energy prices; it
has often been depicted as a symbol for nuclear energy lobbies or
genetic engineering, and rightist populist rhetoric has often
denounced the wastefulness of the Brussels’ bureaucracy.
1
See; orf online, “Zustimmung zu <strong>EU</strong> laut Umfrage auf Rekordwert“,
19.11.2009
2
46 percent of the Austrians think that their country has only little impact on <strong>EU</strong>
decisions. (“<strong>EU</strong>-Skepsis: Die Kommission kritisiert Politik und “Krone” in: Die
Presse, 14 July 2008)
119

The larger people’s parties ÖVP (Conservatives) and SPÖ
(Social Democrats) have failed to continue and, even more so, to
implement the pro-<strong>EU</strong> rhetoric they had pursued before the
referendum on accession. While the public’s expectations
regarding economic savings were high – this had constituted the
major part of the government’s pro-<strong>EU</strong> campaign – prices
constantly rose since membership, and the situation in the labour
market became increasingly difficult. 3 The people’s parties, but
also the media, academia and civil society organisations have
continuously failed to explain the advantages of membership to the
<strong>EU</strong>. Instead, the issue fell into the hands of the far right, which has
increasingly agitated the public against “Brussels’s dictatorship”.
While Austria can be counted among the countries which
economically benefited most from integration with the former
communist countries of Eastern Europe, the Austrian public has
also remained rather sceptical of this process. The <strong>EU</strong>’s eastern
enlargement, strongly supported by the country’s political,
intellectual and economic elites, was hardly promoted. The elites
failed to communicate and confer their enthusiasm and they failed
to respond to the comprehensible fears and anxieties of the
common people. After all, the general public hardly felt any
positive effects. Whereas larger companies, banks, and insurance
companies benefited from expansion into the neighbouring eastern
countries, the economic success of these companies hardly trickled
down to the common man. On the contrary, small sized companies
faced difficulties adapting to the new competition, and particularly
handcraft labourers, workers in the manufacturing sector and
3
See; Cengiz Günay, “Austrian Stakeholders in the <strong>EU</strong>-<strong>Turkey</strong> Debate”, Natalie
Tocci (ed.), Talking <strong>Turkey</strong> in Europe: Towards a Differentiated
Communication Strategy, Quaderni IAI, December 2008, p. 67
120

unqualified white-collar workers in the service sector have feared
social dumping from the bordering eastern countries.
Despite the general public’s uncertainties about
enlargement and its possible negative consequences, the issue was
hardly debated. Even the far right Freedom Party (FPÖ), a party
which has seen itself as a kind of “Robin Hood”, defending the
interests of the common man against the elites, but also against
“threatening” “foreigners” (Ausländer) by ruthlessly stirring up
people’s simmering feelings of fear and rage, had refrained from
politicising the issue, as it was tied up in a coalition with the
conservative ÖVP, and approval to eastern enlargement had been a
precondition to participation in the government.
Interestingly, while <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership was not an
issue until then, the so-called “Turkish Question” gained
momentum with eastern enlargement in 2004. A break within the
far right movement triggered the discussion.
The “Turkish Question”, also a consequence of eastern
enlargement
One can easily say that the debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>
compensated for the lack of any discussions revolving around the
last two rounds of enlargement. A public discussion on the benefits
and costs of Romania and Bulgaria simply did not take place,
despite the fact that the public remained rather critical of the
accession of both countries. 4
4
Although, Austrian companies and industries are highly involved in the
Bulgarian and Romanian financing-sectors as well as energy markets, high
121

On the other hand, the discourse on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession
contained many fears, uncertainties and prejudices connected with
the transition to an increasingly multi-cultural society. In this
context, the integration of growing Muslim migrant communities
into what has been perceived as Austrian culture has constituted
the biggest challenge, particularly in metropolitan areas.
The debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession coincided with a
culturalist global discourse which has prevailed after September
11, and which has been charged with prejudices, anxiety and
suspicion against Islam and Muslims. In its campaigns, the far
right has used <strong>Turkey</strong> and Turks – the largest group of Muslim
migrants in Austria – as the representatives of Islam; as such, they
have been portrayed as a major threat to Austrian culture, which
has been equated with Christian and European civilization. The
Freedom Party (FPÖ) used images of Talibans and fully veiled
women on its billboards, in order to mobilise against the so-called
“Islamic Threat”. The Freedom Party played with historical
narratives deeply buried in the collective memory, excavating
images of the “terrible” medieval Turks, perceived as one of the
major historical threats to the country. The party’s blue-eyed
leader, H.C. Strache, was presented in a historical context as
Prince Eugene, the historical figure who saved Vienna from
Turkish siege in 1683, and in its electoral campaign for the general
elections in 2006, the party applied slogans saying in Viennese
dialectic “Home instead of Islam” or “No Turkish <strong>EU</strong>”,
demonstrating the seeming incompatibility of Islam and
Turkishness with Austria and Europe.
economic involvement could not be transformed into public approval to the
membership of the two countries.
122

Whereas in other European countries the left has often
stood against such xenophobic undertones, in Austria, the quality
of the discourse on Turkish membership clearly worsened when
the then oppositional Social Democrats shifted in 2004 to a
hardline position against Turkish membership. The Social
Democrats’ U-turn that year was due to tactical reasons, and aimed
at gaining back the party’s working class grassroots and the
pensioners who have been increasingly susceptible to the far
right’s culturalist, anti-foreigner and anti-Muslim slogans. The
Social Democrats, then the major opposition party, put pressure on
the coalition government consisting of the conservative People’s
Party (ÖVP) and the FPÖ and later the Union for Austria’s Future
(BZÖ), to hinder the opening of accession talks with <strong>Turkey</strong>.
The idea of a referendum calms the debate
Challenged by the opposition parties and by its own
conservative grassroots, the government tried to hinder and delay
the opening of accession talks. Strongly backed by the then
oppositional German Christian Democrats, Chancellor Schüssel
tried to promote the concept of a “privileged partnership”. The
government’s tactics to hinder and delay the opening of
negotiations also aimed at extorting the other member states to also
open negotiations with Croatia, which was previously criticised by
the Commission for not having sufficiently cooperated with the
War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. After long hours of
negotiations behind closed doors and stipulations which
emphasised the open-ended character of the negotiations, the
Austrian Chancellor and his foreign minister – who had been
rather isolated in this issue – had to give in. In return, the Union
123

decided to also open negotiations with Croatia. The government
sold its tough stance in Brussels as a success and as a proof that
Austria has a say in the Union. In order to silence criticism, the
Chancellor announced a referendum on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership, to
be held once the negotiations were completed.
While, except for the Greens and a few commentators
who pointed to the dangers and warned against xenophobic
polarization a referendum might cause, the idea was celebrated by
the political elites as a means of countering criticism that <strong>EU</strong>
policies would lack democratic popular support. Disapproval for
Turkish membership and the idea to leave the final decision with
the people helped to establish a rare moment of cross-party
consensus. Tellingly, the political elites have refrained from
demanding referenda on other enlargements, such as that of
Croatia.
While the integration of the Balkans region – Austria’s
historical sphere of political and economic influence – lies among
the prime goals of the country’s political and economic
establishment (in Croatia, for example, Austria is the largest
foreign investor with a share of 25% of all foreign direct
investments 5 ), there have been hardly any lobbies publicly
supporting and promoting <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership. However, despite
the elites’ strong interest in integrating the neighbouring East, the
Austrian public leads the group of opponents of further
enlargement, with 62 percent dismissing Macedonia’s accession,
73 percent being against Albania’s integration, 59 percent being
against Bosnia-Herzegovina’s and 65 percent against Serbia’s
5
Information based on the Austrian Chamber of Commerce.
124

accession to the <strong>EU</strong>. Only Croatia’s accession seems to be rather
undisputed. 55 percent have stated they would support Croatian
membership. 6 Only a few years ago, a majority had refused
Croatia’s membership; however, the elites’ strong support for
Croatia, particularly the support of conservative Catholic circles,
has boosted positive views on this country. Even the far right
Freedom Party seems to have fallen in line.
The promise to hold a referendum on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession
was later adopted by the new coalition government, which was
formed by the Social Democrats and the People’s Party after the
early elections held in fall 2006. 7 The coalition agreement signed
between the two parties formalised the foreign strategy to see the
Balkans as the focus point of the country’s foreign and security
policies and to promote negotiations with Croatia; it also stipulated
the refusal for Turkish membership by paraphrasing it with the
goal of supporting Turkish compliance with European values and
standards and by championing a tailored union with <strong>Turkey</strong>,
another way of saying “privileged partnership”. 8 The coalition
government under Chancellor Gusenbauer immediately proved its
disapproval for Turkish membership when it took on a hardline
position in December 2006, when <strong>Turkey</strong> refused to implement the
protocol of the customs union to the Republic of Cyprus. Even
though Austria acted together with France, Greece and Greek
6
See; Cengiz Günay, “Austrian Stakeholders in the <strong>EU</strong>-<strong>Turkey</strong> Debate”, Natalie
Tocci (ed.), Talking <strong>Turkey</strong> in Europe: Towards a Differentiated
Communication Strategy, Quaderni IAI, December 2008, p. 68
7
The Social Democrats under Alfred Gusenbauer had surprisingly emerged
victorious from these elections while the conservative People’s Party lost around
8 percent in votes.
8
See; Margaretha Kopeinig, “Regierung lehnt Türkei – Beitritt ab“, in Kurier 12
Jannuary 2007
125

Cypriots, the front broke apart, as the strategic interests of the four
countries radically differed. While Austria saw this as an occasion
to bring about the end of the negotiation process, Greece and
Cyprus had an interest in its continuation.
Meanwhile, in 2008 Austria again experienced early
elections, when, after the Social Democrats’ U-turn in regard to
<strong>EU</strong> policies, the former coalition government broke apart. A
change in the leadership of the Social Democrats was accompanied
by a rhetorical shift to a more critical stance against the <strong>EU</strong>.
Observers commented on the party’s tactical shift as another
genuflexion before populism. As mentioned earlier, <strong>EU</strong> critical
voices had gained ground after the negative Irish referendum on
the Lisbon Treaty. More and more voices demanded for a similar
referendum in Austria. In order to counter falling polls, the Social
Democrats joined in the chorus and declared that henceforth all <strong>EU</strong>
treaties which might affect or alter the Austrian constitution should
be presented to the will of the people.
Although the reiteration of the refusal of Turkish
membership has become a tantra of the political mainstream –
except the Greens, who have been supporters of Turkish
membership, though silent ones – the issue itself has gradually lost
momentum. One can even say that over the last four years the
Turkish Question has gradually disappeared from the radar.
Consequently, one can draw the conclusion that the announcement
to hold a referendum has helped to cool down the over-heated
debate, as it has postponed the issue by delegating it to the will of
the people in a far future.
Therefore, reporting on the issue, comments and op-eds
dealing with the pros and cons have largely disappeared – to such
126

an extent that on charts or maps dealing with <strong>EU</strong>-connected issues,
<strong>Turkey</strong> is often hardly or even not at all listed as a candidate
country. While reporting on the negotiation process and its
progresses and setbacks has diminished, interest in <strong>Turkey</strong>, its
domestic and foreign policies and its economic and regional role
have strikingly increased.
Although the previous debates on Turkish membership
have boosted existing prejudices, preset images and perceptions of
“the Turks”, <strong>Turkey</strong>’s economic rise over the last years and the
country’s growing importance as an energy hub have attracted
further interest.
Austrian businesses expanding into <strong>Turkey</strong>
While politicians have pursued a hardline position,
Austrian companies have silently expanded into <strong>Turkey</strong>. The trade
volume between the two countries grew between 2002 and 2008 at
60 percent. In 2006 alone, exports to <strong>Turkey</strong> grew by 14.4 percent.
In 2008, exports from Austria reached a total of 965.9 million
Euros, while imports from <strong>Turkey</strong> in the same year comprised
909.5 million Euros. 9 Direct investment in <strong>Turkey</strong> has reached 1.2
billion USD, ranking Austria tenth among the biggest foreign
investors in <strong>Turkey</strong>. 10 While some of Austria’s leading companies
have already entered the Turkish market (Red Bull, Mayr
Mellenhof, Magna, OMV, Verbund, BankAustria), small and
9
http://www.bmeia.gv.at/botschaft/ankara/bilateralebeziehungen/wirtschaft.html
(26.11.2009)
10
Hercher H. (2008) „Türkei: Bei Investitionen spielt Österreich in der
„Superliga““, Wirtschaftsblatt, 11 February.
127

middle sized companies have been more cautious. 11 Not
surprisingly, the Austrian Federation of Industry and Chambers of
Commerce regard <strong>Turkey</strong> as an extremely important partner with
much potential. In May 2008 the daily Standard reported, citing an
anonymous businessman, that Austria’s policy in regard to Turkish
membership would complicate the businesses of Austrian
companies in <strong>Turkey</strong>. 12 Although the Austrian Federation of
Industry has denied such effects, one can state that the rhetoric of
Austrian politicians talking about Austria’s hardline position has
become softer, emphasising the consistency of Austria’s position,
contrasting it with that of other member countries, such as France,
which have shifted from supporters to ardent opponents, and
pointing to the fact that Austria’s position was honest and that
friendship would require honesty.
In recent years, Austria’s largest company, OMV, has
defined <strong>Turkey</strong> as one of its major growth markets. The company
acquired shares in <strong>Turkey</strong>’s Petrol Ofisi, declaring that the
company aims to extend its shares to 100 percent. OMV has also
been building a power plant near Samsun and the company has
also been leading the Nabucco pipeline project, the aim of which is
to connect Central Europe with the gas fields of the Caspian Sea
by crossing <strong>Turkey</strong>.
While increasing business activities will certainly
contribute to the improvement of bilateral relations, one can also
say that strong public attention to <strong>Turkey</strong> has had a positive side-
11
Cengiz Günay, “Austrian Stakeholders in the <strong>EU</strong>-<strong>Turkey</strong> Debate”, Natalie
Tocci (ed.), Talking <strong>Turkey</strong> in Europe: Towards a Differentiated
Communication Strategy, Quaderni IAI, December 2008, p. 79
12
Ibid, p. 78
128

effect. Extensive reporting on <strong>Turkey</strong> has generated a group of
journalists specialised in <strong>Turkey</strong> or <strong>Turkey</strong> – <strong>EU</strong> issues. Most of
them have gained good knowledge about Turkish politics and its
actors, as well as <strong>Turkey</strong>’s social and historical background. But,
probably most important, they have established information
networks with Turkish colleagues, academics, politicians,
diplomats and business circles. In turn, the quality of reporting on
<strong>Turkey</strong> and related issues has certainly improved. 13
The decoupling of the discourse on <strong>Turkey</strong> from that on
the <strong>EU</strong> accession process has certainly improved the quality of the
debate. This can also be stated about various conferences, seminars
and workshops organised by the academia and think tanks and
which have dealt with <strong>Turkey</strong>-related issues. While only a couple
of years ago, any discussion on <strong>Turkey</strong> would have been highjacked
by an emotional debate on arguments dealing with the
dangers of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership, often characterised by fear and
anxiety, today’s arguments, questions and comments are much
more factual.
Conclusion
One can conclude that the over-heated debate on
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession has cooled down since 2006. Although
approval of Turkish membership has remained at a very low level,
this does not mean that things cannot change – particularly
considering that interest in <strong>Turkey</strong> and its social, political,
economic and cultural development has grown. The media has
been reporting extensively on <strong>Turkey</strong>. Even rather special
13 Ibid, p. 80
129

domestic Turkish debates, such as that on the lifting of the head
scarf ban in universities, have drawn the attention of the Austrian
media. Radio stations, TV and newspapers reported in length on
the issue.
As the trade volume between the two countries has been
constantly growing – economic relations have only experienced a
set-back in 2009, due to the current economic crisis – business
circles and companies can be regarded as potential lobbies for a
change in the quality of the discourse on <strong>Turkey</strong>. This does not
necessarily imply that business circles support Turkish
membership. However, they might have an interest in a more
balanced debate and a less hardline position of the government in
the course of the negotiation process. Therefore, the cooling down
of the debate created by the announcement of a future referendum
should be perceived as a chance to improve perceptions.
130

131

Costas Melakopides *
Greek Cypriot <strong>Perceptions</strong>
Introduction
What “Cyprus” stands for differs radically depending on
whether it is conceived by <strong>Turkey</strong> and the Turkish Cypriots (TCs)
or by the Greek Cypriots (GCs) and the international community,
including the European Union (<strong>EU</strong>). While the Republic of Cyprus
is the internationally recognised state and a full <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Member</strong> State
since 1 May 2004, <strong>Turkey</strong> refuses to recognise it. It recognises,
however, the secessionist “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(“TRNC”) which is recognised by no other state in the world. All
of this results from <strong>Turkey</strong>´s 1974 military intervention and the
1983 unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by the
secessionist regime. <strong>Turkey</strong>´s problem, however, is that the
international community - through such Organisations as the UN
and the EC/<strong>EU</strong>, and its Courts, such as the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) and the Court of Justice of the European
Communities - has treated the 1974 action as invasion, i.e., as an
illegal intervention. It has also condemned the UDI as contrary to
international law and cannot, therefore, recognise it. But <strong>Turkey</strong>´s
well-known geostrategic significance and other attributes of hard
power have ingratiated it to such power-centres and powerformations
as Washington, London and NATO, so that, instead of
*
The opinions expressed herein are only those of the author and do not reflect
any institutional views.
132

convincing it to comply with the principles and norms of the global
legal culture, they have tolerated its excessive ambitions.
Now, the <strong>EU</strong> has supported Cyprus vis-à-vis <strong>Turkey</strong>:
raising consistently the issue of the occupation of 37% of Cypriot
territory; condemning immediately the 1983 UDI; rejecting
<strong>Turkey</strong>´s application for membership in 1989, in part because of
the two aforementioned unlawful acts; finally, the <strong>EU</strong> accepted the
entire Republic as a full member. For the GCs, however, this is
insufficient: first, the gross violation of their, and the TCs´, human
rights has lasted for too long; and second, since Cypriot territory is
under illegal occupation, it follows that <strong>EU</strong> territory suffers
similarly.
The GCs insist that they are eager to settle the Cyprus
problem. They see their good will as demonstrable, in their
extending friendship and material support to the TCs; in raising no
obstacles to the start of <strong>Turkey</strong>´s negotiations for <strong>EU</strong>RO
membership in either 2004 or 2005; and in their working to settle
the problem fairly and functionally for the benefit of all legitimate
Cypriots. Simultaneously, they perceive <strong>Turkey</strong>´s intransigence as
bad faith - in ignoring the international legal and ethical
pronouncements - and as deriving from the arrogance of hard
power, the ambition to become a “regional superpower”, and the
exploitation of the occupation as leverage for eventual <strong>EU</strong>
accession. Meanwhile, although the entire Republic became a full
<strong>Member</strong> State, the presence of 40,000 Turkish occupation troops
prevents the acquis communautaire from being applied to the
occupied territory until the settlement of the country´s
(legal/political/ethical) problem.
133

Numerous international initiatives to settle the notorious
problem have failed. The last such initiative, known as the “Annan
plan”, was accepted by the TCs and the thousands of (illegal)
Turkish settlers in the “TRNC”; the GCs rejected it, as unfair and
nonviable, by an overwhelming 76%. 1 According to that plan, its
rejection by either Cypriot community would render it “null and
void”. And yet, those who worked for the plan´s endorsement –
primarily the UK, the US and <strong>Turkey</strong>- are at pains to revive it. All
this explains why the GCs are experiencing anger and frustration
caused by their intolerable condition. These sentiments are
mitigated by the <strong>EU</strong> accession in 2004 and the <strong>EU</strong>RO zone entry
on 1 January 2008. However, neither these successes nor the
accumulated “ethical acquis” – intimated above as manifesting
<strong>EU</strong> attachment to its principles and values - suffice to eradicate the
Greek Cypriots´ sense of unbearable injustice.
In September 2008, “face-to-face” negotiations began
between President Demetris Christofias and TC leader Mehmet Ali
Talat. Although the negotiations are full of enigmas, hence clouded
in mystery, the Nicosia Government remained optimistic while
many political actors are increasingly sceptical. Intriguingly,
although the Republic holds – through its veto - a decisive key to
<strong>Turkey</strong>´s <strong>EU</strong> trajectory, its post-2004 Governments have resisted
its use. In tandem with Athens, and to avoid causing a serious
intra-Community conflict, Nicosia has embraced the diplomatic
style associated with the Union´s non-conflictual principles and
values, as the best road to reconciliation. This policy has not
worked. However, under mounting pressure from public opinion,
1
See Costas Melakopides, Unfair Play: Cyprus, <strong>Turkey</strong>, Greece, the UK and the
<strong>EU</strong> (Kingston, Canada: Queens´s Centre for International Relations, 2006).
134

political elites, influential opinion-makers, and some prestigious
academics, the Zeitgeist is currently being metamorphosed.
Precisely because <strong>Turkey</strong> insists on mobilizing the full repertoire
of its asymmetric hard power - including recent threats to use again
military force vis-à-vis the reported hydrocarbons in Cyprus´
exclusive economic zone- the intellectual, analytical and political
pressures are calling on Nicosia to stop using exclusively
diplomatic carrots and to begin employing its political stick. In
what follows, then, I will address Cypriot perceptions of, and
intentions towards, <strong>Turkey</strong>´s candidacy, in terms of (a) the
Government, (b) the Opposition, (c) the media, and (d) civil
society.
The Nicosia Government
In December 2004, despite a mobilised body of (public
and expert) opinion, Nicosia supported <strong>Turkey</strong>´s accession
negotiations. President Tassos Papadopoulos resisted the veto
temptation so soon after Cyprus´ accession. By December 2005,
there was renewed pressure to combat <strong>Turkey</strong>´s continued
obduracy, by such “verbal actions” as demanding the departure of
the occupation troops from Cyprus/<strong>EU</strong> territory, the ending and
reversal of illegal colonization, ceasing the sale of GC properties in
the occupied area, etc. Many GCs were also inspired by the 21
September 2005 <strong>EU</strong> “anti-declaration”, which stressed that
Ankara´s unilateral “declaration” against the recognition of the
Republic of Cyprus had “no legal effect” whatsoever; therefore,
<strong>Turkey</strong> should open its airports and ports to Cypriot planes and
vessels and normalize its relations with Nicosia.
135

Papadopoulos´ refusal to employ the veto followed from
“the Europeanization assumption”, which Nicosia has shared with
Greece. Recall that, in the 1999 Helsinki European Council,
Athens performed a volte face: it stopped obstructing <strong>Turkey</strong>´s
candidacy due to the occupation of Cyprus, having concluded that
détente with <strong>Turkey</strong> -despite its ongoing challenge in the Aegean
Sea- and <strong>Turkey</strong>´s adoption of <strong>EU</strong> principles and values should
eventually result in mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation and
friendship, with concomitant positive implications for Cyprus.
Throughout 2006, Nicosia entertained the aforementioned
“assumption”, optimistic that principled and appropriate <strong>EU</strong>
pressures would be applied effectively on <strong>Turkey</strong>: the
Commission and –primarily- the European Parliament were
already urging Ankara to fulfil its legal and political obligations to
Cyprus being, essentially, <strong>EU</strong> obligations. However, since all this
proved ineffectual, the December 2006 European Council “froze”
the negotiation of eight “chapters”, until <strong>Turkey</strong> complied, within
three years, with the “anti-declaration” demands.
Meanwhile, President Papadopoulos had falsified twice
the accusations that he “opposed reunification”. With Koffi Anan
he agreed (Paris, February 2006) to resume inter-communal
negotiations “after proper preparations”; and, under the aegis of
the UN´s Ibrahim Gambari, Papadopoulos and Talat agreed to
restart negotiations “on a technical level”. This “July 8 (or
Gambari) agreement” was never implemented, despite the late
President´s valiant efforts. The point, however, is that the “July 8
agreement” verified Nicosia´s good will, even though
Papadopoulos argued that, deontologically, Cypriot negotiations
should be held between Nicosia and Ankara.
136

Regrettably, the inter-communal atmosphere was being
poisoned further by the never-ending building of homes and hotels
on occupied GC properties and by the steady arrival of thousands
of illegal settlers. In 2001, the illegal settlers were about 120,000. 2
Since the 2004 referendum, they exceed 200,000 while the
indigenous TCs reportedly number below 85,000. Therefore, the
GCs´ exasperation kept growing, since these actions were coupled
with Ankara´s supercilious rhetoric about Cyprus´ “two states, two
governments, and two peoples”, in total disregard of the global and
<strong>EU</strong> legal and ethical consensus.
During the February 2008 presidential election, Tassos
Papadopoulos, passionately opposed for years by all those
fastening on the “Annan plan”, was defeated by left-wing leader,
Demitris Christofias, who promised to settle the Cyprus problem
once and for all: because he “possessed the solution” which was
attainable with his “friend and comrade”, Mr Talat. Thus, as the
new rhetoric emphasised “settlement for the Cypriots by the
Cypriots”, references to <strong>Turkey</strong>´s <strong>EU</strong> prospects were essentially
limited to the entrenched stereotype, “<strong>Turkey</strong>´s road to the <strong>EU</strong>
passes through Nicosia”, while the “Europeanization assumption”
seemed to survive implicitly. Moreover, when asked about “a plan
B” should the inter-communal negotiations fail, President
Christofias was adamant: “there is no plan B”, evidently meaning
that, since the negotiations were bound to succeed, no room for
pessimism existed.
2 See Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Colonisation by Turkish
settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus, Doc.9799, 2 May 2003, Rapporteur Mr
Jaakko Laakso (Finland), p.2.
137

But pessimism soon began to sink in. Political elites and
commentators started lamenting that, contrary to initial assurances,
the two negotiating sides did not share fully either the rules of the
game or the meaning of even fundamental terms. Moreover, public
opinion was becoming deeply sceptical about the novel – made in
Britain – slogan “by the Cypriots, etc.” First, they could detect
that, behind Talat´s proposals, the “null and void” “Annan plan”
stubbornly kept raising its head. Second, the TC side´s proposals
implied a Confederative structure, as opposed to the Federation
agreed upon for years. And third, Mr Talat kept admitting his
dependence on a constant dialogue with Ankara. And yet, the
Christofias government insisted that the process was on the right
track. Near the end of 2008, however, when Mr Talat´s
spokesperson asked Mr Christofias to please avoid calling Talat
“his comrade”, one of Christofias´ major weapons was rendered
outdated. Thereupon, he was forced to utter the obvious: “the
solution to our problem lies with Ankara!” This telling episode
occasioned intensified calls, by most domestic political actors, to
start preparing for “a plan B” in view of December 2009.
Noteworthy statements were made during Kostas
Karamanlis´ official visit to Nicosia, in April 2009. In a joint press
conference, Karamanlis reiterated his favourite dictum on <strong>Turkey</strong>´s
accession: “Full compliance, full membership”. Christofias then
declared:
Cyprus, like Greece, supports <strong>Turkey</strong>´s accession
prospects, which, under certain conditions, can function as a
motive for Ankara to cooperate for a fair, viable and functional
solution…Of course, the first and foremost precondition for the
smooth continuation of <strong>Turkey</strong>´s movement towards accession is
138

the fulfilment of its obligations towards both the <strong>EU</strong> and the
Republic of Cyprus, something that, unfortunately, it has not done
as yet. 3
Christofias and Karamanlis jointly stressed that the
Cyprus problem entails an inevitable European dimension; that,
consequently, the <strong>EU</strong> has a decisive role here to play; that the <strong>EU</strong>
constitutes a solid guarantee for Cyprus; therefore, there is no
reason to talk, like <strong>Turkey</strong>, about “its guarantees”, which, being
contrary to <strong>EU</strong> principles, are now obsolete. Finally, President
Christofias added that “there is certainly need for a lot of patience,
for cool-headedness, to face the challenges, not by ´begging`
anyone, but by denouncing <strong>Turkey</strong>´s behaviour”. 4
With the 6 June 2009 Euro-elections approaching, the
Government was obliged to face <strong>Turkey</strong>´s <strong>EU</strong> candidacy directly.
Political forces competed on platforms that contained little
“Europe” and a lot about Cyprus´ “existential” problem owing to
the occupation. As regards governing AKEL´s two elected MEPs,
Kyriakos Triantaphylides included <strong>Turkey</strong>´s accession among the
broader topics of concern, and promised to “continue following
<strong>Turkey</strong>´s accession trajectory through the European Parliament
Reports”. 5 The usually soft-spoken new left-wing MEP, Takis
Hatzigeorgiou, declared that the first goal of all Cypriot MEPs is
“independently of our political origins, and in full cooperation with
the Government, to raise as many obstacles as we can against
3
Simerini (Nicosia daily), 23 April 2009, p.7.
4
Ibid.
5
Simerini, 9 June 2009, p.8
139

<strong>Turkey</strong>, if it does not demonstrate its will to settle the Cyprus
problem”. 6
A week later, Mr Christofias was interviewed by
Nicosia´s leading daily, Phileleftheros. His “clarifications” on the
negotiations did not provide any “news”, until asked “whether
there is a ´plan B` in case of a deadlock”. He replied: “When I say
that we will examine with the Greek Government and the [Cypriot]
political parties all the scenarios, what do I mean? [This is what I
mean] without saying that we have a plan B”. 7
Finally, on the day of Jose Manuel Barroso´s official visit
to Cyprus, Secretary General of AKEL, Andros Kyprianou, made
two noteworthy points at the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation
(CyBC) regarding <strong>Turkey</strong>´s December evaluation: first, that AKEL
had embarked on a studying the issue and would soon submit its
conclusions to the President. And second, Cyprus will support
<strong>Turkey</strong>´s progress towards accession “under preconditions, but
raising difficulties on the way”. 8
After the inevitable Summer hiatus, pessimism
concerning the inter-communal negotiations kept rising. Hence,
rising also was Demetris Christofias´ irritation at the posture of
both Ankara and his former comrade, Mr Talat. Thus, during his
speech to the UN General Assembly, on 24 September 2009,
President Christofias emphasised three “paradoxes”: first, that
<strong>Turkey</strong>, a non-permanent <strong>Member</strong> of the UN Security Council
today, does not recognise one of the members of the UN and the
6
Ibid, emphasis added.
7
Interviews with Androula Taramounda and Costas Venizelos, Phileleftheros,
14 June 2009, emphasis added.
8
Interview with Paris Potamitis, ´Extensions`, CyBC, 25 June 2009.
140

<strong>EU</strong>; second, the same UNSC member retains occupation troops in
another UN/<strong>EU</strong> member; and third, <strong>Turkey</strong> is violating the
territorial integrity of Cyprus aiming at the creation of another
state on the island, in clear violation of UNSC resolutions 541 and
550”. And yet, Christofias reiterated that “the Republic of Cyprus
supports <strong>Turkey</strong>´s accession to the <strong>EU</strong>, convinced that the whole
process, like its accession, will help our neighbours and will be
beneficial both to our region and ourselves.” 9 He added, however,
Nicosia´s other stereotype: “This support, however, is not without
conditions: <strong>Turkey</strong> must fulfil its obligations towards both the
Republic of Cyprus and the <strong>EU</strong>.” 10
A month later, during newly elected George
Papandreou´s official visit to Nicosia, Papandreou and Christofias
re-emphasised the long-standing position of Athens and Nicosia in
support of eventual Turkish accession—provided that <strong>Turkey</strong>
fulfils the established requirements for all. To be sure, George
Papandreou - in a rare emulation of his late father, Andreas -
“defined” the Cyprus Question, in his address to the Cypriot
Parliament, as “a problem of invasion and occupation”. He also
insisted that Athens will “stand by Nicosia in every sense”. But
then he also referred to a “new road map for <strong>Turkey</strong>”, leaving
unclear whether this should operate before or after December
2009.
Finally, President Christofias and Foreign Minister
Marcos Kyprianou kept reaffirming in October 2009 what the
9 Phileleftheros, 25 September 2009.
10 Ibid.
141

latest National Council had decided unanimously: 11 given <strong>Turkey</strong>´s
never-ending disregard of its <strong>EU</strong>-imposed obligations, “<strong>Turkey</strong>
should not be ´unscathed` in December 2009”.
The Opposition
The meaning of (political) Opposition in current Cypriot
politics resists precision. The Government of AKEL-originating
President Christofias is supported in domestic matters by both
centrist DIKO and centre-left EDEK and, frequently, by the
Cypriot Greens. On the Cyprus problem, however, the Government
enjoys the occasional support of centre-right -and EPP member-
DYSI. Therefore, this leaves the “European Party” (EVROKO) as
the only persistent -nominal and substantial- Opposition. And yet,
during the current inter-communal negotiations, DIKO, EDEK and
the Ecologists have frequently criticised openly Christofias´
handling of the Republic´s interests.
In particular, they have attacked two “extreme
concessions” made at the outset without Talat´s reciprocation: to
“offer” 50,000 (illegal) settlers in the envisaged Federal Republic
and a “rotating presidency”. Moreover, they are concerned about
the “fogginess” of the negotiating procedures; the limited
information supplied at the National Council; and the “partiality”
of the technical committees´ members assisting the negotiations.
Essentially, then, President Christofias –who favoured initially the
11
All parliamentary political parties participate in this Council to discuss the
Cyprus problem.
142

“Annan plan”- is suspected as disinclined to reject embodying
“Annanite” elements.
EDEK´s President, Yiannakis Omerou, and its Honorary
President, Vassos Lyssarides, are among the leading elites long
flirting with a Cypriot veto next December. Last April, Mr
Omerou, arguing “against removing the Damoclian sword from
<strong>Turkey</strong>´s head”, stated: “Vetoes are not announced in advance, just
as the intention not to exercise them is not pre-announced”. 12
These EDEK personalities are joined by EVROKO leaders,
Demitris Sylouris and Nikos Koutsou, who criticize Christofias for
his “soft” negotiating line, instead of “claiming” forcefully the
Republic´s rights in the <strong>EU</strong>. In addition, DIKO´s Parliamentary
Spokesperson, Andreas Angelides, has long been arguing for the
need “to claim Cyprus´ rights”. Similar notions and associated
arguments are employed by three other leading DIKO
personalities: Parliament President Marios Karoyan; DIKO´s
Alternate President, Giorgos Kolokasides; and Vice-President,
Nikolas Papadopoulos (son of the late Tassos). For months, all
these figures, joined also by Ecologist MP, Giorgos Perdikis, and
new Ecologist leader, Ioanna Panayiotou, exhibit a consistent
fighting spirit. They assert or clearly imply that Cyprus should be
heard in the <strong>EU</strong> fora “as the victim of the 1974 invasion and the
consequent illegal occupation” and should, therefore, deploy all its
diplomatic weapons and political alliances to confront <strong>Turkey</strong>.
12 Phileleftheros, 24 April 2009.
143

The Media
Most of the Press in the “government-controlled” part of
the Republic is not “ideologically” biased or intimately linked to
political parties. Except for Haravgi, AKEL´s official organ, and
Alithia (supporting DYSI), the leading Nicosia dailies,
Phileleftheros and Simerini, are clearly independent. Hence they
assumed a “hands-off” stance vis-à-vis the “left-wing” Christofias
Government, for about 100 days. Progressively, however, they
declare their views even in clear opposition. For instance,
commenting on the first day of Karamanlis´ official visit, the
Phileleftheros editorial concluded: “We need a Plan B for Euro-
Turkish issues” (23 April 2009). The next day´s editorial – entitled
“The Veto is not Advertised”- argued: “An important weapon [the
veto], which protects the interests of the small and the weak,
remains in our armoury and must be utilised. We want to believe
that the adopted tactics will not allow <strong>Turkey</strong> to evade in the end
its obligations”.
Phileleftheros and Simerini are outspoken whenever they
sense the President´s “softness” towards Talat or when they see
Talat´s and Ankara´s verbal or nonverbal actions as falling under
the categories “intransigent”, “threatening”, or “provocative”.
Through their editorials and major columnists, they have
condemned vociferously Mr Gül, Mr Erdogan, and Mr Davutoglu,
whenever they mention “two nations, two governments, and two
states in Cyprus”. Similarly, they were incensed by the Turkish
military´s muscle-flexing concerning Cyprus´ explorations for
hydrocarbons. They regularly give prominence to all serious
statements against Turkish intransigence, including declarations
144

favouring <strong>Turkey</strong>´s less-than-full <strong>EU</strong> membership, by Angela
Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy. And most of their columnists echo
their editorials´ tone: this is particularly the stance of leading
Simerini columnists, Savvas Iakovides and Lazaros Mavros, who
are long committed to a Cypriot veto next December.
Turning to TV and Radio, state-run CyBC is struggling to
maintain objectivity on the “national problem”, its journalists also
playing a “pedagogical” role. Run by mature journalists, most of
its political programmes aim at balance, both regarding invitees
and their treatment. And yet, since Christofias´ ascent to power,
sceptical viewers have left the CyBC Evening News, opting
instead for the more critical ANT1 TV or Sigma. Finally, it seems
that Lazaros Mavros´ dynamic Morning Radio Show, in Radio
Proto, has a constantly increasing following. Mr Mavros -
regularly assisted by the gifted Brussels correspondent Dr Yiannos
Charalambides - is a bold critic of <strong>Turkey</strong>´s Cyprus policy. Hence,
I anticipate his strong call for a December veto, unless, of course,
Ankara surprises the Republic with a brilliant volte face.
Civil Society
Cypriot civil society´s vitality is credited primarily to the
<strong>EU</strong> accession, except for actors dealing with the “Cyprus
problem”. Concentrating on support for the “Annan plan”, many
“peace groups” and NGOs embracing “track-two diplomacy” were
cultivating inter-communal rapprochement long before that plan,
and were especially active in the campaign to accept it. Assisted
“ideologically” and financially by foreign centres, such as UNDP
145

and Norway´s PRIO, and clearly supported “morally” by the US
Embassy and the British High Commission, they helped the “Yes”
side reach 24% in the 2004 referendum. Currently, however, they
keep a low profile, presumably gearing for the time when all
Cypriots will confront whatever the negotiations proffer.
Simultaneously, numerous civilians formed activist units
criticising the “Annan plan” and maintained the final opposition to
just below 80%. Among them, one observed lawyers, politicians,
journalists, youth leaders, and academics, who organised popular
gatherings in December 2004 under the slogan, “Veto is a Political
Option”. Many of them formed “The Committee for a European
Solution in Cyprus” which, inter alia, created “An International
Expert Panel” that criticised thoroughly the “Annan plan” and
offered rational alternatives. 13 Now, many of that Committee´s
leading figures, and additional persons, have banded together to
oppose any return of “Annanite” hybrids. Other activists have also
coalesced, questioning the wisdom of a “bi-zonal, bi-communal
federation” and fearing it entails “the loss” of Cypriot Hellenism.
Finally, three Cypriot political scientists replied to our
cardinal question (edited here only for length). Dr Maria
Hatzipavlou (University of Cyprus) wrote: “Officially, Nicosia has
been favouring [<strong>Turkey</strong>´s accession]; personally I agree, assuming
that, if <strong>Turkey</strong> complies with the European laws and principles, it
will have [inter alia] to withdraw its 40,000 Turkish troops …
Turkish accession will also help find an accommodation to the
protracted Cyprus conflict as well as settling many internal Turkish
13
See Costas Melakopides, et al. (eds.) The Cyprus Yearbook of International
Relations 2006, pp. 206-218.
146

disputes…[Accession] will also lead to regional stability. <strong>Turkey</strong> is
a neighbouring country to Greece and Cyprus which all share
common interests…and it is important that all three, being in the
<strong>EU</strong>, will give impetus to collaboration and peaceful relations at
different levels: political, trade, educational and cultural. This will
set an example of co-existence…and thus implement in practice
the European value of union in diversity”.
Professor Kyriakos Demetriou (University of Cyprus)
replied: “On the assumption that <strong>Turkey</strong> will comply with the
established <strong>EU</strong> principles, values, and norms, I favour <strong>Turkey</strong>´s
eventual accession to the Union. However, should <strong>Turkey</strong> abstain
from a substantial demonstration of good will – such as beginning
to withdraw its troops and colonists before December 2009 - I
believe that Nicosia should reject the opening of any new chapter
in <strong>Turkey</strong>-<strong>EU</strong> negotiations. Needless to say, <strong>Turkey</strong> should also
demonstrate domestically its willingness to conform to <strong>EU</strong> values
and norms”.
Last, Lecturer Giorgos Kentas (University of Nicosia),
wrote: “It seems that <strong>Turkey</strong> is interested in joining the European
Union on the basis of some special conditions that suit its
‘uniqueness’…It appears ready to follow the path of
Europeanization on its own terms. If accepted, this will be a
travesty of the <strong>EU</strong>’s principles and standards… Ankara contends
that it has fulfilled all its obligations in Cyprus by supporting the
Annan Plan. This, of course, is unacceptable to the <strong>EU</strong>…[U]nless
<strong>Turkey</strong> fulfills its obligations up until December 2009, the <strong>EU</strong> will
take a new decision. In my view, the new decision must provide
for the provisional suspension of negotiations for a period of six
147

months (until June 2010). This will be a period of reflection for
reexamining <strong>Turkey</strong>´s progress and deciding the steps forward”.
Conclusion
In recent months, more and more Cypriot voices were
calling for governmental, political, diplomatic, and societal
assertiveness. Ankara´s increasingly arrogant mood, current TC
developments, the absence of TC reciprocation to Christofias´
“generous offers”, and the Turkish military´s threats, poisoned the
atmosphere surrounding the Cypriot negotiations. And yet, any
rational and open-minded initiatives by <strong>Turkey</strong> – such as starting
to withdraw its troops and the thousands of illegal colonists - and
the fulfilment of the legal obligations deriving from the “antideclaration”
can metamorphose the inter-communal climate. The
GCs, just like the Greeks of mainland Greece, have long been
eager to embark on a new phase of trilateral relations with <strong>Turkey</strong>,
to attain cooperation and friendship. If, however, <strong>Turkey</strong> does not
reciprocate, most Greek Cypriot political forces in tandem with the
media and civil society could compel the Christofias Government
to start “raising many (effective) obstacles against <strong>Turkey</strong>” in
December 2009.
148

149

Petr Kratochvíl, David Král, Dominika
Dražilová *
Czech <strong>Perceptions</strong>
Abstract
The article explores the political and societal discourses
in the Czech Republic that pertain to <strong>Turkey</strong>´s <strong>EU</strong> membership.
While most political parties express their lukewarm support for the
accession, the topic certainly does not constitute an important part
of their foreign policy agenda. The issue is also only seldom
discussed in the media or in the academia. Czech citizens, even
though more than forty percent of them support the enlargement,
have a low level of knowledge about <strong>Turkey</strong> and their indifference
directly reflects the absent deliberation about the issue in the
society at large.
Introduction: the Four Limitations of the Discourse and Their
Corollaries
The Czech debate about the Turkish membership in the
<strong>EU</strong> is limited in four ways. First, after 2004, the Czech Republic
became one of the few <strong>EU</strong> member states that are surrounded by
other <strong>EU</strong> members only (i.e. that have no sea border). The
geographic location exerts considerable influence on Czech
*
The opinions expressed herein are only those of the author and do not reflect
any institutional views.
150

discussions about further enlargement since it is often portrayed as
geographically distant, with little direct impact on the lives of
Czech citizens. This applies equally to the Czech attitude towards
Eastern Europe (which is geographically still closer than <strong>Turkey</strong>)
and the Balkans.
Second, the geographic distance from membership
candidates, including <strong>Turkey</strong>, is complemented by the limited
historical experience with <strong>Turkey</strong>. Even though the Czech Lands
were part of the Austrian Empire at the time of the Ottoman
expansion into Central Europe, the territory of the current Czech
Republic has never been part of the Ottoman Empire. Hence,
unlike in the case of Hungary or Austria, not to mention the
Balkans, there are no historical stereotypes or prejudices worth
mentioning in the case of <strong>Turkey</strong>.
Third, it is not only the lack of historical contacts, but
also the absence of Turkish migrants in the country that sets the
Czech Republic apart from other countries from the same region
that have sizeable Turkish minorities (Germany, Austria, etc.). 1 In
addition, the common (if flawed) conflation of the Turkish
minority with Muslims in general that is often used by the
opponents of the Turkish <strong>EU</strong> membership has a rather limited
potential in the Czech Republic since the numbers of Muslims
residing in the country are nigh negligible.
Fourth, the discussions about <strong>Turkey</strong> are usually seen as
part of the larger enlargement debate. Yet this debate pertains to
1
Turks do not even appear on the list of the eighteen most numerous ethnic
groups living in the Czech Republic. Cf. the data of the Czech Statistical Office
at http://www.czso.cz/csu/2003edicniplan.nsf/p/4114-03.
151

countries like Ukraine or Serbia, which play a much bigger role in
the minds of ordinary Czechs. This is the case due to a number of
factors, including a common (Communist) past, geographical
proximity or – as in the case of Croatia – huge numbers of Czech
tourists visiting these countries. As Czechs are very much in
favour of the Croatian membership and they generally count as
supporters of further enlargement to Eastern Europe, the possible
negative attitudes toward <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession may be hidden
behind the general acceptance of further enlargement.
This state of affairs has two significant consequences
which heavily impact the Czech debate on the Turkish accession.
The first is that since the debate is not really widespread among the
populace, it stays only at the level of high politics, with an
occasional spill-over into the academia. As a consequence, it is
virtually impossible to find any consistent and detailed coverage of
issues regarding <strong>EU</strong>-<strong>Turkey</strong> relations either in the media or in the
civil society. The second corollary pertains to the originality of
arguments used in the debate. As we noted above, there are no
signs of a deeper societal deliberation on the issue, which also
translates into the dependence on the arguments used by external
sources.
This can be nicely shown by analysing the only visible
campaign against the Turkish membership in the Czech Republic.
The campaign, launched in the summer of 2005, was not organised
locally, but by an international initiative called Voice for Europe,
and its aim was to collect signatures of those who generally oppose
the Turkish accession and, more specifically, reject the start of
152

accession negotiations with <strong>Turkey</strong>. 2 Josef Zeleniec (EPP), one of
the most vocal Czech opponents of <strong>Turkey</strong> in the <strong>EU</strong>, and a
member of the European Parliament, immediately expressed his
support for the initiative. 3
The lukewarm attitudes to the Turkish accession are also
reflected in the results of public opinion polls. The number of
opponents among the citizens of the Czech Republic seems to be
fairly constant – from 51 % in the Spring 2005 Eurobarometer poll
to 49 % three years later. 4 According to Eurobarometer, the
number of those who are in favour of <strong>Turkey</strong> in the <strong>EU</strong> has been
slowly rising to the current 43 %. 5 Even though the polls do not
explore the relative relevance of the question to the interviewees or
ascertain the level of knowledge the respondents have about the
issue, some indication is the decline from 12 to 8 percent of those
who do not have any opinion about the question. 6
2
Kampaň proti vstupu Turecka do Evropské unie [online]. Econnect, 23.8.2005
[cit. 2009-05-30]. Available from
www:
3
Voice for Europe v Bruselu proti vstupu Turecka do <strong>EU</strong> [online]. 2005 [cit.
2009-05-30]. Available from www:<
zieleniec.eu/index.php?dok=00830000000299,det > The initiative stopped
working (its original website http://www.eu-turkey.info/ does not exist
anymore).
4
Eurobarometr 63,4 [online]. Jaro 2005 [cit. 2009-05-30]. Available from
www:;
Eurobarometer 69 [online]. March-May 2008 [cit. 2009-05-30]. Available from
www:.
5
Ibid.
6
At the end of May 2009, a national poll conducted by a local polling agency
that does not allow for the “no opinion” answer came up with somewhat
different results, with a larger majority (62 percent) against the Turkish
accession. Cf. http://img1.ct24.cz/multimedia/documents/9/900/89917.doc.
153

Political Parties
Regarding the Czech political scene, the issue of the
Turkish membership was sometimes mentioned in the context of
the Czech <strong>EU</strong> Presidency, for instance when negotiations on the
chapter on taxation were opened in June 2009. Due to the
unexpected upheavals in the domestic politics in April 2009 and
the following creation of the caretaker government, it is not
possible to divide our analysis into a discussion of the opinions of
the government and the opposition. Therefore, we will focus on the
positions of the individual political parties and actors.
The Civic Democratic Party (ODS) is probably the
parliamentary party that is consistently the most favourably
disposed towards the Turkish accession. The arguments
concerning <strong>Turkey</strong> can be summarised as follows. Firstly, the
ODS, as the party that generally opposes further European
integration, sees the Turkish membership as a chance to decelerate
this process. Secondly, the ODS argues that the accession
negotiations may require reforms on both sides, which means that
within the <strong>EU</strong> this may include the reform of the agricultural and
regional policy for which the Civic Democrats are calling. Thirdly,
the ODS refuses the idea of the <strong>EU</strong> as a Christian club and
proposes the <strong>EU</strong>´s deeper involvement in the Muslim world. In this
context, the accession of <strong>Turkey</strong> can be seen as the first step
towards better ties with the Muslim countries. 7 Finally, the Civic
Democratic Party is strongly Atlanticist, and therefore the support
of the Turkish European bid not only by the former US President
7
Král, D. Česká debata o perspektivách členství Turecka a Ukrajiny v <strong>EU</strong>,
<strong>EU</strong>ROP<strong>EU</strong>M, 2006. Available from www:.
154

George W. Bush but recently also by the current US President
Barack Obama may represent an important argument in shaping
the policy towards <strong>Turkey</strong>. Nevertheless, the ODS stresses the
need for continuity in <strong>Turkey</strong>´s reform process as well as the strict
adherence to the Copenhagen criteria.
Among the most active participants in the debate are
party members Jan Zahradil, Mirek Topolánek and Miroslav
Ouzký. 8 Especially Jan Zahradil is known for his efforts in
promoting the issue of the Turkish membership. Zahradil, who
strongly opposes the concept of the privileged partnership,
assumes that the Czech Republic, due to its lack of a Turkish
minority and absence of past conflicts with <strong>Turkey</strong>, may serve as a
mediator for the Turkish European aspirations. 9 In 2008 during his
official visit to Ankara, Mirek Topolánek described the relations
between the Czech Republic and <strong>Turkey</strong> as friendly and above
standard, adding that the Czech Republic supports a full
membership for <strong>Turkey</strong> 10 and fosters the opening of new chapters
of the acquis during the Czech Presidency.
On the other end of the spectrum, the Christian and
Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People´s Party (KDU-ČSL) is
the parliamentary party with the most critical attitude towards the
Turkish accession. However, its stance can be rather defined as
8
Mirek Topolánek, chairman of ODS, served as Prime Minister from August
2006 until May 2009. Jan Zahradil and Miroslav Ouzký are members of the
European Parliament.
9
Česká republika podporuje vstup Turecka do Evropské unie [online]. CT24,
15.11.2007 [cit. 2009-05-30]. Available from www:.
10
Premiér M. Topolánek v turecké Ankaře podpořil vstup Turecka do Evropské
unie [online]. Vláda ČR, 8.10.2008 [cit. 2009-05-30]. Available
from www:.
155

eserved than as a complete refusal. The position of KDU-ČSL is
inspired by the perspective of other Christian and Democratic
parties within the <strong>EU</strong>, especially that of the German CDU/CSU.
Although KDU-ČSL acknowledges the importance of <strong>Turkey</strong> for
Europe, its members prefer other forms of cooperation with it than
the full Turkish membership, which they believe is inconsistent
with the fundamental nature of the <strong>EU</strong>. The debate concerning the
Turkish European bid includes several arguments. First, <strong>Turkey</strong> is
not seen as “European” in the cultural and social sense. Second, so
the argument goes, the accession of a Muslim country might lead
towards a change of the identity of the Union as a community
based on Christian values. Third, <strong>Turkey</strong> still does not fulfil the
Copenhagen criteria and its low level of protection of human rights
is criticised. Finally, it is believed that the fragile balance within
the <strong>EU</strong> would be disturbed by the presence of another big member
state. 11
However, in 2005 a prominent member of the party, Cyril
Svoboda 12 , stated in his answer to a critical article 13 by Josef
Zieleniec 14 that the accession negotiations were an open process
with uncertain results, which may not necessarily lead to a full
membership for <strong>Turkey</strong>. 15 Other Christian Democrat politicians
active in the discussion are the MEPs Jan Březina and Zuzana
11
Král 2006.
12
Cyril Svoboda is chairman of KDU-ČSL, former Minister for Regional
Development and former Minister of Foreign Affaires.
13
Published in Právo on 1.9.2005.
14
Former member of the European Parliament.
15
<strong>EU</strong> potřebuje impuls v podobě Turecka [online]. 10.9.2005 [cit. 2009-05-30].
Available
from www:.
156

Roithová (both EPP). 16 Both of them opposed the opening of the
accession negotiations.
The Green Party (SZ) supports the integration of <strong>Turkey</strong>
into the <strong>EU</strong> 17 , but on the whole, the party´s participation in the
debate over the issue of the Turkish accession is rather limited.
However, the Green Party´s envoy and former Minister of Foreign
Affairs Karel Schwarzenberg made several statements on this
matter. Schwarzenberg doesn´t recognise the problem of the non-
European identity of <strong>Turkey</strong>, and according to him <strong>Turkey</strong> has
much in common with Europe thanks to its Byzantine heritage. 18
In January 2009 Schwarzenberg reaffirmed his support for the
Turkish accession and highlighted its strategic importance. 19 On a
more cautious note, Schwarzenberg stressed that the reforms in
<strong>Turkey</strong> needed new impulses in April 2009 and urged Turkish
representatives to continue with the reform policy. 20
The Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), which is one
of the two major elements in the Czech party system (the other one
being the ODS), is also supportive regarding the accession of
<strong>Turkey</strong>; this support can be partly explained by the strategy
16
Miroslav Kalousek, former chairman of KDU-ČSL, served as Minister of
Finances until May 2009. Roman Línek is former vice-chairman of KDU-ČSL.
Jan Březina and Zuzana Roithová are members of the European Parliament.
17
Berdych, A. – Nekvapil, V. Česká zahraniční politika a volby 2006, AMO,
2006, p. 30.
18
Turecký advokát [online]. 26.11.2007 [cit. 2009-05-25]. Available
from www:.
19
Schwarzenberg: Turecko musí kvůli přiblížení k <strong>EU</strong> urychlit reformy [online].
22.4.2009 [cit. 2009-05-25]. Available from www:<
rozhlas.cz/evropskaunie/zpravodajstvi/_zprava/573559>.
20
Klaus: Podporuji vstup Turecka do <strong>EU</strong> [online]. 30.4.2009 [cit. 2009-06-25].
Euroscop. Available from www:.
157

adopted by the European Social Democratic parties, which stresses
the need for stability and prosperity within Europe and the
necessity of the consolidation of the democratic character of
<strong>Turkey</strong>. However, Social Democrats see a potential problem in the
fact that an accession of a large, mostly agricultural country can
slow down the integration process and also radically change the
institutional balance in the <strong>EU</strong>. 21
One of the first politicians from the Czech Social
Democratic Party to express his views about the Turkish
membership was Vladimír Špidla, who, already in 2003, claimed
that the Czech Republic agrees with the Turkish European bid.
Later, Špidla articulated his anxiety about the potential
“Orientalization” of <strong>Turkey</strong> in the context of the non-opening of
the accession negotiations. The favourable attitude towards the
Turkish membership is shared by other prominent Social
Democrats, such as Stanislav Gross and Jiří Paroubek. 22
The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)
doesn´t contribute often to the debate over the Turkish membership
in the <strong>EU</strong>. Nevertheless, all representatives of KSČM in the
European Parliament were supporting the opening of the
negotiations process, which implies that the party has a favourable
stance in regard to this issue. 23
Among other important political actors who may
influence the debate over the Turkish membership is President
Václav Klaus, who is supportive of the accession as well. After the
21 Král 2006.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
158

April 2009 meeting with the Turkish president Abdullah Gül,
Klaus again confirmed this view. Being strongly Eurosceptical,
Klaus considered the opening and closing of the chapters as a mere
“game of the bureaucrats” and as not related to the real Turkish
achievements. 24
Civil Society and Research Institutions
Regarding civil society and research institutions, it is only
a handful of think-tanks that have dedicated some attention to the
issue. Among those which are more or less supportive of the
Turkish accession, the most visible is Europeum 25 , whose
members have written several articles and studies analysing the
pros and cons of the Turkish <strong>EU</strong> membership. 26 Also, Europeum is
the only think-tank in the country that produced a comprehensive
report on the Czech debate about <strong>Turkey</strong> in the <strong>EU</strong>. 27 Even though
the report was released in 2006, large parts of it are still topical. In
addition, Europeum is probably the only think-tank to publish in
Czech an article by a Turkish author, Seda Domaniç. 28 The article
forcefully put forward the original argument that the main problem
lies in the fact that both sides (the <strong>EU</strong> and <strong>Turkey</strong>) believe that the
24
Klaus: Podporuji vstup Turecka do <strong>EU</strong> [online].
25
The full name is Europeum, the Institute of European Policy,
http://www.europeum.org/index.php?lang=en.
26
See, for instance, the article written by Lukáš Pachta:
http://www.integrace.cz/integrace/koment_zobraz.asp?id
=43.
27
Král, D. Česká debata o perspektivách členství Turecka a Ukrajiny v <strong>EU</strong>,
<strong>EU</strong>ROP<strong>EU</strong>M, 2006. Available from www:.
28
Domaniç, S. Vstup Turecka do Evropské unie: Výhodný pro obě strany?
Možný pro obě strany? <strong>EU</strong>ROP<strong>EU</strong>M, 2006. Available from www:<
europeum.org/doc/pdf/864.pdf >.
159

accession of <strong>Turkey</strong> would be more advantageous for the other
side, claiming that in 2006, only one third of Turks and one fifth of
<strong>EU</strong> citizens believed that the accession would be mutually
beneficial. Regarding other think-tanks and research institutions,
some attention to <strong>Turkey</strong> can be detected in the Association of
International Affairs, where several analysts focus on the country
and the region, 29 and in the Institute of International Relations. 30
The most widely read journal about international relations
published in the country, Mezinárodní politika (International
Politics), released a special issue on “<strong>Turkey</strong> at the crossroads” in
September 2007. Although the focus of the issue was not
exclusively on <strong>EU</strong>-Turkish relations, there were allusions to this
problematique scattered throughout the whole issue. In particular,
two polemical articles on <strong>Turkey</strong>´s <strong>EU</strong> entry were published, an
approving one by the well-known Czech journalist Zbyněk
Petráček, and a more critical one by the conservative thinker
Alexandr Tomský. 31 One article on the issue also appeared in E-
Polis, the political science journal of the Czech-Slovak Political
Science Students Union in Pilsen. 32
29 http://www.amo.cz/vyzkum/analytici.htm.
30
www.iir.cz.
31
Petráček, Z. Turecko na evropské cestě, Mezinárodní politika, 9/2007, 20-21.
Available from www:;
Tomský, A. Turecko do Evropy nepatří, Mezinárodní politika, 9/2007, 20-21.
Available from www:.
32
Marešová, S. Cesta Turecka do <strong>EU</strong> - problematika vstupu [online]. E-polis.cz,
6. červen 2008. [cit. 2009-06-15]. Available from www:.
160

As far as civil society is concerned, deliberations about
<strong>Turkey</strong> are scarce indeed. One exception is the “European Values”
NGO. While being in favour of deeper integration, the NGO is
critical of <strong>Turkey</strong>´s entry and lobbies for a special partnership
rather than a full-fledged membership for it. The organisation also
joined the above described campaign against the launch of <strong>EU</strong>
accession negotiations for <strong>Turkey</strong>.
Media
Among the printed media, only the country´s four serious
newspapers (Mladá fronta Dnes, Právo, Hospodářské noviny, and
Lidové noviny) offer a continuous coverage of the issue. All of
these focus primarily on reporting news about <strong>Turkey</strong> and the <strong>EU</strong>,
and analytical reports or commentaries on this issue are not
common. Virtually none of the related articles pertain to Czech
domestic issues. If we leave aside the space that is given to views
of Czech politicians (which we have discussed above), there are
only two persistent connections between the Czech Republic and
the Turkish accession in the Czech media: (1) news about the latest
<strong>EU</strong>-wide opinion polls, which also include the attitudes of the
Czech populace towards the Turkish entry, and recently also (2)
the role the Czech <strong>EU</strong> Presidency could play in fostering <strong>EU</strong>-
Turkish relations.
The articles related to <strong>EU</strong>-Turkish relations usually fall
into one of three broad categories. 33 First, there are a lot of reports
33
The same categories and topics are also present on the main radio stations and
TV channels. However, in particular on the Czech Radio, more space is given to
161

about the progress in accession negotiations, chapters being
opened or blocked, the assessment reports by the European
Commission or the criticism levelled against <strong>Turkey</strong> in some areas,
notably human rights and protection of minorities. However, these
articles usually do not give any opinion and instead limit
themselves to reporting the events.
Second, many articles describe specific bilateral relations
that also influence the individual countries' relations to the <strong>EU</strong> as a
whole. For instance, much attention is given to the insistence of the
United States that <strong>Turkey</strong> should be accepted to the <strong>EU</strong> since it is a
reliable ally of the West in NATO. 34 The complementary side is
described in those articles that deal with other countries´
scepticism towards the Turkish membership, most notably that of
France. Interestingly, there seems to be a tendency to use a
simplified dichotomy of the United States and France as the two
poles representing opposite views on <strong>Turkey</strong>´s <strong>EU</strong> aspirations,
with the Czech Republic taking up the middle ground. Also, the
vocal role of France, and in particular its President Sarkozy, is
sometimes seen as too critical – hence, there are articles discussing
how France disagrees with the European Commission or how it
“punished” the Swedish <strong>EU</strong> Presidency for being too positive in its
attitudes to <strong>Turkey</strong>. 35 Another example of this kind is that of the
relations of <strong>Turkey</strong> and Greece or <strong>Turkey</strong> and Cyprus. Sometimes
the views of Czech politicians (particularly the Prime Minister, the Foreign
Minister, and the current and former presidents).
34
Stín summitu: turecké členství v <strong>EU</strong> [online]. 5.4.2009 [cit. 2009-06-16].
Lidovky.cz. Available from www:< lidovky.cz/stin-summitu-turecke-clenstvi-veu-due-/ln_eu.asp?c=A090405_170326_ln_eu_ter
>.
35
Sarkozy zdůraznil: Turecko v <strong>EU</strong> nechci [online]. 24.5.2007 [cit. 2009-06-
16]. iHned.cz. Available from www:< zahranicni.ihned.cz/c4-10149910-
21228220-003000_d-sarkozy-zduraznil-turecko-v-eu-nechci>.
162

the articles discuss the history of Greek-Turkish and Cypriot-
Turkish relations, and in other cases they analyse the Turkish
efforts to decouple these from the <strong>EU</strong> accession. 36
The third category covers specific issues: One example is
the role <strong>Turkey</strong> plays in safeguarding <strong>EU</strong> energy security (the
Nabucco pipeline) 37 ; another is the importance <strong>Turkey</strong> attaches to
visa facilitation or even the introduction of a visa-free regime 38 ;
sometimes the geostrategic position of <strong>Turkey</strong> in the wider Middle
East and its impact on the <strong>EU</strong> are discussed as well.
Conclusion
The overall impression from our analysis might evoke a
mild optimism regarding the Czech attitudes toward <strong>Turkey</strong>.
However, we believe that some factors curbing this optimism
should be mentioned. No matter how supportive of <strong>Turkey</strong>´s
membership the biggest political parties are, they are typically not
interested in <strong>Turkey</strong> per se, but rather in some hidden agendas of
their own. First, the Civic Democrats, for instance, see the ongoing
enlargement process as the best safeguard against deeper political
36 <strong>EU</strong> „potrestala“ Turecko za jeho postoj vůči Kypru [online]. 29.6.2006 [cit.
2009-06-16]. iHned.cz. Available from www:< zahranicni.ihned.cz/c1-
18798680-eu-potrestala-turecko-za-jeho-postoj-vuci-kypru >.
37 See, for instance, Turecko kývlo na plynovod Nabucco, Evropa sníží závislost
na Rusku [online].8.5.2009 [cit. 2009-06-16]. idnes.cz. Available from www:<
ekonomika.idnes.cz/turecko-kyvlo-na-plynovod-nabucco-evropa-snizi-zavislostna-rusku-1fn-/eko-zahranicni.asp?c=A090508_132551_eko-zahranicni_fih
>.
38 Cf. „Ale hlavně zrušte ta víza“ [online]. 10.12.2008 [cit. 2009-06-
16].lidovky.cz. Available from www:< lidovky.cz/ale-hlavne-zruste-ta-viza-
0h6-/ln_noviny.asp?c=A081210_000044_ln_noviny_sko&klic=228990
&mes=081210_0>.
163

integration. Second, the Czech parties do not have strong opinions
about these issues, which means that they often mechanically
adopt arguments from their sister parties in the <strong>EU</strong>. Third, if the
costs of the Turkish membership become more visible (for
instance, the shift of the Czech Republic from being a member of
the group of net recipients of <strong>EU</strong> funds to being a net payer), the
resistance both within the society and in the parties may increase.
The uncertain political situation coupled with the low relevance of
<strong>Turkey</strong> for Czech foreign policy may bring a substantial change at
any time.
164

165

Adam Szymański *
Polish <strong>Perceptions</strong>
Abstract
The <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong> is not a top issue in the
public debate in Poland. However, it is still possible to outline the
general position of the main participants of the debate on this
question. This contrubution includes the attitude of the Polish
government and president, political parties, society and media in
2006-2009 period as well as determinants of their position. It is
argued that although Poland is generally in favour of the Turkish
accession as a result of the support for the whole process of <strong>EU</strong>
enlargement, both elites and society are divided on the <strong>EU</strong>
membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>. Moreover, their attitudes do not have to be
invariable, and can be influenced even by single incidents.
General Determinants of the Polish Position
The new <strong>EU</strong> enlargement strategy, developed in 2006 1 ,
has not changed the principles of the Polish policy towards <strong>EU</strong>
*
The opinions expressed herein are only those of the author and do not reflect
any institutional views.
1
“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council. <strong>EU</strong> Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007 (Including
Annexed Special Report on the <strong>EU</strong>’s Capacity to Integrate New <strong>Member</strong>s)”,
Brussels, 8 November 2006, Com (2006) 649,
www.ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/Nov/com_649_strateg
y_paper_en.pdf
166

enlargement, which seems to be the main determinant of Poland’s
position on the Turkish accession. As it was before 2006, Poland
supported throughout the period of the development of the new
strategy a continuity of the process and the “open door” policy.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Meller had already stated in
January 2006 that “<strong>EU</strong> enlargement is indispensable and we accept
all candidacies (…).” 2
However, the Polish authorities support to a different
degree the European aspirations of individual countries. The <strong>EU</strong>
enlargement eastwards is still the priority and the strategic goal is
the <strong>EU</strong> accession of Ukraine. 3 The admission of so-called official
and potential candidate countries (<strong>Turkey</strong>, West Balkan states) is
also supported by the Polish political elites. This stems from the
recognition of openness as Europe’s main rule, but it also (if not
first of all) helps the Ukrainian case. Therefore, the Polish position
on the prospects of the accession of the eastern neighbour of
Poland determines to a large extent the general positive attitude
towards the whole process of <strong>EU</strong> enlargement.
The fact that the accession of the candidates from South
Eastern Europe is less important for Poland than the admission of
Ukraine stems from the unequal role of the eastern and southern
vectors in the Polish foreign policy. Polish political elites simply
do not see the direct benefits of <strong>EU</strong> membership of countries from
South Eastern Europe. For them, when it comes to <strong>Turkey</strong>, its <strong>EU</strong>
2
“Rußland hat keine Orientierung. Gespräch mit Außenminister Meller”, Die
Welt, 7 January 2006, www.welt.de/printwelt/article189286/Russland_hat_keine_Orientierung.html
3
Anna Fotyga, “Europejska perspektywa Turcji i Ukrainy” (European Prospect
of <strong>Turkey</strong> and Ukraine), speech during the conference of the Institute of Public
Affairs, 2 December 2005, author’s archive.
167

accession is as distant as the country itself, whose citizens rarely
choose Poland as their country of destination (the Turkish
Diaspora in this <strong>EU</strong> state comprises only several hundred persons)
and who do not have very close relations with Polish society. The
economic relations between these countries have been developed
in recent years (trade volume in 2008 – about 4.3 billion dollars 4 ),
but <strong>Turkey</strong> is not a top priority country, never mentioned in
foreign ministers’ exposes.
This is the main reason why the <strong>EU</strong> memberships of
<strong>Turkey</strong> and the West Balkan states are not top issues in the
political debate, within the election campaigns, among others
(2007 – parliamentary elections, 2009 – European Parliament
elections). Declarations about these states, made by both the Polish
government and the opposition, reflect the national position that is
balanced, economical with words and often only partially
specified. 5 The political elites claim that the <strong>EU</strong> should give the
above-mentioned countries a clear membership prospect.
However, it seems that they talk more often than in the case of
Ukraine about such issues as “a fair starting point” or pacta sunt
servanda, and are more eager to admit that progress on the way to
the <strong>EU</strong> depends largely on the state of preparations of the
candidates. The Polish government approves the <strong>EU</strong> decisions in
favour of the official or potential candidates, but does not express
any signs of strong enthusiasm. It does not run information
4
Data: “Wicepremier Pawlak: Polska i Turcja silne w czasach kryzysu” (Deputy
Prime Minister Pawlak: Poland and <strong>Turkey</strong> Strong in the Time of Crisis), 14
May 2009, www.mg.gov.pl
5
Adam Szymański, “Postura de Polonia frente a la ampliación de la Unión
Europea”, La Musa, Vol. 5, 2006, pp. 121-136.
168

campaigns to communicate its positions and is not very active in
the promotion of these candidates.
The sense of distance and lack of direct benefits of, as
well as knowledge about these countries are also the main reasons
why the <strong>EU</strong> memberships of <strong>Turkey</strong> and the Balkan states are in
the background of the public discussions in the media and among
Polish society. It is a noticeable issue only occasionally, and it
concentrates on a few repetitive questions.
Polish Position on the <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Member</strong>ship of <strong>Turkey</strong>
Government and President
All three governments in the 2006-2009 period 6 have
generally supported or are still in favour of the <strong>EU</strong> membership of
<strong>Turkey</strong>, which can be a reality after fulfilment of the official
accession criteria. When it comes to Law and Justice
governments, they recognised the Turkish accession as a real
challenge. Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga said: “We are not against
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession, though we realise the process will be
6
The government headed by Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz worked between
October 2005 and July 2006. It was a minority government until April 2006
with the participation of the conservative party Law and Justice (PiS, Prawo i
Sprawiedliwość). Between May 2006 and July 2006 PiS created a coalition with
the right oriented League of Polish Families (LPR, Liga Polskich Rodzin) and
populist Self-Defence (Samoobrona). Between July 2006 and November 2007
Law and Justice governed under the leadership of Jarosław Kaczyński – first
together with the League of Polish Families and Self-Defence, and then alone -
between August and November 2007. From November 2007 the Polish
government led by Donald Tusk consists of centre-right oriented Civic Platform
(PO, Platforma Obywatelska) and Polish Peasant Party (PSL, Polskie
Stronnictwo Ludowe). During the whole analysed period the Polish president is
Lech Kaczyński, supported by PiS.
169

difficult.” 7 At the same time, they looked at the <strong>EU</strong> membership of
this state as a step bringing benefits both to Poland and the <strong>EU</strong>.
Apart from the already mentioned “Ukrainian factor” and
underlining the need to sustain the Union’s credibility, the
governing elite talked about <strong>Turkey</strong> as a NATO ally and a good
U.S. partner which has good relations with Poland (based on
historical experience). According to the Polish government,
<strong>Turkey</strong> as an <strong>EU</strong> member would strengthen the Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP) and the <strong>EU</strong> as a global player that
would be able to take active part, e.g., in the fight against
terrorism. 8 The geopolitical factor, the main Polish argument in
support of the whole process of the <strong>EU</strong> enlargement, played here a
crucial role. The government started to recognise the Turkish role
in the regions important both for <strong>EU</strong> and Poland (South Caucasus
or Black Sea region). 9
The Tusk government also supports the <strong>EU</strong> membership
of <strong>Turkey</strong>, presenting the same main arguments and only focusing
more on some factors connected with current developments - first
of all, the importance of <strong>Turkey</strong> for the energy security of
Europe. 10 During the visit of Foreign Minister Ali Babacan in
Warsaw in November 2008, the Polish counterpart Radosław
Sikorski said that Poland supported the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>,
7
“Chcemy otwartego dialogu z Rosją” (We Want an Open Dialogue with
Russia), Gazeta Wyborcza, 20-21 May 2006.
8
Fotyga, Europejska perspektywa Turcji i Ukrainy, author’s archive.
9
More about the Polish position on the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong> in 2006 see
Przemysław Osiewicz, “Polskie stanowisko w kwestii przystąpienia Republiki
Turcji do Unii Europejskiej” (Polish Position on the Turkish Accession to the
European Union), Przegląd Politologiczny, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2006, pp. 61-71.
10
Speech of Deputy Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski during the
conference „The Middle East Peace Process after Annapolis”, Warsaw, 3 April
2008, author’s archive.
170

as the Turkish state had been in favour of Polish membership in
NATO. Sikorski reminded Babacan that Poland belonged to the
group of friends of <strong>Turkey</strong> who were trying to convince the <strong>EU</strong>
states to accept <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession. 11 In May 2009 (during the
official visit of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Poland),
Prime Minister Tusk, assuring that Poland will participate
consequently in the process of negotiations between <strong>Turkey</strong> and
the <strong>EU</strong>, stated: “We both deeply believe in near and positive end to
the process of Turkish <strong>EU</strong> accession.” 12 He hoped that the year
2011, when Poland takes over the presidency in the <strong>EU</strong>, would
bring the acceleration of negotiation talks. Tusk claimed that the
European aspirations of <strong>Turkey</strong> were justified. He announced that
Poland would remind its <strong>EU</strong> partners that some time ago nobody
suggested the need to set new, additional criteria of the <strong>EU</strong>
membership of <strong>Turkey</strong> besides the ones that exist now. According
to Tusk, there should be no obstacle on the Turkish way to the <strong>EU</strong>
after the fulfilment of the universal membership criteria by
<strong>Turkey</strong>. 13
The position of the Polish governments was confirmed by
the Polish President, Lech Kaczyński, during the meeting of the
Weimar Triangle in Mettlach, in December 2006. President
Kaczyński was against the introduction of stricter measures against
<strong>Turkey</strong>, which did not fulfil the obligation stemming from the
11
“’Polska popiera aspiracje Turcji do UE’” (Poland Supports the <strong>EU</strong> aspiration
of <strong>Turkey</strong>), Wprost, 18 November 2008, www.wprost.pl/ar/144764/Polskapopiera-aspiracje-Turcji-do-UE
12
“Premier Turcji w Warszawie” (Prime Minister of <strong>Turkey</strong> in Warsaw),
Rzeczpospolita, 14 May 2009, www.rp.pl/artykul/23,305263.html
13
“’Polska popiera starania Turcji o wejście do UE’” (Poland Supports the
Turkish Efforts to Enter the <strong>EU</strong>), Wprost, 14 May 2009,
www.wprost.pl/ar/161297/Premier-Turcji-z-wizyta-w-Polsce
171

protocol to the customs union agreement. He was for the
continuation of accession negotiations and admitted that it was a
difficult process, bringing benefits after many years. 14 In January
2007, the Polish president pointed out the importance of <strong>Turkey</strong>
for the regional stability, energy security, increase in
competitiveness and intercultural dialogue. 15
However, the position of the Polish president proves that
the attitude of some Polish authorities towards the <strong>EU</strong> membership
of <strong>Turkey</strong> does not have to be constant, and can be influenced even
by single events. In April 2008, President Kaczyński emphasized
the cultural differences as a problem on the Turkish way to the
<strong>EU</strong>. 16 The weakening of the president’s support was a reaction to
the unstable situation in <strong>Turkey</strong> caused by the constitution
amendments that created the possibility to wear headscarves at
universities. The mentioning of the cultural factor has a lot to do
with the position of Law and Justice, with which the Polish
president is clearly associated.
Political Parties
The general attitudes of the Polish political parties
towards the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong> have not been coherent in
the period of 2006-2009. The opinions of their members vary
because the Polish parties have different wings, and because most
14
“Pressekonferenz nach dem Treffen des Weimarer Dreiecks in Mettlach”, 5
December 2006, www.bundesregierung.de
15
Interview of the President of the Republic of Poland for the Turkish journal
“True”, January 2007, www.prezydent.pl
16
Interview of the President of the Republic of Poland for Reuters, 9 April 2008,
www.prezydent.pl
172

of their parties changed status (as governing or opposition party)
during this time. Moreover, the attitude of individual members
depended on the place of their activity (Polish parliament,
European Parliament, etc.). It is difficult to present some
classifications, therefore. However, the political profile of the party
seems to have an impact on the position on the Turkish accession.
The supporters of the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong> are
centre-right Civic Platform and two left-oriented parties –
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD, Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej)
and Social Democracy of Poland (Socjaldemokracja Polska). Civic
Platform’s members are realists – they do not predict Turkish
accession in the coming 10-15 years and they see problems
concerning, among others, the respect for democratic rules and
human rights. However, they have never been explicitly against
Turkish accession, no matter if they were in government or
opposition. This does not mean that they have not had some
reservations, both before and after the 2007 parliamentary
elections. As in the case of all other parties, various positions are
taken by the deputies to the European Parliament (EPP-ED, EPP
now). Reservations on their part were seen before the 2007
elections – e.g., Jacek Saryusz-Wolski had already in 2004 (but
also later) appealed that “yes” for <strong>Turkey</strong> had to also be “yes” for
Ukraine. 17 According to a 2008/2009 survey, there are deputies
who are “definitely” for the Turkish accession, and those who
“rather” support it (e.g., president of the EP Jerzy Buzek, who,
however, recognises the cultural difference between Europe and
17
“Warunki dla Turcji” (Conditions for <strong>Turkey</strong>), Gazeta Wyborcza, 7 October
2004.
173

<strong>Turkey</strong>), as well as those who said that “it was difficult to say” or
were “rather” against the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>. 18
The Democratic Left Alliance, as an opposition party,
supports the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>; this is a continuity of the
position of this party while it governed (2001-2005). It follows the
position of PES (S&D now) and supports the negotiation process
with <strong>Turkey</strong> on the basis of the clear criteria, under the condition
that both <strong>Turkey</strong> and the <strong>EU</strong> fulfil their obligations. 19 One of the
major politicians of this party, Tadeusz Iwiński, a big supporter of
the Turkish way to the <strong>EU</strong>, compared the quality of the possible
accession with the <strong>EU</strong> enlargement in 2004. 20 The deputies to the
European Parliament from this party are, however, not always sure
about Turkish membership. In the 2008/2009 survey, they often
answered “rather yes” or “difficult to say” as far as this issue is
concerned. However, they oppose the emotional discussion and
“cultural” arguments against the Turkish accession. 21
A similar position is taken by Social Democracy of
Poland, the party which is in the Polish parliament as an
opposition party after the 2007 elections (taking part in it together
with the Democratic Left Alliance and two minor parties) and in
18
Surveys (November 2008-February 2009) from the research project (with the
participation of the author of this text) titled Role of the Polish Deputies of the
European Parliament in Shaping Its Policy, European Studies Chair, Faculty for
Journalism and Political Science, University of Warsaw; Davutoğlu criticizes
speaker of <strong>EU</strong> parliament, “Hurriyet Daily News”, 16 November 2009,
www.hurriyetdailynews.com
19
“Manifest PES 2009” (PES Manifesto 2009), p. 57,
www.sld.org.pl/program/p-r-m-a-1958/manifest_pes_2009.htm
20
Ankieta Wirtualnej Polski - Tadeusz Iwiński (“Virtual Poland” Survey –
Tadeusz Iwiński), http://eurowybory.iwinski.pl/debaty/articles/ankietawirtualnej-polski.html
21
Surveys (November 2008-February 2009), University of Warsaw.
174

the EP before 2009. The leader – Marek Borowski – is for the <strong>EU</strong>
membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>, providing it fulfils the democratic and
economic criteria of the membership, assessed thoroughly by the
<strong>EU</strong>. 22 Again, the deputies to the EP (2004-2009), also PES
members, had different opinions. Józef Pinior is a strong supporter
of the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>, who wanted to set a date for the
Turkish accession. Other politicians are not so sure about it, and
sometimes even answered in the 2008/2009 survey that they are
“rather against” the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>. 23
The politicians of Self-Defence, which played an
important role before the 2007 parliamentary elections (they have
been out of the Polish parliament since 2007 and EP since 2009),
also seemed to support the Turkish accession. This was proven
already in 2004, when the majority of its deputies to the EP voted
for opening the accession negotiations with <strong>Turkey</strong>. 24 However,
deputy Jan Masiel (UEN) said in the 2008/2009 survey that he was
definitely against the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>. 25
The position of the Polish Peasant Party is ambiguous,
hence difficult to define. Although it rather supports the <strong>EU</strong>
membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>, in 2004, its EP deputies (EPP-ED)
abstained from voting when the Parliament decided about the start
of the accession negotiations with <strong>Turkey</strong>. This party can have
22
“Zatrzeć różnice między "starą" i "nową" Unią” (Blurring the Difference
Between “New” and “Old” Europe), official website of Marek Borowski,
www.borowski.pl/wiadomosci/wiadomosc_982.phtml
23
Surveys (November 2008-February 2009), University of Warsaw.
24
Polscy eurodeputowani podzieleni w sprawie otwarcia negocjacji z Turcją
(Polish Eurodeputies Divided on the Opening of Negotiations with <strong>Turkey</strong>),
Polish Press Agency, 15 December 2004,
www.dziennik.pap.pl/?dzial=POS&poddzial=UE&id_depeszy=15630277
25
Surveys (November 2008-February 2009), University of Warsaw.
175

some objections to the Turkish membership, because it is sensitive
towards the Common Agricultural Policy. 26
Polish political parties that support Turkish accession
repeat the arguments presented in the European debate. These are,
among others, that <strong>Turkey</strong> is important for the <strong>EU</strong> because it can
strengthen the Union’s economic position in the world, help to
solve the problem of energy security and the development of a
multicultural Europe, as well as enhance the role of CFSP. They
also present arguments from the Polish interests’ perspective.
According to the supporters of Turkish accession, it would make
the <strong>EU</strong> membership of Ukraine easier, serve the Polish interests
when it comes to relations with Russia, strengthen the
‘transatlantic bloc’ in the <strong>EU</strong>, develop the economic relations
between Poland and <strong>Turkey</strong> and help to diversify the supplies of
energy resources to Poland. 27
Right-oriented parties - Law and Justice, as well as the
League of Polish Families - were more sceptical about Turkish
accession. Although Law and Justice’s position has been evolving
since 2004, some of its politicians have always opposed the <strong>EU</strong>
membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>. Jarosław Kaczyński was against it, in
2004, because of the cultural differences between <strong>Turkey</strong> and
Europe, as well as the possible costs of the Turkish accession. 28 In
26
Adam Balcer, “Polish Stakeholders in the <strong>EU</strong>-<strong>Turkey</strong> Debate”, in: Nathalie
Tocci (ed.), Talking <strong>Turkey</strong> in Europe: Towards a Differentiated
Communication Strategy, IAI Quaderni English Series No. 13, December 2008,
p. 49, http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni_E_13.pdf
27
See more e.g. Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz, “Poland”, in Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz, The
<strong>EU</strong> Accession Prospects for <strong>Turkey</strong> and Ukraine. Debates in New <strong>Member</strong>
States, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw 2006, pp. 138-141.
28
EP deputies from this party voted against the opening of the accession
negotiations and proposed the privileged partnership instead. See more: Balcer,
176

the 2005-2007 period, the party leaders’ stance was modified by
the participation in the government. However, the party’s attitude
influenced its position. As it has been said, the Law and Justice
government underlined that the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong> was a
big challenge (benefits are mentioned later). It said that it was “not
against the Turkish accession”, but avoided using an explicitly
affirmative form. Moreover, not only Lech Kaczyński, but also his
brother Jarosław mentioned the cultural argument. The cultural and
religious differences seem to be counterbalanced in the debate in
2009 by the geopolitical factor, but they still play an important
role, which shows the new program of the party. 29
Many EP deputies (UEN, ECR now) are still opposing
the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>. According to Konrad Szymański,
Poland should not be the major supporter of <strong>Turkey</strong> until
smoothing out the differences between <strong>Turkey</strong> and Ukraine. He
claims that Turkish accession would destroy the European identity.
According to him, <strong>Turkey</strong> is important for the <strong>EU</strong> from the
economic and political point of view, but its assets can be used by
the Union without <strong>EU</strong> membership. 30 Many other PiS deputies to
the EP are sceptical as well – e.g. historian Wojciech Roszkowski,
who is “rather” against the Turkish accession. 31
“Polish Stakeholders in the <strong>EU</strong>-<strong>Turkey</strong> Debate”, p. 49; Polscy eurodeputowani,
www.dziennik.pap.pl/?dzial=POS&poddzial=UE&id_depeszy=15630277
29
There is a talk about the <strong>EU</strong> enlargement eastwards and to Balkans there, but
<strong>Turkey</strong> is not mentioned. See “Nowoczesna, Solidarna, Bezpieczna Polska.
Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości” (Modern, Loyal, Secure Poland. Law and
Justice Program), Kraków 2009, pp. 172-185,
www.pis.org.pl/download.php?g=mmedia&f=program_pis_2009.pdf
30
Konrad Szymański, “Z poparciem Turcji powinniśmy się wstrzymać” (We
Should Abstain from the Support for <strong>Turkey</strong>), Nasz Dziennik, 21 November
2008.
31
Surveys (November 2008-February 2009), University of Warsaw.
177

The League of Polish Families preferred “the privileged
partnership” of <strong>Turkey</strong> and the <strong>EU</strong> because of cultural differences
between <strong>Turkey</strong> and Europe. Its EP deputies opposed the opening
of the accession negotiations. In the 2008/2009 survey, they chose
the “rather not” option when answering the question about the <strong>EU</strong>
membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>. 32
Apart from the already mentioned arguments, the
sceptical politicians, following the European debate, talk about
<strong>Turkey</strong> as a poor, big Muslim country that does not respect human
rights and is located in an unstable international neighbourhood.
According to them, there are already difficulties in the integration
of the Turkish minorities in Europe. 33
Society
In recent years there has been a growing interest in
<strong>Turkey</strong> in the Polish society, at least in some groups (e.g., students
or academicians), which is connected with the fact that more and
more European issues have a lot to do with <strong>Turkey</strong>, and because
the Turkish culture is more popular, especially after the Nobel
Prize for Orhan Pamuk. However, <strong>Turkey</strong> is still a sort of niche
issue and the Polish society, even educated Poles, know little about
this country. Moreover, their sources of information are first of all
media or tourist trips, which makes their knowledge selective,
superficial and, unfortunately, sometimes based on prejudices. The
32
Ibidem. Polscy eurodeputowani,
www.dziennik.pap.pl/?dzial=POS&poddzial=UE&id_depeszy=15630277
33
See more Adam Szymański, “Przyszłe członkostwo Turcji w Unii
Europejskiej – skutki dla Polski” (“The Future <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Member</strong>ship of <strong>Turkey</strong> –
Impact on Poland”), Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny, No. 5, 2006, pp. 35-54.
178

Polish press articles on <strong>Turkey</strong> have often shown negative issues,
such as recent terrorist activities or human rights abuses. Because
of all this, Polish citizens can sometimes have an impression that
<strong>Turkey</strong> is some kind of Islamic religious state and a military
dictatorship at the same time.
This phenomenon, together with the rising negative view
of Muslims in Poland 34 , led to the weakening of Polish support for
the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong> in recent years. According to a
Transatlantic Trends survey only in 2004, 27 percent of Poles
treated the Turkish accession as “a good thing”, 13 percent as
“bad” and 37 percent as “neither good nor bad”. 35 This
corresponded to the Polish surveys at this time and was a result of
such factors as prevailing of the positive image of <strong>Turkey</strong> in
media, “a soft support” for the Turkish aspirations by the Polish
Church and the lack of a sizeable Turkish minority in Poland. 36
However, in recent years, the above mentioned negative factors
resulted in more people who look at the Turkish accession as a
“neither good nor bad” thing – in 2009, it was 47 percent of Poles.
According to the same survey in 2009, 18 percent of the Polish
34
According to Pew Research Center’s poll from Spring 2008 in 2005 30
percent of Poles had the negative view of Muslims and in 2008 – already 46
percent of the Polish citizens. Data: Unfavourable Views of Both Jews and
Muslims Increase in Europe, 17 September 2008,
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/955/unfavourable-views-of-both- jews-andmuslims-increase-in-europe
35
Data: Transatlantic Trends, Topline Data 2009,
www.gmfus.org/trends/2009/docs/2009_English_Top.pdf
36
See more: Wojciech Forysiński, Przemysław Osiewicz, “Should Poland
Support <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Member</strong>ship for <strong>Turkey</strong>? Convergent and Divergent Interests”, in:
Jarosław Jańczak (ed.), Rediscovering Europe: Political Challenges in the 21
179
st
Century <strong>EU</strong>, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań 2007, pp. 132-134.

citizens treated the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong> as a good thing and
17 percent as a bad one. 37
However, it must be admitted that the general support for
the Turkish accession is still relatively high, although lower than
for the Balkan states or Ukraine. This stems from a very positive
attitude towards the whole process of <strong>EU</strong> enlargement. According
to Eurobarometer 71, 69% of Polish citizens are in favour of the
process (17% are against), which gives this country the first
position among <strong>EU</strong> nations. 38
The debate about Turkish accession has not been
developed among the organized groups in Polish society.
However, it is possible to point to the attitude of the most
important parts of the civil society in Poland. The Catholic
Church, which has a strong position in Poland, is more critical
than the other organizations in the Polish society about the <strong>EU</strong>
membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>, emphasizing the cultural differences
between Europe and <strong>Turkey</strong>. However, it is divided on the issue.
The church hierarchs have never officially opposed the Turkish
accession. They only appeal for the respect of rights of the
Christian minorities in <strong>Turkey</strong>. Archbishop Alfons Nossol did talk
about the support for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s aspirations as a Christian
obligation, in the spirit of solidarity and as a way to improve
relations between Islam and Christianity. On the other hand, such
hierarchs as Primate Józef Glemp or field bishop of the Polish
army Tadeusz Płoski presented sometimes critical opinions,
37
Data: Transatlantic Trends,
www.gmfus.org/trends/2009/docs/2009_English_Top.pdf
38
Data: Eurobarometer 71. Public Opinion in the European Union, p. 162,
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb71/eb71_std_part1.pdf
180

emindful of the myth of the battle of Vienna and the danger of
turning Europe into a European Caliphate. 39 Based on talks with
ordinary priests, it can be argued that they are also divided on this
issue. Some of them rule out the Turkish accession, because
<strong>Turkey</strong> is a Muslim country, but others have no objections,
emphasizing only a need for fulfilment of the accession criteria.
Some priests have close links with political parties, taking similar
positions to theirs. The best example is Tadeusz Isakowicz-
Zalewski, also an informal leader of the Armenian lobby in
Poland, who is sceptical about the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>
unless it recognizes the Armenian massacres in 1915-1916 as
genocide.
Universities and think tanks, both public (e.g., Centre
for Eastern Studies or Polish Institute of International Affairs) and
private (e.g., Institute of Public Affairs, demosEuropa,
Union&Poland Foundation, Foundation Amicus Europae, Sobieski
Institute), have organized in recent years some (though not
numerous) lectures, seminars and conferences about <strong>Turkey</strong>-<strong>EU</strong>
relations, or have published works on it, because this issue has
become a very interesting research topic. The biggest event was
the Europe-<strong>Turkey</strong> Forum organized together by the Eastern
Institute and Turkish TASAM, in Sopot in December 2009, with
the participation of about 150 persons from <strong>Turkey</strong> and the <strong>EU</strong>
countries. The debates show that Polish scholars and analysts are
also divided on the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>. In Poland, there are
not many scholars or analysts who really work on <strong>Turkey</strong>-<strong>EU</strong>
relations - there are more persons who work on general Turkish
foreign policy or on relations between <strong>Turkey</strong> and the
39
Balcer, “Polish Stakeholders in the <strong>EU</strong>-<strong>Turkey</strong> Debate”, pp. 54-55.
181

neighbouring regions. These few who do work on <strong>Turkey</strong>-<strong>EU</strong>
relations – e.g., Adam Balcer (demosEuropa, University of
Warsaw), Przemysław Osiewicz (Adam Mickiewicz University in
Poznań, Sobieski Institute), and the author of this text – usually
support the Turkish accession, while being at the same time
objective. This means that they present the arguments for Turkish
accession (e.g., they emphasize the role of <strong>Turkey</strong> in <strong>EU</strong> external
relations or energy security), but they are able to have a critical
approach to it, and they understand the arguments of sceptics.
They also contribute to the popularization of this issue in Poland,
together with some other think-tankers, e.g., Krzysztof Bobiński
from Union&Poland Foundation. Of course, many other people,
whose main subject of interest is not the Turkish case, take part in
the public debate on the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>, as well. In that
case, they are very often sceptical about it, as is professor Roman
Kuźniar from the University of Warsaw, who presents a wellknown
argument that <strong>Turkey</strong> does not belong to Europe culturally
(but Israel does). 40
It seems that the Polish business community should
become a supporter of the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>, because it
can bring benefits for economic ties between both countries,
developed significantly in recent years. Certainly, the supporters
include the Polish-Turkish Chamber of Commerce, established in
May 2007 and consisting of almost 30 companies from the Polish
40
Roman Kuźniar, “UE – kluczowe problemy” (<strong>EU</strong>- Key Problems), Dziennik,
9 August 2006.
182

side. They have organized the Polish-Turkish Economic Forum in
October 2008 and again in Spring 2009. 41
There are, in Poland, some not very influential
organizations which focus their activity on <strong>Turkey</strong>. Among
these, there are both supporters and opponents of the Turkish
accession. To the first group belongs the Association for Polish-
Turkish Friendship, which aspires to develop ties between the two
societies. There are also sporadic actions of some small and briefly
functioning organizations that are against the <strong>EU</strong> membership of
<strong>Turkey</strong>. An example was the society “Europe of Future”, founded
by young people in Wrocław and Warsaw, which organized
already in 2005 a campaign against Turkish accession, being a
member of the group of European NGO’s “Voice for Europe” and
collecting signatures under the petition to the European and
national institutions. They supported the development of relations
between <strong>Turkey</strong> and European countries, but opposed the Turkish
accession to the <strong>EU</strong>, because the country does not respect human
rights, is too poor and has unstable neighbours. 42
Media
The Polish media are not very interested in <strong>Turkey</strong> or in
relations between the country and the <strong>EU</strong>, which is reflected in the
fact that they do not have regular correspondents in <strong>Turkey</strong>. In
41
“Waldemar Pawlak: Polska i Turcja silne w czasach kryzysu” (Waldemar
Pawlak: Poland and <strong>Turkey</strong> Strong in the Time of Crisis), Ministry of Economy,
14 May 2009, www.mg.gov.pl
42
Dominika Pszczółkowska, “Kampania przeciwko wpuszczeniu Turcji do UE”
(Campaign Against Letting <strong>Turkey</strong> into Europe), Gazet Wyborcza, 17 May
2005, www.gazeta.pl
183

ecent years, the Polish press and TV have chosen to cover Turkish
issues only occasionally – e.g., before <strong>EU</strong> summits or when
something happened in that country. In the latter case,
unfortunately, negative issues prevail, although there are also some
press articles praising <strong>Turkey</strong>, e.g., the article in Rzeczpospolita by
Jacek Przybylski about, paradoxically, Turkish actions during the
April 2009 NATO summit. 43 The lack of knowledge about <strong>Turkey</strong>
and the lack of understanding that it is an important country also
for Poland, make the wide coverage on the issue impossible. TV
and radio stations do not try to shape the opinions on the Turkish
candidacy, reflecting the most popular views of elites or the
public. 44 The situation looks different in the case of newspapers
and magazines. 45 Liberal Gazeta Wyborcza rather supports the <strong>EU</strong>
membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>. It usually publishes positive commentaries
(e.g., the articles written by journalist Dawid Warszawski), yet
sometimes with critical remarks. It was so, also, before 2006, when
journalist Marek Rapacki expressed fears about the negative
influence of the potential Turkish accession on the Polish
beneficiary status in the <strong>EU</strong>. 46 In more conservative newspapers,
such as Rzeczpospolita or Dziennik, views are more diversified.
Some of their journalists support the Turkish accession, but others
can be critical, as with regard to the issue of the Pope’s speech in
Regensburg, in 2006, and the Turkish reaction to it.
43
Jacek Przybylski, “Mistrzowie szachów dyplomatycznych” (Masters of
Diplomatic Chess), Rzeczpospolita, 14 April 2009.
44
Balcer, “Polish Stakeholders in the <strong>EU</strong>-<strong>Turkey</strong> Debate”, p. 51.
45
The Polish newspapers and magazines have some journalists who know a lot
about <strong>Turkey</strong> and sometimes speak Turkish (e.g., Dawid Warszawski and
Witold Szabłowski from Gazeta Wyborcza, Jakub Kumoch from Dziennik or
Łukasz Wójcik who wrote for Przekrój).
46
Kaźmierkiewicz, “Poland”, p. 133.
184

Usually, moderate supporters of the Turkish accession
among journalists point to the geopolitical argument. The sceptics
also mention the issues that are debated in Europe, i.e., cultural
differences, lack of the democratic system or borders with unstable
countries. However, they present also “the Polish” arguments: the
negative impact of the Turkish accession on the <strong>EU</strong> membership
prospects for Ukraine, or on the <strong>EU</strong> budget. 47
Conclusion
To conclude, a general support of Poland for the whole
process of <strong>EU</strong> enlargement has a positive impact on the Polish
position on the membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>, which is not, however, a
top issue in the public debate in this Central European country. It
can be said that Poland is generally in favour of the Turkish
accession. However, a more detailed analysis proves that the
Polish position is more complex than it seemed at first glance.
Some groups within elites and society can be critical or even
against the <strong>EU</strong> membership of <strong>Turkey</strong>. Moreover, the Polish
positive attitude cannot be taken for granted. The position of both
political authorities and common citizens can change, being
influenced even by single events or tendencies, in <strong>Turkey</strong> and
Poland as well as in Europe in general. This is the reason why the
communication strategy about <strong>Turkey</strong> must be developed also in
case of Poland. It could limit the negative influence of stereotypes
and oversimplifications on the Polish approach towards the
Turkish accession to the <strong>EU</strong>.
47
Balcer, “Polish Stakeholders in the <strong>EU</strong>-<strong>Turkey</strong> Debate”, p. 52.
185

Iulia Serafimescu, Mihai Sebe ∗
Romanian <strong>Perceptions</strong> •
Abstract
Even though the topics usually associated with <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
accession process in the capitals around the Union are not so much
debated upon in Bucharest, the importance of having <strong>Turkey</strong> play
as a European actor is not underestimated, especially when it
comes to the Black Sea area. Officials and civil society alike
declare themselves supportive of <strong>Turkey</strong> becoming an <strong>EU</strong>
<strong>Member</strong>, invoking excellent economic bilateral relations, common
history and common perspectives, as well as more strategicallysophisticated
reasons such as the role of <strong>Turkey</strong> in issues
pertaining to Europe’s energy security and the fact that the Union’s
leverage in key areas of the globe would be enhanced following
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession. Substantive debates on the institutional
effects, at the <strong>EU</strong> level, of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession, as well as those
regarding the real implications of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession for Romania,
are, however, missing.
∗ Iulia Serafimescu is Project Coordinator in the European Studies and Analysis
Unit, European Institute of Romania, and Associate Editor of the Romanian
Journal of European Affairs. E-mail: iulia.serafimescu@ier.ro
Mihai Sebe is Project Coordinator in the European Studies and Analysis Unit,
European Institute of Romania, and Associate Editor of the Romanian Journal of
European Affairs. E-mail: mihai.sebe@ier.ro
• The opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors alone and do
not represent the official position of the European Institute of Romania.
186

Introduction
Going from economic to political, the arguments behind
the support for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession 1 stem either directly or
indirectly from a series of concrete dimensions, such as bilateral
ties and various regional cooperation aspects, but also from the
ways in which Romania and <strong>Turkey</strong> approach issue specific topics
such as security. A brief overview of these elements is offered
below, together with an image of how the major topics surrounding
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession negotiations are reflected in Bucharest.
Support for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> Bid
As recently as November 2008, Romania and <strong>Turkey</strong>
celebrated 130 years since the establishment of formal diplomatic
relations. The occasion was only appropriate to emphasize once
again the unity of perspective and opinions that the two countries
share by virtue of their common history and their positioning on
the shores of the “Hospitable Sea”, arguments that ultimately
underlie Romania’s support for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> bid.
Across the Romanian political party spectrum and during
the period subjected to analysis (2006-2009), little change is to be
identified in the Romanian political discourse as regards the topic
of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong>, and indeed as regards various
1 st
After January 1 2007, Romania finds itself in the legitimate position to
confirm the “total, firm, support for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s integration in the European
Union” – See Cristian Diaconescu, Romanian Minster of Foreign Affairs, 3 July
2009, Press Statement available at
http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=39782&idlnk=2&cat=4, accessed
on 10 June 2009.
187

other topics concerning Romania’s position towards <strong>Turkey</strong>, while
the rhetoric of Romanian high officials has advocated support for
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong> bid and cooperation on all levels. Unlike in other
<strong>Member</strong> States, most voices of the Romanian civil society are
consonant with the state-level position of support for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
accession 2 and recent polls suggest Romanians are the most
favourable, among Europeans, to <strong>Turkey</strong> becoming an <strong>EU</strong>
<strong>Member</strong> 3 . Romania’s new status as an <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Member</strong> State in 2007
only made for nuances in this discourse, to the extent that the word
“cooperation” is henceforth endowed with new meanings: all
regional policies gain new (European) stakes, while Romania, in
pushing the agenda on the Black Sea, calls for awareness that there
can be no European policy for the Black Sea without engaging
<strong>Turkey</strong> to play as a European actor.
Against the backdrop of a special bilateral interest,
translated in the excellent economic relations between the two
countries before, as well as after Romania’s accession, from 2006
to 2009 “the need is to cement the relationship between the two
countries by means of stronger political ties” 4 . This is the more so
2
See for instance Magdalena Boiangiu, “Ispita superiorităţii” (The temptation of
superiority), Dilema Veche, 12-18 January 2007, available at
http://www.euractiv.ro/UserFiles/article/Supli%20intreg_01120723.pdf
(“Without positioning itself on one side or another (because we would not be in
the position to tilt the scales, but only to stimulate the hostility of others),
Romania should be on the side of those Turks who wish to join the <strong>EU</strong>”),
accessed on 3 June 2009.
3
“Transatlantic Trends” 2009, German Marshall Fund, see
http://www.gardianul.ro/German-Marshall-Fund-Rom%C3%A2nilor-nu-lepasa-de-Obama,-dar-vor-ca-Turcia-sa-intre-in-UE-s144028.html,
accessed on 15
September 2009.
4
Prime Minister Călin Popescu- Tăriceanu, Press statement upon arrival from
the official visit in <strong>Turkey</strong>, 2 February 2006, available at
http://www.gov.ro/declaratii-de-presa-ale-primului-ministru-calin-popescu-
188

since there are voices who argue that the political relationship
between the two is more like a paper tiger, with no concrete
bilateral projects planned for the near future. 5
Hot in Brussels is Lukewarm in Bucharest
Hardly any of the concerns voiced in the capitals around
Europe in respect to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession are the subjects of hot
debates in Bucharest. Thus, discussion of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s European
vocation, for instance, is no longer appropriate from the
perspective of the Romanian president, since “the decision to begin
talks with <strong>Turkey</strong> has already been taken” 6 ; upon meeting the set
criteria, the <strong>EU</strong> is bound to hold true the promise it made <strong>Turkey</strong>.
In this respect, even the dispute with Cyprus, which led to
the 2006 negotiation deadlock with the <strong>EU</strong>, must not be allowed to
hamper indefinitely <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession process: “we stand
convinced that efforts must be continued towards the reunification
of Cyprus. We stand convinced that the <strong>EU</strong> must hold true its
commitments towards <strong>Turkey</strong>, that negotiation talks with <strong>Turkey</strong>
must be pursued and that <strong>Turkey</strong> will be an <strong>EU</strong> member state when
it meets all the standards, including those pertaining to the
relationship with an <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Member</strong> State, such as Cyprus”. As
tariceanu-la-sosirea-din-vizita-oficiala-in-turcia__l1a54512.html, accessed on 3
June 2009.
5
Adrian Cioroianu, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, “A Romanian priority:
<strong>Turkey</strong>” (O prioritate românească: Turcia), Foreign Policy Romania,
September/ October 2009, p.80
6
Interview with Romanian President Traian Băsescu in the French publication
Dernières Nouvelles d'Alsace, 17 December 2006, available at
http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=8298&_PRID=search
189

egards the issue of Turkish airports and seaports closed to Greek
Cypriot traffic, though, Romanian officials tend to consider that
the current situation goes against both the spirit and the letter of
the Union: “it would be impossible to imagine that two <strong>EU</strong>
<strong>Member</strong> States could ever impose entering restrictions in their
respective national air or sea ports to vessels flying the flag of <strong>EU</strong>
<strong>Member</strong> States” 7 .
On the issue of the Kurdish minority, a hot debate topic
when it comes to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession, especially around the
countries of Old Europe, Romania rallied behind the <strong>EU</strong> position
at the end of 2007 when PKK attacks prompted Turkish military
incursions into Northern Iraq: “Romania understands <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
legitimate security interests and believes that each state has the
right to defend itself against terrorist threats. Romania’s position in
this respect is consonant with the <strong>EU</strong> position, which states that
fighting terrorism successfully may only be possible to the extent
states agree to cooperate” 8 .
When debating upon <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession around Europe,
the <strong>EU</strong>’s cultural identity – perceived as under siege in various
capitals around Europe, not least due to the growing influx of
Muslim immigrants – is also a high salience topic. One year after
Romania’s accession, Adrian Severin, Group of the Progressive
7
Joint Press Statement, Traian Băsescu, President of Romania, Karolos
Papoulias, President of the Hellenic Republic, 15 February 2007, available at
http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=8483&_PRID=search,
accessed on 17 June 2009.
8
Joint Press Statement, Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu, Prime Minister of Romania,
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Prime Minister of the Republic of <strong>Turkey</strong>, 25 October
2007, available at http://www.gov.ro/declaratii-de-presa-sustinute-de-primulministru-calin-popescu-tariceanu-si-de-primul-ministru-al-republicii-turciarecep-tayyip-erdogan-la-palatul__l1a66958.html,
accessed on 10 June 2009.
190

Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament
(S&D) MEP and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, was speaking
about defining the Union’s cultural identity in the mould of
secularism: “We pay respect to the various cultures and we must
open a platform in order to create unity with different religions
also. <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong> will show exactly how secular
the <strong>EU</strong> is” 9 .
In Bucharest, unlike in other capitals across Europe,
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession was not a seminal issue in the debates
surrounding the elections for the European Parliament this year.
However, in the context of the previous elections, held in
November 2007 after Romania and Bulgaria’s accession, one
Romanian NGO queried the most important Romanian political
parties as to their foreign policy priorities. The answer coming
from the Democratic Party 10 , while being the most substantiated,
offered several insights as to what Romania’s perspectives might
be in relation to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession. Overall, “it is in Romania’s
best interest that <strong>Turkey</strong> joins the <strong>EU</strong> because only in this way the
economic and political development of the Black Sea riparian
states can be guaranteed, as well as energy security in this region”,
but there are nevertheless a series of concerns as regards <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
accession, such as the one relating to the <strong>EU</strong> decision-making
process: “It is estimated that in 20 years from now <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
population will reach 80-85 million, which would make it the state
9
See:
http://www.trt.net.tr/international/newsDetail.aspx?HaberKodu=b5a04fd8-a8bd-
4f63-b80e-5f710c5e5537, accessed on 25 June 2009.
10
The Democratic Party ceased to exist in December 2007. Formerly headed by
Traian Băsescu (currently President of Romania) and later Emil Boc (currently
Prime Minister of Romania), it gave rise by merger to the Democratic Liberal
Party, part of the present governing coalition.
191

with the largest population in the <strong>EU</strong> […] in such a scenario, in
order for <strong>Turkey</strong> to become an <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Member</strong> State, the decisionmaking
mechanism at the <strong>EU</strong>-level must be reconsidered […] If
<strong>Turkey</strong> were to join the <strong>EU</strong> under the current institutional
organization formula, the decision-making mechanism would be
paralyzed.” 11
Arguably as a result of the fact that Romania is a new
<strong>Member</strong> State, Romanian attitudes are generally supportive of
future enlargements, specifically those of <strong>Turkey</strong> and the states in
the Western Balkans. Since Romania is now a part of the <strong>EU</strong> body,
a plastic physiological comparison explains that the <strong>EU</strong> apparatus
should be a faster processor: “it is not the candidate countries or
the new <strong>Member</strong> States that are indigestible: our digestive system
is too slow. Either we find a good digestive quickly or we will be
obliged to starve for a long time.” 12 There are two reasons behind
the feeling of urgency associated with this perspective on
enlargement: the first is that enlargement is one of the powerbestowing
dimensions of the <strong>EU</strong> and it is only by being a powerful
actor in a global world that the <strong>EU</strong> can offer its citizens security,
and the second one, as explained by Adrian Severin, S&D MEP, is
the fact that the <strong>EU</strong> needs to be competitive as much as it needs to
be powerful: “Enlargement is not a concession made to the
11
“Teme Europene pentru Alegeri Europene” (European topics for European
elections), Questionnaire of the NGO Clubul “România-UE”, October 2007,
available at http://www.euro-club.org/documente/PD%20ChestionarClubRo-
UE.pdf, accessed on 25 June 2009.
12
Adrian Severin, S&D MEP, European Parliament debate, 9 July 2008,
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+CRE+20080709+ITEM-
012+DOC+XML+V0//RO&language=RO&query=INTERV&detail=3-320,
accessed on 10 June 2009.
192

candidate countries. Some of them, such as Ukraine, Serbia,
Moldova and <strong>Turkey</strong>, have alternatives – maybe worse, but
alternatives. In these cases we are in competition with others.
Some of their internal problems could be solved better inside,
rather than outside, the European Union. If we do not offer them
prospects, we do not offer our citizens security.” 13
Still on the topic of enlargement, while there is no
mentioning of the “strategic partnership” surrogate for accession as
regards <strong>Turkey</strong>, the idea of a “multiple-speed Europe” is perceived
as constructive: “in time, although this phrase was not used as
such, different speeds have been a reality of the enlargement
process (ever since the period in which only the European
Economic Communities were in place). […] The <strong>EU</strong>’s next
enlargement will also be a process in which we will again speak
about different speeds: Croatia, <strong>Turkey</strong>, Serbia.” 14
Regional Cooperation and a European Black Sea Agenda
In Bucharest, support for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong> is
generally voiced but not elaborated upon. 15 Between 2006 and
13
See above footnote.
14
Renate Weber, ALDE MEP, interviewed in “UE facilitează existenţa liderilor
supranaţionali, mai departe contează persoanele” (<strong>EU</strong> facilitates the existence of
supranational leaders, what matters next is the persons themselves), Adevărul, 6
June 2009, available at http://www.adevarul.ro/articole/renate-weber-uefaciliteaza-existenta-liderilor-supranationali-mai-departe-conteazapersoanele.html,
accessed on 10 June 2009.
15
It is interesting in this respect to note one journalist’s observation: “Recently
asked to speak about <strong>Turkey</strong>’s Accession to the <strong>EU</strong>, one high ranking Romanian
official could only fumble something like «we support <strong>Turkey</strong>’s European
path». Why? Because there is no national, articulate position on this topic. We
193

2009, the large majority of official statements dealing with
Romania’s support for <strong>Turkey</strong> during its accession process iterate
promises of sharing the expertise Romania gained in its own
negotiation process and providing the technical assistance (e.g. by
means of twinning projects) needed in order to carry out the
necessary economic and political reforms. Promises are being
made and support is expressed, but on most occasions they go
hand in hand with the proviso of <strong>Turkey</strong> meeting the accession
criteria.
Statements of support for Turkish membership are usually
made in connection with various topics present on the cooperation
agenda. In this respect, on the bilateral level, such major energy
projects as the building of the underwater electrical cable
Constanţa - Istanbul are underway, while in the regional
dimension, the two states cooperate in various regional
organisations focused on the region of South East Europe and that
of the Black Sea.
While in the South East of Europe the cooperation
formula has found a fortunate expression in the functional duality
of the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP)
(organization with political attributes) and the Regional
Cooperation Council (RCC) (operational framework for SEECP),
the Romanian perspective as regards the cooperation in the Black
Sea area is that it lacks precisely the political dimension that would
simply don’t know whether <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession is to Romania’s advantage or
not, and if it is, we don’t know if we would prefer a swifter or a slower
accession process.” See Sever Voinescu, “Departe de Europa reală” (Far from
real Europe), Cotidianul, 18 June 2007, available at
http://www.cotidianul.ro/departe_de_europa_reala-27990.html , accessed on 17
June 2009.
194

enable the existent cooperation organizations and the relevant
stakeholders to cope with the current threats, even more so since
energy related issues have pushed the (Wider) Black Sea on the
European agenda. Cooperation thus needs to go beyond the
economic direction (exemplified, for instance, by the Organization
of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation), and in this respect the
organizations/missions that currently exist are either strictly
focused on security (BLACKSEAFOR, Operation Black Sea
Harmony) or, despite Romanian vocal backing, have yielded few
concrete results so far (Black Sea Synergy). Over this particular
need for an institutionalized political dimension at the Black Sea,
the Romanian and Turkish perspectives split.
In 2006, Daniel Dăianu, Alliance of Liberals and
Democrats for Europe (ALDE) MEP and former Minister of
Finance, was taking note of the absence of high ranking officials
from Russia and <strong>Turkey</strong> at the launching event of the Black Sea
Forum, a Romanian initiative meant to stimulate the political
consultative process among the Black Sea riparian states. On this
occasion, some elements hinted at <strong>Turkey</strong>’s future moves at the
Black Sea. Dăianu was warning Romanian foreign policy and
security policy-makers to watch closely the dialogue between
Ankara and Moscow, since there is likelihood of a scenario
involving a <strong>Turkey</strong>-Russia Black Sea axis: “As the process of
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s negotiations of <strong>EU</strong> accession gets more and more
complicated, Ankara will be more and more prone to re-think its
strategic options. […] A big country, a regional power – as <strong>Turkey</strong>
thinks of itself and its neighbours perceive it –, with a very
dynamic economy (minus some constant weaknesses related to the
duality of the economic system), with a military to be feared
195

(approx. half a million soldiers, modern air forces etc.) will not
find itself knocking sine die at the Union’s door. My argument
here rests not only with the pride of the Turkish people, but also
with pragmatic reasons, related to the dynamics in the global
context: the economic rise of China and India, Iran’s evolution as a
rival in the region, the intricate situation in Iraq (including the
issue of the Kurd population) and, last but not least, the advantages
of a multi-layer cooperation with Russia.” 16
Without taking the argument so far as to think of an
Ankara-Moscow axis at the Black Sea, the Romanian President
Traian Băsescu, more or less the architect of Romania’s Black Sea
foreign policy perspective, agreed in 2006 with this vision,
underlining the sheer impossibility of ever dealing with the Black
Sea corpus of problems in power formulas that exclude <strong>Turkey</strong> or
Russia, the great regional powers. 17 After Romania’s accession,
this perspective became one of the dimensions to be explored in
the search for a European strategy at the Black Sea. The argument
that there is no serious game at the Black Sea without <strong>Turkey</strong>
playing quarterback is also picked up by the current President of
the Romanian Senate, Mircea Geoană, albeit in a broader
perspective: Romania as a <strong>Member</strong> State (and one of the stops on
the Silk Road), together with the <strong>EU</strong> as a global actor, cannot fail
to admit <strong>Turkey</strong>’s strategic importance in the Black Sea complex
understood as part of the “Eurasian corridor” linking Europe to
16
Daniel Dăianu, “O nou axă?” (A new axis?), Jurnalul Naţional, 11 July 2006,
available at http://www.jurnalul.ro/stire-editorial/o-noua-axa-16981.html,
accessed on 17 June 2009.
17
Romanian President Traian Băsescu, Press Statement, 20 January 2006,
available
http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=7039&_PRID=search,
accessed on 10 June 2009.
196
at

China via Central Asia – the corridor where all the major global
actors have high stakes. 18
The prevalent Romanian foreign policy outlook at the
Black Sea refers to a certain unity of perspective of the riparian
states in relation to the unity of threats that must be addressed.
More specifically, since we are dealing with a set of asymmetrical
threats that are common (drug and arms trafficking towards the
states of the <strong>EU</strong>, human trafficking, frozen conflicts), the
assumption is that the perspectives and views these countries hold
in order to counter the threats must resemble. The explanation for
this is the fact that the states are now interconnected to the Euro-
Atlantic structures (either by membership or as candidates), and
should therefore reason as Euro-Atlantic players: “<strong>Turkey</strong>,
Romania and Bulgaria are NATO members. Is there room for
doubt that three NATO member states must hold, one way or
another, common objectives? Do you believe that NATO countries
should oppose NATO’s participation?” 19 . <strong>EU</strong> membership for
<strong>Turkey</strong> is thus seen as a mere expression of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s de facto
already assumed commitments.
In an interesting analysis of Romania’s foreign policy at
the Black Sea, analysts at Revista 22 weekly note that, after 2005,
the inability of Romania’s foreign policy-makers to garner Turkish
18
Mircea Geoană, President of the Senate of Romania, Head of the Social
Democratic Party, Intervention in the Debate “20 Years Ago – 20 Years to
Follow: Stages and Perspectives for Eastern and Central Europe”, The Aspen
Institute Romania, 10 September 2009, Bucharest (authors’ participation).
19
Zaman, interview with Traian Băsescu, President of Romania, 31 May 2006,
available at
http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=7602&_PRID=search,
accessed on 3 June 2009.
197

support for Romanian initiatives at the Black Sea ultimately
accounts for the latter’s failure. 20
Furthermore, European initiatives also seem to lack the
necessary political teeth: the Black Sea Synergy is in critical
danger of losing credibility points, as observed by Ioan Mircea
Paşcu, S&D MEP. The argument is that as long as the real corpus
of problems at the Black Sea,energy and frozen conflicts, is being
dealt with on a sectoral basis, i.e. in the light of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
membership negotiations for instance, this initiative will fail to
provide any added value. 21
<strong>EU</strong> Going Global: Security Aspects
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession talks have been interpreted in
Bucharest to have direct bearing on European security on several
dimensions.
The most immediate of these dimensions is energy
security, where <strong>Turkey</strong>’s role has been referred to as
“paramount” 22 in securing the diversification of energy supply for
20
Ileana Racheru, Octavian Manea, “Priorităţile de politică externă ale lui
Traian Băsescu” (Traian Băsescu’s foreign policy priorities), Revista 22, 10
March 2009, available at http://www.revista22.ro/prioritatile-de-politicaexterna-ale-lui-traian-basescu-5737.html,
accessed on 10 June 2009.
21
Ioan Mircea Paşcu, S&D MEP, European Parliament intervention, 12 March
2009, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+CRE+20090312+ITEM-
004+DOC+XML+V0//EN&query=INTERV&detail=4-021, accessed on 17
June 2009.
22
Cristian Diaconescu, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Press
Statement,12 May 2009, available at
http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=39110, accessed on 3 June 2009.
198

the European Union. Once in the <strong>EU</strong>, Romania linked the priority
of European energy security to its solid interest in the Black Sea
area and manifested vocal support for the Nabucco pipeline
project, seen as a way “to make use of the trans-Caspian – trans-
Black Sea corridor, a direct and safe energy route, that may have
an important contribution in the economic development of the
states in the region” 23 . Turkish support for the project signals
understanding in Ankara as regards the strategic energy needs of
the Union and also proves its willingness to play this energy game
as a de facto European actor. Nevertheless, analysts warn about the
possibility that, expressing frustration over the stalling of the
accession talks, <strong>Turkey</strong> may switch its ambitions from being a
mere transit country to being a regional energy hub. Such an
evolution, which would imply that part of the Azeri gas destined
for Nabucco would be re-exported by <strong>Turkey</strong>, would go against the
European, and thus the Romanian position. 24
The Romanian perspective on the issue of energy security
as a dimension of European security was brought to the attention
of the Euro-Atlantic institutions in several episodes in 2005, 2006
and 2008. The perspective implies an “internationalization of the
Black Sea” mostly by placing the issue of the security of energy
transport routes on the NATO agenda. On the issue of the NATO
23
Romanian President Traian Băsescu, Speech at the Nobel Institute, Oslo, 7
November 2007, available at
http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=9281&_PRID=search,
accessed on 3 June 2009.
24
Adrian Pop, Ph.D. Professor, Faculty of Political Science, National School of
Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest, Intervention in the Conference
“Political evolutions in <strong>Turkey</strong>. The future of Turkish-Romanian bilateral
relations”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 4 May 2009, Bucharest (authors’
participation).
199

presence in the Black Sea area, analysts again note that Romanian
and Turkish opinions are hardly in a unity of perspectives, and,
even more, that the Turkish position is more susceptible to be
consonant with that of Russia: “<strong>Turkey</strong> is the one who decides who
enters the Black Sea. An eventual NATO presence in the region
may be perceived by Russia in zero sum game terms, which is the
last thing that <strong>Turkey</strong> wants. We notice, in fact, a genuine
convergence of interests between Russia and <strong>Turkey</strong>, in the
sheerest spirit of countering the threat, namely their concerted
rejection of any <strong>EU</strong>, NATO or US initiative that may affect their
regional geopolitical status” 25 .
The Turkish perspective on Black Sea security, on the
other hand, favours “the regional solutions to regional problems”
approach, which translates for instance in the Turkish opposition to
a spill-over of the Active Endeavour Operation of the Alliance
from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, in favour of the “Black
Sea Harmony” project. This approach is considered wrong by
military analyst Iulian Chifu, from the Center of Conflict
Prevention and Early Warning, since “the so-called «subregionalization
of security» cuts out the situation in that area from
the global context, with a view to giving priority to one of the
actors at stake or to a certain agreement” 26 and is by no means
suited for an European strategy in the region.
25
Ileana Racheru, Octavian Manea, “Priorităţile de politică externă ale lui
Traian Băsescu” (Traian Băsescu’s foreign policy priorities), Revista 22, 10
March 2009, available at http://www.revista22.ro/prioritatile-de-politicaexterna-ale-lui-traian-basescu-5737.html,
accessed on 17 June 2009.
26
Iulian Chifu, “Marea Neagră, lac rusesc sau baltă regională?” (The Black Sea,
Russian lake or regional pond?) Dilema Veche, 10 February 2006, available at
200

Ultimately, <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession is interpreted in terms of
global European clout. Adrian Severin, S&D MEP, believes that
the Union will never be a global actor without having <strong>Turkey</strong>
among its members 27 while Ion Iliescu, former President of
Romania, explains this perspective by referring to the
consequences of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession for the Union: “the European
Union will project its influence and stabilising factor effect further,
towards the regions of the Middle East and Central Asia” 28 .
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s potential to bring about <strong>EU</strong> leverage in the areas of the
Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East is not
underestimated in Bucharest.
Conclusion
As Romania works on assuming, in a more resolute
manner, its <strong>Member</strong> State responsibilities and also to build up a
stronger voice among European peers, substantive debates are
likely to follow as regards <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession to the <strong>EU</strong>.
Nevertheless, given the constant support voiced for Turkish <strong>EU</strong>
membership both prior and post Romania’s accession, the debates
in Bucharest will probably have, as an end result, more solid
arguments in favour of <strong>Turkey</strong> becoming a <strong>EU</strong> <strong>Member</strong>. In the
http://www.dilemaveche.ro/index.php?cmd=articol&id=1124&nr=107, accessed
on 3 June 2009.
27
See footnote 7.
28
Ion Iliescu, “Viziune a foştilor şefi de stat asupra Europei şi a Planetei”
(Former chiefs of state perspective on Europe and the world), 4 May 2008,
available at http://ioniliescu.wordpress.com/2008/05/04/interventie-masarotunda-turcia/
, accessed on 10 June 2009.
201

meanwhile, political support awaits harnessing in a more concrete
manner.
202

203

Marin Lessenski *
Bulgarian <strong>Perceptions</strong>
Positions and perceptions of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership bid in
Bulgaria: a backgrounder to the factors that shape it
A public opinion poll in the spring of 2008 registered that
one third of Bulgarian citizens support <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership, one
third are against it, and one third does not have a definite opinion
(Open Society Institute – Sofia, released April 2008). This pretty
much sums up as a whole Bulgaria’s position on Turkish
candidacy – in equal parts supportive, opposing and undecided.
There are at least three factors that inform and influence the shape
of this position. First, there is the domestic political context, where
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership bid is often associated with the role and
behavior of Bulgaria’s Turkish community party - the Movement
for Rights and Freedoms. Thus, political stances on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s <strong>EU</strong>
membership are often shaped around domestic political
calculations with MRF in mind, having a positive or negative
effect on the position vis-à-vis <strong>Turkey</strong>’s candidacy – but most
often this has resulted in reluctance to define a clear-cut position
anyway. At times, this association has been misfortunate for
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s candidacy, as the MRF has serious issues with its public
image, since there have been allegations of corruption and abuse of
*
The opinions expressed herein are only those of the author and do not reflect
any institutional views.
204

its position within the Turkish and Muslim communities in the
country.
Second, there is the bilateral relations context, as the two
countries are immediate neighbors with a high level of economic
and trade relations, FDI flows, security and defense ties within
NATO, and last, but not least different forms of people-to-people
contacts through tourism, etc. In fact, the role of this factor can be
described as quite beneficial, as bilateral relations can be described
as very good to excellent.
The third factor, operating on the level of public
perceptions, is the historical and cultural context. As is the case of
most Balkan states, the modern Bulgarian national state and
identity was shaped very much in opposition to the Ottoman
Empire and the “Turk”, in many cases, as “the other”. This does
not mean in any case that the distant past has overarching effect
over current attitudes (as bilateral relations prove). But, for
example, <strong>Turkey</strong>’s policy of “neo-ottomanism” has mostly
negative connotations in Bulgaria (in contrast to the Arab world
where it may be successful) for fears of “neo-imperialist”
aspirations. These factors do not have the same weight or
relevance, but their interaction causes the current cautious position
and a vigorous or substantial debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s candidacy is, with
few exceptions, missing.
205

By the Media
The Neutrality of the Mainstream Media and the “Soft Power”
of Telenovelas
The coverage of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s candidacy in the <strong>EU</strong> mirrors
the state of political and public debate in the country, which means
that media runs mostly reporting and very rarely commentaries.
But even these commentaries are rarely based on assessing
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s candidacy from Bulgaria’s point of view, and repeat the
more general pros and cons from either the <strong>EU</strong> or Turkish point of
view in mostly neutral tones. This means that the reporting and
commentaries in the mainstream and serious media has been fairly
objective and more often than not never critical to either side. The
progress of <strong>Turkey</strong> in reforms, its domestic developments in
politics and the economy, and foreign policy are also quite
regularly reported in the media.
Thus, the general assessment for media coverage is that
there is a high level of interest in this important issue and close
neighbor, with regular, neutral and balanced reporting and rare opeds
or commentaries from the viewpoint of Bulgaria’s interest per
se.
The nationalist parties’ media outlets are of course
excluded from this trend, as they are (as a rule) negatively
disposed to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership. The newspaper Ataka of the
Ataka party and political talk shows on the cable Skat TV (also
previously associated with Ataka) have been regularly reporting
and commenting in negative terms about <strong>Turkey</strong>’s candidacy in the
<strong>EU</strong>.
206

There is a recent phenomenon, quite distant from the
negotiations as such, but worth mentioning in the context of
Bulgarian-Turkish relations. This is the Turkish “charm offensive”
in 2009, with the advent of telenovelas. They have proven
astonishingly successful and the two major TV networks have been
running, at some point, about six different telenovelas at the same
time. Reportedly, the series have changed quite positively many
public perceptions and preconceptions and proved beneficial on
how the public perceives its southern neighbor through the media.
By the Government
The official Bulgarian position is to support the
negotiations between the <strong>EU</strong> and <strong>Turkey</strong>, with the <strong>EU</strong> requirement
for <strong>Turkey</strong> strictly to cover the criteria for membership. The main
caveat, which was put forward by the previous Bulgarian
government in the area of bilateral relations, requests <strong>Turkey</strong> to
address the claims of the Eastern Thrace refugees after the early
20 th c. wars and population displacement. The new government, in
power since July 2009, is maintaining the condition. But, in
general, Bulgaria’s governments follow the <strong>EU</strong> mainstream. The
Bulgarian political parties often follow the general line of the
respective European political families. But as research into the
issue (by OSI-Sofia 2008) has registered, the party positions were
rather vague and a variety of opinion existed within both the right
and left political camps, within parties and party supporters
themselves.
In the August 2005 – June 2009 period, Bulgaria was
governed by a trilateral coalition, which survived through
207

alancing, trade-offs and compromises, and which as a result
rarely had clear-cut positions – including on the membership of
<strong>Turkey</strong>. The coalition consisted of the Bulgarian Socialist Party,
the National Movement Simeon II (later renamed National
Movement for Stability and Progress) and the Movement for
Rights and Freedoms – the Turkish minority party. The MRF
presence had an ambiguous role. On the one hand, the government
policy towards <strong>Turkey</strong> had always to take into account the role of
the MRF for the survival of the government, as opposition to
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership would mean jeopardizing the coalition
relations. On the other hand, the MRF itself refrained from any
open advocacy for <strong>Turkey</strong>, as this would be interpreted as acting
on behalf of another country. The main coalition party – the
Bulgarian Socialist Party – has been generally supportive of
membership, but at the same time it put forward the demands of
the Thrace refugees’ associations and backs a strict treatment of
<strong>Turkey</strong> in the negotiation process.
The result was that the previous government (2005 -
2009) was neither particularly supportive nor particularly opposing
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s candidacy, because of the specific domestic political
situation. This attitude is demonstrated by at least three facts.
Officially, the government never denied that it is supportive of the
membership of its neighbor. At the same time, when one of its
ministers (Ms. Emel Ete in January 2007) announced during a visit
to Ankara full support for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership, this was
considered a gaffe, which did not reflect the official position. In
fact, just the month before this statement (December 2006), PM
Sergey Stanishev backed freezing talks because of the noncompliance
with the Ankara protocol.
208

While Bulgaria’s government at the time had never
opposed the negotiations and accession per se, nor supported
alternatives to membership – such as “special relations” as a
substitute – it did successfully advance an issue in bilateral
relations at the <strong>EU</strong> level and link it to the accession process. As
mentioned above, this is the issue of compensations and property
rights for the “Thrace refugees” (referring to the events after the
Balkans wars), which have not been settled yet. The question was
included in <strong>Turkey</strong>’s Progress Report 2007 as part of the
“Regional issues and external relations” chapter of the European
Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs ((2007/2269(INI)).
<strong>Member</strong>s of the European Parliament from the ruling BSP have
been particularly active in introducing the condition in the EP
report, as the Thracian associations (i.e. associations of the
descendants of the refugees) have important political clout and ties
with the center-left.
In the reporting period, 2006-2009, the governing and
opposition parties switched sides in the July 2009 elections. The
BSP, MRF, and NMSP lost the elections and GERB formed a
minority government with the tacit support of the center-right
(DSB and UDF), the nationalists from Ataka and the Order, Law
and Justice party.
The current government of GERB, which came to power
after the July 2009 elections, is not likely to change substantially
the government policy. Foreign Minister Rumiana Jeleva (who is
also Bulgaria’s appointee for a European Commissioner for 2009)
has already pledged support to the property rights claims. The
GERB party is a member of the European People’s Party, and the
EPP positions and debates have influenced the party positions.
209

There have been statements of individual GERB members about
“an open-ended process” of negotiations, but the overall position
of the party and its government is quite more moderate and close
to the <strong>EU</strong> mainstream – i.e. continuing of negotiations with <strong>Turkey</strong>
meeting the criteria in order to advance.
By the Opposition
The Political Positions towards <strong>Turkey</strong>’s Candidacy: No Easy
Labels
The main characteristic of the party positions in Bulgaria
on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s candidacy is that putting labels on them can be
misleading. Indeed, the center-right may be slightly more reserved
towards Turkish membership and the center-left slightly more
supportive. However, there is a diversity of views on both the right
and left and in the different parties – be they center-right or centerleft.
Of the main parties in the country, only Ataka is openly
against any negotiations with <strong>Turkey</strong>; the rest of the parties display
more nuanced positions, which generally support negotiations.
Despite the fact that individual party members have now and then
stated support for an “open-ended process” or “privileged
partnership”, none of the parties currently has it as its official
position.
But somewhat paradoxically at first sight, only one party
has developed and maintained a detailed and well-defined position
on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s candidacy from Bulgaria’s viewpoint. This is the
center-right Democrats for Stronger Bulgaria. A declaration of the
DSB, dated May 2006, states that “At the basis of this position is
210

the conviction of the BSB, that the negotiations of the <strong>EU</strong> with
<strong>Turkey</strong> are an instrument for the overall reform of this our
neighboring country, in which democratization and well-being
Bulgaria has a deep interest.” In other words, the DSB viewed
continuing negotiations as essential, but at the same time it warned
about premature accession of <strong>Turkey</strong> that might jeopardize the <strong>EU</strong>
integration processes and last, but not least, the national interests –
and even security – of the <strong>EU</strong>. DSB has also criticized and warned
about the intervention by the Turkish state in the domestic politics
of Bulgaria – namely the support for the election manipulations of
the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. DSB’s position has
evolved since 2006 and the party is no longer insisting on openended
negotiations, but emphasizing the strict adherence to the
criteria. However, DSB cannot be considered “anti-Turkish” per
se, since it recognizes and insists on the pivotal role <strong>Turkey</strong> has as
a neighbor and security partner.
There is no clear-cut left-right divide in politics over
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s candidacy, and this is evident in the difference in the
positions between the DSB and a fellow center-right party – the
Union of the Democratic Forces. Although a center-right EPP
member, the UDF is supportive of Turkish membership. It is not
clear whether the current coalition with the DSB (within the Blue
Coalition) will substantially alter its position, despite the UDF
inner circle’s concerns that the DSB might impose its more
reserved position.
The extreme nationalist Ataka has been capitalizing on
vehemently opposing <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership in the <strong>EU</strong>. As a matter
of fact, Ataka’s slogan for the 2009 European elections was “No to
<strong>Turkey</strong> in the <strong>EU</strong>”, an issue that certainly was not on the society’s
211

agenda in the middle of economic crisis and upcoming national
elections. To set the record straight, Ataka’s success is largely due
to its anti-corruption and anti-establishment rhetoric, rather than to
its anti-minority stance.
The Order, Law and Justice (OLJ) party, which made it to
parliament this year, is a self-described conservative party,
associated with the group around the British Conservatives.
However, the party does not follow the conservatives’ unflinching
support for <strong>Turkey</strong>, and OLJ members have been skeptical of
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership bid.
Now, the formerly ruling BSP and MRF are the
opposition parties, but this will hardly substantially change their
views on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership. The MRF will remain a staunch
supporter and the BSP will continue to mostly support membership
– by virtue of its own positions, its continuing partnership with the
MRF, and the influence of the European socialists – despite that
the party’s membership is not entirely united around the official
party stance.
By the Civil Society
Public Opinion: Evenly Distributed Views Among
Respondents
When discussing “civil society” positions on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
membership bid, there are two components that should be taken
into account. The first is public opinion in general, and the second
is the opinions of non-governmental organizations in the country.
212

Public opionion about <strong>Turkey</strong>'s <strong>EU</strong>
membership
DK
36%
No
33%
Yes
31%
213
Yes
No
DK
What concerns non-governmental organizations? There
have been pretty active exchanges among local NGOs on
transborder activities, focused on practical cooperation. There
aren’t any NGOs that can be described as “politically active to
advocates”, either in favor or against <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership. Policy
research institutes have been engaged in public awareness
activities, to increase the level of information about negotiations
between <strong>Turkey</strong> and the <strong>EU</strong>. In the reported period, the European
policies program of the Open Society Institute – Sofia has been
particularly constructive on the issue, generating analytical
materials on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s candidacy to fill the gaps in an objective and
informed debate on the issue. It has published political and
economic analyses on the effects of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership for
Bulgaria and the <strong>EU</strong>, a study on the positions of the main parties,
and public opinion surveys. It has also organized a major
international forum (in the spring of 2008) as a venue for stirring a
serious and substantial debate on the issue, which is otherwise
missing in the public sphere.
The public opinion perceptions are mixed, and a 2008
study of the Open Society Institute – Sofia (results released in
April 2008, the poll was conducted in February-March 2008) is

very telling about the diversity and balance of views towards
Turkish membership. The respondents had to answer the question
if, hypothetically, there were a referendum on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
membership on that day, how would they vote. The answers were
almost evenly distributed with 33% “No”, 31% “Yes” and 36%
“don’t know”.
Answer of respondents
by party affiliation
GERB (Citizens for the
European Development of Bulgaria;
center-right)
Bulgarian Socialist Party
(center-left)
Movement for Rights
and Freedoms (Turkish minority)
Union of Democratic
Forces (center-right)
Ataka (extreme
nationalist)
Poll by the Open Society
Institute – Sofia, released April
2008
The distribution along political lines is also very telling,
and as a rule there is a diversity of opinion among supporters of
one and the same party. 67% of supporters of the center-right UDF
would support it, as would nearly 35% of the current governing
GERB party and even more than 21% of the supporters of the
Ataka party, whose official line is against any negotiations. The
supporters of the Bulgarian Socialist Party tended to be more
“against” (about 37%) than “for” (with 28%).
214
Support Against
34.40% 41.90%
27.90% 37.20%
67% 2.2%
44% 24%
21.50% 64.60%

The answers across ethnic lines are not surprising, as the
majority of ethnic Turks – 59.1% –supported membership, along
with 27.1% of ethnic Bulgarians and 32.7% of Roma.
The arguments in support of or opposition to membership
are also quite interesting. There were two sets of questions – pros
and cons from the <strong>EU</strong>’s viewpoint and pros and cons from
Bulgaria’s viewpoint. The top three benefits for the <strong>EU</strong>, according
to Bulgarians, from <strong>Turkey</strong> entering the <strong>EU</strong> would be (1) better
relations with the Middle East and Asia, (2) development of
multiculturalism and greater tolerance, and (3) increased security
for Europe. The top three benefits for Bulgaria would be (1)
increased security, (2) ethnic stability and (3) increase in trade.
About 59% of the supporters of membership considered that the
state interests of Bulgaria and <strong>Turkey</strong> coincide. On the opponents’
side, the main argument from the viewpoint of the <strong>EU</strong> is the
religious incompatibility between <strong>Turkey</strong>, as a Muslim country,
and Europe (64.3%). However, only 9.8% of opponents considered
that <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership will bring the end of the <strong>EU</strong>. The
opponents’ views for the effects on Bulgaria were (1) increased
ethnic tensions in Bulgaria, (2) decrease in the level of security in
the country and (3) increase in unemployment. Basically, the first
two arguments of both opponents and supporters refer to the level
of ethnic relations and security – but of course with different
orientation.
The Eurobarometer Survey 69 (2008) provides a basis for
comparison across the <strong>EU</strong>. The public opinion in Bulgaria that is
strongly in favor (16%) and fairly in favor (29%), which brings the
support to 45%; those who are strongly opposed are 22% and those
fairly opposed 17%, which brings the opposition of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
215

membership to 39%. Thus the overall support is higher than the
<strong>EU</strong> average of 35% and the overall opposition is slightly higher
than the <strong>EU</strong>27 average of 35%.
216

217

Özgehan Şenyuva, Sait Akşit 1
<strong>Turkey</strong> Seen from the <strong>EU</strong>: Conclusions
The aim of the contributions in this volume was to address
a very popular subject within the European Union enlargement
debate: How <strong>Turkey</strong> is perceived by different stakeholders in
different European Union member states. As was put forward in
the introduction, it is difficult to find comprehensive analysis that
tackles all the relevant stakeholders and brings together their
positions and arguments. There is very limited literature on the
European perceptions on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s entry into the <strong>EU</strong>, and almost
none that tries to tackle all relevant stakeholders, such as the
government, the opposition, the public and the elites, by exploring
their views and examining the media coverage of those views
within different countries. 2 Thus, the studies in this volume have
tried to provide insights into how <strong>Turkey</strong>’s candidacy has been
perceived in different <strong>EU</strong> member states between the years 2006
and 2009. In such an endeavour, the contributions to this volume
1
Dr. Özgehan Şenyuva is a lecturer at the International Relations Department,
Middle East Technical University, Ankara, <strong>Turkey</strong> and Dr. Sait Akşit is a
Research Fellow at the Centre for European Studies, Middle East Technical
University, Ankara, <strong>Turkey</strong>. The opinions expressed herein are only those of the
authors and do not reflect any institutional views.
2
One exception to this is the TEPAV IAI Talking <strong>Turkey</strong> series; Natalie Tocci
(ed.), Talking <strong>Turkey</strong> in Europe: Towards a Differentiated Communication
Strategy, Quaderni IAI, December 2008. Also, for some detailed analysis on
European public opinion, see Antonia R. Jiménez and Ignacio T. Payá,
European Public Opinion and <strong>Turkey</strong>’s Accession: Making Sense of Argument
For or Against, EPIN, European Policy Institutes Network Working Paper no.
16, 2007.
218

aimed to find answers to, or insights on, some of the questions
which were put forward in the introduction. The main conclusion
is that there is no single European debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>, but there are
converging debates.
European Union member states and their positions vis-à-vis
Turkish membership to the European Union
Eduard Soler i Lecha and Irene Garcia provide an excellent
analysis of Spanish attitudes towards <strong>Turkey</strong>’s entry into the <strong>EU</strong>.
As Soler and Garcia argue, Spain remains one of the <strong>EU</strong> countries
that are positioned more clearly and unambiguously in favour of the
prospect of <strong>Turkey</strong> joining the <strong>EU</strong>. Spain is also one of the very few
countries in which public support for Turkish membership has
increased over the last years, while there is a clear decline in the
majority of the European countries. The Spanish position carries
special importance for two significant reasons. First, Hispano-
Turkish relations enjoy excellent conditions and there are several
international joint initiatives that are in place, such as the Alliance
of Civilizations initiative. Furthermore, Spain has always fully
supported Turkish membership, for a list of reasons that Soler and
Garcia explain in detail. However, as their findings demonstrate,
while there is clear Spanish support for <strong>Turkey</strong>, a certain level of
reluctance has started to appear, especially among conservative
politicians and certain segments of the social sectors. Soler and
Garcia discuss in detail what the main causes of this reluctance are,
and what may be the possible repercussions. Second, Spain is an
important country to be studied carefully, as it will assume the
rotating presidency of the European Union as of January 2010, and
will surely be very influential in the negotiation process with
219

<strong>Turkey</strong>, especially in the face of the rising criticism and objections
of France and Germany.
On the issue of increasing German opposition to Turkish
membership, Katrin Böttger and Eva-Maria Maggi provide a
detailed analysis. Their contribution on Germany is very timely
and important, as it demonstrates that the positions of different
actors in Germany are not as unified and solid as it may be
perceived. Böttger and Maggi show that there is a very heated
debate in Germany within both opposing and supporting parties on
the issue of <strong>Turkey</strong>.
Along with Germany, we also observe France and Austria,
two other outspoken opponents with the least favourable public
opinions on <strong>Turkey</strong>. As Nicolas Monceau argues in his analysis of
French perceptions, there exists a clear ideological divide between
right and left parties on the issue of <strong>Turkey</strong>. While the centre and
far left are in favour of Turkish membership, the centre and far
right strongly oppose it. However, it is also evident that these
divides exist only among the political elite; the French public
opinion remains firmly against <strong>Turkey</strong>’s entry into the <strong>EU</strong>.
The Austrian debate on Turkish candidacy appears to be
shaped more by cultural and religious elements, rather than legal
and technical issues. Cengiz Günay’s discussion gives a clear and
short summary on how the debate was ‘over-heated’ in Austria,
and how it brought to surface historical elements, such as Turkish
images from medieval times, or reached to the borders of
xenophobia and racism. As Günay argues, however, the debate in
Austria has to do more with the integration of immigrants and the
acceptance of the emergence of a new multi-ethnic, multi-religious
Austrian society than Turkish candidacy alone. This is also evident
220

in Austrian public opposition to any future enlargement of the <strong>EU</strong>,
with the exception of the Croatian membership. Public opinion
shifted its opposition to Croatia only recently, with the strong elite
support, especially from conservative Catholic circles.
Another contribution that deserves special interest is that
on Greek Cypriot perceptions. Since the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ 3
gained full membership in 2004, <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession process has
been directly affected by the unresolved dispute on the island.
Successive Greek Cypriot governments, although they have not
officially used their veto power, have in practice created obstacles
in <strong>Turkey</strong>’s negotiation process with the <strong>EU</strong>, in coalition with
other countries that oppose Turkish membership. As a
consequence, <strong>Turkey</strong> cannot start negotiations on eight chapters of
the accession process due to the Cyprus issue.
In his article, Costas Melakopides presents the general
mood and approach to <strong>Turkey</strong>-<strong>EU</strong> relations among the Greek
Cypriots. What is noteworthy in this Greek Cypriot perspective is
the fact that Greek Cypriots in general are not categorically against
Turkish membership, and there is little debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
European qualifications. However, there is a general tendency to
use <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership desire as possible leverage and the <strong>EU</strong>
as a platform for achieving Greek Cypriot demands. This appears
to be a unified approach: <strong>Turkey</strong> should become a member of the
<strong>EU</strong> if it fulfils initiatives demanded by the Greek Cypriot society at
large, regarding the complete removal of Turkish troops or the
3
As officially named, The ‘Republic of Cyprus’, although accepted by the <strong>EU</strong>
to represent the whole island in the <strong>EU</strong>, is not representative of the Turkish
Cypriot Community on the island. The ‘Republic of Cyprus’,,in this volume,
refers to the Greek Cypriot administered part of the island, and perceptions in
‘Cyprus’ refers to Greek Cypriot perceptions.
221

issue of residents from <strong>Turkey</strong>. Thus, one of the first points to
make is that the Greek Cypriot perception on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s candidacy
is overwhelmingly considered in light of the issue of the Cyprus
problem.
Indeed, the Greek Cypriot perceptions are clear
representations of deep-rooted myths and prejudices about <strong>Turkey</strong>
which take on an almost emotional character, which tries to link all
the setbacks in <strong>Turkey</strong>-<strong>EU</strong> relations to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s policy on the
Cyprus question. This sometimes results in factual
misinterpretations, i.e. the consideration of the EC Commission
opinion in 1989 on <strong>Turkey</strong>´s application for membership as a
rejection due to the situation in Cyprus. 4 At times, this leads to
exaggeration, and downgrades the implementation to one reason
only, i.e. the presence of Turkish troops as the only reason for the
non-application of the acquis communautaire in the northern part
of Cyprus. The result is largely a one-sided and unfair
interpretation of the Cyprus problem, which claims the Greek
Cypriot demands to be the only true and just demands, and often
proves ignorant of the Turkish Cypriots themselves and their
demands by pointing to <strong>Turkey</strong> as the main party in the
negotiations for a just settlement on the island. We believe the
4
The Opinion of the EC Commission on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s application for membership
presented the need to complete Single Market Programme and emphasised the
weak state of Turkish economy as the official reason for denying immediate
membership. Furthermore, the opinion stressed <strong>Turkey</strong>’s eligibility to become a
full member. See Commission of the European Communities. Commission
opinion on <strong>Turkey</strong>'s request for accession to the Community, SEC (89) 2290
final. Brussels: 20.12.1989.
222

ideas and comments by the Turkish Cypriot President Mehmet Ali
Talat deserve more attention. 5 The deeply rooted perceptions also
lead to considerations that possible developments between <strong>Turkey</strong>
and the <strong>EU</strong> are solely linked to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s ‘gestures’ with respect to
the Cyprus question. As such, the expectations on the possible
developments in <strong>Turkey</strong>-<strong>EU</strong> relations in December 2009 are
narrowly linked to the developments on the island, where there
exists a plethora of considerations, as well as the failure on the <strong>EU</strong>
side to meet certain expectations, if not towards <strong>Turkey</strong>, then
towards the Turkish Cypriot community.
Greek public opinion also presents a rather similar stand to
that of Greek Cypriots. However, Athanasios Kotsiaros points out
a very significant characteristic within the Greek society and
politics. He argues that following the 1999 Helsinki summit, which
represented a major breakthrough in Greek diplomacy, the political
elite have started to fully support <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership, albeit
under certain conditions. The 1999 breakthrough symbolized the
shift in Greek diplomatic strategy towards <strong>Turkey</strong>, a shift from
confrontation to cooperation, attesting to the belief that Greece had
better chances of advancing and protecting its interests against
<strong>Turkey</strong> within a European frame. However, the Greek public and
media are not in full accord with the political elite, and especially
the public opinion strongly rejects a possible Turkish membership,
based on different arguments ranging from economics to a possible
flux of Turkish immigrants. Of course, as Kotsiaros argues, there is
5
Erdal Güven, ADAM: Talat’ın Kıbrıs’ı, Söyleşi, İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, Kasım
2009. See especially sections eleven and twelve.
223

the significant impact of the troubled history between the two
countries. It appears that for the Greek public opinion, the <strong>EU</strong>
membership process of <strong>Turkey</strong> is not perceived as an opportunity
for reconciliation of the historical issues. Then again, according to
Kotsiaros, as long as the will and support of the Greek political
elite remain strong, the influence of public opinion will remain less
significant.
Bulgarian and Romanian perceptions are also significant
within the debate of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s accession. First, these two countries
are the last two entries within the latest enlargement wave. Second,
both countries experienced certain challenges during the accession
process that may be very similar to the challenges ahead for
<strong>Turkey</strong>, such as those regarding agriculture. Finally, these
countries are in very close geographical proximity to <strong>Turkey</strong>, and
therefore the outcome of Turkish accession would be extremely
important for them.
Iulia Serafimescu and Mihai Sebe present that there is a
significant amount of support for <strong>Turkey</strong> in Romania. They further
argue that Romanian stakeholders take a very pragmatic stand on
the issue, focusing on the potential gains for Romania from
Turkish membership. Unlike in Western European countries, the
issue of the Turkish population being predominantly Muslim
appears to have little effect in Romania. The issues of security and
Black Sea cooperation surface as more significant determinants
within the Romanian debate, all leading to a positive approach to
Turkish membership.
Turkish-Bulgarian bilateral relations have been improving
significantly over the years. These two countries are immediate
neighbours, and enjoy a very long history of cultural, political and
224

economic relations. However, Marin Lessenski shows that this
good state of bilateral relations does not necessarily transform into
support for Turkish membership. The presence of a sizeable
Turkish minority in Bulgaria and their active participation in
Bulgarian politics create a rather mixed state of mind among the
Bulgarians. Thus, the support and opposition to Turkish
membership are at similar levels, while the number of undecided
form almost one third of the Bulgarian public opinion. The state of
public opinion is also reflected in the political scene. As Lessenski
argues, the party positions are rather vague, and a variety of
opinion exists within both the right and left political camps, within
parties and party supporters themselves. However, the official
Bulgarian position remains in approval of Turkish membership.
Two other countries that joined the <strong>EU</strong> in the last
enlargement wave are also examined in this volume: the Czech
Republic and Poland. During the negotiations process, there have
been several attempts to establish parallels between Poland and
<strong>Turkey</strong> based on their similarities in terms of their populations and
the state of their agricultural sectors. However, apparently such
similarities do not resonate much within Polish circles. Adam
Szymański argues in his contribution that the Polish standpoint visà-vis
Turkish membership is highly related to the Polish support
for further enlargement. Contrary to Western European states,
Poland is strongly in favour of an ‘open-door policy’ for the
European Union, and throws its full support behind future
membership of its eastern neighbour, Ukraine. Coupled with this
support for further enlargement, Polish political elite and party
leaders also stand behind the principle of pacta sunt servanda,
which leads to a positive evaluation of Turkish membership.
225

However, Szymański rightly points to three important issues that
may change this positive outlook. The first issue is that of
agriculture. For Poland, which is an agrarian society itself, it is
very probable that Turkish membership would create a big debate
on the Common Agricultural Policy and possible repercussions on
the Polish economy. The second is the role and influence of the
Catholic Church. The Catholic Church enjoys great power over the
conservative Polish society and its attitude is a very strong
determinant. Finally, the lack of knowledge and interest that exist
in the Polish public sphere regarding <strong>Turkey</strong> can work to the
disadvantage of <strong>Turkey</strong>. The opinion polls indicate that the
majority of the Polish public is indifferent towards Turkish
membership, and its people often make use of stereotypes and
oversimplifications when forming their attitudes. Szymański
argues that such a situation is open to possible backlashes, or can
easily fluctuate in the face of even minor incidents.
Petr Kratochvíl, David Král, and Dominika Dražilová’s
portrait of Czech attitudes towards <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership reveals
characteristics that are not uncommon in some other countries as
well: a disinterested public with little information which is using
general shortcuts in forming an opinion about <strong>Turkey</strong>, a lukewarm
support for <strong>EU</strong> enlargement in general, and the lack of a concrete
debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>.
Gunilla Herolf discusses the rather peculiar Swedish
approach to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership to the <strong>EU</strong> in her article.
Swedish parties seem to have reached a consensus in favour of
<strong>Turkey</strong>’s entry into the <strong>EU</strong>, as long as <strong>Turkey</strong> meets the necessary
criteria. Therefore, the political debate on Turkish accession is
more focused on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s performance in making necessary
226

eforms and its shortcomings. However, Sweden’s strong stand on
respecting the legal and historical relations and agreements
between <strong>Turkey</strong> and the <strong>EU</strong> may serve as an important model for
other countries, and Sweden may play a very important role in
keeping the Turkish integration process intact and ongoing.
Belgium, on the other hand, is far from being a potential
frontrunner in the Turkish debate. Yvonne Nasshoven clearly
demonstrates that despite the positive approach of the government
to <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership, the Belgian political scene has been
dominated, between 2006 and 2009, by domestic problems which
have overtaken any other debate, let alone a debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>. Due
to the sizable Turkish community in Belgium, <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
membership is considered as an opportunity to further consolidate
the diversity within the Belgian society. Although certain extremist
elements from both Flemish and Walloon communities strongly
question <strong>Turkey</strong>’s European credentials, their role so far seem
rather limited. Considering the fact that Belgium will assume the
presidency of the <strong>EU</strong> in the second half of 2010, its position may
prove crucial in determining the future nature of ongoing
negotiations.
One particular country that sends out conflicting signals
regarding Turkish membership is Italy. With Sebastiano Sali,
Emiliano Alessandri claims that despite the strong bi-partisan
political support for <strong>Turkey</strong>, this support may prove to be
misleading in the long run. Especially the Italian public opinion,
which has been gradually turning against Turkish membership
over the last few years, portrays a sceptical and divided position.
Alessandri warns against the identity politics with a religious
element, and the possibility of Islamophobia affecting what he
227

calls ‘Christian public opinion’. It is also observed that Italian
party politics are divided on the issue and cross-party coalitions for
or against Turkish integration may be found, regardless of the
ideological positioning of the parties.
What all these analyses indicate
Based on all these individual analyses of the contributing
experts, we may outline certain important points regarding how
<strong>Turkey</strong> and Turkish membership to the <strong>EU</strong> are perceived:
1. The media is very influential in shaping opinion,
especially public attitudes. Considering that each country’s
contribution stressed the persistent lack of public knowledge
regarding <strong>Turkey</strong>, the media remains the main source of
information that a non-attentive public turns to for answers. The
articles in this volume demonstrate that <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership is a
very popular discussion topic in certain media outlets in some
countries such as Germany, while in some other countries, such as
Spain or Poland, the debate is much more limited or even nonexistent.
However, as we observe in each contribution, it is very
difficult to conclude that <strong>Turkey</strong> receives fair treatment and
objective representation in the majority of mass media throughout
Europe. While the news and commentaries choose to focus on
problems that <strong>Turkey</strong> poses, objective assessments or even simple
factual arguments are very rare.
This, however, should by no means be interpreted as a plea
for a cover up of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s shortcomings. What is deemed
necessary is fairness and objectivity; considering the low level of
228

knowledge on Turkish politics, society and even economy among
European publics, the media coverage should not shed light only
on negative aspects. As Tocci (2008) also emphasizes, what
<strong>Turkey</strong> needs is not branding or communication, but to provide
information to European publics.
2. <strong>Turkey</strong>’s entry into the <strong>EU</strong> is a cross-party issue. As all
the contributions demonstrate, it is very difficult to find clear-cut
party positions on Turkish membership. While there are some
differentiations between the government and opposition parties in
countries such as Spain and France, it is clear that on the issue of
<strong>Turkey</strong> and <strong>EU</strong> membership, there are divisions within parties
themselves. However, in the case of France, for instance, the
debate also appears to exist between the centre and the centre right
parties, which are against Turkish membership, and the centre and
far left, which are in favour.
3. The issue of meeting the necessary criteria keeps coming
up, especially on the issues of human rights and democracy. Even
in the most opposing countries such as France and Germany, the
public and elite opinion show signs of a possible shift in their
opposition, and indicate that they might be willing to approve
Turkish membership if <strong>Turkey</strong> makes necessary reforms and meets
the criteria on human rights and democracy. This should lead to an
important conclusion for the supporters of <strong>Turkey</strong>’s full integration
with the <strong>EU</strong>: that they should focus on demonstrating <strong>Turkey</strong>’s
capacity and willingness to meet these criteria in order to achieve
concrete results, and not waste resources and energy locked in
seemingly endless debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s Europeanness.
4. The contributions in this volume also demonstrate that
the debate on <strong>Turkey</strong>’s membership is actually the tip of the
229

iceberg of larger debate within Europe. Although most of the
debate on <strong>Turkey</strong> takes place within the immigration-identityreligion
axis, the issue of <strong>Turkey</strong> appears to be closely linked with
a wide range of unresolved debates on Europe’s future; the
institutional structure of the <strong>EU</strong>; the repercussions of the recent
‘big-bang’ enlargement; Europe’s boundaries; the question of
Islam; immigration and the integration of immigrants. It should be
no surprise that the public opinion in countries like Austria, France
and Germany is not only against Turkish entry, but opposes any
further enlargement of the <strong>EU</strong> itself.
Therefore, for an accurate analysis of support and
opposition to Turkish membership, one also needs to closely
examine the wider debate. It is evident that there is no
homogenous opposition or support for <strong>Turkey</strong>’s integration with
the <strong>EU</strong>, and it is possible to find different reasons and motives
within each camp. For the champions of Turkish membership, it is
necessary to identify these motives, distinguish each of them, and
work to address those that offer a possibility of change. The issue
of meeting necessary reforms is therefore of the utmost
importance.
230