The Zintan Militia and the Fragmented Libyan State

Hot Issue Jamestown Foundation u January 19, 2012denounced his appointment as “undemocratic” whilepromoting their own candidate, General Salah Salemal-Ubaydah (AFP, January 3; Jeune Afrique, January13). General al-Mangush is determined to establish asupreme defense council and speed up the integration ofmilitia fighters into the national army and police, but hemay need a greater level of support than he has now tobe successful (Jeune Afrique, January 13).Libya’s Difficult TransitionIn political science, especially following the collapse ofthe Soviet Union, the term “transition” is mostly usedto define those political processes leading to a – more orless – effective (liberal) democracy. In Libya, at present,it is impossible to use transition in this meaning, as thefirst step to start a transition to democracy is to have agovernment capable of imposing its rule on the peopleand groups in its national territory. The 42 years ofthe Jamahiriya (State of the Masses) – a very personalQaddafi creation lacking institutions typical of modernstates – makes this an enormous challenge, even in theevent of a scenario (at present completely detachedfrom the reality on the ground) in which everyone inLibya acted to meet the need to create a functioningstate without seeking to advance narrow and factionalinterests at the same time.The success of this transition is strongly connected tohow Libyans will be able to manage the thorny issueof militias and the risk of starting a political shift towarlordism rather than democracy. The continuousclashes between different militias – the latest occurringin near Gharyan (50 miles south of Tripoli), involvinga militia from Gharyan pitted against another militiafrom neighboring Assabia – are a powerful reminderof the menace they pose to Libya’s increasingly volatileand fragmented security environment (Reuters, January14; AFP, January 16). One of the most importantand well organized groups in present-day Libya is theZintan militia, which controls the Tripoli airport andother institutions in the capital. The group has been theprotagonist in several political and security incidentsover the past few weeks.Moving on from the Jamahiriya StateLibya as a unitary state has always been characterizedby several internal fault lines, with ethnic, tribal, culturaland political cleavages characterizing its political andsocial environment. These fault lines were exploited byQaddafi during his rule. For example, in the very early2stages of his rule after the 1969 coup, Qaddafi tried todowngrade the importance of the tribes, but, after a fewyears he understood that it was impossible to maintaina strong grip on the country without the support of atleast some of the major tribes. The resulting “divideand rule” policy was a major feature of the Qaddafijamahiriya (state of the masses). In the long run,stressing these divisions proved to be unsustainable andwas a key factor in explaining the eruption of the revoltsin February 2011.It is no coincidence that the core of the revolt was theeastern city of Benghazi, the stronghold of the pre-Qaddafi Sanussi monarchy and the area most penalizedunder Qaddafi. The Libyan east-west divide is a longstanding feature of the Libyan political and sociallandscape and is essential to understanding Libya’sfragmentation. The increasing weight of local, regionaland tribal interests – which emerged clearly in theprotests against the appointment of the new transitionalgovernment – is connected to this domestic cleavage.Though very important, this dynamic is only one ofmany working against the establishment of a unitarystate in Libya.The killing of Qaddafi was not only the symbolic endof an era but visible proof that his rule cannot returnto Libya. The psychological relief this provided hadanother side to take into account; the death of thecommon enemy opened the underlying structuralfissions within the heterogeneous bloc of rebels whocarried out the revolution. In this context, the presenceof autonomous armed militias on the ground representsa major obstacle to the normalization of the Libyansecurity environment.Recent Clashes in TripoliAt the end of November, fighters of the Zintan militiastopped Abdulhakim Belhadj at the Tripoli airport,accusing Belhadj of travelling to Istanbul on a fakepassport. Only after a direct intervention from Libyaninterim leader Mustafa Abdul Jalil was he able to catchhis flight (Tripoli Post, November 26, 2011). Belhadj,head of the Tripoli Military Council, a former leader ofthe Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and one ofthe most important figures in the anti-Qaddafi revolt, isconsidered to be one of the main enemies of the Zintangroup. His military council presents a direct challenge tothe Zintan Brigade in the struggle to control the securityof Tripoli. Like other militias active in the Libyancapital, establishing control over the city is considered