Spring 2008 - Air & Space Power Chronicles - Air Force Link

Spring 2008 Volume XXII, No. 1 AFRP 10-1Senior Leader PerspectivesDevelopmental Planning: The Key to Future War-Fighter Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Gen Bruce Carlson, USAFMaj Stephen Chambal, PhD, USAFLorenz on Leadership: Part 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Lt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz, USAFFocus AreaDoctrine and Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF, Chief, Professional JournalsFeaturesExposing the Information Domain Myth: A New Concept for Air Forceand Information Operations Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Maj Geoffrey F. Weiss, USAFRange and Persistence: The Keys to Global Strike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, RetiredWeather and the Calculated Risk: Exploiting Forecast Uncertainty forOperational Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71Maj F. Anthony Eckel, USAFCapt Jeffrey G. Cunningham, USAFMaj Dale E. Hetke, USAFIntegrating Weather in Net-Centric Warfare: A Case for Refocusing HumanResources in Air Force Weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83Col Scot T. Heckman, USAFA Look down the Slippery Slope: Domestic Operations, Outsourcing, and theErosion of Military Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93Maj Bryan D. Watson, USAFDepartmentsPrelaunch NotesRicochets and Replies and Presenting the Latest ChroniclesOnline Journal Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Ricochets and Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15The MergeWe Are at War with Terrorists, Not Muslims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21LTC Michael R. McGee, USA, RetiredNetwork-Centric Operations: A Need for Adaptation and Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24CDR Phillip G. Pattee, USN, RetiredWhatever Happened to Strategic Attack? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, Retired

PIREPsThe Need for Developmental Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mr. Gregory K. JenkinsLt Col Christopher A. Lettiere, USAFRExcellence in Leadership: Lessons Learned from Top-Performing Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mr. Martin PittDr. Michael BunamoReview EssayFiction: A Higher Form of Truth? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Dr. David R. Mets3944105Quick LookEffects-Based Information Battle in the Muslim WorldRemy M. Mauduit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109Book ReviewsOne Day Too Long: Top Secret Site 85 and the Bombing of North VietnamTimothy N. CastleReviewer: Mr. Glenn LeinbachRed Tail Captured, Red Tail Free: The Memoirs of a Tuskegee Airman and POWLt Col Alexander Jefferson, USAF, RetiredReviewer: Lt Col Robert F. Tate, USAFR, RetiredLockheed’s SR-71 “Blackbird” Family: A-12, F-12, M-21, D-21, SR-71James Goodall and Jay MillerReviewer: Col Joe McCue, USAF, Retired. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112Divining Victory: Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .William M. ArkinReviewer: Lt Col John P. Hunerwadel, USAF, RetiredWhere Are the WMDs? The Reality of Chem-Bio Threats on the Home Frontand the Battlefield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Al MauroniReviewer: LTC Richard S. Tracey, USA, RetiredI Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer ForceBernard D. RostkerReviewer: CSM Jim Clifford, USA, Retired113114. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116Twilight Warriors: Covert Air Operations against the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Curtis PeeblesReviewer: Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, RetiredWith the Possum and the Eagle: The Memoir of a Navigator’s War overGermany and Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ralph H. NutterReviewer: Dr. John H. BarnhillAmerican Defense Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Paul J. Bolt, Damon V. Coletta, and Collins G. Shackelford Jr., eds.Reviewer: Lt Col Brian S. Brandner, ANGStand Well Clear: More Adventures in Military AviationD. K. TookerReviewer: Lt Col John Wood, USAF117118118. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

In Their Own Words: Conversations with the Astronauts and Men WhoLed America’s Journey into Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Scott Sacknoff, ed.Reviewer: Col Phil Bossert, USAFFilling the Ranks: Transforming the U.S. Military Personnel System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Cindy Williams, ed.Reviewer: Dr. David R. MetsThe Rising Tide: A Novel of the Second World War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Jeff ShaaraReviewer: Capt Brian D. Laslie, USAFFiasco: The Amerian Military Adventure in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Thomas E. RicksReviewer: Col Robert A. Potter, USAF, Retired120121123123Mission Debrief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125Air Force Mission StatementThe mission of the United States Air Forceis to deliver sovereign options for thedefense of the United States of Americaand its global interests—to fly and fightin Air, Space, and Cyberspace.

Air and Space Power Journal Board of ReviewersCol Ronald K. Bartley, USAFRAir UniversityLt Col Eric Braganca, USAFNaval Air StationPatuxent River, MarylandDr. Kendall K. BrownNASA Marshall Space Flight CenterCol Steven D. Carey, USAF, RetiredMontgomery, AlabamaDr. Clayton K. S. ChunUS Army War CollegeDr. Mark ClodfelterNational War CollegeDr. Conrad CraneDirector, US Army Military History InstituteCol Michael D. Davis, USAFAir UniversityCol Dennis M. Drew, USAF, RetiredUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space StudiesMaj Gen Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAFThe PentagonDr. Stephen FoughtUSAF Air War CollegeCol Richard L. Fullerton, USAFUSAF AcademyLt Col Derrill T. Goldizen, PhD, USAF, RetiredWestport Point, MassachusettsCol W. Michael Guillot, USAFAir UniversityDr. John F. Guilmartin Jr.Ohio State UniversityDr. Grant T. HammondDean, NATO Defence CollegeDr. Thomas HughesUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space StudiesLt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, RetiredAir UniversityCol Mark P. Jelonek, USAFThe PentagonCol John Jogerst, USAF, RetiredNavarre, FloridaMr. Charles Tustin KampsUSAF Air Command and Staff CollegeDr. Tom KeaneyJohns Hopkins UniversityCol Merrick E. Krause, USAF, RetiredDepartment of Homeland SecurityCol Chris J. Krisinger, USAFDepartment of StateDr. Benjamin S. LambethRANDMr. Douglas E. LeeAir Force Space CommandDr. Richard I. LesterEaker College for Professional DevelopmentCol Edward Mann, USAF, RetiredColorado Springs, ColoradoMr. Brent MarleyRedstone Arsenal, AlabamaMr. Remy M. MauduitAir UniversityCol Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, RetiredWest Chicago, IllinoisDr. Daniel MortensenAir UniversityDr. Richard R. MullerUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space StudiesDr. Bruce T. MurphyAir UniversityCol Robert Owen, USAF, RetiredEmbry-Riddle Aeronautical UniversityCol Bob Potter, USAF, RetiredUSAF Public Affairs Center of ExcellenceDr. Steve RothsteinColorado Springs Science Center ProjectLt Col Reagan E. Schaupp, USAFAir UniversityCol Michael A. Stanley, USAF, RetiredUSAF Air War CollegeCol Richard Szafranski, USAF, RetiredToffler AssociatesLt Col Edward B. Tomme, PhD, USAF, RetiredSci-Ops ConsultingDr. Christopher H. TonerUSAF Air Command and Staff CollegeLt Col David A. Umphress, PhD, USAFR, RetiredAuburn UniversityDr. Harold R. WintonUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

Developmental PlanningThe Key to Future War-Fighter CapabilitiesGen Bruce carlson, usaFMaj stephen chaMBal, phD, usaFWhile the [global war on terror] is the near-term priority, we firmly believe that the nation and theAir Force must prepare for emerging global threats at all levels of warfare. . . . In fact, we believeit’s time to re-focus on and increase the asymmetric advantages the Air Force offers the nation.Our nation expects and deserves no less.—hon. Michael Wynne and Gen t. Michael MoseleyBoth the secretary and chief ofstaff of the air Force candidly addressedtheir strategic concerns tothe armed services committee of theUs house of representatives on 24 october2007, highlighting the need to refocus on ourasymmetric advantages in order to prepare forthe global threats of future warfare. the airForce must look across the spectrum of futurecapabilities and determine where those advantagescould exist, given the proper emphasison planning and fiscal considerations. Identifyingsuch advantages and ensuring that weacquire our asymmetric capabilities on timedepend upon a robust developmental planning(DP) function, a critical step that we currentlylack. early DP lays the foundation foridentifying materiel solutions for acquiringweapon systems by investigating future threats;recognizing capability gaps and requirements;capturing needed system-performance characteristics;and understanding technology gaps,risks, and needs. Without this planning, theair Force could find itself tactically focused,inadequately prepared to meet future threats,and postured to react only to forecasted or unanticipatedadvances of the enemy.In today’s air domain, we see evidence ofour delinquency in DP. Protected by a highlyintegrated joint force, our nation depends onthe air Force to deliver air superiority today,tomorrow, and into the foreseeable future.our service has maintained this asymmetricadvantage for over half a century, due in largepart to our past efforts in early planning andresearch. We began DP on the F-X aircraft,which became the F-1, a year before the firstflight of the F-4D. We initiated DP on the advancedtactical Fighter, which became the F-22,three years before the first flight of the F-1.the first flight of the F-22 took place over sixyears ago; however, we have not begun any seriousconsideration of options for its replacement.We have not taken the first steps necessaryto sustain our asymmetric and unparalleledadvantage in the air.the F-22 and F-3 represent the air Force’snewest generation of fighter aircraft. althoughincredibly capable, these platforms do not—nor did we intend them to—guarantee air superiorityindefinitely. In fact, we must beginexploring follow-on capabilities today if wewish to stay ahead of rapidly advancing threatsacross the globe. We cannot afford to forfeitour military advantage of air superiority to theenemy, thus giving him an equal footing, forcingthe United states to fight on a level playingfield, and relegating us to attrition-based

AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008warfare. Given the proper national emphasis,we can avoid having to fight this way. We haveno intention of relinquishing control of thiswar-fighting domain to an ever-growing andchallenging threat that our nation will face inyears to come.the air Force must initiate and supportdedicated DP activities to deliver the next generationof capabilities that we will need to fly,fight, and win. although similar shortfalls existin other areas, this article focuses on the airdomain to capture the interactions among domaintrends, organic planning capability, andthe current political environment, thereby highlightingthe expanding gap in the developmentof future weapon systems. our currentnational leadership has the responsibility forcorrecting this shortfall and addressing DPacross the air, space, and cyberspace domains.the early 1900s gave birth to aviation, buteven as late as the 1930s, only a few americansunderstood (and even fewer appreciated) theimportance of airpower in military warfare.only because of the courageous leadership ofa handful of individuals, airpower came of ageduring World War II and single-handedly providedthis nation with the sovereign optionsthat led to victory in the cold War. even as werealized the importance of airpower’s dominance,the aircraft-development cycle changeddramatically over the last 7 years, particularlywithin the military environment. three keytrends, specific to fighters and bombers, representthe overall direction of military aviationand indicate the growing pressures that aircraftprocurement will face in the future. Figure1 depicts the number of new-aircraft startsfor fighters and bombers by decade.In the past, rapid advances in aviation benefitedgreatly from a high number of new-programstarts. at the same time, many industrial partnersbuilt their own aircraft to sell to the Departmentof Defense or to use in “fly-off” competitions.We gained an incredible amount ofknowledge, experience, and technologicalmaturity even when the programs were cancelledand not taken into full production.soon after the end of World War II, new startsdeclined dramatically and have continued thisdownward trend, significantly affecting aviationdedicated to america’s defense. today,the rarity of new starts places tremendouspressure on early DP activities to support successfulprogram execution. Figure 2 capturesthe troubling increase in the average numberof years necessary to develop those fighter andbomber aircraft that will continue into fullproduction.as aircraft become more complex, the leadtime necessary before starting a formal acquisitionprogram also increases—a fact that emphasizesthe importance of early exploratory/VNCFSPG/FX4UBSUT'JHIUFSBOE#PNCFS"JSDSBGU0OMZ%FDBEFT"WFSBHFZFBSTPGEFWFMPQNFOUPODBODFMMFEQSPHSBNTContinued $POUJOVFECancelled $BODFMMFET T T T T T T TFigure 1. Number of new-aircraft starts per decade

dEvELOPmENtAL PLANNING7'JHIUFS"JSDSBGUCZ&SB#PNCFS"JSDSBGUCZ&SB:FBST:FBST11 '' ''&SBT''''## ## ##&SBTFigure 2. Average number of years in development (from technology-development request forproposal until delivery of the first production aircraft)research. although not addressed here, onefinds that the same trend applies to mobilityand air-refueling aircraft. Because of budgetpressures, long lead-time requirements, and theurgency of developing and producing sophisticatedaircraft at first fielding, we do not havethe luxury of retiring aircraft and replacingthem with newer platforms. Figure 3 illustratesthis trend toward sustaining aircraft that mustremain in service for longer periods of time.these trends drive the need to consider additionaldesign factors to provide for maintainabilityand long-term sustainment concerns—another reason to make provisions for DP.these issues will motivate our future practicesin aircraft development and acquisition.the overall trends for fighters and bombersare representative of defense aviation as awhole and portray a challenging future for aircraftproduction. aircraft starts will be few andfar between. We will develop platforms one ata time, with all our “acquisition eggs” in onebasket. the time allotted to aircraft developmentwill increase, and we will expect aircraftto last longer. each program that we launchmust succeed, a fact that underscores the needto conduct DP well in advance of predictedcapability shortfalls.DP is fundamental to the continued successof aircraft acquisition. the F-22 and F-3both benefited from years of planning priorto an acknowledged program start. this early:FBST'JHIUFS"JSDSBGUCZ&SB11 '' '' '' ## ## # ##&SBT:FBST#PNCFS"JSDSBGUCZ&SB&SBTFigure 3. Average number of years flown (from first production until retirement; lighter-shadedareas based on projected retirement)

AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008research enabled the air Force to assess riskand refine technology, more fully understandthe anticipated threat, and establish solid requirementsfor systems. the results of theseactivities proved invaluable as the programsprogressed and were critical to attaining theperformance we see today. recently though,the air Force has recognized a decreasing capabilityto conduct this type of early planningactivity. Much like the trends in aircraft development,the trend in DP capability gives uscause for concern as the air Force strives tomaintain its advantage in air superiority.the air Force possessed a robust organicDP capability from the 1970s to the early 1990s.acquisition organizations enjoyed a substantialnumber of personnel with unique DP skill setsand expertise. these personnel were responsiblefor supporting the definition of futurecapability needs, evaluating alternative concepts,assessing technology maturity and risk factors,defining sustainment and life-cycle cost issues,and forming executable acquisition strategies.Given today’s realities, future aircraft-acquisitionprograms will not succeed without comprehensiveDP as the critical first step in the acquisitioncycle.our organic capability for DP began deterioratingin the 1990s and is now all but eliminated.Many factors contributed to this decline:reduced number of aircraft programs,decreased budgets, fewer trained personnel,higher-priority needs, and, most importantly,loss of dedicated funding to support DP activities.the net result is that our organic capabilitiesin this area have atrophied and faceextinction. We simply cannot allow this to happen.DP is an essential function in translatingcapability and/or threat-based requirementsinto future combat capabilities for the air Forceand our nation. We must work to ensure thatDP and the proper personnel remain in place,despite a very challenging fiscal environment.our nation, both inside and outside themilitary, finds itself overwhelmed with neartermpriorities that consume most of our time,effort, and energy. We focus on the issues athand: the global war on terror; the economy,with its associated constrained resources; andthe upcoming political elections. consequently,we devote little thought to establishing a longtermvision and conceptualizing the capabilitiesrequired to meet an increasingly dangerousworld. Burdened with the immediate challengesat hand, we have confined ourselves tothese thoughts, giving little attention to whatcomes next.the economy will continue to evolve. theelections will come and go. the war on terror,whose successful resolution is pivotal to ourway of life and the liberties we enjoy, will notbe our last conflict. therefore, those of us inuniform—those of us responsible for protectingthis nation and preserving our safety, security,and freedom for generations to come—must focus at least a portion of our attentionon the questions left unanswered: Who will bethe enemy of the next war, and the one afterthat? What war-fighting capabilities do we needto give our nation the sovereign options to employmilitary force that no other country possesses?What should we do today to ensure thatthose capabilities remain in place tomorrow?Doing nothing is not an option. We mustbegin to prepare today for challenges the futuresurely holds. It is our responsibility to devotethe appropriate resources and effort topreparing for the unknown. We must invest inDP capabilities across all domains: air, space,and cyberspace. DP is the first step down everypath to acquiring future war-fighting capabilities.the F-22, our newest air-superiority fighter,will not give us the final solution to air superiority.We must begin planning now in order tobetter understand and quantify the futurethreat environment, postulate capability shortfalls,and identify technological challenges ofthe future air domain. today, we must beginto extend our capabilities beyond these aircraft,beyond our current understanding ofair superiority, and into the complicated threatpicture of future warfare. We are responsiblefor ensuring that future airmen can fly, fight,and win in our next great conflict. the decisionswe make today will affect our role in providingwar-winning capabilities to america’sintegrated, joint warfare team as well as determineour nation’s ability to protect our way oflife and secure the freedoms that our childrendeserve. ❑

Lorenz on Leadership Part 2Lt Gen Stephen R. LoRenz, USAFIn the summer of 2005, when I was directorof Financial management andComptroller at the Pentagon, Air and SpacePower Journal published an article of minetitled “Lorenz on Leadership.” now, as thecommander of Air university, I sit down againto proffer some additional thoughts on my favoritesubject: leadership. I hope that you sharemy enthusiasm for the study of leadership!Never, Ever Give UpIn my last article, I quoted WinstonChurchill and briefly explained why I findhim so fascinating. One of his most famousquotations was, “never, ever, ever give up!”Churchill was a man who met failure face toface many times in his life. he ran for Parliamentand lost, only to be elected two yearslater. When he was the First sea Lord of theAdmiralty (equivalent to our secretary of thenavy), he planned the Gallipoli campaign inturkey, which turned out to be an abject failure,and was fired. During the early 130s, herailed against nazi tyranny, but nobody listenedto him. then in 140, he became theprime minister who led england in the waragainst hitler. After the defeat of Germanybut before the war against Japan ended, thepeople held an election, throwing him and hisparty out of office! Five years later, in 150, hebecame prime minister for a second time. Wow!talk about perseverance, tenacity, and strengthof character! I admire Winston Churchill somuch because the story of how he overcamehis struggles in life is an example for all of usto follow.As a graduate of the Air Force Academy—and I can truly say that those four years weretough—I could handle the physical, military,and mental aspects without much difficulty;however, my struggles were mostly academic.

10 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008You see, I was on the dean’s “other” list six ofeight semesters. I enjoyed courses in aeronauticalengineering, computer science, andelectrical engineering so much that I tookthem twice. Although this may seem humoroustoday, it is not an aspect of my history thatI am particularly proud of; nevertheless, thelesson here is that one must never, ever give up.While many of my friends were going out toenjoy themselves on the weekends, I forcedmyself to concentrate on my studies, especiallythose math and science courses that held littleinterest for me—the ones I had to work ontwice as hard just to pass. this particular aspectof character has served me well in the morethan 34 years I have served in the Air Force,and now, as the commander of Air university,I am lucky enough to be responsible for mostof the education in the entire united statesAir Force. Isn’t America a great country?Life Is a Marathon, Not a 50-Yard Dash We’ve all seen examples of athletes or teamswho, in a moment of almost certain glory, celebratedtoo early, only to see victory swept fromtheir grasp by an opponent who, not surprisingly,never, ever gave up. In our lives, it is importantto remember that we must prepare torun a marathon—not a 50-yard dash. I’m surethat in your careers, you’ve seen military membersstart a task in a sprint only to find out itrequired marathon-like stamina. What’s theirfirst inclination? to give up because it was toohard. they didn’t do their homework, so theyspent all their energy in the early stages andcouldn’t complete the task. You see, life isabout training and being prepared for opportunitieswhen they come—you don’t train fora marathon in the same way you train for a50-yard dash! You must invest time and effortin understanding your goals and then in chartinga course to accomplish them. I use theshort-term, midterm, long-term approach,and I teach my people this as well. there’s alot of truth to the cliché “What’s the best wayto eat an elephant? One bite at a time.” understandthe mission, do your homework, andnever, ever give up!Never Develop a Senseof EntitlementYou will never get what you want when youthink you deserve it. rewards always comelater than we are typically willing to accept.since we are human, we frequently compareourselves to our peers, but we should reallycompete only with ourselves—not others. Wesee others being rewarded, so we take an “Ishould have won that” or “I deserved that” attitude.If you get the feeling that “you deserve”something or feel that the organization “owesyou,” immediately stop what you’re doing,take a deep breath, and reevaluate yourselfbecause once you go down that path of “me,me, me,” it’s hard to turn around. Over thecourse of my career in the Air Force, I’ve seena number of people develop an entitlementattitude, only to end up disappointed and bitter.When this happens, the person loses, hisor her family loses, and ultimately the organizationloses. the Air Force or any job owesyou only one thing—the opportunity to competeand serve!As a Leader,You Must Reach the Acceptance Phase of Grief Faster Than the People You Lead there are five traditional stages of grief: denial,anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance.When a challenge arises in your organization,it is important that, as a leader, youreach the final stage long before your peopledo. In 13 I took command of the 22nd Airrefueling Wing at march AFB in riverside,California. A few weeks after taking command,we had an operational readiness inspection(OrI), and the Airmen performed brilliantly!I was so proud. On the last day, we all gatheredin the base theater for the outbrief. horns,bells, and whistles were going off, and everyonewas pumped about getting the OrI gradebecause they had worked so hard to do a great

LORENZ ON LEADERSHIP 11job. the inspector general (IG) took the stage,and in the first of four categories we got a“high satisfactory,” and in the second categorywe got a “high satisfactory.” As the briefingprogressed, the noise level got lower and lowerbecause everyone knew what was coming.that’s right, an overall “high satisfactory”—which really just means a “satisfactory.” the IGthen got up and left, leaving me, the wingcommander, in this room with these tremendouspeople who had done a wonderful job,but it felt like all the oxygen had been absolutelysucked out of the place. You could haveheard a pin drop. now, as the leader, what wasI to do? I had five options: denial, anger, bargaining,depression, and acceptance. I thoughtlong and hard about what to say, and, havingreached acceptance faster than the folks inthe room, I came up with the following: “theIG is a great group of individuals who havecome here with a difficult task, and we are allbetter off because of their feedback. But I’lltell you what I think. I think that grade is thebiggest bunch of ‘Bs’ I’ve ever heard of.”At first there was no reaction to my remarks,but then the entire room erupted in shoutsand cheers! All I had done was reach acceptanceof our final grade and then put intowords what everyone else in the room wasthinking. however, imagine my surprise whenwe all went to the club to celebrate the end ofthe OrI and saw that a videotape of me makingmy statement about the grade was on apermanent television loop for everyone to seeand hear, over and over again! As a leader, youmust get through all the stages of grief beforeyour people do, so you can lead them throughthe tough times.It’s Not about You!the sooner you can wrap your mind aroundthis one, the sooner you can focus on what’sright and get out of your own way. Leadershipis not about you; it’s about the organizationand the people who work in it. As a leader, youset the tone of the organization and give yourfolks the tools to succeed; then you must getout of the way and let them do their jobs! Let’stake a lesson from sports. Professional footballteams have coaches—folks who devise thestrategies and the plays. they look at theteam’s talent and put the right players in theright position for the best possible outcome,but they are not out there running the ball—their players do that. As a leader, it’s your jobto put the right folks in the right places to ensuremission success. I’ve seen too many leaderswho were afraid to trust in their subordinatesand the organization; consequently, thepride and attitude of the workers suffered.Leadership is not about, “hey, look at me. I’mthe leader. Look at what my organization hasdone.” those who pursue the awards, promotions,and accolades are often the ones whoare exposed in time and eventually fall by thewayside. People see right through someonewho has his or her own agenda, and that person’sability to lead is immediately sacrificed.Leaders have to understand that it is aboutthe people, the organization, and its mission.A few years ago, my spouse reminded methat it is indeed not about me. We were at aconference, and during the course of themeeting, I was asked a certain question severaltimes. I don’t recall the question, and it’s notimportant. But I do remember being asked thisquestion what seemed a dozen times, so, to bequite honest, I was tired of hearing it and tiredof answering it. While we were seated at dinnerthat night, a young cadet happened to askthe very same question again, and withouthesitation I gave him a halfhearted, emotionlessanswer. my mannerisms reflected my frustrationwith the question, and my answer simplyvocalized it. Overhearing what I had said, myspouse squeezed my arm and said, “honey, Iknow you’ve heard that question a dozentimes, but that’s the first time that cadet hasever asked it.” she was absolutely right. thecadet didn’t know how many times I had beenasked that question, nor did he care. he onlyknew that he had asked it and wanted an answer.I immediately sought him out and gavehim the right answer with the right attitude.remember, it’s not about you! (Postscript:this also applies to every promotion ceremony,parade, and speech you will ever attendor participate in. You must be enthusiastic and

12 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008sincere, no matter how many times you havedone it before!)You Want People with Ambition Working for You, Not Ambitious People my father taught me this statement a longtime ago. As a leader, you want people withambition working for you—those are the folkswho are goal oriented and possess a willingnessto strive for excellence. they are the oneswho are willing to do what it takes to fulfill themission, whether it’s staying late or workingharder to ensure that the goals and mission ofthe organization are complete. On the otherhand, ambitious people often have an ulteriormotive behind their actions—motives shroudedin “What’s in it for me?” versus “What’s goodfor the organization?” As a leader, you willhave to know the difference.You Never Know When You AreGoing to Make a DifferenceIn 16 I became commandant of cadets atthe Air Force Academy. In my first two years,nine cadets died due to rock-climbing accidents,car accidents, aircraft accidents—andone to pulmonary edema at high altitude. shewas a third-class cadet (a sophomore), a 1year-oldwho was sharp as a tack! At the memorialservice in the Cadet Chapel, I steeled myselfto go and talk to her mother and father.What could I say? this family had given its nationaltreasure to the Air Force, and she diesduring training. In this moment, how could Iattempt to assuage her parents’ grief? I walkedup and introduced myself to her mother.“ma’am,” I said, “my name is steve Lorenz.”she immediately stopped me and said, “I knowwho you are, General Lorenz—my daughtertold me about you. she had just earned hersuperintendent’s pin for getting good grades,and you saw her on the terrazzo where all thecadets formed up and congratulated her fordoing a great job. she immediately went backto her room and called us to say, ‘the commandantof cadets told me how proud he wasof me for earning the superintendent’s pin.’ ”this conversation with the mother is especiallypoignant to me because I do not remembertalking to this young cadet at all. But this iswhat the mother remembered. In a few seconds,I had made a difference in someone’slife. You truly never know when you are goingto make a difference.Another example. During my tenure onthe Joint staff, I worked several layers belowthe man I consider one of the greatest militaryofficers of our time, Gen Colin Powell. now,before the days of e-mail, we used to handcarrycorrespondence into his office. I distinctlyremember going to his executive officer’sdesk one day to deliver a staff package. As Iturned to leave, a major entered the room withhis grandmother and said, “Grandmother,there is General Powell’s office.” At that precisemoment, General Powell came out of hisoffice to retrieve a package. seeing the majorwearing his Joint staff badge and his guest, heasked, “major, is this your grandmother?” themajor said, “Yes,” and then I saw General Powellgingerly take this lady’s hand and for the nextcouple of minutes tell the grandmother whata great job her grandson was doing and howwithout his support he would be unable to dohis job. General Powell then reached into adesk drawer, presented the grandmother witha Joint staff pin, and said he was off to a meeting,but he thanked her again for allowing hergrandson to serve. As soon as his door closed,I turned to look at the grandmother, and youcould certainly see that her heart was aflutter—andso was mine. You see, in less than aminute, General Powell had made a differencein her life, the major’s life, and my life. Ittakes only a moment to make a difference,and you may never know when that momentwill present itself.Being in Our Profession Is Allabout Service to OthersI am reminded of the photograph of thechief master sergeant stationed in Iraq who,after working a full 12-hour shift, would go to

Lt CoL PauL D. Berg, uSaF, ChieF, ProFeSSionaL JournaLSRicochets and Replies and Presenting the Latest Chronicles Online Journal ArticlesAir And SpAce power Journal (ASpJ ),the professional journal of the USAir Force, encourages worldwide debateabout military topics by publishingarticles that critique current methodsand propose new ideas. Because feedbackfrom readers is central to sustaining this debate,the ASpJ staff facilitates such commentaryvia “e-mail the editor” links throughoutthe ASpJ Web site. We receive numerous “Ricochetsand Replies” from readers respondingto articles. Authors, fellow Journal readers, andstaff members are all interested in audiencereactions to published articles, so we forwardRicochets and Replies to authors for their reactionand publish selected ones in each quarterlyissue. Because a given article may appearin multiple ASpJ language editions, we mightreceive Ricochets and Replies in any of thoselanguages; we translate that correspondenceto bring about international discussion of articlesthat strike a responsive chord among ouraudience. Few other journals reach readers insix languages to stimulate the free exchange ofideas among the world’s military professionals.ASpJ publishes comments in different formats,depending on their length and the writer’spreferences. Brief remarks may appear inthe Ricochets and Replies section if commentatorsgive the Journal permission to publishthem. ASpJ may coordinate with readers topublish longer responses as separate “Merge”articles that “succinctly present opposing viewpointsabout controversial topics.” * A series ofRicochet and Reply or Merge articles can continuefor several ASpJ quarterly issues. A fewcommentators prefer to keep their responsesprivate, and we respect that choice. Ultimately,some articles spur readers to write entirelynew articles, perpetuating the cycle of professionaldebate that ASpJ encourages. If youhave a comment about any ASpJ article, pleasesend it to us at aspj@maxwell.af.mil.All ASpJ editions promote professional dialogueamong Airmen worldwide so that wecan harness the best ideas about air, space,and cyberspace power. chronicles Online Journal(cOJ ) complements the printed editions ofASpJ but appears only in electronic form. Notsubject to any fixed publication schedule orconstraints regarding article length, cOJ canpublish timely articles anytime about a broadrange of military topics.Articles appearing in cOJ are frequently republishedelsewhere. The various ASpJ languageeditions routinely translate and printthem. Book editors from around the world selectthem as book chapters, and college professorsuse them in the classroom. We arepleased to present the following recent cOJarticles (available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc.html):• Dr. Stephen R. Schwalbe, “The World’sFireman and Its Lily Pads: The Case ofK2” (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/schwalbe5.html)• Richard L. DiNardo, “From Bucharest tothe Baltic: German Air Operations on theEastern Front, 1916–1917” (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/dinardo.html)*Lt Col Paul D. Berg, “Introducing ‘the Merge’ and the Latest chronicles Online Journal Articles,” Air and Space power Journal 20, no. 1(Spring 2006): 10, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/spr06/spr06.pdf.14

icOcHeTS And repLieS 17A RESCUE FORCE FOR THE WORLD:AN AUTHOR REPLIESAfter reading Lt Col John Taylor’s comment(Ricochets and Replies, Winter 2007) aboutour article “A Rescue Force for the World:Adapting Airpower to the Realities of theLong War” (Fall 2007), I agree that there isno doubt that all combat search and rescue(CSAR) weapon systems are under significantand sustained operations-tempo pressure. Thatbeing said, our article does not make an all-ornothingproposition—we can wade in if we’renot ready to dive in. For example, rescue canbegin doing the following things today:• Stop talking about engagement events thatCSAR has supported as one-time operationsthat were brief diversions from the“real job.” Connect the dots for peopleup and down the chain of command todraw a compelling picture of the strategicsignificance of those engagement events.• Begin learning about the organizationsand processes that are relevant to the operatingconcept that our article describes.There is much to learn about joint taskforce organization, combatant commander(COCOM) staffs, interagency coordination,and nongovernmental organizations.• Arrange to put the right people ontoCOCOM and joint staffs. Doing so willbenefit CSAR’s traditional role as well asthe one described in the article. WritingCSAR’s capabilities into theater securitycooperation plans will be a good use oftime as the Air Force waits for CSAR’staskings to abate somewhat.• Begin defining the professional-developmentcareer path that rescue’s special breed of“long warriors” must walk. For example,does your wing have a foreign-languageprogram? Do you plan to conduct anyLightning Bolt exercises this year? If so,why not do them somewhere in the USSouthern Command area of responsibilityinstead of the Avon Park range in Florida?Are irregular-warfare doctrine and reportsfrom West Point’s Combating TerrorismCenter on your professional readinglist? From a pure CSAR point of view,those things may not appear directly relevantto your daily work, but now they are.• Let special operations forces (SOF) beSOF. Spend what little extra training timeyou have doing what you do best, not tryingto become something that you arenot. We must still address the growingfeeling that the CSAR community hasforgotten its basic purpose—that it has“lost its soul.” Our mission is noble, challenging,and chock-full of strategic relevance,so go after it.Getting from a concept to an actionableplan will take time and effort. Most of all,though, it will take commitment to the basicnotion that neither the Air Force nor rescueneed be irrelevant in the ideological strugglethat defines the global war on terror. If unitsare too busy right now to join that struggle,then take advantage of opportunities to beready when the time is right.We must realize that without a validatedconcept, one cannot define a requirement.Our article informally introduced the conceptand set the stage for more detailed thinkingabout capabilities, implementation, and requirements.Lt Col Marc C. DiPaolo, USAFRFort Belvoir, VirginiaA RESCUE FORCE FOR THE WORLDNot to denigrate the article “A Rescue Forcefor the World: Adapting Airpower to the Realitiesof the Long War” by Lt Col Marc DiPaoloand others (Fall 2007), but is the Air Force tryingto reinvent the wheel? Anyone who visitsthe Air Force archives and reads the missionreports for the HH-43 Huskie helicopter thatthe Air Rescue Service (later the AerospaceRescue and Recovery Service [ARRS]) flew from1959 to 1975 would find that those units fulfilledmost of the missions that Colonel DiPaoloand his coauthors discuss in their article.A good example is a description of thecivic-action program conducted from January

18 Air & SpAce pOWer JOUrnAL SprinG 2008to March 1969 by Detachment 3, 38th ARRS,3rd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group,based at Ubon Royal Thai AFB, Thailand. Accordingto the History of the 38th rescue and recoverySquadron, 1 Jan 1969–31 Mar 1969, preparedby Maj James L. Wissert, Detachment 3flew nine civic-action medical airlifts thatquarter in support of Operation Medic-Lift.Working in conjunction with the base civilactionofficer, Detachment 3 airlifted medicalteams and Thai public-health officials tonearby villages where doctors and nurses sawapproximately 200 to 300 patients and wheredentists extracted an average of 50 teeth pervisit. The Thai people were very interested inthe HH-43 that went by the call sign Pedro.Immediately after the helos landed, Pedro aircrewswould pass out photos of the HH-43 tothe excited and curious children who surroundedthem.Not only did the venerable Huskie performcombat search and rescue (CSAR) missions inenemy territory without an in-flight refuelingcapability and either with or without protectiverescue combat air patrols, but also its crewswrote the original procedures for CSAR. Duringthe Vietnam War, the HH-43 completedmore combat rescues—1,893—than either theHH-3 or HH-53 helicopters. At one time, therewere 100 HH-43 detachments worldwide, withaircraft based in the United States, Canada,Greenland, Europe, Turkey, Libya, the Azores,Ethiopia, New Guinea (on a temporary-dutybasis), Japan, Okinawa, Korea, the Philippines,Guam, Thailand, and Vietnam.Prior to deploying to Southeast Asia, in thetwo-year period beginning 31 January 1962,HH-43 crews saved 262 military and civilianlives and assisted 1,473 other persons. Many ofthese people were rescued from precarioussituations and would undoubtedly have diedwithout the help of the HH-43. In addition,Huskies scrambled 12,613 times to assist aircraftin trouble. Local base-rescue detachmentsworldwide helped rescue foreign nationalsand participated in civic-action programs,medical evacuations, and, in the United States,the Military Assistance to Safety in Traffic program.During its 16 years of operational service,the HH-43 Huskie rescued more peoplethan all other types of helicopters, a recordthat still stands.DEFINING INFORMATIONOPERATIONS FORCESMSgt Stephen Mock, USAF, RetiredLibby, MontanaIn their article “Defining Information OperationsForces: What Do We Need?” (Summer2007), Maj Timothy Franz and his coauthorscorrectly identify the Air Force’s lack of an informationoperations (IO) career field as a factorthat limits “the potency and maturity” of bothnetwork warfare and influence-operationsforces (pp. 57, 58, 60). Indeed, at the IO commanders’conference hosted by Air CombatCommand in April 2007, one commander afteranother identified an “inability to retainexpertise and advance careers” as a problemthat severely limits the Air Force’s IO capability.However, establishing a career field is onlyone of the numerous challenges facing theAir Force’s emerging IO capability.The Air Force must also organize intelligentlyto integrate full-spectrum air, space,and cyberspace options into a combatantcommander’s campaign. Momentum continuesto build behind Air Force Cyber Command;however, the vehicle by which our jointforce air component commanders commandand control all aspects of airpower is the numberedair forces’ air and space operations centers(AOC). In order for the Air Force to becomea true air, space, and cyberspace force,Cyber Command’s development must be accompaniedby a concurrent effort to prepareour AOCs to command and control cyberpower.Additionally, the Air Force must systematicallytrain its entire force, not just IO or cyberwarriors,on IO. Only a full-court press, includingflag and theater exercises, Air ForceWeapons School, Air Force specialty code–awarding courses, and courses taught in alldevelopmental-education programs, will successfullyinfuse IO into the Air Force’s culture.Finally, the launching of Cyber Commandmust not exclude the continued maturation ofthe Air Force’s influence-operations capabilitiessuch as psychological operations (PSYOP),

icOcHeTS And repLieS 19military deception (MILDEC), operations security,counterintelligence, public affairs operations,and counterpropaganda. An inclinationtowards technology may predispose our corporateculture to focus on dominating the cyberdomain,but, ultimately, all warfare—especiallythe current ideological struggle—is won in thecognitive battlespace.Although IO is an emerging endeavor, wecan build upon experienced resources. Boththe Joint Information Operations WarfareCommand and the Air Force IO Center haveconducted a variety of research projects andhave collected numerous lessons learned. TheArmy’s 1st IO Command has quickly becomea center of excellence, and the electronic warfare,space, MILDEC, and PSYOP communitiesare already well established.Information is a fundamental aspect of nationalpower, and IO is crucial throughout thespectrum of conflict. Our Air Force facescritical choices about organizing, training,and employing IO. These choices will determinewhether we truly intend to be an Air,Space, and cyberspace force.Maj Brian J. Tyler, USAFramstein AB, GermanyOne need only read “Defining InformationOperations Forces: What Do We Need?” tocome to the rapid conclusion that these capabilitiesof information operations (IO) arecats and dogs living together. Let’s get thedoctrine right by taking the following steps.First, divide all operations into “objective”and “subjective” categories. Objective operationsare those conducted primarily in thephysical domains of air, space, and cyberspaceto create physical effects. Subjective operations,which target the cognitive domain toinfluence perceptions and decision making,include strategic communication, psychologicaloperations, and military deception. Second,eliminate the fictitious “information domain”and create a doctrinal category of cyberspaceoperations. Third, recognize that IO is neitherkinetic nor nonkinetic but the synthesis of operationsdesigned to influence an adversary’sdecision making. If we take these steps, wewon’t have the unpalatable task of trying tocreate an “IO career force” but can create acareer force that understands IO intuitively atall levels of war.Maj Geoffrey Weiss, USAFUS Marine corps University, Quantico, VirginiaTHE AIR FORCE’S MISSING DOCTRINEIn his interesting and enjoyable article “TheAir Force’s Missing Doctrine: How the US AirForce Ignores Counterinsurgency” (Spring2006), Maj Kenneth Beebe seeks to explainthe need to draft a suitable counterinsurgency(COIN) doctrine to guide the US Air Force tovictory in future battles. In doing so, he highlightsthe limitations of the previously availabledoctrine on that topic and, based on lessonslearned in previous conflicts, proposes adoctrine that is essential to COIN warfare.In my opinion, this article points out a majorproblem that the Air Force has faced formany years; on this subject, Dennis Drew’s article“U.S. Airpower Theory and the InsurgentChallenge: A Short Journey to Confusion” inthe Journal of Military History (October 1998)constitutes an indispensable reference. I alsocongratulate the US Air Force for the publicationof Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, irregularWarfare, on 1 August 2007. Major Beebe’sarticle needed to be published so that Airand Space power Journal readers would be fullyinformed about the critiques, discussions, andanalyses that preceded this important new AirForce doctrine document.As far as Major Beebe’s article is concerned,it is worth emphasizing that it covers the subjectquite well, clearly poses the problem, andoffers a title consistent with the contents.Dr. Wautabouna OuattaraAbidjan, ivory coasteditor’s note: dr. Ouattara read the French versionof the article, available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-f/2007/hiv07/beebe.html. Major Beebe has been promoted tolieutenant colonel since his article first appeared.

In air combat, “the merge” occurs when opposing aircraft meet and pass each other. Then they usually “mix it up.”In a similar spirit, Air and Space Power Journal’s “Merge” articles present contending ideas. Readers can drawtheir own conclusions or join the intellectual battlespace. Please send comments to aspj@maxwell.af.mil.We Are at War with Terrorists,Not MuslimsLTC MiChaeL R. MCGee, USa, ReTiRed*After reAding Col William darley’sarticle “Strategic imperative:the necessity for Values operationsas opposed to information operationsin iraq and Afghanistan” (Spring 2007),i believe that the author misconstrued the natureof the current conflict by labeling it “strifebetween civil religions.” 1 in point of fact, thenational security strategy of 2006 explicitlystates that “while the War on terror is a battleof ideas, it is not a battle of religions.” 2i do concur that we are engaged in a verydifferent kind of war. However, we must becareful to state that this war is with terrorists,not with the Muslim populations of iraq or Afghanistan.3 We are chasing criminals—notfighting a nation’s army. this distinction is importantbecause it changes the dynamic thatexists between the US, iraqi, and Afghan governments(i.e., they can join us in the pursuitof criminals only if we are not fighting theircountries).According to Colonel darley, “Culture . . .is the battlefield. therefore, we must logicallyand frankly understand the end objective asthe transformation of those cultures and thevalues that underpin them in a manner thatmakes them compatible with the values underpinningour own culture and political objectivesfor being at war.” 4 i disagree with thisconstruction. first, the United States’ end objectiveis not the transformation of cultures.Second, we do not intend to make other cultures’values “compatible with the values underpinningour own culture.” the United Statesis trying to spread democratic ideas (hence a“battle of ideas”), but we are not trying to conqueranyone; nor are we trying to impose our“civil religion” on the Muslim world.later in his article, Colonel darley says,in other words, to attain conditions conduciveto democracy, the iraqi people should shift theKoran to the same respected cultural nichewithin their society that the Judeo-Christian Biblenow occupies in developed Western democraticsocieties—a resource for examining the traditionsand wisdom associated with the history ofislamic moral judgments but entirely excludedfrom official legal standing as representing theauthority for enforcement of civil law. 5first, his presumption that the goal is to “attainconditions conducive to democracy” ignoresthe reality of islam, in which no separationof religion and state exists. next, hefocuses on iraq and its people as if that countrywere somehow the bellwether for Muslimculture in the wider Middle east—implyingthat if iraqis would only comply by “shift[ing]*the author, who retired after 20 years in the US Army, currently works in the intelligence, Surveillance, and reconnaissancefunctional integration office of the national Security Space office.21

22 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008the Koran to the same respected culturalniche,” the rest of the Muslim world would follow.this is wishful thinking at best; more importantly,it is not palatable to Middle easternculture and therefore not helpful for furtheringUS foreign policy. Better to accept the realityof the Muslim state and work to enrich itscultural fabric than to try to destroy thosemanifestations of that civilization that we findunacceptable.from the above, i infer that no route to democracypasses through the gate of islam; further,there is no acceptable path to a placewhere the Muslim community can absorb andlive out unabridged Western ideas (culture orcivilization). the fact that America would likeMuslims to “delink islamic religion and religiousclergy” does not mean that Muslims feelthey can do so, which does not even addresswhether they want to do so. 6Some authors (often professors at US collegesand universities) write that islam is compatiblewith Western ideas about democracy. 7However, “prominent Muslim scholars arguedemocracy to be incompatible with their religion.they base their conclusion on two foundations:first, the conviction that islamic lawregulates . . . every area of life, and second,that the Muslim society of believers will attainall its goals only if the believers walk in thepath of god. in addition, some Muslim scholarsfurther reject anything that does not have itsorigins in the Qur’an.” 8As an illustration, note the following:islam is a complete way of life. . . . the preeminentrule which the islamic state must observe isstated in the Qur’an. . . . it is clear that the state’sobligation of obedience to the Creator is as importantas the obedience of the individual.Hence, the islamic state must derive its law fromthe Qur’an and Sunnah. This principle excludescertain choices from the Islamic state’s options for politicaland economic systems, such as pure democracy,unrestricted capitalism, communism, socialism,etc. 9 (emphasis added)if we are to succeed in iraq (and the Middleeast), we cannot simply dismiss those elementsof culture and civilization with which we disagree.instead, we must acknowledge them,find means to discuss their application in newways, and, finally, help Muslim leaders andtheir populations use those new methods tosolve real cultural (social, economic, educational,etc.) issues throughout the Middleeast. the United States should concentrateon helping to transition Muslim culture intothe twenty-first century; killing terrorists isalso necessary but almost incidental.Michael rubin notes that, as with all societies,“until Arab citizens hold their leaders accountable,in the press, on the internet, and on thestreet, the democracy debate will be moot.” 10Here, rubin speaks of the broader Middleeast, but the application seems clear: cultureswhich lack a venue for open discourse on issuesof concern to the populace that composes itare innately incapable of sustaining representativegovernments (including democratic ones).As part of the worldwide islamic culture, ArabMuslims must decide to act and establish thisenvironment so that debate can be open andforthright. this is a tall order for societies accustomedto poverty, authoritarian leaders, lackof personal freedoms, poor economic growth,lack of advanced education, and underfundingof research in science and technology—allwithin a culture permeated by a religion withan innate belief in its own righteousness.America cannot “win” a cultural war withthe Muslim world, and we should not let anyonetell us that this is what we are really doing.instead, America must be satisfied (over thelong term) with encouraging academic endeavorsthat leverage Muslim scholarshipwhere the benefits can propel economic andpolitical capital that is inextricably linked todeveloping formal self-awareness and incentivesto join the globalization efforts of Westerncivilization. We should promote all reasonablemeans that encourage Muslims to expandtheir mental, societal, economic, or religiousendeavors. We need an integrated, holisticstrategy and the requisite plan of execution sothat all appropriate elements of our governmentcan participate. ❑Woodbridge, Virginia

THE MERGE 23Notes1. Col William M. darley, “Strategic imperative: thenecessity for Values operations as opposed to informationoperations in iraq and Afghanistan,” Air and SpacePower Journal 21, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 39, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/spr07/spr07.pdf.2. The National Security Strategy of the United States ofAmerica (Washington, dC: the White House, March 2006),9, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf.the strategy does not use the term civil religions.3. note that the term global war on terror is not useful.first, it is a poor choice of words (i.e., how does one makewar on terror, a noun that means fear, horror, fight, dread,and so forth?). Second, we might prosecute those who useterror tactics or who commit terrorist actions, but we cannotmake war on a concept, method, or emotion.4. darley, “Strategic imperative,” 33.5. ibid., 39.6. ibid.7. See, for example, david Bukay, “Can there Be anislamic democracy?” Middle East Quarterly 14, no. 2 (Spring2007): 71–79, http://www.meforum.org/article/1680; andnajib ghadbian, “democracy or Self-interest? An investigativelook into islamic democracy and US Policy,” HarvardInternational Review 25, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 78–79,http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1128.8. Bukay, “Can there Be an islamic democracy?” 77.9. “ten Misconceptions about islam,” in USC-MSA[Muslim Students Association] Compendium of Muslim Texts(los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California, n.d.),http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/notislam/misconceptions.html.10. Michael rubin, “the Middle east’s real Bane:Corruption,” Daily Star (Beirut), 18 november 2005, MiddleEast Forum: Research and Writing, http://www.meforum.org/article/790.

Network-Centric OperationsA Need for Adaptation and EfficiencyCDR PhilliP G. Pattee, USN, RetiReD*In an artIcle published in 1998, Viceadm arthur K. cebrowski and John J.Garstka argued that “network-centricwarfare and all of its associated revolutionsin military affairs grow out of and drawtheir power from the fundamental changes inamerican society. these changes have beendominated by the co-evolution of economics,information technology, and business processesand organizations.” at that time, theauthors noted that three themes governed thepath that the military would take to changethe way it conducted operations:• the shift in focus from the platform to thenetwork• the shift from viewing actors as independentto viewing them as part of a continuouslyadapting ecosystem• the importance of making strategic choicesto adapt or even survive in such changing ecosystems.1the Department of Defense (DOD) hasmade tremendous strides along the lines ofthe first theme by exploiting networks of hightechnologyweapons systems but little progresson the second theme, including—at the mostbasic level—understanding what it means.the third theme, a clarion call urging the militaryto change in order to remain competitive,should cause the national security establishmentto reflect on the second theme and decideexactly what it wants to do about it. Back inearly 1998, cebrowski and Garstka asked, “Howcan the military not change?” 2 the military’sbiggest obstacle to change lies in its failure torethink its rules as an actor among others in acontinuously adapting ecosystem. currently,the DOD focuses overwhelmingly on exploitingnew technologies for military advantage,but these gains “are of marginal utility against adiffuse and elusive insurgency” such as the onepursued by al-Qaeda. 3 Only one actor amongmany in the national security environment, theDOD will not realize the promise of dramaticallyimproved national security if it continuesa nearly exclusive emphasis on exploiting newtechnologies for their value within the contextof traditional military operations. ensuring itscontinued viability requires a balance betweenexploitation and exploration: exploitation inorder to promote efficiency and economy, andexploration in order to investigate radicallynew approaches to national security.Networking Is Not Newalthough the DOD has not precisely definednetwork-centric warfare, proponents identify “tonetwork” as a verb, noting that the concept fundamentallyconcerns human behavior and theway humans behave “in the networked environment.”4 When referring to the environment,“network,” as a noun, means an interconnectedgroup or system, while “to network” denotes theact of interconnecting. networking is not novel:humans have operated in a networked environmentfor millennia. the relevant point aboutnetworking involves determining which types ofinterconnections to encourage, permit, discourage,or restrict, as well as using new technology to*the author currently instructs in the Department of Joint and Multinational Operations at the US army command and General Staffcollege, Fort leavenworth, Kansas. He has over 20 years’ experience in the submarine service and previously served on the faculty at theUS army War college, carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.24

THE MERGE 25foster desired networking but restrict the undesirablevariety. network-centric operations dealwith shaping networks to exploit the emergingenvironment to one’s advantage.Networking for Exploitationthe Office of Force transformation developeda construct for network-centric warfareas the intersection of four warfare domains:physical, informational, cognitive, and social(fig. 1). the physical domain includes thecontinuum of space and time. In the informationdomain “information is created, manipulated,and shared.” the “mind of the warfighter”makes up the cognitive domain, andin the social domain, “humans interact, exchangeinformation, form shared awarenessand understandings, and make collaborativedecisions.” 5 In this paradigm, the informationand cognitive domains intersect to formshared awareness, the cognitive and physicaldomains intersect to form compressed operations(planning, organizing, deploying, employing,and sustaining), and at the intersection ofthe information and physical domains, speedand access enable precision force. althoughits proponents state that network-centric warfare“exists at the very center where all fourdomains intersect,” they have not ascribed anyimportance to the social domain as a piece inthe ecosystem. 6 Moreover, the model itself followsa narrowly defined mission for the military,based on deterring war and—when deterrencefails—fighting and winning the nation’swars. One finds evidence for this in the factthat the domains of conflict intersect to formthe construct for network-centric warfare. thecognitive domain embodies the mind of thewar fighter. the Office of Force transformation’semphasis on warfare, conflict, and warfighter shows that its conception of networkcentricoperations represents a strategic choiceto network within a narrowly defined socialdomain of military professionals for the conductof strictly military operations.this type of limited networking to exploit awar-fighting advantage has already producedan excellent precision force that has repeatedlydemonstrated a battlefield advantage overless-networked adversaries. 7 With today’s technology,only adversaries beyond sensor reachfeel safe. For example, during exercise north-Social DomainCollaborative DecisionsInformation-Age Warfare Conveyed Commander’s Intent SharedAwarenessInformation DomainInformation AdvantageCognitive DomainCognitive AdvantageNetwork-CentricWarfarePrecisionForceCompressedOperationsPhysical DomainForce AdvantagePosition AdvantagePlan, Organize, Deploy, Employ, and Sustain Cycle Speed and AccessFigure 1. Information-age warfare—domains of conflict. (From The Implementation of Network-CentricWarfare [Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, 5 January 2005], 21,http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_387_NCW_Book_LowRes.pdf.)

26 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008ern edge 2006, the F-22 raptor air-superiorityfighter prevailed against 40 simulated enemyaircraft, achieving an impressive overall kill ratioof 108 to zero. Moreover, when operatingin a network, the F-22, by using its onboardsensors to direct other aircraft’s weapons, improvedthe performance of the older F-18sand F-15s. 8 networking in this manner enablesthe best sensors to couple with the combinedpayload of all aircraft, effectively spiraling performanceby combining the best attributes ofeach platform. the DOD has made tremendousstrides along the path from platformcenteredoperations to network-centric operations,but this progress has little bearing onthe second of the themes, “the shift from viewingactors as independent to viewing them aspart of a continuously adapting ecosystem,”mentioned above.no reason exists for limiting the model ofnetwork-centric warfare to conflict since thephysical world, information, cognitive processes,and social constructs apply equally wellto other situations. cebrowski and Garstkacite the example of Wal-Mart’s shift to pointof-salescanners to track weekly store sales. Byproviding this information directly to suppliers,Wal-Mart eliminated the platform-centricpurchasing department at each store, thus reducingoperating costs and improving controlover its stock. 9 Sharing information to reduceits sales cost below the industry average enabledWal-Mart to exploit its already dominantposition in the retail sector.nevertheless, adopting similar strategiesfor the military, as in the domains-of-conflictparadigm, creates a culture that needlesslylimits the joint force to network with allies andothers in the DOD to improve the military’sability to conduct warfare. In fact, instead ofconceiving new methods of national security,network-centric warfare’s central point simplyentails translating an information advantageinto a competitive advantage for military operations.10 continuing down this road willlikely lead the military to more effective operations,but the payoff on investment for improvednational security remains uncertain.the United States armed forces have had nopeer since the breakup of the Soviet Union. 11america has produced the finest military inthe world by following simple rules. to reiterate,the military exists and organizes itself todeter aggression against the United States andto fight and win the nation’s wars when deterrencefails. If we continue to view the military’spurpose as deterring and winning wars, willthat guarantee national security in an evolvingsecurity environment? When cebrowski andGarstka argued for network-centric warfare,they expected to incorporate the ideas andstrategies used successfully by american businesses.One lesson from industry maintainsthat “dominance lies in making strategicchoices appropriate to changing ecosystems”and, more to the point, that “simply pursuingoperational effectiveness while adhering to anobsolete strategy is a formula for failure.” 12Viewing the World as ComplexAdaptive Systemsthe shift from viewing actors as independentto viewing them as part of a continuouslyadapting ecosystem involves changing the wayone thinks about the world. every actor has thecapability to interact in some fashion with itsenvironment and with other actors. Groups ofactors form populations, which, especially ifthe members act in concert, become actors intheir own right. the way actors interact withthe environment, other actors, or populationsin pursuit of specific goals is a strategy. a patternof interaction is a network. actors andpopulations usually are part of multiple networks.actors, their environment, patterns ofinteraction, and strategies compose a systemwhose properties emerge from the actions andinteractions of the parts. Since components ofthe system change (i.e., new actors are bornwhile others die; technologies can alter strategiesand change the ability of actors to interact;actors vary their strategies; etc.), the system towhich they belong changes continuously aswell. 13 Sometimes change is slow and small—sometimes fast and furious.negative feedback dominates relativelystable systems. adapting systems have a mix ofpositive feedback based on increasing returns

THE MERGE 27and negative feedback to keep them from degeneratinginto chaos. In this region ofbounded instability, individual or collaborativecreativity can produce new standards orrule sets. an initial advantage, when magnifiedby increasing returns, generates a successfulparadigm that other actors will mimic andadopt. Once the standard becomes successfuland widely adopted, those who deviate from itincur penalties—hence, negative feedbackagain dominates in the system and the standardbecomes locked in. 14 this continues until newpatterns emerge with new rules for success thateventually undermine the older system and replaceit. Kevin Kelly, Wired magazine’s executivedirector, refers to this process as sustainabledisequilibrium or churn. 15the main elements that produce adaptivebehaviors in these complex systems are therichness of interactions and variety. 16 the attractivenessof the new system to others whowill voluntarily support and sustain it generatesincreasing returns. Various actors spontaneouslyself-organize around the attractors,and a new self-synchronizing system emergesfrom the bottom up. 17Networking for Exploration: Strategic Networking and Transformation Strategic choice in a changing ecosystemdeals fundamentally with recognizing emergingpatterns, determining the rules or attractorsgoverning the new order, and posturingoneself to take advantage of the new system asit develops. as an example, consider the riseof Wal-Mart to its position of prominence inthe retail sector. Prior to 1962, competitionfrom regional discount chains was squeezingout Sam Walton’s few variety stores. Obviouslyconcerned, he “traveled the country to studythis radical, new retailing concept.” 18 Insteadof determining how he could find more efficiencyin a local market, Walton increased hisnetwork to the national level, looking foremerging national trends. His interaction withother retailers and potential customers enabledhim to recognize an emergent pattern.convinced that this new retailing model wasthe wave of the future, Walton postured hisbusiness to take advantage of evolving shoppingpatterns by opening the first Wal-Mart inrogers, arkansas, in 1962. 19convenience paired with value made thisnew retailing model attractive to consumers.Walton thought about his store from the pointof view of the customer, providing a “wide assortmentof good quality merchandise; thelowest possible prices; guaranteed satisfactionwith what you buy; friendly, knowledgeableservice; convenient hours; free parking; [and]a pleasant shopping experience.” 20 as an actor,Walton mimicked the strategy already pioneeredby other retailers such as Kmart andtarget to tailor the store to attract shoppers byoffering value and convenience.In addition to the way he configured hisstores, Walton used aerial observation to choosetheir locations. 21 During the 1960s and 1970s,many americans bought homes in suburbs. Usingan old airplane for observation, Waltoncould see where suburbs were growing andwhere populations of customers would be in severalyears’ time, pick out likely traffic routes, andnote the areas neglected by his competitors. Bylocating his stores conveniently for emergingshoppers, he created more frequent interactionswith potential customers and immediately capitalizedon developing local markets.Walton recognized two rising patterns: consumers’new shopping preferences and customerlocations/traffic routes. He dismissedthe strategy of simply trying to make the best ofhis situation by improving the operating effectivenessof his Walton’s Variety Stores—theemerging pattern signaled their demise, irrespectiveof their efficiency. Instead, Walton developeda strategy that created opportunity tointeract with more customers and provide themwith an attractive store by offering convenienceand value. He did this by having a social domainmuch larger than that of the local economy andother variety-store retailers. the emergent systemof customers, interactions, and attractorstransformed Sam Walton’s business and lockedin Wal-Mart as a retail success.a second example of revolutionary changecomes from a depression-era truck driver from

28 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008north carolina named Malcolm Mclean. afterWorld War II, the demand for trade andcargo continued to increase. the initial solutionto the problem called for building largerfreighters. In 1955 Mclean acquired the PanamericanSteamship company with the proceedsgained from the sale of his trucking firmand began to experiment with ideas to increasethe throughput of cargo. His innovationtook the form of using containers thatcould be unloaded from truck trailers andloaded onto ships. Despite initially slow progress,in 1961 the International Standards committeeestablished containers measuring 20 x8 x 8.5 ft. and 40 x 8 x 8.5 ft. as the standard. 22Ships were constructed with rails in their holdsto accommodate the containers. By 1967Mclean’s Sea-land corporation had won acontract with the US government to transportmuch of what the army needed to sustain itselfin Vietnam. In addition to shipping fromseaport to seaport, Sea-land assumed responsibilityfor moving freight to inland depots.the intermodal containers moved easily fromship to railcar or truck bed and vice versa so thatSea-land could “track shipments, retain oversightof the containers, and ensure that theempty boxes were returned for further use.” 23at this point, the commercial sector realizedthe system’s advantages and began toplace orders for ships built to accommodatecontainers. today, oceanborne commerceamounts to 1,167.9 million metric tons, nearlydouble the amount 20 years earlier. Prior tothe container revolution, “a typical freightercould handle only 10,000 tons” and took upwardsof two weeks to unload and load cargo.today, each 20-foot container can hold up to20 tons of cargo, and a port such as longBeach, california, can handle over 23,000containers daily—roughly the equivalent ofunloading and loading 45 freighters a day. 24cargo hauling has locked in around thecontainer standard with ships, trucks, railcars,cranes, and port facilities all constructed as anetwork to support the seamless movement ofgoods. Deviating from the standard will incurincreased time and cost for the shipper.Mclean could have endeavored simply to improvethe efficiency of trucking by exploitinglarger trailers and more fuel-efficient tractors,but that strategy would not have produced theexponential growth in trade that he eventuallyachieved by creating new standards thatthe entire sector adopted.networking for exploitation has its place.Wal-Mart has shifted from utilizing purchasingdepartments in its stores to computer networksthat provide suppliers with real-timesales data of the products they produce. Suppliersuse this data to appropriately gear theirproduction lines to meet demand. 25 this kindof networking makes Wal-Mart more efficient.However, networking in a strategic sense toexplore new concepts in a large and diversesocial domain (fig. 2) seeks new combinationsof emerging patterns and rule sets to producenovel solutions to enduring problems. thisexploratory networking enabled Sam Waltonto take advantage of emerging patterns, ultimatelytransforming his variety stores into acompletely different type of retailer. this iswhy Wal-Mart has become a giant in the retailsector. Similarly, Mclean sought better waysto move cargo beyond exploiting what wasavailable in the trucking industry. By creatinga network involving shipbuilders, port authorities,governmental departments, and the InternationalStandards committee, Mclean transformedthe entire shipping industry.RecommendationsUsing networks to interact with diversegroups to generate a variety of collaborativeideas that, in turn, will produce new methodsfor achieving national security is at least as importantfor the DOD as using networks to gainmilitary advantage. carl von clausewitz concludedlong ago that war was part of a patternof politics. alfred thayer Mahan also postulatedthat economic competitions often led tomilitary competition. the links among political,economic, and military systems exist and createtheir own more complex system. the DOD willnot see patterns or be in a position to capitalizeon them if it views itself as independent;that department must think of itself as an actorconstituting part of a larger, continuously

THE MERGE 29Social DomainInformation-AgeWarfareIndividualKnowledgeCognitive DomainIndividualCapabilitiesUnknown by anIndividual orHis or HerNetworkSocial-NetworkKnowledgeInformation DomainNetwork-CentricWarfareNew CombinationsforNational SecuritySocial-NetworkCapabilitiesPhysical DomainInformation-AgeNational SecurityPotential VulnerabilitiesPhysical Worldbeyond Either One’sOwn Ability or the Abilityof One’s Network toControl or InfluenceFigure 2. Information-age security. (Adapted from The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare[Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, 5 January 2005], 21, http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_387_NCW_Book_LowRes.pdf.)adapting ecosystem. thinking about the worldin this way, as complex adaptive systems, comesfrom the modern science of complexity. as thekey first step toward understanding complexadaptive systems, the DOD should incorporatecomplexity theory into all levels of professionalmilitary education.the second essential step calls for DODpersonnel to deliberately choose to networkbroadly. Familiarity gained in previous professionaleducation will enable this initiative.Service members would understand that thepurpose of networking is to define patternsand rule sets in use by other actors. It is unreasonableto expect any individual to masterthe broad range of disciplines that actuallymake up the international political and economicsystem. that is why policy makers andplanners must have large social networks; whatthey cannot know, their network can (see fig.2). By networking in political, economic, business,scientific, religious, and social systems,DOD policy makers and planners have a strongerchance of recognizing emerging patternsand appropriately posturing government departmentsto take advantage of them. Militaryleaders should encourage service members topursue broad interaction within their neighborhoodsand cities and with other governmentagencies as well as the private-businesssector to develop diverse interests, a variety ofexpertise, and numerous personal contacts asa matter of course in career development.Broad, diverse networks represent a key sourceof the variety that leads to true innovation andbreakthrough. the goal of networking thisbroadly, as shown in figure 2, involves movingfrom network-centric warfare toward networkednational security.Finally, the DOD needs to adopt variousnew strategies on a trial basis with the idea ofmodifying them to suit emerging circumstances.the past tendency has involved running longseries of experiments prior to implementingnew doctrines, equipment, or strategies. realand potential enemies, however, are alreadyworking to undermine rules and paradigms thatdo not suit them. terror networks use their knowledgeof social networks and information-agetechnology to avoid engaging strong Western­

30 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008style militaries in traditional symmetrical warfare.thus, terror networks have already mitigatedsome of the advantages that new systemssuch as the F-22 raptor create. the point isthat prolonged experimentation may simplyperfect a solution to yesterday’s problem andremain only marginally effective against theproblems currently emerging. the contextfor which a new system or strategy is designedis neither fixed nor linear—it constantlychanges. While terrorists successfully expandtheir networks, US policy makers and plannersremain stagnant; consequently, potentialvulnerabilities develop and grow. the DODmust not only strenuously investigate technologicalsolutions to problems but also examinesocial and political structures to understandthem and find nontechnical ways to manageand enhance national security.Conclusionthe DOD has mastered traditional militaryconflicts and is gaining efficiencies with its currentnetworking initiative. However, it still lacksproficiency in the larger social domain that willlead to new combinations for enhanced security.We must educate military officers to thinkin terms of new combinations—the journeystarts in the officer-education system. adaptationwill come much faster and more regularlywith constant exposure to new ideas and perspectives.Variety in ideas and perspectiveemerges from a large social network. the DODmust expand its networking effort to guardagainst becoming a highly efficient but irrelevantforce for national security. ❑Fort Leavenworth, KansasNotes1. Vice adm arthur K. cebrowski and John J. Garstka,“network-centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” US navalInstitute Proceedings 124, no. 139 (January 1998): 32.2. Ibid.3. David c. Gompert, Heads We Win: The Cognitive Side ofCounterinsurgency (COIN), ranD counterinsurgency Study,Paper 1 (Santa Monica, ca: ranD corporation, 2007), ix,http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2007/ranD_OP168.pdf.4. The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare (Washington,Dc: Department of Defense, Office of Force transformation,5 January 2005), 3, http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_387_ncW_Book_lowres.pdf.5. Ibid., 20.6. Ibid., 21.7. Ibid., 21–24. See also Joint Operations Concepts (Washington,Dc: Department of Defense, november 2003), 16,http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/secdef_approved_jopsc.doc.8. SSgt c. todd lopez, “F-22 excels at establishingair Dominance,” Air Force Link, 23 June 2006, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123022371 (accessed 27September 2006).9. cebrowski and Garstka, “network-centric Warfare,”32.10. Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare, 9 and 18.11. thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map:War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century (new York: G. P.Putnam’s Sons, 2004), 59–60. For an excellent generaldiscussion of relative US military power, see eliot a. cohen,“History and the Hyperpower,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 4(July/august 2004): 52–53.12. cebrowski and Garstka, “network-centric Warfare,”31.13. For an excellent introduction to complex adaptivesystems, see robert axelrod and Michael D. cohen,Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a ScientificFrontier (new York: Basic Books, 2000), 1–31.14. ralph D. Stacey, “the Science of complexity: analternative Perspective for Strategic change Processes,”Strategic Management Journal 16, no. 6 (September 1995):483, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/114071144/PDFStart.15. Kevin Kelly, “new rules for the new economy,”Wired 5, no. 9 (September 1997), http://www.wired.com/archive/5.09/newrules_pr.html (accessed 18 September2006).16. axelrod and cohen, Harnessing Complexity, 6 and 156.17. Stacey, “Science of complexity,” 481.18. “the Wal-Mart Story,” Wal-Mart Facts.com, http://www.walmartfacts.com/content/default.aspx?id=1 (accessed19 January 2008).19. Ibid.20. Ibid.21. “aviationandtravel,” Wal-Mart,http://www.walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do?catg-285(accessed 28 September 2006).22. Dr. Salvatore r. Mercogliano, “the container revolution,”Sea History, no. 114 (Spring 2006): 9, http://www.sname.org/newsletter/SeaHistorycontnrShps.pdf.23. Ibid., 10.24. Ibid., 11.25. See “Information Superiority” sidebar in cebrowskiand Garstka, “network-centric Warfare,” 30.

Whatever Happened to Strategic Attack?Lt CoL J. P. HunerwadeL, uSaF, retired*All of wAr is about will. Those whowage war follow Clausewitz’s dictum:“To impose our will on the enemy is[war’s] object. To secure that object,we must render the enemy powerless” (emphasisin original). 1 Down through history,rendering the enemy powerless most oftenmeant denying him the means to resist by defeatinghis fielded military forces. There are,however, other ways of rendering an enemypowerless or otherwise convincing him to accedeto one’s will. Collectively called strategicattack (SA), they have a historical pedigreethat long predates the name.This article examines portions of that pedigree,reveals its length and variety, and wondersopenly why one finds so little written onthe subject. Always an intuitive part of thecommander’s tool kit, SA nonetheless has notreceived much explicit attention in documentedUS best practices. Such documentation takesthe official form of joint doctrine, which mentionsSA only seven times. 2 Joint Publication(JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, offers this short paragraphas the only explanation of SA:The JfC [joint force commander] should considerconducting strategic attacks, when feasible.A strategic attack is a JfC-directed offensive actionagainst a target—whether military, political,economic, or other—that is specifically selectedto achieve national or military strategic objectives.These attacks seek to weaken the adversary’sability or will to engage in conflict or continuean action and as such, could be part of acampaign, major operation, or conducted independentlyas directed by the President or [secretaryof defense]. Additionally, these attacks mayachieve strategic objectives without necessarilyhaving to achieve operational objectives as aprecondition. Suitable targets may include butare not limited to enemy strategic CoGs [centersof gravity]. All components of a joint forcemay have capabilities to conduct strategic attacks. 3This is fine as far as it goes, but it does notgo very far. one finds no mention of historicalbest practices or unique aspects of SA that mayentail doctrinal consideration. furthermore,joint doctrine does not address how such attacksachieve strategic objectives without achievingoperational objectives as a precondition.It clearly states that a JfC “should consider”SA and just as clearly implies that it representsan effective use of “all components” of a jointforce. Still, no joint doctrine exists on the subject,save this one brief mention. In contrast,one finds entire books on barriers, obstacles,and mines as well as the use of “intermodalcontainers” in the joint-doctrine hierarchy. 4Doubtless, these important subjects warrantfull mention in doctrine, but isn’t a form ofwarfare that promises neutralization of enemyCoGs without having to fight through enemyforces also worthy of doctrinal treatment?In fairness, Air Force doctrine includes anentire book on SA. (In fact, a new and improvedversion hit the streets as of June 2007.) 5 Perhapstherein lies part of the reason that jointdoctrine does not contain fuller treatment.But we will return to the reasons for the dearthof joint doctrine at the end of this article, afterconsidering SA itself in greater detail.*The author is a senior doctrine analyst in the Joint and Multinational Doctrine Directorate at the Air force Doctrine Developmentand Education Center, Maxwell AfB, Alabama.31

32 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008What It IsJoint doctrine’s definition of SA, citedabove—“JfC-directed offensive action againsta target . . . specifically selected to achieve nationalor military strategic objectives”—does notreveal much. An earlier joint definition describedSA as “offensive action intended to directlyaffect an adversary’s centers of gravity.” 6The current Air force publication on SA definesit as “offensive action specifically selectedto achieve national strategic objectives.” 7These provide little additional illumination.An older Air force definition, produced by ageneral-officer-level symposium on the subjectheld in 2002, is perhaps the most illuminating(and certainly most specific): “offensive actionconducted by command authorities aimed atgenerating effects that most directly achieveour national security objectives by affecting anadversary’s leadership, conflict-sustaining resources,and/or strategy.” 8 This puts the subjectin a bit more context. To understand thematter fully, however, one must examine thespecifics of that definition.“Offensive Action”Victory normally requires offensive action;thus, SA is the proactive and aggressive portionof strategic operations, which also includestrategic defense (e.g., Cold war nuclear deterrenceand the placement of Patriot missilesin Israel during operation Desert Storm) andother strategic operations (e.g., the Berlin airlift),all of which “most directly achieve ournational security objectives.”“Conducted by Command Authorities”The joint definition gives the option of directingSA to the JfC. SA is most often conductedby components of the joint force, particularlythe air and special operations components;thus, SA operations come under the purviewand approval of those component commanderswho support the JfC’s intent. Conversely,SA often assumes such importance and sensitivityto a campaign that it receives approvaldirectly from national leaders above the JfC,such as the president, secretary of defense, ora combatant commander. In fact, combatantcommanders other than the one who appointedthe JfC (such as the commanders of US StrategicCommand [STrATCoM] or Special operationsCommand) may sometimes have authorityto conduct SA operations in the JfC’sarea, independent of that commander’s ownplan or intent—one of the reasons that weneed joint doctrinal guidance on SA.“Aimed at Generating Effects”Defeating or coercing adversaries requireseffects-based SA. That is, one must design actionsagainst adversary systems to create specificdesired effects that contribute directly toachieving military and political objectives, attainmentof which delivers a set of end-stateconditions that confers continuing advantage.furthermore, one must do so while avoidingspecific undesired effects that will hamper thecreation of such conditions. The conduct of SAencourages taking an effects-based approachto military operations.“Most Directly Achieve OurNational Security Objectives”The phrase most directly is the key to understandingthis aspect of SA. oftentimes, theaccumulation of tactical actions against anenemy’s fielded military forces also offers aneffective way of achieving national security objectives;however, it frequently does not representthe most direct means in terms of level ofeffort or of targets selected. Such tactical victoryagainst fielded forces often comes at ahigher cost with regard to lives, treasure, time,and opportunities. So SA may prove more efficientas well as more direct. Ironically, historianssuch as B. H. liddell Hart labeled attacksthat bypass enemy forces “the indirect approach.”9 This illustrates how deeply ingrainedthe idea of force-on-force war has become inthe military mind-set. In fact, SA is more direct,seeking to bypass the operational-leveleffects of traditional warfare and directlyachieve strategic aims (see figure).

THE MERGE 334USBUFHJDMFWFMFGGFDUTBOEPCKFDUJWFTPWFSBMMSFTVMUTPGDPOGMJDU5SBEJUJPOBMXBSGBSF4USBUFHJDBUUBDLBTBOBQQSPBDIUPXBS5BDUJDBMMFWFMBDUJPOTBOEFGGFDUTSFTVMUEJSFDUMZJOTUSBUFHJDMFWFMFGGFDUT5SBEJUJPOBMXBSGBSF"DDVNVMBUJPOPGMPXFSMFWFMFGGFDUTFWFOUVBMMZSFTVMUTJOBDIJFWFNFOUPGTUSBUFHJDMFWFMPCKFDUJWFT0QFSBUJPOBMMFWFMFGGFDUTSFTVMUTPGDBNQBJHOTBOENBKPSPQFSBUJPOT5SBEJUJPOBMXBSGBSF5BDUJDBMMFWFMFGGFDUTSFTVMUTPGJOEJWJEVBMFOHBHFNFOUTBOEBDUJPOT4QFDJGJDTUSBUFHJDBUUBDLPQFSBUJPOTFigure. Strategic attack and the levels of war. (From Air Force Doctrine Document [AFDD] 2-1.2, StrategicAttack, 12 June 2007, 8, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page_HTML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd2-1-2.pdf.)“Leadership”Every system has some sort of directing function;every human system has a leader or leaders.In many cases, attacks that neutralizethese leaders can eliminate enemy resistance,rendering the enemy powerless. Historically,as we shall see, this has most often entaileddirectly attacking strategic leaders; moreover,we now have the ability to attack the infrastructurethat supports and connects thatleadership function to the rest of the system.of course, in today’s context, one must conductattacks on leadership in accordance withthe law of armed conflict, which maintainsthat leaders must be legitimate military targets.“Conflict-Sustaining Resources”It is often possible to target an adversary’s meansof conducting or continuing a conflict. Thesupport necessary to sustain resource-intensivemodern warfare (even primitive war relies onresources of some sort) provides many lucrativetargets, speeds the enemy’s collapse, andremoves options from enemy commanders.“Strategy”Sun Tzu said that the best policy in war is todefeat the enemy’s strategy; this requires thatone hold at risk what the adversary seeks toobtain or deny him the ability to obtain it. SA

34 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008can often deny an adversary strategic choices,frequently in conjunction with the denial ofconflict-sustaining resources. That is, SA maydeny the enemy the means of engaging inconflict or the pursuit of certain strategicchoices in ways that do not involve direct destructionof his military forces.Unique ConsiderationsMany considerations distinguish the conductof SA from that of more traditional counterforcewarfare. The selection of targets differs,of course, as may the means of attacking them.The sophistication required to conduct SAsuccessfully against modern systems entails amuch greater intelligence-analysis cost thando operations that simply attrit enemy fieldedforces. This necessitates the development ofintelligence-federation partnerships withnational-level agencies and sometimes evenwith intelligence services of foreign governmentsin order to analyze systems adequately.Commanders must ensure that such preparationwork happens before crises develop andconflict ensues. further, in counterforce operationsit may be possible to gauge progresssimply by counting numbers of enemy troopskilled or pieces of equipment destroyed, butassessing the effects of SA demands muchgreater sophistication in choosing measuresand indicators. It also calls for more patiencefrom commanders and national leaders sinceprogress toward the achievement of objectivesmay show few outward signs until one fulfillsthe objectives themselves. Yet, joint doctrinementions none of these considerations.One Thing Strategic Attack Is NotSA is not synonymous with nuclear or atomic,as the Cold war’s long association of theword strategic with nuclear used to imply.Nonetheless, one can use nuclear weapons toconduct SA, as in the atomic bombing of Japanin 1945. In the context of SA, strategic refersto the level of effects—not the methodsused to create them. Potentially, one can employany weapon system to conduct SA, eventhose as simple as the spear and the sword, ashistorical examples show.Historical Examplesfrom what source is this information on SAderived? Is there a record of historical successthat demonstrates best practices? In fact, onedoes exist although, of course, attacks wewould consider SA today were not so namedby historians.one early instance occurred at the Battle ofIssus in November of 333 BC. Alexander theGreat defeated the Persians when he “drovehard with his cavalry at [Persian] King Dariushimself, wanting not so much to defeat thePersian army as to win the victory with his ownhands.” 10 Alexander drove Darius from thefield and wrested his empire from him. Similarly,Charles Martel’s frankish infantry at theBattle of Tours in 732 AD isolated Emir Abd-errahman, the Muslim commander, and “piercedhim through with many spears, so that hedied, then all the [Muslim] host fled beforethe enemy,” thus saving western Europe fromfurther Muslim advances. 11 The story of Davidversus Goliath also comes to mind. In the contextof ancient battle, ground forces usuallyconducted SA against strategic leaders. Gettingto the leader, of course, usually involved adegree of force-on-force engagement, but notthe tactical defeat of the entire enemy force(as in most other ancient battles). Still, thelong existence of SA proves its pedigree andthe fact that surface forces can conduct it aswell as any other element of the joint force.Although force-on-force engagement settledmost battles, SA (when possible) proved atleast an effective adjunct to attrition and annihilation,rendering military operations bothmore effective and efficient. Some people mightconsider Gen william T. Sherman’s famousmarch to the sea and Gen Philip Sheridan’spillage of the Shenandoah Valley during theAmerican Civil war SA campaigns, in that theysought to deny the Confederacy vital conflictsustainingresources while avoiding direct engagementwith Confederate forces.within what joint doctrine has come to call“irregular warfare,” SA has also had its place. 12from 1899 to 1902, the United States engagedin a war to suppress Philippine insurrectionagainst American rule. regardless of the pro­

THE MERGE 35priety of this imperialist venture, bloody andbrutal on both sides, the war’s most famousincident involved the capture of Philippine insurrectionleader Emilio Aguinaldo by US troopsin 1901. Some question exists regarding thelegality of the ruse used to capture Aguinaldoaccording to the rules of war (US troops posedas prisoners of allied filipino scouts, dressedin filipino Army—not US—uniforms). Nonetheless,the action effectively ended resistancethroughout most of the Philippines and representedan effective use of SA by a groundforce in the context of irregular warfare. 13Special operations forces (Sof) often playa critical role in SA. In 1943 Norwegian andBritish commando teams destroyed Germansupplies of heavy water and sabotaged theplants used to produce them in an actiondubbed by the British special operations executive“the most successful act of sabotage in allof world war II.” 14 It also offered a tremendouslyeffective example of SA designed todeny Hitler a strategy option by preventinghim from creating weapons of mass destruction(wMD).Similarly, the Allied submarine campaignagainst Japan in the Pacific theater duringworld war II showed an effective use of SAagainst resources: Allied submarines specificallysought to avoid contact with the ImperialJapanese Navy, instead going directly aftercommercial shipping. This campaign not onlyreceives almost as much credit as the atomicbombing of Japan for forcing an end to thewar, but also demonstrates the effective use ofSA by a purely naval force. of course, theatomic bombing, perhaps the most famous example,embodied the purest form of SA: deliveryof two weapons that had direct and nearlyimmediate desired strategic consequences.Airpower and Strategic AttackAfter world war II, the aircraft became oneof the most effective systems for conductingSA. In 1942 lt Col Jimmy Doolittle and a smallcontingent of B-25 bombers operating off carriersin the central Pacific conducted an almostsimilarly “pure” example of SA. AvoidingJapanese air defenses, the raids caused onlyinsignificant damage to the enemy’s capabilities.Though intended primarily to bolstermorale in the United States and demonstratethat Allied forces could indeed strike Japan,this action had more far-reaching strategicconsequences. first, it revealed to Japan’s politicalleadership the country’s vulnerability,leading to a strategic realignment of its airforces from China to the home islands, causing,in essence, virtual attrition of the enemy’scapability in China. Second, the attack convincedthe Japanese general staff to pursuethe course of action that led to the Battle ofMidway and decisive defeat of the ImperialJapanese Navy. In this case, SA greatly facilitatedoperational-level campaigns concurrentlyunder way and effectively shortened thewar in the Pacific.During the Combined Bomber offensivein Europe in world war II, Allied air attacksagainst German rail and inland waterway systemsstruck a fatal blow against the Germaneconomy. Even though the productive capacityof individual factories increased throughoutmost of 1944, the disruption of transportationnearly immobilized the economy as a whole,almost stripped Germany of electrical power(due to the interruption of coal shipments),and greatly hampered the movement of theenemy’s armies. These efforts might haveended the war in Europe by themselves hadGermany’s resistance in the field not collapsedsimultaneously. “The attack on transportationwas the decisive blow that completely disorganizedthe German economy. It reduced war productionin all categories and made it difficultto move what was produced to the front. Theattack also limited the tactical mobility of theGerman army.” 15 In essence, this amounted toa fatal attack on a conflict-sustaining resource.The SA portion of operation Just Cause inPanama in 1989—aerial gunships destroyingPanamanian dictator Manuel Noriega’s Commandancia,for example—disrupted his commandand control capabilities and helped setthe context for his eventual isolation and captureby US forces. Similarly, the extensive SAportion of Desert Storm disrupted SaddamHussein’s command and control by neutralizing

36 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008many of his regime-control mechanisms, nearlyleading to the downfall of his regime in thewake of the ground campaign that removedhis troops from Kuwait. In operation Alliedforce, SA conducted by combined air forcescoerced Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevicinto withdrawing his forces from Kosovo.The case of Allied force is interesting fromthe SA perspective for a couple of reasons. first,the true SA portion of the campaign beganlate, after many weeks of direct aerial attackson Serbian fielded forces had failed. Second,the selection of SA targets was very sophisticated.Coalition strategists chose to selectivelytarget industries and businesses associatedwith Milosevic’s kleptocratic cronies. Theycombined physical attacks against these facilitieswith cyberspace attacks on the croniesthemselves (e.g., personally addressed faxestelling them that their businesses were beingbombed). Although we targeted civilian infrastructureto weaken Serbian public supportfor Milosevic, these nonlethal assaults causedno lasting damage (e.g., carbon-filament attacksagainst electrical facilities that temporarilytook down much civilian power). 16 Unlike coalitioncounterforce action, SA did prove effectivein bringing about a desirable end to thisparticular campaign.This success, however, does not point theway toward what commentator ralph Petershas called “immaculate warfare.” 17 Campaignsin which nondestructive SA “wins the day” willbe the rare exception, not the rule. SA is mosteffective in concert with other efforts, includingcounterforce operations. operation Iraqifreedom offers a better template. That campaignbegan with an unsuccessful but nonethelessdisruptive attempt to kill Saddam outright,and SA continued throughout, disrupting leadershipfunctions, denying conflict-sustainingresources, and neutralizing suspected IraqiwMD sites. we used SA in much the same wayin Desert Storm—or, for that matter, in worldwar II. regardless of the medium from whichit is conducted, SA helps the joint/combinedforce seize the initiative, disrupt the adversary’sdecision cycle and decision calculus,critically affect the adversary’s strategic CoGs,and otherwise establish the terms of the conflictin the manner and time of our choosing.It is a vital part of comprehensive strategy andoperational design.our enemies certainly think so: they usedone of the more spectacular examples of SAagainst us in the 9/11 attacks on the worldTrade Center and Pentagon, even choosing touse aircraft as the means of delivery. whethertheir use of SA was successful remains to beseen, but it certainly did have profound strategicconsequences. for example, we use SA todayin ongoing operations in the global waron terror to deny our enemies access to vitalresources such as conflict-sustaining financialassets and to eliminate the enemy’s legitimatecombatant leadership, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The hunt for al-Qaeda and other terroristleaders continues daily in the ongoing war(much of it carried out by elements of the jointforce other than air). with boots on the groundin places like Iraq and Afghanistan, SA willonce again become the province of all serviceand functional components of the joint force.Joint SilenceAs we have seen, SA remains distinct fromother operations and has a track record of historicalbest (and worst) practices. It also requiresthat commanders consider factors sufficientlydifferent from other operations towarrant doctrinal treatment. So why the relativesilence in joint doctrine?The answer to that question leaves manypeople uncomfortable. The simple explanationis that most opposition to SA in joint doctrinecomes from the ground services, whichsee it as a threat to their perceived status asthe decisive arm of the US military instrumentof power. The fact that joint airpower and Sofconduct most SA today acts as an irritant sincemany members of the ground forces—the USArmy and Marine Corps—consider thosecomponents of the joint force mere supportingelements of their decisive arms. Such a reactionis understandable to a degree: armiesfight other armies, and ground-force commandersthink in terms of defeating enemyforces. This situation has created a culture

THE MERGE 37rich in tradition and emotional attachment tothe concept of force-on-force, attritional warfare.one finds it difficult not to become emotionallyaffected when considering the sacrificeof men (and now women) in uniform whohave given their lives for America’s causes duringforce-on-force engagements. Yet, is it possiblethat a prejudice exists against SA in certainjoint circles because of the perception thatit offers airpower and Sof an equal footing inthe quest to be decisive? Advocates for the useof SA must take care not to overemphasizesuch aspects as its apparent air-centricity. Allelements of the joint force can conduct SA, andall joint commanders must know how best to useforces to employ it. In today’s integrated joint/combined environment, we should think interms of defeating the enemy, not just his forces.Again, all war has to do with will and with compellingthe enemy to do ours. SA can be a vitalpart of rendering the enemy powerless andcreating conditions of continuing advantage.Nonetheless, certain elements of the jointcommunity have resisted SA in proactive andemotional terms. At one time, a draft jointpublication existed—JP 3-70, “Joint StrategicAttack”—and at various times it enjoyed thesponsorship of the Air force and STrATCoM,but elements of the joint-doctrine communityfought it tooth and nail. It was cancelled at thebehest of certain doctrine representativesfrom other services, who thought that thepassing reference to SA in JP 3-0 constitutedadequate treatment. The publication reemergedbriefly under STrATCoM, but a joint-doctrinecolloquium in 2005 voted it out of existenceagain. Since then, no one has tried to revive itor to craft doctrine that would well and trulyrepresent SA’s unique characteristics to a jointaudience. During the document’s coordination,doubts arose about the quality of thedrafts submitted (SA can be difficult to writeabout, especially if practitioners aren’t involved),but opponents maintained that we did notneed it—that adequate coverage in joint doctrinealready existed. This argument is falseon its face. As mentioned before, we have awealth of doctrine on such issues as mine warfareand intermodal containers (no doubt, allof it valuable) but only a paragraph on SA.Certainly, a form of war fighting that (a) commandershave used extensively in the past, (b)involves unique considerations compared totraditional force-on-force warfare, and (c)may involve potentially contentious issues ofcommand/control and execution warrantsfuller treatment in joint doctrine.The joint-doctrine community must putaside any emotional resistance to the conceptof SA and to the fiction that SA entails airpower“cowboys” trying to go it alone. Theportions of the joint community that endorseSA must avoid overpromising and put asideany thoughts that it will yield “immaculatewarfare,” realizing that it represents only onetool in the commander’s kit. Nonetheless, SA’spedigree and distinctiveness warrant grantingit a permanent place in the joint-doctrine hierarchy.we need a joint-doctrine publicationon strategic attack. ❑Maxwell AFB, AlabamaNotes1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. MichaelHoward and Peter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,1993), 83.2. four times in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations,17 September 2006, and three times in JP 3-30, Commandand Control for Joint Air Operations, 5 June 2003.3. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, III-21 through III-22.4. JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for JointOperations, 26 April 2007; and JP 4-01.7, Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Use of Intermodal Containers in JointOperations, 7 January 1997.5. Air force Doctrine Document (AfDD) 2-1.2, StrategicAttack, 12 June 2007.6. JP 3-70, “Joint Strategic Attack,” third draft, March2005, I-1 (copy at Air force Doctrine Development andEducation Center, Maxwell AfB, Al).7. AfDD 2-1.2, Strategic Attack, 2.8. AfDD 2-1.2, Strategic Attack, 30 September 2003, 1.The version of 12 June 2007 uses a modification of thejoint definition. Though preferable in that it has somedegree of “joint buy-in,” the new definition is not as descriptive.

38 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 20089. B. H. liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d rev. ed. (london:Plume, 1991), 383.10. Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, trans. C. H.oldfather (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1935), bk. 17, sec. 23.1-3.11. Anonymous eighth-century Arab chronicler,quoted in Edward Creasy, The Fifteen Decisive Battles of theWorld from Marathon to Waterloo (whitefish, MT: KessingerPublishing, 2004), 144.12. Irregular warfare is “a violent struggle among stateand non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over therelevant population.” JP 1, “Doctrine for the Armedforces of the United States,” draft final-coordination revision,27 october 2006, I-2.13. Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars andthe Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002),99–128.14. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “NorwegianHeavy water Sabotage,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norwegian_heavy_water_sabotage.15. The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys (EuropeanWar) (Pacific War) (1945; repr., Maxwell AfB, Al: Air UniversityPress, 1987), 30.16. See, for example, “CBU-94 ‘Blackout Bomb,’BlU-114/B ‘Soft Bomb,’ ” Federation of American ScientistsMilitary Analysis Network, 7 May 1999, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/dumb/blu-114.htm.17. ralph Peters, “The Myth of Immaculate warfare,”USA Today, 5 September 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2006-09-05-warfare-edit_x.htm.

Editor’s Note: PIREP is aviation shorthand for pilot report. It’s a means for one pilot topass on current, potentially useful information to other pilots. In the same fashion, we use thisdepartment to let readers know about items of interest.The Need for Developmental PlanningMr. GreGory K. JenKinsLt CoL Christopher A. Lettiere, UsAFr*In todAy’s RAPIdLy evolving technologyenvironment, new war-fighting capabilitiesoften seem to emerge virtually overnight.Quick reaction capability (QRC)programs such as the massive ordnance airburst (MoAB) have generated substantial headlines,which would lead one to believe thatonly the briefest of planning horizons is necessaryfor the development of modern armament.However QRC programs are generallythe tip of the iceberg, representing only theculminating step in a series of developmentefforts. As our war-fighting systems become increasinglycomplex and interconnected, theextensive effort required to “birth” a new capabilitycontinues to mandate a deliberateand systemic developmental-planning process.Air-Armament Developmental Planning nearly four decades ago, the Air developmentand test Center at Eglin AFB, Florida,established the developmental Planning directorate(XR). Prior to the founding of thisorganization, developmental-planning effortswithin the air-armament acquisition processwere largely ad hoc and disjointed. XR waschartered with instituting and maintaining adisciplined process for defining and selectingnew weapon-systems concepts for further developmentto satisfy the Air Force’s operationalneeds. Much of this process focused onthe preparation of planning documents andjustification for new armament systems basedupon direct-analysis support to the weaponsystemsdevelopment programs. However, themost challenging aspects involved the “matchmaking”process between requirements pull(such as the need to counter modern threats,the evolution of societal standards requiringminimization of collateral damage, and newconcepts of warfare redefining close air support),technology push (such as advances insignal-processing technology, availability of theglobal positioning system [GPs], and miniaturizationof modern electronic components),and the inevitable limitations of developmentfunding. As the developmental-planning processfor air-armament systems matured, XR’sscope of effort increased notably, spawning suchsuccessful major programs as the advancedmedium-range air-to-air missile, combinedeffectsmunition, and sensor-fuzed weapon.Although the years brought about manychanges in the designation of both thearmament-acquisition activity at Eglin and the*Colonel Lettiere is a senior individual mobilization augmentee at the Air Armament Center, Eglin AFB, Florida, and Mr. Jenkins is acapability architect, also at the Air Armament Center.39

40 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008developmental-planning function therein (fig.1), the basic function of defining and selectingnew weapon-systems concepts for furtherdevelopment has remained at the core of armamentdevelopmental planning.A Case Study of Technology Transition into a Major Acquisition Program one needs some historical perspective toappreciate the requirement for the often costlyand time-consuming developmental-planningprocess, made evident by reviewing the developmentof an armament technology nowtaken for granted—autonomously guided airto-groundmunitions. In late 1984, Armamentdivision XR commissioned a study to demonstratethe utility of an inertial-aided munitionfor all-weather attack. this study was foundedon the emerging technology opportunitiesprovided by advances in inertial-navigationcomponents and the common-reference gridprovided by the GPs program. target-basedrequirements for airfield-attack missions appearedwell suited for this technology. thereforethe analysis was based upon attack of arepresentative Warsaw Pact airfield with morethan 50 separate targets of interest (fig. 2).the operational concept under study entailedusing high-altitude aircraft to deliverlarge payloads in an accurate manner fromstandoff ranges as opposed to dive-bombingor the use of laser-guided bombs (LGB), neitherof which represented all-weather capa­bilities (fig. 3). the vision called for strikingall of the important aim points, using fewerbombs than a single bomber could carry, whileimproving aircraft survivability by avoidingsuccessive attacks on individual aim pointsand direct overflight of the target.As a result of the study, Air Force systemsCommand’s Planning directorate decided tospend its own discretionary funds on the proposedinertial-guided technology demonstration(IGtd). this proof-of-concept demonstrationmated low-cost inertial-guidance kitswith standard bombs and dispensers to createa system capable of guiding these “dumb” warheadsto selected targets. the program commencedin december 1986 with dual contractawards to Boeing and northrop to build anddemonstrate conversion kits.the kits used for this program had only inertialguidance since initial GPs-user equipmentsets were far too large and expensive toemploy within munitions. However, the GPsprovided a common reference grid utilized totransfer navigation-alignment parameters fromthe appropriately equipped launch aircraft,initializing the inertial-guidance system withinmunitions. At the commencement of the IGtdprogram, GPs technology was so immature thatwe had no satellites in orbit, and initial testinghad to take place at yuma Proving Groundsusing an “inverted” GPs-guided weapon-testingrange with stationary pseudosatellites positionedon the ground. Later in the IGtd program, aminimal set of satellites became available tosupport testing. However, the simultaneousdevelopment of IGtd technology and theGPs satellite constellation often put the two at1968–79 1979–89Air Development andArmamentTest CenterDivision1989–901990–98 1998–TodayMunitions Aeronautical Systems Air ArmamentSystemsCenterCenterDivisionXR YHX VXYX WMYX WMX XR69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07Figure 1. Organizational designations for air-armament developmental planning

(&/&3*$"*3'*&-%"*3$3"'54)&-5&3445&&-)"/("343&1"*34)014$0/530-508&313*."3:5"9*8":36/8":'&&503%/"/$&4503"(&Figure 2. Representative Warsaw Pact airfield"*3'*&-%"55"$,'&&5"-5*56%&'&&5%08/3"/(&'&&50''#03&4*()5Figure 3. Operational concept for airfield attack

42 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008odds, as demonstrated when controllers of theGPs satellite constellation modified that constellationat the same time an IGtd flight testoccurred, causing all munitions to miss theirplanned targets. However, even this testhelped prove the efficacy of the technologysince the average miss distance of a weaponprecisely matched the magnitude of the GPsconstellationgrid correction!the IGtd program ended successfully,proving the feasibility of transferring alignmentfrom the host aircraft to the weapon, ofconsistently dropping autonomously guidedweapons with the specified accuracy, and ofproducing the resultant system at an acceptableprice. However, due to continued relianceon maturer technologies, such as LGBs,the war fighters declined to establish a needstatement for the new technology.during operation desert storm, coalitionaircraft used LGBs with great effectiveness,but operational limitations made clear theneed for an all-weather air-to-surface munition.As a result, in 1992 the Joint Requirementsoversight Council validated the requirementfor such a capability, resulting in the initiationof the all-weather precision-guided munition(AWPGM) program, which moved guidancetechnology for autonomous weapons out ofthe developmental-planning venue and intothe acquisition mainstream. the AWPGM efforteventually led to the highly successfulJoint direct Attack Munition ( JdAM) program.Finally, in october 2003, a B-2 bomberdropped 80 JdAM GBU-38 bombs, demonstratingthe envisioned capability set forth inthe XR utility study 17 years earlier.The Need for Armament Developmental Planning the evolution of the JdAM program fromdevelopmental-planning efforts in the early1980s to fruition nearly two decades later isnot a unique case of technology transition.Historical records indicate that the currentgeneration of autonomous area-denial systemslikely stems from the “Wasp” study conductedby XR in 1978 as a component of the WideArea Anti-Armor Guided Munition program. 1similarly, one can trace current developmentefforts for directed energy (dE) weapons backto XR’s Battlefield Laser Implications Projectof 1982 and can trace the Universal ArmamentInterface back to the stores IntegrationProgram of 1983. 2 despite the clear link betweena robust developmental-planning functionand the later achievements of the greateracquisition community, emphasis on developmentalplanning continues to vary cyclically, asone can see in figure 4, which depicts the varyingmanpower levels devoted to this function..JMJUBSZBOE$JWJMJBO1FSTPOOFM 'JTDBM:FBSFigure 4. Manpower for armament developmental planning

PIREP 43the late 1970s and early 1980s saw tremendousemphasis on developmental planning asa component of the armament-acquisitionprocess. As a result, a plethora of advancedweapon technologies emerged in the 1990s,including the JdAM, Joint Air-to-surfacestandoff Missile, and Wind-Corrected Munitiondispenser. However, the diversion ofmanpower necessary to execute these highlysuccessful programs had the effect of reducingthe developmental-planning staff to acaretaking cadre in the early 1990s. Consequently,in the early twenty-first century, theonly major new-start armament-acquisitionprogram has been the small-diameter Bomb.The Future of Air-ArmamentDevelopmental PlanningContinued emphasis on air-armament developmentalplanning is absolutely necessaryin order to support the force planned for upcomingdecades. the manner in which theemergence of dE weapons closely parallelshistorical armament-developmental effortsexemplifies this need.As discussed in the previous case study, thedevelopment of autonomously guided weaponscontinued for years without instigating aweapon-acquisition program, largely due tothe lack of a unique link between new capabilitiesand existing requirements, along withreliance upon maturer, more familiar technologies.only when the experiences of desertstorm provided a catalyzing function tomeld technology push with war-fighter pullwas the JdAM program finally born. Analogously,dE concepts have been in developmentfor decades without fielding a substantial airto-groundweapon. We have conducted dEdevelopment efforts without direct linkage tocurrent war-fighter requirements and have focusedongoing weapon-acquisition efforts, designedto meet war-fighter requirements, onmore conventional and familiar technologies.However, the ongoing experiences of operationsEnduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedomhave highlighted the limitations of traditionalkinetically based armament in urban operations,emphasizing the need for a class ofweapons with greater precision and less likelihoodof causing collateral damage.War fighters are unlikely to generate newand unique requirements to specifically leveragethe capabilities of dE weapons. Rather, wewill evaluate those weapons against otherweapon options to determine the optimal solutionfor meeting existing requirements suchas high precision, extremely short “time offlight,” scalable effects, and reduced collateraldamage. this will require a significant paradigmshift in order to consider this new classof weapons within the context of centuries-oldconcepts for employing kinetic weapons. Wewill need an integrating function between scientistsand war fighters in order to bridge thischasm. the requirement for this integratingfunction shows the need for armament developmentalplanning. ❑Notes1. Voncille Jones and Barry R. Barlow, History of the AirDevelopment and Test Center, 1 October 1977–30 September1978 (Eglin AFB, FL: Air development and test Center,1978), 1:28. (For official Use only) Information extractedis not FoUo.2. Voncille Jones and Barry R. Barlow, History of theArmament Division, 1 October 1981–30 September 1982 (EglinAFB, FL: Armament division, 1982), 1:46, 26. (FoUo)Information extracted is not FoUo.

Excellence in LeadershipLessons Learned from Top-Performing UnitsMr. Martin PittDr. Michael BunaMo*In 2004 I became the new executive assistantfor leadership in the US Air ForceOffice of Special Investigations (OSI).Because of my responsibility for trainingOSI personnel assigned to leadership positions,I had a particular interest in learninghow the command’s award-winning leaders influencedtheir personnel to fulfill the mission.One day I asked my colleague and coauthorDr. Bunamo if a fact-based way existed to identifythe leadership and management practicesused in the command to foster performanceexcellence. After mulling over this question,he recommended an approach consistentwith Air Force doctrine, pointing to two passagesfrom Air Force Doctrine Document(AFDD) 1-1, Leadership and Force Development:Effective leadership transforms human potentialinto effective performance in the present andprepares capable leaders for the future. . . .The primary task of a military organization is toperform its mission. The leader’s primary responsibilityis to motivate and direct people tocarry out the unit’s mission successfully. A leadermust never forget the importance of the personnelthemselves to that mission. 1He suggested that we reverse-engineer performanceexcellence to identify effective leadership.Dr. Bunamo wanted to harness theOSI’s data-mining capabilities to identify topperformingunits and validate these selectionswith OSI senior leaders. Then he proposedthat we interview unit leaders to learn howthey fostered performance excellence, hasteningto add that this was a risky procedure withouta guarantee of success. That said, I soughtand received backing from Brig Gen L. EricPatterson, then the commander of the OSI, forthe Excellence in Leadership project. This sequenceof events led us on a remarkable journeythat has provided some amazing results. 2BackgroundTo identify excellent units, we used somehigh-tech wizardry. We defined an excellentdetachment as one that demonstrated the following:• High productivity, as measured by the unit’sability to provide more output per hourthan its peers. In the OSI, output includesinvestigations, intelligence-informationreports, counterintelligence briefings, andspecialized investigative services.• Mission versatility, as demonstrated byabove-average performance in a variety ofmission areas, especially under challengingcircumstances such as deployments.• Efficiency, as measured by a unit’s abilityto complete mission-related tasks on atimely basis against established metrics.In the OSI, efficiency metrics track thetimely completion of felony investigationsand the rapid dissemination of threat information.• Results orientation or the unit’s missioneffectiveness, as measured by the resultsof its efforts, such as the percentage ofconvictions in criminal investigations, thenumber of recoveries in fraud cases, or*Mr. Pitt, of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), Andrews AFB, Maryland, is adviser to the command on leadershipdevelopment, and Dr. Bunamo, now retired, served as a command contract analyst with the OSI.44

PIREP 45the responsiveness of counterintelligencecollections to the Department of Defense’shighest-priority collection requirements. 3We used data-mining software and statisticalalgorithms to examine performance data on150 OSI field detachments around the worldduring 2001–4. We extracted all of the data fromthe command’s legacy and current informationmanagementsystems. After examining the indicators,we selected seven units for in-depthstudy. 4Capitalizing on the OSI’s traditional lawenforcementskills, we found that structuredinterviews helped us identify effective leadershippractices employed in these units. 5 Ineach interview, we asked the same questionsabout leadership practices and managementprocesses used to foster excellence in performancein garrison units during peacetime. Wecollected information from unit commanders(both military on active duty and civilian personnel),their superintendents or the seniornoncommissioned officer at the location, andthe agents and support personnel who weremembers of these units, asking them about whatencouraged performance excellence. We hopedto determine if these leaders used commonpolicies and practices to foster excellence.What Made These Leaders Different During these sessions, we were struck by howthe interviewees differed from stereotypicalviews of excellent leaders. For example, wefound that having a reputation as the world’snicest person did not necessarily reflect excellence.neither did stern, authoritarian taskmastersnecessarily foster that quality.The participants made up a diverse group.We interviewed men and women, active dutymilitary and civilians, none of whom had asingle behavioral style in common. Some weresoft spoken—others more forceful. 6 Leadershipexperience also varied; some had four ormore leadership assignments—others onlyone or two.Although dissimilar, they possessed similarleadership skill sets. The interviewees tendedto view leadership as a process rather than aposition, focusing their energy on creating anenvironment in which others could succeed.These individuals also proved effective inachieving mission objectives while sustainingproductive working relationships in the unit.They recognized the propriety of serving asa boss, realizing that forceful leadership doesnot have to equate with obnoxiousness. Duringthe interviews, we found that these leadersfelt comfortable with themselves, with command,and with dealing with individuals bothpersonally and professionally. 7 They brought adifferent mind-set to their jobs, telling us thatthey believed in service before self and demonstratingthat belief in three ways: by ensuringthat their customers received timely, firstclassproducts and services; by providing theirunits the resources and training required toget the job done; and by demonstrating compassionfor employees and their families. 8Best Practicesduring PeacetimeOur interviewees took small-unit leadershipseriously, starting when they learned aboutthe assignment. They prepared diligently fortheir new command by learning about theunit and its mission, the accompanying challenges,and the personnel they would lead. 9Once in command, they defined roles and responsibilitiesfor all unit members and took ahands-on approach to fulfilling the mission.Most of them self-inspected key programs, usingthe OSI inspector general’s checklist, andspent the time required to bring all programsinto compliance with established standards. 10They monitored and measured performance,holding people accountable for the results oftheir efforts. They rewarded and punished asappropriate, but they did not micromanage,relying instead on coaching and mentoring tohelp unit members succeed and grow.These leaders had a vision for where theywanted their teams to go—a vision foundedon the priorities and requirements of key cus­

46 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008tomers but also reflecting internal goals developedcollaboratively. 11 They realized that visionby developing detailed plans that guidedexecution, expecting everyone to contributeto the plan to make it a success. They workedhard to develop a sense of inclusiveness.These leaders got results by working throughothers. They made every effort to build trustwith their personnel by emphasizing a positiveattitude, fairness, and honesty, as well as bycreating a sense of “one team, one fight.” Theteams knew what their superiors expected ofthem. Leaders challenged their unit membersand stretched them. Brainstorming tough issuesas a team, they encouraged thinking “outsidethe box” and displayed a willingness tolearn from their personnel. Exhibiting respectand appreciation for all, they created a thoroughlyprofessional workplace. These leadersprovided “top cover,” which enabled teammembers to focus on mission-related tasks.These attributes became particularly evidentas we observed how they worked withprobationary agents—any OSI agent with lessthan one year on the job. The leaders viewedprobationary agents as a gift whose energyand enthusiasm could propel a unit to excellence.Recognizing that inexperienced agentsmade mistakes, they compensated by creatinga learning environment through continuouscoaching, mentoring, and training, explainingto their personnel what to do and thenshowing them how to do it. They worked withdifferent people differently—doing more forsome and less for others. When mistakes occurred,these leaders took corrective actionwithout belittling the people involved andthen moved on to meet the next challenge. 12Excellent communicators, they maintainedan open-door policy and “managed by walkingaround.” 13 They provided honest feedbackand listened. 14 They were helpful, respectful,encouraging, and enthusiastic. In this way,these leaders communicated to members ofthe unit that they considered them importantand that they cared about them. In turn, theirsubordinates often described them as authentic,down-to-earth, empathetic, honest, andtrustworthy. 15Decisive and determined, these leadersworked hard and made up their own minds.They did the right things. They held themselvesaccountable. no one questioned theirintegrity. They had an unwavering commitmentto achieving excellence—to being the best.Changes during WartimeAs the pace of deployment of OSI personnelin support of operations in Afghanistan andIraq increased, internal debate intensifiedabout whether or not leadership policies andpractices would or should change in wartime.With the backing of Brig Gen Dana Simmons,the current OSI commander, we expandedthe scope of the project and interviewed individualsidentified by OSI senior leaders as havingexcelled in a wartime environment.All of the people we interviewed describedleading in wartime as the most important assignmentof their career. 16 Most of them indicatedthat key leadership practices which fosteredperformance excellence in peacetimecarried through to a war zone. OSI combatleaders told us that they• prepared thoroughly for their assignments;17• learned their environment well, especiallythe requirements of combatantcommanders;• built well-functioning teams through collaborationand open communications; 18• created people-friendly environments;• had a vision of where they wanted the unitto go and vetted it with unit members;• crafted detailed operational plans toguide mission execution, ensuring thatall personnel involved in an operationknew their role and what leaders expectedof them; and• avoided micromanaging.They also told us that wartime assignmentsdiffered in significant ways, citing as an examplethe importance of new leaders getting off to a

PIREP 47fast start. Having only four or five days to bondwith the unit, new commanders had to showtheir commitment to the mission. They neededto invest time with the members of the unit,work the same hours as everyone else, and sharethe same experiences and stresses. Moreover,unit leaders had to prepare themselves for thefact that everything happens faster in combat.Our interviewees had written their letter oncommand philosophy and expectations in advanceso they could publish and discuss it withunit members as soon as they assumed command.They had also mapped out the essentialsof a plan for leading their unit in the battlespacebut made adjustments after meetingwith their personnel.A war zone’s accelerated pace reflected twohard facts: unit leaders started at a pronounceddisadvantage by fighting a ruthless and capableenemy in his “house” and, in the case of OSIunits, by fighting with team members who hadnot worked or trained together. To offset thesedisadvantages, OSI leaders must• become part of the joint team in-theater;• hone their knowledge, skills, and tradecraftto a fine edge;• lead courageously and by example;• become less tolerant of mistakes;• confront problems quickly;• learn to weigh risks against the benefitsof different courses of action;• work and train continuously to improvemission execution;• be prepared to adapt and improvise;• exercise self-confidence and decisiveness;and• remain alert to signs of stress in the unit.According to the people we interviewed, ina war zone they had to act like commandersaround the clock and let their actions speakfor themselves because Airmen will followwhat their leaders do—not necessarily whatthey say. Leaders have to direct both themselvesand unit members through difficult situationsbecause there may not be specialists toturn to for assistance. Leaders also must findways to relieve stress and tension. Finally, all ofthe interviewees acknowledged that leadersshould realize that the wartime experiencewould change them, especially upon their returnhome.ConclusionWe found that excellent wartime leaders hadseveral personal traits in common. They couldfocus themselves, would never quit, and respondedcreatively to challenge and adversity.All of them took extremely seriously their responsibilityto bring their colleagues home safely. 19The Excellence in Leadership project provideda bountiful harvest of lessons learned,practical leadership suggestions, and helpfulhints. We have made these results available toall OSI leaders by uploading the study on thecommand’s intranet. The study has now becomepart of the curriculum of the LeadershipChallenge Forum (LCF), a workshop inunit-level leadership principles provided inconjunction with professional military education.The LCF is designed for newly assignedactive duty and Reserve commanders, specialagents-in-charge, and superintendents—especiallythose taking their first leadership assignment.Staff lectures and presentations by seniorOSI leaders emphasize essential leadershipand management skills required for the operationof an OSI unit, while practical exercisesprepare students for their new roles.During the LCF, we demonstrated a directlink between unit leadership and mission effectiveness.Although all Air Force managersshare the same goal of successfully accomplishingthe mission, only individuals with anunwavering commitment to leadership bringout the best in unit personnel. The results ofthe Excellence in Leadership study indicatethat those who set high standards, as well asmotivate and inspire Airmen, can foster performanceexcellence consistently. These empiricalfindings underscore and reinforce thevery same points from AFDD 1-1 that we discussedin this article’s introduction. ❑

48 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008Notes1. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1, Leadershipand Force Development, 18 February 2006 (interim change tothe version of 18 February 2004), 1, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page_HTML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd1-1.pdf.2. See Michael Bunamo and Martin Pitt, Excellence inLeadership, vol. 1, Peacetime, vol. 2, Wartime (Washington,DC: US Air Force Office of Special Investigations, 2006).3. Law-enforcement agencies measure performancein many different ways. The Municipal Research and ServicesCenter of Washington, a nonprofit organization thatworks to foster excellence in local government, maintainsan excellent Web site that illustrates the use of metrics bylaw-enforcement agencies. See http://www.mrsc.org/subjects/pubsafe/le/le-main.aspx. See also Use of Data inPolice Departments: A Survey of Police Chiefs and Data Analysts(Washington, DC: Justice Research and Statistics Association,2005), 12–26.4. Upon request, we will make available a short paperthat describes the criteria and methods used in selectingexcellent units.5. Dr. Mike Thirtle, “Developing Aerospace Leadersfor the Twenty-first Century: A Historical Context for theDAL Concept,” Air and Space Power Journal 15, no. 2 (Summer2001): 52–57, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/sum01/thirtle.pdf. This articlecontends that the Air Force was lax in documenting itsown excellent leadership practices in a comprehensible,universally articulated way.6. Drea Zigarmi et al., The Leader Within: LearningEnough about Yourself to Lead Others (Upper Saddle River,nJ: Prentice Hall, 2005), 211–44. Chapter 7 examines therelationship between personality and leader behavior.7. Oren Harari, The Leadership Secrets of Colin Powell(new York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 125–40. Chapter 8 emphasizesthe importance of people.8. Larry Bossidy and Ram Charan, Execution: The Disciplineof Getting Things Done (new York: Crown BusinessPress, 2002), 1–9. The introduction discusses the necessityof getting things done.9. Michael Watkins, The First 90 Days: Critical SuccessStrategies for New Leaders at All Levels (Boston: HarvardBusiness School Press, 2003), 1–15. The introduction discusseswhy transitions are critical times for newly assignedleaders.10. Maj Gen Perry M. Smith, Rules and Tools for Leaders:A Down-to-Earth Guide to Effective Managing (new York:Perigee Books, 2002), 45–52. Chapter 3 discusses settingstandards.11. Ibid., 53–68.12. Daniel Goleman, Richard E. Boyatzis, and AnnieMcKee, Primal Leadership: Realizing the Power of EmotionalIntelligence (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2002),53–69. Chapter 4 discusses gearing one’s leadership styleto the situation.13. Gen Hal M. Hornburg stresses the importance ofcommunications in “What I Believe,” Air and Space PowerJournal 19, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 4–16, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/spr05/spr05.pdf.14. Jack Welch with Suzy Welch, Winning (new York:HarperBusiness Press, 2005), 25–51. Chapters 2 and 3 discussthe importance of honest feedback.15. Robert Galford and Anne Seibold Drapeau, TheTrusted Leader: Bringing Out the Best in Your People and YourCompany (new York: Free Press, 2002), 29–41. See chapter3 for a discussion of the characteristics and competenciesof trusted leaders.16. Bunamo and Pitt, Excellence in Leadership, vol. 2,Wartime, 7–17.17. John Keegan, Intelligence in War: Knowledge of theEnemy from Napoleon to al-Qaeda (new York: Alfred A.Knopf, 2003), 7–25. Chapter 1 discusses preparing for awartime command.18. Edgar F. Puryear Jr., American Generalship: CharacterIs Everything: The Art of Command (novato, CA: PresidioPress, 2000), 188–235. Chapter 6 discusses how contactwith the troops influenced General Eisenhower’s decisionmaking.19. Col Thomas A. Kolditz, “The In Extremis Leader,”Leader to Leader, no. 36 (Spring 2005, supplement): 6–18,http://www.leadertoleader.org/knowledgecenter/L2L/spring2005-supp/kolditz.html. This article describes thecharacteristics of individuals leading in dangerous andhigh-risk situations.At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefsfor waging war in order to achieve victory.—Gen Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff, US Air Force, 1961–65

Exposing the Information Domain MythA New Concept for Air Force and InformationOperations DoctrineMaj Geoffrey f. Weiss, UsafEditorial Abstract: Within all military services, information remains mischaracterized as a“domain,” and all services have difficulty quantifying and establishing doctrine to exploit thewar-fighting advantages of information. At least within the US Air Force, the author assertsthat a poor doctrinal structure and inadequate definitions of information operations contributeto the problem. He proposes a completely new doctrinal framework, along with recognitionof cyberspace as the true domain, in order to begin solving these challenges.The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping the old ones, which ramify, for thosebrought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our minds.—John Maynard Keynes49

50 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008On 11 SepteMber 2001 (9/11), asmall group of terrorists broughtthe most powerful nation on theearth to its knees and paralyzedmuch of the world. the US economy plungedinto recession, the airline industry collapsed,and “soccer moms” rushed out to buy gasmasks. the essence of this quintessential,asymmetric assault was not the use of aircraftas weapons or the horrific but nonethelessmilitarily insignificant results. Indeed, this wasinformation warfare of the highest order.Years of planning, analysis of enemy psychology,assessment of physical vulnerabilities,training, operational security, and brutally efficientexecution characterized this psychologicaloperation. the terrorists did not seekto seize territory or defeat the US military;rather, they intended that 9/11 send messagesto multiple audiences: to sympathizers (“We arepowerful, join us”); to the United States (“Wecan hurt you; remove your troops from our soiland change your policies”); and to the world(“Interfere with our agenda at your own peril,for you will be next”). As in ages past, informationoperations (IO) use messages as weapons,and the enemy currently has the advantage. 1Using weapons is fundamental to the military.even before 9/11, the US military hadbegun the process of understanding and harnessingthe products of the information revolutiontaking place throughout the world—arevolution fueled primarily by the advent ofthe microcomputer and improvements indata-transmission technologies. Whereas inthe past, military forces sought to control linesof communication on the physical battlefield—highways,sea-lanes, airfields, and railroads—atpresent, information itself is thelifeblood of technologically based forces, andits lines of communication often flow througha domain known as cyberspace. 2 but not allaspects of IO are technically based; neitherare they new to warfare. the martial use ofpsychological influence has existed since thefirst caveman frightened his enemy with ahowl or distracted him with a tossed rock.Millennia ago, Sun tzu famously proclaimedthat all warfare is based upon deception. 3However, the recent explosion of informationtechnology has piqued our interest in IO. Informationhas become a valuable resource, acommodity, and a military necessity. Defenseand exploitation of this resource has compelledmilitary and civilian leaders alike to actquickly to establish an IO doctrinal framework.the US Air Force (USAF), as perhaps themost technologically centered branch of thearmed services—having itself arisen from theachievement of controlled, powered flight—has relied upon the continuous advancementof scientific and technological innovation toremain the overwhelmingly effective fightingforce it is today. even so, rapid advances in informationtechnology and its implications forwarfare have obligated the USAF, like the restof the military, to speed efforts to define andrefine its own IO doctrine—to “weaponize”information. this has presented a challengeto doctrine writers as the USAF attempts to establishan effects-based approach to IO that isin concert with air and space power. Clearlythe service must have doctrine that is well defined,expansive enough to accommodate theswiftness of change, and sufficiently flexible toassimilate future concepts and capabilitieswhile still adequately treating timeless, nontechnicalprinciples such as psychological operations(pSYOp)andmilitarydeception(MILDeC).Current USAF doctrine, for IO in particular,has not met this challenge, partly due to thefact that a necessary and proper delay occursbetween analysis of theory /lessons learnedand the codification of doctrine—but also becausewe have not adequately adapted the currentstructure of the doctrine. Furthermore,shortcomings exist in the definition of IO—arising from a mischaracterization of informationitself—that have led to difficulty in understandingand employing IO at all levels of war.An examination of the vast body of writingson the subject of IO reveals near-universalagreement on two points. First, IO is an extremelysignificant aspect of national securityand, by extension, military operations: wemust use it to our advantage. Second, theUnited States cannot seem to get IO right,whether in doctrine, training, definition, employment,leadership, or some combinationof these. the IO cognoscenti have prescribed

EXPOSING THE INFORMATION DOMAIN MYTH 51a formidable array of procedural remedies orexhortations to “just do it,” but these havetreated only symptoms—not the root problem.none have recommended a fundamentalshift in definitions, characterization, and doctrinalarchitecture. Often the solution to anintractable problem requires a return to firstprinciples, an examination and reformulationof basic beliefs, a system “reboot.” to make IOthe weapon it needs to be, the USAF must leadthe way and establish IO doctrine built correctlyfrom the ground up.Basics of DoctrineDoctrine can arise from theory, lessonslearned, or a study of exercises and experiments.Good doctrine is designed to be understandableand useful in the real world, at thelevel of warfare for which it is written. Doctrinecan prove especially critical in areas thatmay be least intuitive: IO, for example. AirForce Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air ForceBasic Doctrine, defines air and space doctrineas “a statement of officially sanctioned beliefs,warfighting principles, and terminology thatdescribes and guides the proper use of air andspace forces in military operations.” 4 becausedoctrine influences the way the USAF organizes,trains, equips, and sustains its forces, itrepresents a significant factor not only in theway the service fights but also in terms of therequirements, planning, programming, andbudgeting process.the USAF writes basic, operational, andtactical doctrine. the principles of basic doctrine,which reflect the service’s most fundamentaland enduring beliefs or “elementalproperties,” rarely change. Operational doctrine,which “describes more detailed organization ofair and space forces and applies the principlesof basic doctrine to military actions,” changesinfrequently as well, but more often than basicdoctrine since we derive insight from newtechnologies or lessons learned. 5 AFDD 2-3, IrregularWarfare, serves as an example. by contrast,tactical doctrine entails frequent updateswith routine innovation in tactics, techniques,and procedures. AFDD 1 plainly and properlystates that “it must be emphasized that doctrinedevelopment is never complete.” 6 becauseits users own Air Force doctrine, eachAirman must know it, look after it, and helpfix it when required. Currently, the USAF publishesbasic and operational doctrine in a seriesof documents arranged hierarchically andorganized according to logical functional areas.this doctrinal structure embodies the architecturalframework within which doctrinelives, changes, and grows (fig. 1).the USAF arranges doctrine in a classificationhierarchy to facilitate its understandingand use, organizing doctrinal categories fromgeneral to specific in a series grouped accordingto function and similarity. Subcategories,though stemming from the same parent category,reflect fundamental differences that distinguishthem from each other. For example,AFDD 2-1.1, Counterair Operations, and AFDD2-1.4, Countersea Operations—both encompassedby AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare—differ interms of target type. to maintain clarity, alldoctrine must be logical and adhere to thesebasic principles.In general, this logically arranged USAFdoctrine contains an impressive, time-testedbody of wisdom and practical guidance. USAFoperational doctrine extends from basic doctrineand begins with the parent category(AFDD 2, Operations and Organization). WithinAFDD 2 one finds the fundamental, “domain,”or core volumes of Air Force operations doctrine:AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare; AFDD 2-2, SpaceOperations; and AFDD 2-5, Information Operations.Although USAF “living” doctrine has expandedover the years, no significant changehas occurred in the overall structure of thedoctrine itself—a situation that presents problemswhen the USAF attempts to “fit” IO andthe emerging domain of cyberspace into itsbody of doctrine.Origins of Information Operations Doctrine If we are to accept air forces as a militaryweapon, our first inclination is to fit it intothe established theories and practices of war­

"'%%-FBEFSTIJQBOE'PSDF%FWFMPQNFOU"'%%"JS'PSDF#BTJD%PDUSJOF"'%%0QFSBUJPOTBOE0SHBOJ[BUJPO"'%%"JS8BSGBSF"'%%4QBDF0QFSBUJPOT"'%%$PVOUFSBJS0QFSBUJPOT"'%%4USBUFHJD"UUBDL"'%%$PVOUFSMBOE0QFSBUJPOT"'%%$PVOUFSTFB0QFSBUJPOT"'%%/VDMFBS0QFSBUJPOT"'%%1FSTPOOFM3FDPWFSZ0QFSBUJPOT"'%%"JSTQBDF$POUSPMJOUIF$PNCBU;POF"'%%$PNCBU4VQQPSU"'%%$PVOUFSTQBDF"'%%'PSDF1SPUFDUJPO"'%%)FBMUI4FSWJDFT"'%%#BTF&TUBCMJTINFOUBOE.JTTJPO(FOFSBUJPO"'%%-FHBM4VQQPSU"'%%*SSFHVMBS8BSGBSF"'%%$PVOUFS$IFNJDBM#JPMPHJDBM3BEJPMPHJDBMBOE/VDMFBS0QFSBUJPOT"'%%5BSHFUJOH"'%%'PSFJHO*OUFSOBM%FGFOTF"'%%*OGPSNBUJPO0QFSBUJPOT"'%%"JS.PCJMJUZ"'%%&MFDUSPOJD8BSGBSF0QFSBUJPOT"'%%1VCMJD"GGBJST0QFSBUJPOT"'%%4QFDJBM0QFSBUJPOT"'%%*OUFMMJHFODF4VSWFJMMBODFBOE3FDPOOBJTTBODF0QFSBUJPOT"'%%$PNNBOEBOE$POUSPM"'%%)PNFMBOE0QFSBUJPOT"'%%8FBUIFS0QFSBUJPOTFigure 1. Air Force doctrine today. (From “Doctrine Hierarchy,” Air Force Doctrine Center, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Main.asp? [accessed 5 December 2007].)

EXPOSING THE INFORMATION DOMAIN MYTH 53fare, with as little disruption as possible. Certainlythis takes the least mental effort, and istherefore most inviting. But such an applicationis not necessarily most efficient.—Air Corps tactical School, 1935this epigraph illustrates how airpower itselfsuffered from the general tendency toforce new concepts into old, familiar paradigms.Substitution of the word information forair forces yields much the same condition thatexists today with respect to IO. this irony wasnot apparent to the USAF as it embarked onthe task of codifying information-warfare lessonsand principles into doctrine shortly afterthe first Gulf War. In 1995 the chief of staffand secretary of the Air Force released Cornerstonesof Information Warfare, the service’s firstofficial publication on the subject. 7 (Sincethen, the term information operations has replacedinformation warfare.) though not doctrine,this document influenced all later IOpublications. the USAF first published IO doctrinein 1998 with the release of AFDD 2-5. Inthe eyes of the doctrine writers, this originalattempt contained a number of conceptualfaults, prompting the appearance of a substantiallyrevised edition in 2005. 8 Ironically,the first edition did a better job of acknowledgingthe fundamental and universal natureof IO but awkwardly applied the doctrinaltemplate of air warfare to IO principles, givingrise to such dissonant terminology as “offensive”and “defensive counter information.” 9regrettably, both efforts have fallen short inarticulating IO properly, but that is due to underlyingproblems with the characterization ofinformation itself.Evidence of the ProblemWhile the US military has a demonstrated capacityto dominate a situation with its technologicalsupremacy and computer software,it has not yet mastered modern InformationWarfare, where the most important softwareexists—between the ears of the local population.—Frank G. HoffmanOnly a few documents trumpet our masteryof IO, but a myriad proclaim the opposite. Accordingto Lt Col Charles Hardy of the USArmy War College, “most senior military commanders. . . consistently state ‘we are losingthe Information Operations fight.’ ” He alsonotes that “it is universally accepted that theUnited States Armed Forces . . . do not applythis element of national power effectively.” 10As an influence-operations program managerin Headquarters USAF (A3), this author witnessednumerous instances of confusion anddeficiencies in understanding IO, from tacticalto strategic levels. Unsure about what to dowith operational-planning billets funded toperform IO, commanders used them for otherfunctions or left them empty. Automated programmingand budgeting capabilities as wellas assessment tools proved ill suited to accommodatenontechnical influence capabilities,causing difficulties in justifying appropriatefunding levels for these programs. In coordinationsessions, representatives from the socalledcore capabilities of IO—electronic warfareoperations, influence operations, andnetwork warfare operations—shared no commonframe of reference in terms of operationalintegration, organization, manpower,training, procurement, or funding. Otherthan their status as “declared” brethren withinIO, little similarity existed between the disciplines.In that regard, Maj thomas Kardos ofthe US Army Command and General StaffCollege describes IO doctrine as “ill founded”and “mistakenly” drawing from too narrow arange of features. 11 Similarly, in his assessmentof IO in Iraq, Maj norman emery of the USArmy laments that US forces’ inability to useIO has hampered efforts to quell the insurgencythere and has given the enemy an informationadvantage. 12The Information Domain MythWe cannot get IO doctrine right becausewe mistakenly identify information as a domain,the latter defined by a standard dictionaryas “a field or sphere of activity or influence.”nor do we find an acceptable definition

54 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008of information that makes it a domain, the formerterm defined as something told (i.e.,knowledge or data). Information is a resource,a weapon of war and peace. bullets, bombs,tanks, and pilots are not domains, but they areimportant aspects of war fighting—as is information,which may take many forms. In itstangible form, information exists and travelsin physical space—in its electronic form, itdoes so in cyberspace. It also exists within thesubjective realm of the human mind. thus,rather than constituting a domain, informationresides in and moves across domains. beforewe can create the intellectual frameworkrequired for the proper understanding anddoctrinal classification of IO as well as developthe concept of a legitimate cyberspace domain,we must realize that no single informationdomain or “environment” exists. IO reallyinvolves using information to generateeffects that, like information itself, apply to alldomains. Once we acknowledge that informationis not a domain and is not bounded by aparticular domain, then by definition we cannotclassify IO in a manner analogous to domain-baseddoctrine (i.e., air warfare andspace operations); neither can we define itwithin them.From the first recognition of the power ofinformation in modern war, a conscious effortemerged to establish it as a domain—a designationthat ultimately led the USAF to juxtaposeIO with air warfare and space operations,the subjects of the other domain doctrinedocuments. 13 Dr. George Stein of the US AirWar College first articulated many of the principlesfundamental to IO today, including thenotion of an “information environment” or“realm.” 14 With this concept in mind, USAFdoctrine writers established the subcategoryIO for the domain of information. thoughmeant to highlight the importance of informationalongside the air and space operationaldomains, this arrangement does notwithstand honest intellectual analysis and ultimatelyhas negative implications for understandingand applying IO.Current doctrine often presents IO assomething the USAF does along with air andspace operations; in fact, those operations oftenproduce IO effects. the doctrine encourageswar fighters to perceive a domain-basedIO concept, but the ephemeral informationdomain defies intuitive grasp. Instead, by presentingIO separately from air and space, wegive practitioners the mistaken impressionthat IO is “added in” or occurs “alongside” theother types of operations. Air and space operationsare separate elements from IO (fig. 2).AFDD 2-5 also explains that IO is “integral toall Air Force operations and may support, orbe supported by, air and space operations.” 15though true, this idea of mutual supportand integration leaves out the fact that air andspace operations can actually be IO (a pointrecognized clearly by early airpower theoristssuch as billy Mitchell and Giulio Douhet, whoasserted that the psychological effects of airpoweron the enemy could prove decisive inwar). Such diagrams and definitions leave thereader of doctrine with the impression thatonly network warfare operations, electronicwarfare operations, and influence operationsconstitute IO. this is also incorrect. properlyunderstood, information and IO span domains.Many air and space activities can beplanned for informational effects, whether interms of psychology, information itself, or informationsystems.Although it may take a monumental effortto eradicate the concept of the informationdomain, such a step is necessary to obtain amore accurate conceptualization of IO. referencesto the domain or environment of informationhave become ubiquitous. even the2007 edition of AFDD 2 states that “informationis an environment in which some aspectsof warfare can also be conducted,” going onto specifically designate information as a domain,like air and space. 16 As daunting as the prospectof repudiating the information-domainparadigm may seem, the recent designationby the chief of staff and secretary of the AirForce of cyberspace as an official domain andits inclusion in the USAF mission statementprovide the intellectual way ahead to makethe change. 17 Doctrine writers must recognizecyberspace as the true domain for the types ofinformation associated with the informationtechnological revolution.

EXPOSING THE INFORMATION DOMAIN MYTH 55*OUFHSBUFE&GGFDUTGPSUIF+PJOU'JHIU/FUXPSL8BSGBSF0QFSBUJPOT&MFDUSPOJD8BSGBSF0QFSBUJPOT*OGMVFODF0QFSBUJPOT"JS0QFSBUJPOT*OGPSNBUJPO0QFSBUJPOT4QBDF*OUFHSBUFE$POUSPM&OBCMFSTFigure 2. AFDD 2-5’s relationship with IO and air/space operations. (Adapted from AFDD 2-5, InformationOperations, 11 January 2005, 7, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page_HTML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd2-5.pdf.)Defining Information Operations After defining information properly andthus intellectually unshackling ourselves, wemay more closely examine the definition andcomposition of IO itself. AFDD 2-5 defines IOas “the integrated employment of the capabilitiesof influence operations, electronicwarfare operations, and network warfare operations,in concert with specified integratedcontrol enablers, to influence, disrupt, corrupt,or usurp adversarial human and automateddecision making while protecting our own.” 18by virtue of its narrowness, this descriptioncauses some problems. For example, underthis definition, a strike mission to neutralize afiber-optic relay station is not IO even thoughthe effect it seeks to create entails disruptionof adversarial decision making. A special operationsforces team that captures and interrogatesan enemy commander has seriouslydisrupted enemy decision making and addedto friendly intelligence (refined information).Should not that be IO? perhaps the perceptionthat IO definitions were too broad motivateddoctrine writers to define IO in thismanner. Likely, they reasoned that more narrowlydefining IO in terms of “nonkinetic” capabilitieswould facilitate understanding andapplication of IO as well as provide doctrinaltreatment at long last for electronic warfareoperations, network warfare operations, andinfluence operations. However, as currentlydefined, IO appears to be more of an orphanagefor nonkinetic capabilities than a rationalgrouping based on true similarity. this “forcedcohabitation” of concepts is not trivial since itfosters misconceptions about the nature of IO

56 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008and places undue emphasis on capabilitiesrather than effects.Fundamentally, IO deals with effects—notcapabilities or means. therefore, many USAFcapabilities that produce information effectsare IO. this does not mean that everything isIO, but it does mean that we need a better,intuitive definition for IO that recognizes itsbroad nature and impact, not limited to a domain.IO fits squarely within the doctrinalconcept of the effects-based approach to operations,which states that USAF operationsfocus upon objectives—not platforms, weapons,or methods. 19 For example, a plannermay decide to use a bomb, a computer virus,or pSYOp to disable an enemy radar system,so long as the effect remains the same. Otherthan the fact that these subcategories of IO donot specifically require the release of kineticbombs and bullets, they are very different.One would be hard pressed to come up withan example of an actual IO plan that consistedonly of some combination of influence operations,electronic warfare operations, and/ornetwork warfare operations. More often, IOlooks like any other operation—only the timingand/or means are tailored to achieve anIO effect. this accounts for the ongoing debateabout whether a b-52 strike on an air defensecommand facility constitutes IO or airwarfare. Intuition and logic say it must be both,but current doctrine suggests otherwise.the association of IO with specific capabilitiesversus effects presents a challenge forcommanders who want to employ IO but areoften unsure about how to combine influenceoperations, electronic warfare operations, ornetwork warfare operations. Commanders andAirmen can easily overlook the IO aspects inherentin traditional applications of air andspace power and may adopt a recipe approachto IO—a little electronic warfare operationshere, a smidgen of network warfare operationsthere, and a dollop of influence operations justfor good measure. In practice, because of itsseparate treatment from traditional, kineticactivities within air and space operations, IOtends to become marginalized, a situation thatnegatively affects budgeting, training, manpower,and employment.Another key disparity between the statedcore capabilities of IO involves the technicalversus nontechnical. Many military professionalswould be surprised to learn that IO actuallyis not a product of the revolution in informationtechnology! the coincidence of IOas a term with technical advancement in informationtechnology has led to the speciousconclusion that they are one and the same.but IO does not necessarily concern itself withcomputers and disk drives. pSYOp and MILDeC,for example, can rely upon very low-techmethods yet remain effective.the constituent elements of IO differ in moreways than their technological basis. Influenceoperations consist of operations security,MILDeC, pSYOp, public affairs, counterintelligence,and counterpropaganda. “Subjective”in nature (i.e., they target the humanmind as well as the perceptions and decisionmaking of the enemy or a population), theseoperations employ varied means in any medium.In contrast, electronic warfare operations—basedon exploiting electromagnetictechnology for combat effects—are “objective”in nature, employing specific technicalmeans to generate effects in any domain,whether air, space, or cyberspace. However,simply being nonkinetic does not equate toinformation, and electronic warfare operationsshare little in common with influence operations.Finally, network warfare operations arequite different from influence operations andelectronic warfare operations. though technologicallycentered, they more narrowly focusupon computer systems and networks. Inapplication, network warfare operations differsignificantly from influence operations orelectronic warfare operations, bearing littleresemblance to traditional air and space operationsand functioning squarely in the realmof cyberspace.the incompatibility among IO elements ascurrently defined indicates that something isclearly amiss. beginning with the informationdomain myth and extending throughout thecapabilities of IO and into the emerging domainof cyberspace, the evidence points directlyto a pressing need for a remedy. butwhat form should the cure take?

EXPOSING THE INFORMATION DOMAIN MYTH 57A New Doctrinal ArchitectureSometimes the solutions will require acknowledgementof past mistakes, and acceptance ofinsights for which none of our learning hasprepared us.—prime Minister Malcolm Fraserthe solution to these doctrinal challengeslies not within the content per se but in thedoctrine’s definitions and construction. theframework of USAF operations doctrine needsan overhaul to add flexibility, logically placecapabilities, and allow for future doctrinalgrowth. toward those ends, this article makesthe following specific recommendations: (1)eliminate the concept of information as a domain,redefine IO, and establish it as a fundamental,effects-based approach to the operationsconcept under AFDD 2; (2) define andinstitute two broad subcategories of operationsdoctrine known as objective and subjective operationsto create doctrinal “space” for treatmentof all conceivable types of operations,especially influence operations; and (3) createa new operational-domain category withinAFDD 2 known as cyberspace operations.Until we define IO properly, no one willrecognize its full power. Information is not adomain, and IO is more than a laundry list ofnonkinetic capabilities. It involves the generationof combat effects created by objective orsubjective operations within the air, space, orcyberspace domains. therefore, the followingserves as a proper definition for USAF IO: theintegrated employment of Air Force capabilities toinfluence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversary information,information systems, perceptions, and/ordecision making while protecting our own. thisdefinition adds the word information and recognizesthat information systems also affectperceptions and all decision making. this definitionand placement offer a key benefit byending the confusion and debate over whatconstitutes IO. A bomber can execute a doctrinallysound strategic-attack mission thatgenerates IO effects. Special operations forcescan perform foreign internal defense and IOat the same time. Some people may argue thatthis definition is too broad and not prescriptiveenough. On the contrary, IO is a broadconcept; artificially defining it more explicitlyconstitutes a disservice to everyone who usesit. In recognition of its broad applicability, IOshould move doctrinally “above” the domainbasedcategories as a direct adjunct to AFDD 2.Given the status of intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance as an essential aspect ofIO with ties to all three domains, it should bea subcategory of IO (fig. 3)."'%%-FBEFSTIJQBOE'PSDF%FWFMPQNFOU"'%%*OGPSNBUJPO0QFSBUJPOT"'%%"JS'PSDF#BTJD%PDUSJOF"'%%0QFSBUJPOTBOE0SHBOJ[BUJPO"'%%*OUFMMJHFODF4VSWFJMMBODFBOE3FDPOOBJTTBODF0QFSBUJPOT"'%%0CKFDUJWF0QFSBUJPOT"'%%4VCKFDUJWF0QFSBUJPOTFigure 3. Operational doctrine, information operations, and objective and subjective categories

58 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008this new definition will facilitate IO planningand employment. Commanders will stillappoint an individual to supervise an IO planningcell; however, the IO team will not be restrictedto an arbitrary set of disciplines. Instead,its members will identify the effects andoutcomes that IO can produce, and throughcoordination and integration with every elementof the effort—proceeding from strategyto task—they will apportion the forces and definethe tasks required to carry out the commander’sintent.the second recommendation entails creatingcategories of operational doctrine designatedas objective operations and subjectiveoperations (see fig. 3). Our dictionary definesobjective as “having to do with a known or perceivedobject as distinguished from somethingexisting only in the mind.” Many air, space,and even cyberspace operations are objectivein nature—that is, we conduct them in thephysical world against physical targets. thisauthor defines objective operations as the subsetof all operations conducted to achieve primaryeffects in the physical world and/or against objectsperceived or known, as opposed to operations designedto influence the human mind. In contrast,our dictionary defines subjective as “of, affectedby, or produced by the mind.” We conductsubjective operations across all physical domainsto achieve cognitive effects. this author definessuch operations as the subset of all operations conductedto achieve primary effects in the cognitivedomain and to influence the perceptions, emotions,and/or reasoning of a human target or targets.Creation of these classifications necessarilyrecognizes that military operations in thephysical and cognitive domains differ sufficientlyto warrant separate treatment. the objectiveoperations /subjective operations doctrinalconstruct establishes a comprehensivedoctrinal framework and creates an architecturein which the former constituent IO capabilitiescan find their proper place. More significantly,it elevates subjective operations fromdeep within the doctrinal hierarchy; divorcesthem from the objective, techno-centric disciplinesof electronic warfare operations andnetwork warfare operations; and imbues themwith the visibility needed for appropriate understanding.We have not readily understood theimportance of subjective operations to warfarein the technological age, but now morethan ever, with direct combat against an identifiableenemy an increasingly difficult proposition,the ability to influence adversaries andcommunicate truthfully to friends and allieshas become essential. Indeed, AFDD 2 sagaciouslystates that “there is a psychological componentto almost every set of effects and this componentis often among the most important in terms of achievingobjectives, especially at the operational andstrategic levels” (emphasis in original). 20Figure 4 illustrates the proposed structureof a doctrinal category of subjective operations.Influence operations and a new subcategory—strategic communications—become the keyelements of subjective operations. Influenceoperations are simplified to two main elements—MILDeC,which targets the mind ofan individual decision maker, and pSYOp,which targets an adversary populace or group.Influence operations do not necessarily dependupon specialized hardware or advancedtechnology. but they do depend upon theability of the influence operations planner—aided by accurate intelligence and humanfactorsanalysis—to get into the mind of thetarget(s) and creatively produce operationsthat result in the desired effect (normally anaction or inaction). the other currently definedcapabilities of influence operations—operations security, counterintelligence, publicaffairs, and counterpropaganda—are logicallyredistributed. Operations security falls withinthe parent IO category since it applies acrossall operations and domains. Counterintelligenceappears within intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance as a natural counterpointto intelligence. Counterpropaganda comesunder the parent category of subjective operationsbecause it can be conducted by pSYOpand public affairs, for example. public affairsbecomes the cornerstone of strategic communications.Like MILDeC and pSYOp, publicaffairs also targets the mind—but with truthful,credible information. though AFDD 2-5lists public affairs as an element of influenceoperations, the USAF public affairs communityhas understandably disassociated itself

EXPOSING THE INFORMATION DOMAIN MYTH 59"'%%*OGPSNBUJPO0QFSBUJPOT"'%%0QFSBUJPOTBOE0SHBOJ[BUJPO"'%%0CKFDUJWF0QFSBUJPOT"'%%4VCKFDUJWF0QFSBUJPOT"'%%*OGMVFODF0QFSBUJPOT"'%%4USBUFHJD$PNNVOJDBUJPOT"'%%.JMJUBSZ%FDFQUJPO"'%%1TZDIPMPHJDBM0QFSBUJPOT"'%%1VCMJD"GGBJST"'%%.VMUJNFEJB0QFSBUJPOTFigure 4. Structure of subjective operationsfrom “influence” and has created an Office ofStrategic Communications, which mergespublic affairs with multimedia operations suchas videography, photography, and broadcasting.Maj Gen erwin Lessel III, former directorof this office, notes that strategic communicationsdepend upon truthfulness to establishcredibility with all audiences, stressing that“there is a difference between wanting to informpeople or influence them, and there areappropriate ways to do both.” 21 thus, the subcategoriesof public affairs and multimediaoperations become the fundamental elementsof the strategic communications category.this framework is more consistent with the requirementto maintain appropriate separationbetween influence in the form of MILDeCand pSYOp and to inform through strategiccommunications. these changes result in adoctrinal category of subjective operationsthat is complete and complementary to objectiveoperations.Figure 5 illustrates the structure of the objectiveoperations category. these operationsconsist of all operational categories and theirsupporting functions (e.g., combat supportand weather operations) that function inphysical domains against objective target sets(e.g., destroying a bridge, protecting a network,launching a satellite, transporting troops,etc.). As a cosmetic change, air warfare is renamedair operations for the sake of consistency.As an objective operation that spans domains,electronic warfare operations assumean appropriate position alongside the domaincategories under objective operations. thisdesignation eliminates the arbitrary placementof these operations as an IO core capabilityand establishes the doctrinal flexibility to accommodatefuture doctrine on directed energy. 22At the same time, proper treatment of networkwarfare operations requires implementationof the final recommendation—creation of adomain-based operational category of cyberspaceoperations.Creation of the doctrinal classification ofcyberspace operations represents a significantand necessary part of this proposal (see fig. 5).In 2005 the secretary and chief of staff of theAir Force redefined the service’s mission as“deliver[ing] sovereign options for the defenseof the United States of America and itsglobal interests—to fly and fight in Air, Space,and Cyberspace ” (emphasis added). Furthermore,the secretary decreed that “defendingand fighting in the Cyber Domain is absolutely

60 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008"'%%*OGPSNBUJPO0QFSBUJPOT"'%%0QFSBUJPOTBOE0SHBOJ[BUJPO"'%%0CKFDUJWF0QFSBUJPOT"'%%4VCKFDUJWF0QFSBUJPOT"'%%"JS0QFSBUJPOT"'%%4QBDF0QFSBUJPOT"'%%$ZCFSTQBDF0QFSBUJPOT"'%%&MFDUSPOJD8BSGBSF0QFSBUJPOT"MMPUIFSWPMVNFTSFNBJOVODIBOHFE"'%%/FUXPSL8BSGBSF0QFSBUJPOTFigure 5. Structure of objective operationscritical to maintain operations in Ground, Sea,Air and Space.” 23 this author defines cyberspaceoperations as the employment of Air Forcecapabilities to defend and exploit electromagnetic informationprocessing, storage, and transmission systemsfor military effect. Computers and networksare the gateways for cyberspace, so network warfareoperations logically belong within cyberspaceoperations. network warfare operationsestablish cyber dominance, just as air and spaceoperations establish air and space dominance.In the final analysis, this proposal amountsto nothing if the end results do not translateinto positive, meaningful effects for the warfighter. Figure 6 illustrates how each operationalconcept relates to the overall operation,maximizes its own unique capabilities, and integratesthem to produce synergistic effectsacross the full spectrum of operations. theprinciple resembles that of the joint force—each service specializes along functional linesto build maximum power and then integratesthat power into the joint force.IO is that subset of all operations that generateinformation effects or use informationas a tool to realize objectives. All the elementsof IO are visible and present in this model,thus allowing for proper focus and emphasison each critical piece and discouraging thetendency to paint IO with a broad brush as amonolithic concept—a practice that has watereddown its efficacy by marginalizing itsconstituent elements. With the focus on effectsand the elimination of artificial associations,planners are free to combine capabilitiesin the most efficient manner, resulting insynergy and economy of force.Without question, the implications of theserecommendations extend beyond IO andUSAF doctrine. In order for this proposal tohave any enduring effect, adoption and standardizationwill have to take place within theentire government and military community,including the Department of Defense, theJoint Staff, and sister services. even then, wewould need a great deal of intellectual effortto flesh out the new IO doctrine and set upconceptual foundations for objective operations,subjective operations, and cyberspaceoperations. Although it is never too late to getthe doctrine right, the sooner we do so, thebetter. every day that passes brings further os­

EXPOSING THE INFORMATION DOMAIN MYTH 61OPERATIONSOBJECTIVE SUBJECTIVEINFLUENCE OPERATIONSSTRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONSAIR OPERATIONSSPACE OPERATIONSCYBERSPACE OPERATIONSINTEGRATIONFULL­SPECTRUMEFFECTSELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONSFigure 6. Operational model for integrated effectssification to a body of IO doctrine that remainsconfusing and ineffective to the war fighter.Conclusionthe information domain myth and currentdoctrinal treatment of IO have led to uncertaintyabout what IO is and its relationship tothe other elements of operations. Logicalanalysis reveals IO as a broader, more fundamentalconcept than we currently acknowledge.the solution to this quandary starts withrefutation of the idea of information as a domain,which enables us to redefine IO and establishit as a more fundamental componentof operations doctrine—a key supportingfunction to all operations rather than anotherdomain-based category such as air, space, orcyberspace operations. Furthermore, the institutionof a broader doctrinal architecture—as represented by the parent categories of subjectiveand objective operations—creates theroom within doctrine to establish visibility andpromote development of traditional operationalconcepts as well as those that target thecognitive domain. Instead of an informationenvironment, we can speak of the subjectiveenvironment, and everyone will understandthat the effects and objectives are cognitiveand perceptual. Implementation will naturallylead to improvements in funding, organizing,training, and equipping our forces to producewar-winning results. Lastly, creating a cyberspacedomain puts the finishing touch on along-overdue doctrinal renovation that shouldstand the test of time. by reforming doctrinein this manner, war fighters of the future willbetter understand IO and IO-related doctrine,creating a more efficient and effective forceacross the entire spectrum of warfare. Ourforces will have the knowledge and tools toturn the tide on our adversaries and, hopefully,give critics of IO much less to writeabout. ❑Notes1. Here, the term messages refers not to specifics suchas e-mail, radio signals, or memoranda but to the generalidea of any information transmission/reception by anymeans. For example, a carrier strike force sends a “message”because it creates perceptions in those observing it.the message is the information conveyed by the action orinaction of forces under our control and can include deceptionand psychological operations.2. Many definitions of cyberspace exist, but perhaps thebest is also the simplest and least constraining. Appropriatelyenough, one can find this term defined in an onlinedictionary as the “realm of electronic communication.”

62 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/cyberspace. perhaps a better definition would be “the domainin which information moves or resides while in electromagneticform.” examples of cyberspace include fiber-optictransmission lines, wireless signals, magnetic or opticalstorage devices, or computer chips.3. Sun tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel b. Griffith(Oxford: Oxford University press, 1963), 66.4. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air ForceBasic Doctrine, 17 november 2003, ix, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_page_HtML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd1.pdf.5. Ibid., 7.6. Ibid., 3.7. Cornerstones of Information Warfare (Washington, DC:Department of the Air Force, 1995), http://www.c4i.org/cornerstones.html; see also Maj James L. Griffith, “UnitedStates Air Force Information Operations Doctrine: Is Itrelevant?” (thesis, US Army Command and General StaffCollege, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2000), 49.8. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 11 January 2005,[i] (“Summary of revisions”), https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_page_HtML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd2-5.pdf.9. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 5 August 1998, v,http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afd2_5.pdf(accessed 30 August 2006).10. Lt Col Charles K. Hardy, “Information Operationsas an element of national power: A practitioner’s perspectiveon Why the United States Can’t Get It right,”strategy research project (Carlisle barracks, pA: US ArmyWar College, 2005), 1, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil126.pdf.11. Maj thomas J. Kardos, “Information Superiority:Seeking Command of the Cyber-Sea” (thesis, School ofAdvanced Military Studies, US Army Command and GeneralStaff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2000), 5.12. Maj norman emery, “Information Operations inIraq,” Military Review 84, no. 3 (May–June 2004): 11,http://calldp.leavenworth.army.mil/eng_mr/2006080808030243/2004/03_May_Jun/04_emery.pdf#xml=/scripts/cqcgi.exe/@ss_prod.env?CQ_SeSSIOn_KeY=WSOMSUnSXHeQ&CQ_QH=124697&CQDC=5&CQ_pDF_HIGHLIGHt=YeS&CQ_CUr_DOCUMent=9.13. Generally attributed to the immediate aftermathof the first Gulf War, ca. 1991.14. Griffith, “United States Air Force Information OperationsDoctrine,” 47–48.15. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 11 January 2005, 1.16. AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, 3 April 2007,21, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_page_HtML/Doctrine_Docs/AFDD2.pdf.17. SSgt C. todd Lopez, “Cyber Summit begins at pentagonnov. 16,” Air Force print news, 15 november 2006,http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123032005(accessed 17 november 2006).18. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 11 January 2005, 1.19. AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, 13.20. Ibid., 90.21. SSgt Julie Weckerlein, “Strategic CommunicationApplies to every Airman,” Air Force print news, 20 September2006, http://www.af.mil/news/story_print.asp?storyID=123027426 (accessed 17 november 2006).22. For example, directed-energy weapons may operateand cause effects in air or space and from air or space;therefore, electronic warfare operations must not be asubcategory under air or space operations. they must remainseparate. by placing electronic warfare operationsoutside the other domain-based doctrine categories, weare free to include doctrine on their use in any domain.23. Secretary Michael W. Wynne and Gen t. MichaelMoseley, “SeCAF/CSAF Letter to Airmen: Mission Statement,”7 December 2005, http://www.af.mil/library/viewpoints/jvp.asp?id=192; and Michael W. Wynne, “Cyberspaceas a Domain in Which the Air Force Flies andFights” (remarks to the Command, Control, Communications,Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and reconnaissanceIntegration Conference, Crystal City, VA, 2 november2006), http://www.af.mil/library/speeches/speech.asp?id=283 (accessed 17 november 2006).Every Airman should read, discuss, and practice doctrine, and ensurethat it adapts as necessary to remain applicable in our changingenvironment.—Gen t. Michael Moseley, Chief of Staff, US Air Force

Range and PersistenceThe Keys to Global StrikeCol PhilliP S. Meilinger, USAF, retiredEditorial Abstract: Global attack, one of the US Air Force’s distinctive capabilities, is directlyattributable to range and persistence. These two abilities, long problematic for the Air Force,rely on very old airframes (bombers and tankers) and increasingly unreliable strategies foroverseas basing. Colonel Meilinger proposes the acquisition of new platforms to ensure continuedAir Force supremacy in these areas, including new long-range strike platforms, improvedair refuelers with defensive capability, and unmanned strike platforms.EvEn bEforE thE invention of theairplane, visionaries had debated whateffect it would have on warfare; indeed,novelists wrote of aerial armadasthat would defeat the tyranny of terrain. Aircraftwould fly over seas, mountains, and fortressesthat hindered armies and navies. fromthe airy heights, aircraft could devastate anenemy’s defenses.At the same time, we also noted the airplane’slimitations—technical challenges thatwe needed to address and overcome. In thedecades since, we have aggressively attackedall of these challenges and made dramatic improvements.We have effectively dealt with theissues of speed, payload, navigation/accuracy,self-defense, safety/reliability, all-environmentoperations, and connectivity/responsiveness63

64 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008through technology and operational solutions.one technical problem, however, hasnot so readily lent itself to fixing—range andthe associated factor of persistence.Global attack is one of the US Air force’ssix distinctive capabilities, as defined in itsdoctrine. 1 “Global” means “range.” to neutralizeor hold at risk targets thousands ofmiles distant, we need strike assets that can putordnance precisely on target at great range—atremendous challenge. the distance an aircraftcan travel (range) and its time on station(persistence) are functions of fuel and humanendurance. the Air force has tried to meetthese two requirements through forward basing,air refueling, and long-range strike platforms(bombers). today, those first two optionsare becoming increasingly problematic.We may not have access to air bases close toa conflict for political reasons, or they may bevulnerable to attack. Air refueling carries risksin an era of long-range surface-to-air missile(SAM) systems. Long-range strike platforms,perhaps mated with standoff weapons, offer thelogical solution to the global-strike mandate. 2Forward Basingthe United States requires access to overseasbases near a crisis area. In operation Iraqifreedom, the Air force used 36 air bases, manyof which it had to hastily construct or upgrade.this is not a new problem. Air operations at thebeginning of both the Korean and vietnamWars were constrained by a shortage of air baseshaving the requisite runways, ramp space, utilitiesaccess, and maintenance facilities. 3Air Base PoliticsAs mentioned above, we may not have assuredaccess in future crises for two reasons. thefirst is political: a country may prove unwillingto allow US military forces to use its soil oroverfly its territory. It may wish to help butnonetheless demur due to disagreements overUS objectives, domestic concerns, or fear ofreprisal. 4 We witnessed a demonstration of thefirst case during Iraqi freedom when franceand Germany did not agree that an invasionof Iraq was necessary and lent no support tothe US-led effort. Similarly, after operationDesert Storm, Saudi Arabia was reluctant toallow US aircraft to use its bases for strikesagainst Iraq because of domestic opinion. furthermore,Spain’s withdrawal from Iraq in2004 after a terrorist attack on the Madridtrain system showed how reprisals can dictategovernment policy. 5operational flexibility and foreign-policyinitiatives can mitigate these concerns. thus,despite the denial of airfields in Saudi Arabia,facilities in Kuwait, bahrain, Qatar, Pakistan, andelsewhere proved sufficient. Yet, the coalitionair commander in Iraqi freedom—t. Michael“buzz” Moseley, then a lieutenant general—warned that the United States could not counton such bases: “In the future, we will requiredeep strike capabilities to penetrate and engagehigh-value targets during the first minutes ofhostilities anywhere in the battlespace.” 6In short, we have assumed that if a countryis in trouble and requests our help, then it willmake bases available for our use. now, however,the United States finds itself in need. Werequire bases in order to prosecute the war onterrorism. Will they be available?Air Base Vulnerabilitythe greatest utility of overseas bases is theirproximity to potential crisis areas. the greatestlimitation of overseas bases is their proximity topotential crisis areas. the issue involves vulnerability—anold problem. following World WarII, Strategic Air Command deployed most of itsbombers to forward bases in Europe, the MiddleEast, and Asia—within unrefueled striking distanceof their targets in the Soviet Union. 7 In1954, however, a rAnD study concluded thatthese bases were vulnerable to a Soviet strike.this report had enormous impact—within ayear, the Air force ordered its first KC-135tanker. 8 the new strategy called for launchingbombers from bases in the United States—airrefueling would get the strike aircraft to theirtargets and back. Strategic Air Command thenpulled its bases back to the periphery for use asstaging areas in the event of war.

RANGE AND PERSISTENCE 65US fighters remained at European bases—north Atlantic treaty organization (nAto)airfields that had dispersed facilities, hardening,air defense systems, stocks of spare parts,and pre-positioned fuel and ordnance. We believedthat these semihardened bases wouldsurvive a Soviet strike—at least until the Airforce ran an exercise called Salty Demo atSpangdahlem Air base, Germany, in 1985, whichmeasured an air base’s ability to survive conventionalas well as chemical attacks and thengenerate sorties afterward. the scenario envisionedsimulated air strikes by Soviet aircraftand ground attacks by Spetsnaz commandounits, subjecting Spangdahlem to simulateddestruction. Personnel built an AlternateLaunch and recovery System (ALrS)—a temporaryrunway—and then deliberately blew itup. 9 buildings or systems designated as “destroyed”by enemy attacks were out of playfor the remainder of the exercise. Personneljudged as injured received “treatment” in thehospital and, if appropriate, returned to duty.those “killed in action” were out of the exercise.Combat engineers repaired craters madein the ALrS, and crews launched and recoveredaircraft on the repaired surface.Although details remain sketchy, enoughdata has emerged from Salty Demo to indicatethat such attacks would have had a serious impacton the wing’s ability to function. Wewould need to initiate a host of actions to ensurethat an air base could survive and fightwhile under attack: improved chemical protectivegear, hardened shelters, technologiesfor the rapid repair of runways, redundantcommunications, perimeter defenses, and betterair defenses. 10the results of Salty Demo proved as soberingas the rAnD study of 30 years earlier. Ironically,however, the problem appeared so massivethat we decided we could do little about it.rebuilding nAto airfields to enable them tosurvive a Soviet attack would cost billions ofdollars. fortunately, the Cold War ended a fewyears later, so we forgot the problem of air basevulnerability—until Desert Storm in 1991. 11Iraq could not compete with the coalitionin the air, so it relied on an asymmetric strategythat saw 88 Scud missiles fired at coalitionforces and Israel. our defenses stopped few, ifany, of these missiles, and one killed 28 US soldiersand wounded 97 more in a barracks inSaudi Arabia. 12 Consequently, the Air forceonce again began worrying about its air bases.fortunately, our ballistic missile defenses haveimproved since then. During Iraqi freedom,Patriot missiles intercepted all nine of the Iraqiballistic missiles fired at “defended assets,” butwe have certainly not eliminated threats. 13Cruise missiles are emerging as a seriousthreat. We have difficulty detecting these weaponsat their ground locations because of theirsmall size and lack of extensive support equipment.When launched they don’t generate adramatic fire plume, as do ballistic missiles—acharacteristic that allows detection by satellites.they fly subsonically at low altitude, followingan irregular and unpredictable path.“Look-down” radars have difficulty distinguishingthem from ground clutter, and thePatriot’s radar cannot pick up these low flyersuntil it is too late. 14Worse, we face a proliferation of cruise missiles,with over 75,000 located in 75 countriestoday. Although most are antiship versions,some—notably the Chinese-made Silkworm—can be converted into land-attack variants thathave a range of over 300 miles. During Iraqifreedom, we failed to detect (much less intercept)any of the five cruise missiles that theIraqis fired at coalition positions. 15the weaponized light aircraft or unmannedaerial vehicle (UAv) also represents an emergingthreat. over 400 different light-aircraft“kits” are available on the commercial market:some cost less than $30,000, have a range ofseveral hundred miles, and can carry a payloadof 500 pounds. replacing the pilot withan autopilot guided by the global positioningsystem—also available commercially for around$5,000—produces a large weapon difficult to detectand stop. 16 Worse, cruise missiles and UAvsare ideal platforms for dispensing chemical orbiological agents. Acting like crop dusters,they could easily spray deadly substances overa wide swath of land.finally, we must consider the threat of enemyground forces and terrorists. In vietnam, vietcongattacks destroyed 99 US Air force air­

66 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008craft and damaged another 1,170. 17 Sanitizingthe area around US facilities presents problemsas well as possible tensions with host countries.the terrorist bombing of the Khobar towersin June 1996 resulted partly from Saudi Arabia’srefusal to allow the extended defense perimeternecessary to ensure the barracks’ safety. 18We should also note that north Korea has 22brigades of special forces who, in the event ofwar, will infiltrate the south and attack US /South Korean air bases. 19Clearly, because overseas bases face numerousthreats, we may not have access to them infuture crises. the austere bases hurriedly establishedfor operations Enduring freedomand Iraqi freedom were of a vulnerable, almostflimsy, nature. Aircrews and support personneloften lived in tents; aircraft, logisticsfacilities, and fuel supplies were similarly exposed.Enemy aircraft or missiles could havewreaked havoc there. We should assume thatenemies in a future crisis will target our airbases. Will they survive and permit sustainedcombat operations? If not, then we will havean increased need for long-range strike assets.Air RefuelingAir refueling became widespread in the1950s, and during the vietnam War, most of theUS strike aircraft that flew over north vietnamrequired it—essentially turning tactical fightersinto strategic bombers. 20 but this dependenceon aerial refueling presents problems. our currenttankers—the KC-10 and KC-135, based oncommercial-airliner designs—are not stealthyand have no self-defense capability. Until now,this has not caused problems—we have neverlost a tanker to enemy action. 21 how much longercan we guarantee this invulnerability?Antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and SAM systems,a longtime bane of aircraft, haveclaimed far more US planes than have otheraircraft. 22 Since World War II, air-to-air combatclaimed only around 210 of the approximately3,250 US Air force aircraft lost infighting—about 6.5 percent of the total. 23AAA and SAMs are the real killers; unfortunately,a proliferation of new SAMs poses anenormous risk to our planes.the most dangerous of these SAMs, the socalleddouble-digit missiles (SA-10, -12, and-20), have a “hit probability” of at least 90 percentagainst nonstealthy aircraft, making lowmaneuverabilityplatforms such as tankers orairlifters especially vulnerable. 24 russia, China,India, Iran, and Syria now field these SAMs. theSA-20, the newest and most capable foreignmadeSAM system, is mobile, has a range ofover 200 miles, can engage six targets simultaneously,and can be reprogrammed quickly. Anupgraded version of this impressive system isalready under development. 25 Even with heavyjamming and clever tactics, our nonstealthyfighters would find these missiles a very seriousthreat, and our tankers would not have achance. In the air war over Serbia in 1999, thenAto air component commander remarkedthat his greatest nightmare was that somehowthe Serbs would acquire an SA-10 or SA-12 battery.26 fortunately, they did not.Long-Range Strike Platformsthe access issue, when combined with theemerging SAM threat, means that we wouldhave to base aircraft outside the range of enemymissiles or far out at sea. Aircraft would then airrefuel as they approached the enemy’s border.because of the SAMs, tankers would have to remainover 200 miles out, imposing a limitedpenetration capability on current strike fighters—assumingthey could get past the SAMs.Moreover, they would have little persistenceonce they reached enemy airspace. At normalairspeed, every hour a fighter loiters reduces itscombat radius by 250 miles. 27 this means thatfighters would almost certainly have to go afterfixed targets because the lack of extra fuel wouldnot allow a hunt for mobile targets. Since the f­22 and f-35 will not have greater range than currentfighters, the SAM threat that keeps thetankers at bay will limit their penetration tobarely 100 miles. 28 A need to maneuver wouldreduce their range even more. 29one solution for extending the effectivereach of these fighters entails arming them with

RANGE AND PERSISTENCE 67standoff weapons. We have several options available.the conventional air-launched cruise missile(CALCM) can carry a 3,000-pound warheadover 600 miles. the Joint Air-to-SurfaceStandoff Missile (JASSM), a stealthy cruisemissile with a range of over 200 miles (a proposedextended-range version would go 500miles), has a 1,000-pound warhead and can bereprogrammed to a new target while in flight.the standoff land attack missile-expanded response(SLAM-Er), another reprogrammableair-launched cruise missile, has a 500-poundwarhead and a range of over 150 miles. theSmall-Diameter bomb (SDb) can glide up to60 miles, and the Low Cost Autonomous AttackSystem (LoCAAS)—a small flying bombunder development—is designed to loiter forup to 30 minutes or travel 100 miles. on thedownside, only the SDb and LoCAAS are currentlyprogrammed for the f-22 and f-35. thelonger-range and more powerful CALCM,JASSM, and SLAM-Er are too large for thesenew fighters. 30 In sum, current plans call formating our short-range stealthy fighters withonly short-range standoff weapons.on the other hand, long-range strike aircrafthave proven invaluable for US militaryoperations, handling a disproportionate loadof strike missions and weapons delivered. InDesert Storm, b-52s flew 1,741 combat sorties—only3.9 percent of the total strike sortiesflown by the coalition—but dropped 32percent of all tonnage. 31 over Kosovo/Serbia,bombers flew 322 of 9,500 strike sorties—only3.6 percent—yet delivered 48 percent of allmunitions. Six b-2 stealth bombers proved especiallyvaluable during the operation, flying45 combat sorties that averaged 28–32 hoursin length; these few missions—less than .5 percentof the total—accounted for one-third ofall the precision-guided munitions droppedduring the war. 32 In Afghanistan, 18 b-1s andb-52s operating out of Diego Garcia logged 10percent of all strike sorties but dropped 67percent of all munitions during the critical periodfrom october through December 2001.of note, these bombers, which flew missionslasting 12–15 hours, did not usually have assignedtargets when taking off; rather, they arrivedin the area and loitered, waiting to receive“emerging targets” from air or ground controllers.33 b-2s also flew in Afghanistan—onesortie lasted 44 hours. In Iraqi freedom, b-1sand b-52s accounted for more than two-thirdsof all the bombs dropped in that conflict. 34Persistence and Crew FatiguePersistence has endured varying fortunes.In one sense, the desire to remove the transitorynature of airpower—one of its traditionalcriticisms—has always been strong. Air refuelingsolved one problem but did little to alleviatethe physical limitations inherent with crewmembers on small aircraft. the issue of crewfatigue induced by long flights, combinedwith excessive stress and frequent deployments,has been well studied. basically, the humanbody and mind get tired when immobilized,cramped, or bored—they need sleep. flightsurgeons sought to discover how sleep couldbe deferred or stolen in small increments toenable a short-term boost in performance.the usual response to these problems—diet,exercise, physical fitness, and a stable routine—isusually ineffective. Alternatively, personnel inmulticrew aircraft take short naps in flight. Pilotsof single-seat fighters, however, do not have thisoption, so medication becomes the next step.Since the early 1960s, the Air force has employed“go/no-go” pills to regulate the sleep cycles of aircrews—tomake them sleep before a flight andkeep them awake during it. no-go pills have hadmixed success. Aircrews often do not want to takethem, or, because of nervousness or other distractions,the pills simply don’t work.Go pills—amphetamines—are designed tokeep pilots awake. During Desert Storm, 57 percentof fighter pilots in single-seat aircraft reportedusing them. 35 reputedly fairly benigndrugs, they may nonetheless produce such sideeffects as cardiovascular disturbances, psychiatricproblems, addiction, drug tolerance, and disruptionsin sleep recovery—certainly not minor reactions.36 In April 2002, an f-16 pilot bombed whathe believed were enemy troops near Kandahar inAfghanistan. In fact the attack killed four Canadians.the pilot claimed that he had taken go pills,and his defense attorney at the subsequent court­

68 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008martial used as a mitigating circumstance the factthat a flight surgeon had prescribed them—despitetheir known deleterious side effects. 37In sum, absent the possibility of getting up,moving about, stretching, or using the latrine,a pilot can go no more than 10 hours strappedinto a single-seat fighter. Even then, groundcrews often have to help the exhausted Airmanfrom the cockpit upon landing. All ofthis means that acquiring long-range strike assetswill become an imperative, given the possibilityof fighting a future enemy on a largecontinental landmass such as China. 38to illustrate the problem, fighter aircrafttraversing the 2,000 miles separating the Asiancontinent from Guam, the nearest air base onUS territory, would require at least four tankerhookups. this would still take a heavy toll onthe aircrews. A round-trip mission from Guamto the Asian coast at normal airspeeds wouldtake nearly 10 hours—certainly a grueling assignment.39 In bombers, crew members can getup and move about, perhaps even nap duringlong flights. 40 During the vietnam War, theb-52s based on Guam flew thousands of suchcombat sorties. In Kosovo, b-2s flew missionslasting more than 30 hours from their base inMissouri with no degradation in performance. 41one should also note that the increasingreliance on UAvs makes a great deal ofsense. these platforms, combined with morecapable sensors and precision weapons, offerpossible solutions to the problems withrange/persistence. UAvs allow a previouslyunobtainable loitering capability—with nocrew-duty limitations. 42ConclusionPerhaps the most enduring theme of airand space power is its global character, whichenables the United States to project influenceworldwide. Although Airmen have grappledwith a number of technological challenges fora century, a nagging issue remains—rangeand the associated need for persistence. In decadespast, we addressed these problems byforward basing, air refueling, and long-rangestrike aircraft. today, forward bases may notbe available due to political constraints or theproliferation of ballistic and cruise missilestipped with weapons of mass destruction. Increasinglyeffective ground-based air defenseswill render our nonstealthy air refuelers toovulnerable to fly close to a crisis area.Part of the solution may still reside in a newtanker for which the Air force is now solicitingbids. Given the age and increasing problemswith the KC-135 fleet, this has become anessential step. Although a new tanker probablywon’t have stealthy features, the Air forceshould insist that it incorporate a self-defensecapability that would permit the aircraft—andaccompanying fighter-bombers—to approachenemy territory more closely and thus denythe adversary a larger sanctuary.A long-range strike platform for the futureremains the most logical solution. numerousdesigns for this mission have emerged—anythingfrom hypersonic unmanned vehicles tostretched “fb”-22s. however, we must maintainour emphasis on range—the crucial nut thatneeds cracking. Moreover, the Air force mustnot allow the budget process to cut this newprogram. Yes, many priorities vie for scarce dollars,but long-range strike must stay at the topof the list. Similarly, stealthy standoff weaponsthat can fit inside the small internal bomb baysof the f-22 and f-35 should make up part of thesolution. In decades past, we endured the distressingphenomenon of air-delivered ordnancereceiving short shrift. that tendency haschanged due to the revolution in precisionguidedweapons, but the trend must continue.Also, we must find something other than medicationto squarely address the very real problemof crew limitations. Using aircraft withmultiple crew members offers one solution, asdoes the use of unmanned strike platforms.What we must not do is rely on short-rangefighters—a policy that assumes away the problemsof access, tanker vulnerability, and crewendurance. that would be foolish. for nearly acentury, we have wrestled with the issues of rangeand persistence—the ability to hold enemy targetsat risk from extended distances. the Airforce’s distinctive capability of global strikedemands long-range strike assets. ❑

RANGE AND PERSISTENCE 69Notes1. Air force Doctrine Document (AfDD) 1, Air ForceBasic Doctrine, 17 november 2003, 76–82, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AfDD_Page_htML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd1.pdf.2. Conventionally tipped intercontinental ballisticmissiles offer a possible option, but they have seriousdrawbacks, including cost, small numbers, inability to hitmoving targets, and the difficulty experienced by observers(China and russia) trying to distinguish between aconventional- or nuclear-weapon launch.3. robert f. futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea,1950–1953, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: office of Air forcehistory, 1983), 67–73, 109–12, 191–94, 394–99; and robertf. futrell with the assistance of Martin blumenson, TheUnited States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to1965 (Washington, DC: office of Air force history, 1981),110, 177, 263–64. See also Squadron Leader Sal Sidoti, AirBase Operability: A Study in Air Base Survivability and Post-Attack Recovery (Canberra, Australia: Aerospace Centre,2001), 26–31, 38.4. See David A. Shlapak et al., A Global Access Strategyfor the U.S. Air Force (Santa Monica, CA: rAnD, 2002),http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/Mr1216.pdf. During operation El Dorado Canyon in1986, france and Spain denied overfly rights to f-111 aircraftlaunching from britain, essentially doubling theflight duration.5. fear of reprisal is not simply about terrorist attacks.because Portugal allowed US aircraft to land at Lajes Airbase, Azores, to refuel en route to Israel during the 1973Yom Kippur War, the Arab states cut off oil shipments toPortugal. Shlapak et al., Global Access Strategy, 22.6. Laura M. Colarusso, “Suddenly, USAf Wants a newbomber,” Defense News, 7 June 2004, 1, 8, http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2004/040607-bomber.htm.7. See Elliott v. Converse, “United States Plans for aPostwar overseas Military base System, 1942–1948” (PhDdiss., Princeton University, 1984); and harry r. borowski,A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment beforeKorea (Westport, Ct: Greenwood Press, 1982), chap. 4.8. A. J. Wohlstetter, “Selection and Use of StrategicAir bases,” Study r-266 (Santa Monica, CA: rAnD, April1954). the increasing speeds of jet bombers such as theb-47 and b-52 also necessitated a jet tanker that couldkeep up.9. bombs that penetrate a runway or taxiway surfacecause significant damage due to the rupture and upheavalof underlying layers. repair is neither quick nor easy.Sidoti, Air Base Operability, 88–94.10. for an unclassified overview of the exercise, seeheadquarters USAfE/PAM, “Salty Demo Q’s & A’s,” 11october 1984, Air force historical research Agency,Maxwell Afb, AL, file K570.01. See also John t. Correll,“fighting under Attack,” Air Force Magazine 71, no.10 (october1988): 50–55; and Edgar Ulsamer, “the fog of War,”Air Force Magazine 68, no. 10 (october 1985): 74–78.11. for an excellent overview, see Christopher J.bowie, The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases (Washington,DC: Center for Strategic and budgetary Assess-ments, 2002), http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/r.20020924.CSbA_Airbases/r.20020924.CSbA_Airbases.pdf.12. Col Charles A. Anderson, “Air and Missile Defense,”Army, January 2004, 41–47; and theodore A.Postol, “Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot,”International Security 16 (Winter 1991/1992): 119–71.13. Iraq fired 20 ballistic missiles in 2003, but onlynine came within the Patriot’s range and were intercepted.the rest, fortunately, fell in uninhabited areas. Anderson,“Air and Missile Defense,” 46. See also Testimony of DennisM. Gormley, Senior Fellow, Monterey Institute’s Center for NonproliferationStudies, before the Subcommittee on National Security,Emerging Threats, and International Affairs of the U.S.House of Representatives, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 9 March2004, http://cns.miis.edu/research/congress/testim/testgorm.htm.14. for a discussion, see David A. fulghum, “CruiseMissile battle,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 21 May2004, 51–53.15. Anderson, “Air and Missile Defense,” 46; ImprovementsNeeded to Better Contest Technology Exports for CruiseMissiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, GAo report 04-175(Washington, DC: General Accounting office, January2004), 13; and Dennis M. Gormley, “the neglected Dimension:Controlling Cruise Missile Proliferation,” NonproliferationReview 9 (Summer 2002): 23. China is developinga new cruise missile with as-yet-undeterminedcapabilities. See “Chinese Developing new AntishipCruise Missile,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 31 May2004, 23.16. An Internet search will turn up several aircraft kitsand autopilot systems. note that China’s cruise and ballisticmissiles have “satellite-aided” guidance systems forincreased accuracy. Ironically, US-provided signals fromthe global positioning system could be used against it.Stephen J. flanagan and Michael E. Marti, eds., The People’sLiberation Army and China in Transition (Washington, DC:national Defense University Press, 2003), 23.17. Alan vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest: A History ofGround Attacks on Air Bases (Santa Monica, CA: rAnD,1995), 68. In vietnam, more US aircraft were destroyedon the ground by guerillas than in air-to-air combat.18. for a copy of the report, see Lt Gen James f.record, Independent Review of the Khobar Towers Bombing,parts A and b (tucson, AZ: Davis-Monthan Afb, 31 october1996), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/khobar/recordf.htm. to eliminate the threat from an 82 mm mortar,for example, one needs a defensive perimeter with aradius of four miles. Sidoti, Air Base Operability, 115.19. David A. Shlapak and Alan vick, “Check Six Beginson the Ground”: Responding to the Evolving Ground Threat toU.S. Air Force Bases (Santa Monica, CA: rAnD, 1995), 41.20. the Air Service had experimented with air refuelingsince the 1920s but found it impractical for the hugeair fleets of World War II. With the onset of the Cold War,the concept took on added importance as air plannersneeded to ensure that bombers could hit targets deep inthe Soviet Union. Air refueling was essential. because far

70 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008fewer bombers were necessary in the age of nuclear weapons,air refueling became more practical. richard K.Smith, Seventy-Five Years of Inflight Refueling: Highlights,1923–1998 (Washington, DC: Air force history and MuseumsProgram, 1998).21. the C-17 has been fitted with passive defenses toward off heat-seeking SAMs that it might encounter duringtakeoff and landing from forward bases. becausetankers generally do not operate in such locations, theydo not have even this limited capability. robert Wall, “thenext Step,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 23 August2004, 58.22. Kenneth P. Werrell, Archie, Flak, AAA, and SAM: AShort Operational History of Ground-Based Air Defense (MaxwellAfb, AL: Air University Press, 1988), 177.23. William t. Y’blood, MiG Alley: The Fight for Air Superiority(Washington, DC: Air force history and MuseumsProgram, 2000), 43; and Wayne thompson, To Hanoi andBack: The U.S. Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966–1973(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000), 311.24. James C. o’halloran, Jane’s Land-Based Air Defence,2004–2005 (Surrey, United Kingdom: Jane’s InformationGroup, 2004), 157.25. John A. tirpak, “the Double-Digit SAMs,” AirForce Magazine 84, no. 6 (June 2001): 48–49, http://www.afa.org/magazine/june2001/0601SAMS.pdf.26. See Dr. benjamin C. Lambeth, “Kosovo and theContinuing SEAD Challenge,” Aerospace Power Journal 16,no. 2 (Summer 2002): 8–21, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/sum02/sum02.pdf.27. bowie, Anti-Access Threat, 13.28. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft reports the combat radiiand payloads of US fighter aircraft as follows: f-16: 780miles with two tons; f-15E: 790 miles with 12 tons; f-18E/f: 1,087 miles with two SLAM-Er missiles (one ton); andf-35: 690 miles with two tons. the official US Air forceWeb site does not list the range of the f-22, but unofficialsources state that it will fall in the f-35 category. the f-22can carry one ton of air-to-ground ordnance. All of theseaircraft can also carry air-to-air missiles. Paul Jackson, ed.,Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 2003–2004 (Surrey, UnitedKingdom: Jane’s Information Group, 2003), 548–671.the f-35 and f-22 could carry external fuel tanks, but doingso would degrade their stealthy characteristics as wellas inhibit their maneuverability.29. one f-15C pilot commented to me that “if a C-model gets into a full-up fight, has to drop all three of itsfuel tanks, and turns several times, it could find itselfbingo fuel in just a very few minutes.”30. Lockheed Martin has begun research on a standoffcruise missile that is not only stealthy but also smallenough to fit inside the new stealth fighters. “LockheedMartin Develops Smaller Standoff Cruise Missiles,” AerospaceDaily and Defense Report, 21 July 2004, 1.31. thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War AirPower Survey: Summary Report (Washington, DC: GovernmentPrinting office, 1993), 15; and thomas A. Keaneyand Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 5, A StatisticalCompendium and Chronology, by Lewis D. hill (Washington,DC: Government Printing office, 1993), 232–33.32. benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo:A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, CA:rAnD, 2001), 63, 87, 91.33. David A. fulghum and robert Wall, “heavybomber Attacks Dominate Afghan War,” Aviation Week andSpace Technology, 3 December 2001, 22; and “operationEnduring freedom: the Air Campaign,” efreedomnews.com,12 January 2003.34. William M. Arkin, “U.S. Military Ain’t broke Yet,”Los Angeles Times, 27 April 2003, M1.35. David L. Emonson and rodger D. vanderbeek,“the Use of Amphetamines in U.S. Air force tactical operationsduring Desert Shield and Storm,” Aviation, Space,and Environmental Medicine 66 (March 1995): 260–63.36. Darlene Schultz and James C. Miller, “fatigue andUse of Go/no-Go Pills in Extraordinarily Long CombatSorties,” Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 75(April 2004): 370–71; and Alain buguet, Dianne E. Moroz,and Manny W. radomski, “Modafinil: Medical Considerationsfor Use in Sustained operations,” Aviation, Space,and Environmental Medicine 74 (June 2003): 659.37. for the official US Central Command report acknowledgingthat the pilot was prescribed go/no-go pills,see http://www.centcom.mil/CEntCoMnews/reports/tarnak_farms_report.htm (accessed April 2006). forthe Web site originated to plead the pilot’s case, seehttp://www.harryschmidt.org (accessed April 2006).38. bowie notes that only 18 percent of the world’s airbases usable by US fighter aircraft (runways 6,000 feetlong and 145 feet wide) are located in Asia. Anti-AccessThreat, 71. rAnD says that the minimum runway lengthfor fighter operations is 7,500 feet and 12,000 feet forlarge aircraft such as tankers. If one uses these criteria,even fewer airfields would be available. If large aircraftreduced their fuel load, they could use shorter runways,but this would reduce their endurance. Shlapak et al.,Global Access Strategy, 49.39. the distance from Diego Garcia to baghdad is3,342 miles; Diego to tehran 3,260 miles; and Diego toKabul 2,888 miles.40. for how distance from base to target reduces sortierates, see William D. o’Malley, Evaluating Possible AirfieldDeployment Options: Middle East Contingencies (SantaMonica, CA: rAnD, 2001).41. rebecca Grant, The B-2 Goes to War (Arlington, vA:Iris Press, 2001), passim.42. northrop Grumman Corporation is exploring theidea of turning its high-altitude Global hawk UAv into atanker. Although the aircraft would not be stealthy, theconversion would at least remove the risk to the aircrew ina high-threat environment. See the image in Aviation Weekand Space Technology, 5 March 2007, 19.

Editorial Abstract: Today’s standard weathersupport lacks a description of forecast uncertainty,thus limiting the forecast’s utility.However, significant scientific and technologicaladvances now make it possibleto overcome that limitation by applyingweather-forecast uncertainty information tothe Air Force’s decision-making process. Theauthors employ cost-effective ensemble forecastingin two different scenarios to demonstratehow principles of operational riskmanagement can yield marked improvementsin combat capability (effectiveness)and conservation of resources (efficiency).Weather and theCalculated RiskExploiting ForecastUncertainty forOperational RiskManagementMaj F. anthony EckEl, USaFcapt jEFFrEy G. cUnninGhaM, USaFMaj DalE E. hEtkE, USaFAir Force SmArt operations 21(AFSo21) has prompted a freshlook at ways to improve combat capability,including enhancing thedecision-making process. 1 Highly effective andefficient operations require optimal decisionmaking in situations that involve risk of unfavorableoutcomes. Such risk exists due touncertainty in decision inputs. operators routinelyface a variety of inexact inputs, such asintelligence reports on enemy strength, projectionson available logistics, and performance71

72 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008of weapon systems. this article explains howthe uncertainty in one such decision input—the weather forecast—can be used within theprinciples of operational risk management(orm) to improve combat capability by applyinga new advancement called “ensembleforecasting.”typically, Department of Defense (DoD)missions with weather vulnerabilities considera single weather forecast, thus largely ignoringforecast uncertainty, which can often provesignificant. Focusing attention on a singleforecast leads to nonoptimal decisions. 2 Failureto consider an objective description of thepotential forecast error leaves an operatoroverly vulnerable to costly mistakes and thewasting of resources—a situation analogous tobetting on a horse race without consideringeach horse’s projected odds of winning.clearly, the absolute best information forweather-related decisions would indeed be aconsistently perfect deterministic forecast (i.e.,a single-valued prediction for a weather phenomenon).Unfortunately, deterministic forecastingis anything but perfect. Forecast skillvaries greatly due to the challenge of predictingthe incredibly complex atmospheric systemthat contains nonlinear hydrodynamic,thermodynamic, radiation, chemical, andphysical interactions. in fact, it is incrediblethat we can predict the atmosphere at all. 3the inherent uncertainty of the weathercan be described with a “stochastic forecast,”which expresses a distribution or range ofpossibilities that defines the potential errorin the deterministic forecast and that cancome in many different forms and from manydifferent sources. For example, weather climatology(i.e., seasonal conditions) is normallygiven stochastically, such as the average,minimum, and maximum monthly expectedrainfall at a location.the idea of including uncertainty as part ofa forecast is nothing new. 4 People recognizedthe potential value for applying stochasticforecasts within Air Force operations as earlyas the 1960s, but we have yet to capitalize uponit. 5 today’s forecasting remains primarily deterministicbecause (1) application of deterministicweather for decision making isstraightforward, (2) benefits from and methodsof applying stochastic forecasts are not widelyunderstood, and (3) production of robust stochasticforecasts for short-term forecasts (upto a few days) has not been practical or affordable.However, since advancements in scienceand technology currently support productionof stochastic forecasts, now is the time for theAir Force to learn and pursue the advantagesof this technique.Production and Application ofStochastic Forecaststhe primary tool for meteorologists for thepast 40 years has been computer-based, numericalweather prediction (NWP) modeling.Weather observations are analyzed and thenfed into a complex algorithm that simulatesatmospheric behavior over time to generate asingle, modeled forecast that has a varying degreeof accuracy. NWP models, run at meteorologicalprediction centers, cover domains ofvarious size (from city to global), resolution(from a few kilometers to hundreds of kilometers),and lengths of time into the future (froma few hours to weeks) to meet specific needs.Producing just one deterministic (singlesolution) forecast in an NWP model requiresperforming trillions of calculations very quicklyto process the data in time to be useful. thisproduction involves extremely powerful, expensivesupercomputers. A typical operationalNWP model uses computer hardware worthabout $100,000 to $1,000,000, dependingupon the model configuration (domain size/resolution, run-time requirements, etc.).computers have now advanced to the pointthat running NWP models in a stochastic(multisolution) mode, using ensemble forecasting,has become cost-effective. in this typeof forecasting, the NWP uncertainty is quantifiedby running the model many times (typically20–30 individual solutions), with slightchanges to the information fed to each modelrun as well as adjustments to the model’s innerworkings. this generates a spectrum offorecasts in which each forecast is a valid pos­

WEATHER AND THE CALCULATED RISK 73sibility; together, they yield an objective, stochasticweather forecast.Additional processing to generate an ensembleforecast requires roughly an order ofmagnitude (10 times) more computer power,with an equivalently higher cost, compared todeterministic NWP. this article takes a DoDperspective on how the benefits of using ensembleforecasts greatly exceed the cost oftheir production. Across the weather-supportcommunity, the benefits for improving users’decision making have fueled extensive researchand development over the past 20 years.meteorological prediction centers worldwideare currently generating ensemble-based stochasticforecasts for their customers:CenterYear ThatEnsembleForecastingBeganUS National Centers for Environmental 1992PredictionEuropean Center for Medium-Range 1992Weather ForecastingUS Navy Fleet Numerical Meteorology 1995and Oceanography CenterCanadian Meteorological Center 1996China Meteorological Agency 1996Bureau of Meteorology, Australia 2000Japanese Meteorological Agency 2001Korean Meteorological Administration 2001United Kingdom Met Office 2007Although the Air Force can and does leverageforecast data from outside sources, it mustalso generate tailored, mission-specific forecasts.Air Force Weather has committed itselfto developing an ensemble-forecast capability.Brig Gen Lawrence A. Stutzriem, the formerAir Force director of weather, stated that “ensembleforecast products and applications arethe future of Air Force weather operations.” 6to that end, Air Force Weather is currentlyprocessing ensemble-forecast data in a prototypesystem and performing an extensive fieldtest to learn how best to apply stochastic forecastsfor enhancing DoD operations. this effortwill last through 2008 and pave the wayfor operational implementation.orm serves as the conduit for applying stochasticforecasts since its guiding principle is“accept risk when benefits outweigh thecosts.” 7 costs encompass necessities for carryingout the mission (supplies, equipmentmaintenance, training, etc.) while risk analysisinvolves understanding the uncertainty ofeach decision input. this principle can be metobjectively, rather than subjectively, throughdecision theory, which bases decisions onmathematical evaluation in order to enableactions that maximize gain and/or minimizeloss in the long run. 8 essentially, decision theoryis the literal realization of the expression“calculated risk.” For example, assume thatanalysis of a business case shows long-term savingsin applying expensive runway anti-icingchemicals if the chance of snow is greater than35 percent. 9 Given a forecast of 25 percentchance of snow, the decision would be not touse the chemicals and accept the risk of moreexpensive, time-consuming plowing. that decisionprocess is fundamentally different, andmore effective over time, compared to usingan imperfect, deterministic snow predictionas decision input.it is possible to minimize losses and maximizegains simultaneously, but decision makingoften focuses on one or the other. in thisarticle, the term defensive ORM refers to optimizationwith respect to minimizing loss, andoffensive ORM refers to maximizing gains. Wepresent examples for each type of orm todemonstrate how application of stochasticforecasts meets the goals of AFSo21. the examplesinvolve computerized modeling andsimulation scenarios designed with enoughrealism to give them credibility while remainingsimple enough to fit within the scope ofthis article. these simulations enable thoroughexploration of potential benefits throughvariation and replay of the scenarios—somethingnot possible in real-life examples.currently, actual examples within the DoDof successful application of stochastic forecastsare few and far between. A couple of notableexceptions include probabilistic storm predictionfor launch operations at Patrick AFB, Flor­

74 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008ida, and inclusion of typhoon-track uncertaintyfrom the Joint typhoon Warning center, NavalBase Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. there are alsomany success stories in the civilian sector. Forexample, california utilities realized a 9.5 percentincrease in annual hydroelectric revenueand a 40 percent reduction in wasteful spillagefrom reservoirs when they switched to usingstochastic forecasts. 10 Similar improvementsare possible within DoD operations.Example of DefensiveOperational Risk ManagementDefensive orm involves making smart decisionsthat ensure the job gets done with theleast expense. this could mean anything fromresource protection for the avoidance of costlydamage to conservation of logistics (ammunition,fuel, etc.). For purposes of demonstration,an evacuation Simulation (evac Sim)was constructed to model protection of a highvaluedaircraft parked at an air base prone tohigh winds from typhoons.each year, on average, four typhoons approachthe air base (within 200 miles). Usuallyone in four (one per year) results in surfacewinds greater than or equal to 50 knots atthe base, which can cause significant andcostly ($1,000,000 in this simulation) damageto aircraft. Using the weather forecast, the aircraftoperator needs a two-day lead time todecide whether to evacuate (costing $150,000for fuel, the crew’s travel vouchers, etc.) to analternative operating location before the typhoonhits. the two choices (evacuate or remainin place) and two possibilities for thewind (greater than or equal to, or less than 50knots) produce four possible outcomes forany typhoon approach (associated expense inparentheses):1. Valid evacuation ($150,000): evacuated;damaging wind avoided.2. Savings ($0): remained in place; damagingwind did not occur.3. False Alarm ($150,000): evacuated; damagingwind did not occur.4. Loss ($1,000,000): remained in place;damaging wind occurred.the evac Sim generates wind conditions atthe base for each typhoon through randomdraws from a distribution of possible conditionsconstructed to represent realistic climatologicconditions. 11 Simulated deterministic(single-valued) forecasts result from addingan unbiased random error onto the true windwith average magnitude of 12 knots—a conservativeestimate for two-day forecast error inhigh-wind situations. the deterministic forecastthus mimics real-world forecasts by alwaysbeing in the neighborhood of the truth—sometimes very close and sometimes highlyerred. the simulated stochastic forecasts areproduced through a statistical calculation thatconsiders where the threshold of 50 knots fallswithin a distribution of potential forecasts(based on the error range of the deterministicforecast). the simulation process mimics areal-world, imperfect ensemble forecast by usingan incorrect estimate of forecast error whenconstructing the ensemble distribution. 12table 1 shows sample results of the evacSim for decisions made and expenses incurredby an operator supported by deterministic versusstochastic forecasts for the same typhoonapproaches. the deterministic operator evacuateswhen the forecast is for wind greater thanor equal to 50 knots. the stochastic operatorevacuates when the probability forecast forwind greater than or equal to 50 knots is 15percent or higher. this percentage representsthe optimal decision threshold defined by thecost of protecting divided by the loss if thedamage occurs, known as the cost/loss ratioin decision theory. 13examination of a single case in table 1,such as typhoon number two, shows that thedeterministic operator can occasionally makethe better decision. it is only in the long runthat the benefit of applying decision theory isrealized. By the end of two years (or eight typhoonapproaches), the stochastic operator isclearly doing better. As the evac Sim continues,the savings of the stochastic operator (thedifference between the deterministic and stochasticexpenses) grow (fig. 1). However, the

WEATHER AND THE CALCULATED RISK 75Table 1. Sample results of Evac Sim*TyphoonApproachDeterministic Operator(Decision Threshold = 50 knots)ForecastObserved WindEvacuate?Wind (knots)(knots)Result1 12 no 20 savings 02 36 no 44 savings 03 77 yes 81 valid evacuation 1504 43 no 62 loss 1,1505 52 yes 41 false alarm 1,3006 28 no 29 savings 1,3007 20 no 27 savings 1,3008 32 no 23 savings 1,300TyphoonApproachForecast Windgreater than or equalto 50 knots (percent)Evacuate?Stochastic Operator(Decision Threshold = 15 percent)Observed Wind(knots)ResultCumulative Expense($1,000)Cumulative Expense($1,000)1 9 no 20 savings 02 17 yes 44 false alarm 1503 99 yes 81 valid evacuation 3004 25 yes 62 valid evacuation 4505 33 yes 41 false alarm 6006 24 yes 29 false alarm 7507 1 no 27 savings 7508 7 no 23 savings 750*the table shows deterministic- versus stochastic-operator evacuation decisions and expenses incurred for eight consecutivetyphoon approaches over a two-year period. the deterministic operator’s total expense amounted to $1,300,000—mostly from a costly miss on the fourth typhoon approach. the stochastic operator suffered from many false alarms(approaches two, five, and six) but correctly evacuated to avoid both damaging wind events (approaches three and four),thus expending $550,000 less.stochastic operator makes plenty of wrong decisions,even including a $1,000,000 loss ontyphoon approach number 27. Given the uncertaintyin the forecast, the best possible performanceis obtained by following orm supportedby stochastic forecasts. repeated runs(multiple 10-year periods [results not shown])of the simulation revealed that the average(or expected) 10-year expense comes to$5,400,000 for the deterministic operator and$3,800,000 for the stochastic operator (a 30percent savings).this simple yet revealing example of defensiveorm can be made more realistic by addingcomplexity, but that would not change thegeneral result. For instance, resource-protectionscenarios often involve a range of possible actionsto choose from and multiple levels ofpotential loss. the simulation could be expandedto include less expensive options toprotect the aircraft for wind conditions up to60 knots, such as securing the aircraft in ahangar. Also, the damage (loss) may greatlyincrease if extremely high winds (more than 80knots) occur. representing such complexityin a decision model would only further supportthe case for using stochastic forecasts in an ormdecision process to maximize efficiency. 14the crux of applying decision theory entailsaccepting the fact that when decision inputscontain uncertainty, it is not possible tomake the right decision consistently. Unfavorableoutcomes (false alarms and/or losses)are bound to occur. the strategy involves aimingfor perfection while simultaneously findinga balance of potential false alarms andlosses that minimizes expenses over time.Such optimization becomes possible with robust,stochastic decision inputs, which an ensembleforecast can provide for weather.

76 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008Cumulative Expense ($1,000)8,0007,000 7,0006,0005,000Deterministic Operator 6,0005,0004,0003,000Stochastic Operator4,0003,0002,000 Perfect Operator2,0001,000 1,000no. 278,0000 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40Typhoon ApproachFigure 1. Sample results of the extended Evac Sim. Cumulative expenses are shown for 40 typhoonapproaches over one 10-year period (including the first eight typhoons from table 1 for the deterministicoperator, stochastic operator, and a hypothetical perfect operator who evacuates only for cases when awind greater than or equal to 50 knots actually occurs). Typhoon approach number 27 is highlighted toshow a case in which both the deterministic and stochastic operators failed to take necessary protectiveaction. The stochastic operator saved about $2,000,000 in this sample 10-year period.Example of OffensiveOperational Risk Managementoffensive orm has to do with making smartdecisions to optimize gain. For DoD operations,this means maximizing combat capability(within resource limitations) to more effectivelyperform the mission. the example forthis article involves destruction of enemy airdefenses (DeAD [pronounced ”deed”]). 15 inthe following DeAD simulation (DeAD Sim),a four-ship flight of F-16s is tasked to reducethe enemy’s surface-to-air missile (SAm) capabilityby executing a series of DeAD missions.the objective calls for quickly and efficientlyreducing the enemy’s SAm capacity down to10 percent, thus clearing the way for the startof the main air offensive. campaign plannershave allocated 630,000 pounds (lb.) of fuelfor DeAD operations. A single mission uses60,000 lb., so the aircraft need to fulfill the objectivewith no more than 10 missions to avoidtapping into fuel needed to support follow-onoperations.Visual contact with the targets is essentialsince the SAms are mobile and not radar active.Additionally, rules of engagement for thiscampaign dictate strict attention to avoidingcollateral damage. With the mobile SAms oftenoperating within small villages, the pilotscan minimize damage to civilian interests onlywith eyes on target. Due to rough and varyingterrain, sufficient visual contact and groundclearance become possible only when thecloud ceiling is 3,000 feet (flight level 030) orhigher. cloud ceiling (ciG) is defined as theheight of the base of the lowest cloud layerthat covers at least six-tenths of the sky. 16Similar to the evac Sim, the DeAD Sim simulatesvarying weather conditions with randomdraws from a distribution of possible cloudstates constructed to represent climatologicalconditions of ciG greater than or equal to 030occurring approximately two-thirds of thetime. 17 Deterministic forecasts are assumed tohave an average random error of 900 feet. Stochasticforecasts from an ensemble are simulatedfrom a slightly erred distribution of potentialforecasts. 18the DeAD Sim steps through sequentialcycles defined as the period of time (manyhours) to plan, equip, execute, and recover.in deciding not to attack, the operator stilluses up a cycle since the planning process, air­

WEATHER AND THE CALCULATED RISK 77crew preparation, and equipping must be restarted.each successful attack mission reducesthe SAms by 20 percent of the enemy’s maximumcapacity. the enemy rebuilds by 5 percentduring any cycle when not successfullyattacked (but can never exceed 100 percent)and has a large resupply capability. Any givencycle has four possible outcomes (associateddestruction [-] or rebuild [+] of enemy capacityas well as fuel expense in parentheses):1. Success (-20 percent | 60,000 lb.): missionflown; found favorable weather.2. No opportunity (+5 percent | 0 lb.):mission not flown; unfavorable weatheroccurred.3. missed opportunity (+5 percent | 0 lb.):mission not flown; favorable weather occurred.4. Wasted effort (+5 percent | 60,000 lb.):mission flown; found unfavorable weather.the stochastic operator can use probabilityforecasts to make a quicker kill (table 2). thedeterministic operator gets the job done butsuffers from more frequent poor decisions.the stochastic operator, though vulnerable tomistaken decisions, is much better at capitalizingon opportunities. the advantage comesfrom attacking when probability for ciGgreater than or equal to 030 exceeds the optimalthreshold, recalculated prior to each cycle. theTable 2. Sample results of DEAD Sim*CycleDeterministic Operator(Decision Threshold = 030)CycleCIGCIGEnemy SAM Fuel UsedAttack?ResultForecastObserved(percent) (x1,000 lb.)1 062 yes 068 success 80 602 045 yes 014 wasted effort 85 1203 022 no 045 missed opportunity 90 1204 048 yes 038 success 70 1805 035 yes 035 success 50 2406 017 no 042 missed opportunity 55 2407 038 yes 027 wasted effort 60 3008 005 no 011 no opportunity 65 3009 016 no 008 no opportunity 70 30010 066 yes 064 success 50 36011 025 no 032 missed opportunity 55 36012 033 yes 049 success 35 42013 125 yes 115 success 15 48014 085 yes 100 success 0 540Forecast CIGgreater than or equalto 030 (percent)DecisionThreshold(percent)Stochastic Operator(Decision Threshold = variable percentage)Attack?CIGObservedResultEnemy SAM(percent)Fuel Used(x1,000 lb.)1 100 45 yes 068 success 80 602 55 39 yes 014 wasted effort 85 1203 42 47 no 045 missed opportunity 90 1204 95 50 yes 038 success 70 1805 88 43 yes 035 success 50 2406 38 33 yes 042 success 30 3007 64 20 yes 027 wasted effort 35 3608 22 31 no 011 no opportunity 40 3609 17 38 no 008 no opportunity 45 36010 100 44 yes 064 success 25 42011 31 25 yes 032 success 5 480*Deterministic- versus stochastic-operator decisions and results for the same weather conditions are shown for one completecampaign. the deterministic operator needed three additional cycles and 60,000 lb. (or one mission) more fuel tocomplete the DeAD objective.

78 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008threshold is based on the changing situationof the enemy’s remaining SAm capacity andremaining fuel. 19 Lower SAm capacity (weakerenemy) and greater fuel supply (strongerfriendly footing) means the stochastic operatorcan afford to be more aggressive and attack ata lower probability of favorable weather.optimally meeting the DeAD objective requiresbalancing between being aggressive torapidly defeat the SAms and being cautious toavoid wasting fuel on unsuccessful missions.Simply attacking every cycle would ensure garneringevery possible opportunity, thus meetingthe DeAD objective the quickest. However,many of the missions would encounter unfavorableweather, thus maximizing fuel wasteand potentially degrading capability for theremainder of the air campaign. the challengethen becomes defeating the SAms as effectively(minimizing time taken) and efficiently(minimizing fuel usage) as possible.Figure 2, built from repeated runs of theDeAD Sim, shows the advantage (particular tothis example) an operator could expect by usingstochastic forecasts to optimize decisions.the stochastic operator performed bettermore frequently and often by a large margin.the deterministic operator could sometimesbeat or tie the stochastic operator since randomchance resulted in some very good deterministicforecasts. the key downfall of the deterministicforecasts was that the good oneswere not reliable. in essence, the deterministicoperator became a victim of uncertaintysince the amount of error can never be knownahead of time.the overall average results had the stochasticoperator improving by 10 percent over thedeterministic operator (mission accomplishedin 10.1 cycles versus 11.2 cycles). Furthermore,effectiveness improved without additional resources.on average, the stochastic operatoractually used 3 percent less fuel. Althoughthat may not represent a significant savings,remember that offensive orm focuses on effectivenessand not efficiency, as with defensiveorm. combat capability is maximized byapplying knowledge of the full range of possibilitiesto the decision process, thus reactingto a comprehensive picture of potential effectson the mission from the natural environment.However, as also shown in the evac Sim, thestochastic operator is certainly not perfect. Ahypothetical perfect operator would meet theStochasticOperatorWinsmore than3 cyclesmore than3 cycles2–3 cycles1 cycleDeterministicOperatorWinscycle tie,less fuelused2–3cyclescycle tie,less fuelused1cycletie by bothcycles and fuelDeterministic Win by more than 3 cycles 23Operator Win by 2–3 cycles 39213Wins Win by 1 cycle 24Cycle tie, less fuel used 127Ties 327 327Cycle tie, less fuel used 112Stochastic Win by 1 cycle 102460Operator Win by 2–3 cycles 97Wins Win by more than 3 cycles 149Figure 2. Results from 1,000 separate campaigns run in the DEAD Sim

WEATHER AND THE CALCULATED RISK 79DeAD objective with 20 percent fewer cyclesand 20 percent less fuel on average. 20 At best,a real-life operator can come closer to perfectionby accounting for the inherent uncertaintyof the forecast.many possibilities exist for expanding thescope and realism of the DeAD Sim. insteadof just monitoring fuel usage, other criticaldependencies such as ordnance, pilot availability,and so forth, could also be tracked.missions that met unfavorable weather for theDeAD operation could be directed to secondarytargets. instead of fixing SAm destructionat 20 percent for a successful mission, destructioncould vary, based on an operator’s choiceto alter the number of sorties per mission oron an enemy who effectively hides during fairweather. Adding such enhancements wouldbe telling for war-gaming analysis, but the bottomline would still be that using stochasticforecasts in an offensive orm decision processmaximizes combat capability.Human Factorsoptimal orm decision making comes frombalancing mission risks and mission objectives.in the decision-model examples above,risks and objectives are well defined, and decisionsfollow prescribed optimization rules.these models have applicability when decisioninputs and their risks are quantifiableand decision rules can be clearly defined apriori. this is the case with decision inputssuch as logistics, enemy strength, weather,weapons’ impact, and so forth, and with clearmission objectives such as minimizing expensesor eliminating enemy capabilities.the role of machines in decision making issteadily increasing as the machine-to-machineenvironment matures. Since machines operateonly as programmed, they are ideal forperforming a balanced risk analysis in a prescriptivescenario. A machine rapidly processesextensive, complex data from a myriadof quantifiable inputs and strictly follows optimizationrules to arrive at an appropriate decision.the weakness of the machine decision isthat it may make nonoptimal decisions in situationsinvolving intangible decision inputs.the latter inputs include issues such as unitmorale and political, strategic, moral, and religiousconsiderations. At best, defining andunderstanding these often powerful influenceson mission accomplishment can normallybe done subjectively. A human decisionmaker must weigh the associated risks againstcosts and mission objectives. in the DeAD scenario,for example, assume that several days ofunfavorable weather have prevented any attemptto attack. morale is dropping rapidly aspersonnel become anxious to perform theirduty. Given yet another forecast for potentialunfavorable weather (exceeding risk tolerance),the operator may decide to risk an attackto bolster morale and greatly increase thechances of overall success.the human ability to process intangible decisioninputs can add tremendous value to thedecision process. Unfortunately, regardless ofwhether a situation involves quantifiable, intangible,or both types of decision inputs, humanscan sometimes make nonoptimal decisionsthrough unbalanced risk analysis. 21Unlike machines, humans may occasionallychoose to ignore optimization rules. For example,in the typhoon scenario, a decisionmaker concerned that incurring a big loss mayruin his or her career may choose to evacuateeven when the rule-based decision calls for remainingin place.Humans also tend to have an overly narrowfocus. Faced with a complex array of both quantifiableand intangible inputs, all with varyingdegrees of uncertainty, an operator can quicklybecome overwhelmed. the logical reaction involvessubjectively weighing the inputs andmaking a decision considering only the mostimportant factors. Although a very experiencedoperator may successfully arrive at a valid decision,more often than not, the narrow-focuseffect leads to nonoptimized decisions.misinterpretation of quantified stochasticinputs also represents a potential problem.inability to think stochastically can sway a decisionmaker away from following the optimizationrules. Humans tend to think deterministically(yes/no) and translate any probability

80 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008greater than 50 percent into “it’s going to happen”and vice versa. Additionally, differentmethods of presenting risk information canresult in different decisions since human informationprocessing involves both experiential(i.e., emotional) and analytic aspects. 22 considerhow a decision maker may react to numericallyequivalent forecasts of “70 percentchance of snow” versus “30 percent chance ofno snow” versus “odds of snow are seven in 10.”in another common behavior—the “kneejerk”reaction—decisions are based upon arecent unfavorable outcome. When an operatorgets hit with the bill from a loss or wastedeffort, the natural reaction is to toss aside(maybe only temporarily) the optimized decisionrules and do whatever it takes to ensurethat bill doesn’t come again. ironically, suchshortsightedness ends up costing more in thelong run. the real flaw lies in using a singleunfavorable (or favorable) outcome as a measureof orm success.the knee-jerk reaction was modeled in theDeAD Sim to demonstrate its impact. Afterwasting effort (flying a mission and findingunfavorable weather), the stochastic operatorincreased the decision threshold to 99 percentchance of ciG greater than or equal to030 for the next cycle to prevent anotherwasted effort (the operator did not attack unlessfavorable weather became very certain).conversely, upon missing an opportunity (notflying a mission and favorable weather occurring),the stochastic operator decreased thedecision threshold for the next cycle to 1 percentto prevent another missed opportunity (theoperator attacked unless unfavorable weatherwas certain). this knee-jerk reaction producedan increase in average number of cycles to10.7 (from 10.2) and in average fuel use to415,000 lb. (from 398,000). this performancewas still better than the deterministic operator’sbut a notable departure from optimal.Summary/Recommendationstwo simple yet realistic decision scenarioswere modeled to demonstrate how stochasticforecasts, which describe a range of likely outcomes,enable orm. the evac Sim showedhow use of stochastic forecasts can significantlyconserve resources (i.e., increased efficiencythrough defensive orm). the DeADSim showed how use of stochastic forecastscan maximize combat capability (i.e., increasedeffectiveness through offensive orm).the added benefit from using stochastic versusdeterministic (single-valued) forecasts canvary greatly, depending upon a mission’s sensitivityto weather, the skill of the deterministicforecasting, and the detrimental weather’s frequencyof occurrence. Additionally, humanfactors can have both positive and negative effectson the decision process.realizing the benefits will require considerableresources, effort, and patience in the developmentarenas of ensemble-data productionand application. the effort would enhanceone of our country’s great strengths—advancedtechnology. Skilled use of stochastic forecastsfrom an ensemble system can provide a distinctadvantage over an adversary in currentand future conflicts. Alternatively, continuingwith decision making based on deterministicforecasts may leave the DoD at a disadvantage,given increasing interest worldwide instochastic forecasts, as mentioned earlier.the DoD can and should exploit stochasticweather information available from externalsources (e.g., the National Weather Service),but internal production of ensemble data isnecessary to tailor forecasts to war fighters’ requirements.For example, generating a reliableprobability forecast for a high-impactevent such as a dust storm at Balad Air Base,iraq, requires processing a fine-scale ensembleforecast to model the event. Such productionis expensive but cost-effective. An ensemblesystem designed for a typical theater of operation(e.g., the middle east) costs several milliondollars in today’s computer hardware.the evac Sim used rather conservative estimatesto show how millions of dollars can besaved through optimal protection of a singleaircraft. By multiplying that across all aircraftand DoD assets susceptible to adverse weather,including life-threatening conditions, andthen adding in the increased combat capabilityfor all missions with weather vulnera­

WEATHER AND THE CALCULATED RISK 81bilities, it quickly becomes obvious that returnsfar outweigh costs. the DoD shouldfully back Air Force Weather’s planned implementation(beginning in 2009) of a robustensemble system designed to deliver highquality,operations-tailored stochastic forecastsfor all theaters of operation.Apart from the production of ensembledata, exploitation of this technology requiresdecision makers willing and able to apply it.Across the Air Force, personnel, procedures,and tools need to transform over the next fewyears to use stochastic forecasts in objectivedecision making. the first step in this transformationis education since appreciation of thebenefits and skillful application require understanding.the DoD should incorporate ormthat uses stochastic forecasts into formal trainingfor its decision makers at all levels. thenext step entails analysis of weather-sensitivemissions and processes to determine optimaldecision thresholds (e.g., choosing an alternateair-refueling track if the chance of moderateturbulence is greater than or equal to 35percent in the primary track). the operationsresearchcommunity, which has an interest inenhancing DoD decision making, can helpmeet the scope and complexity of such anundertaking. 23obviously much too involved to occur overnight,such transformation lends itself to agradual approach. Users who already incorporateaspects of probability forecasting (e.g.,launch operations at Patrick AFB) or havethe most to gain (due to high sensitivity toweather) should target transition as early as2009–10. other users can follow suit whenthey are ready because deterministic forecastswill remain available.the paradigm shift away from today’s relianceon deterministic forecasts constitutes themain barrier to this transformation. Both deterministicand stochastic forecasts focus onhelping users make good decisions, but thekey difference lies in the handling of uncertainty.Deterministic forecasts are fundamentallylimited by inconsistent forecast errors(unknown uncertainty). Stochastic forecastsprovide an objective description of uncertaintyto support optimal decision making followingorm principles: accept mission risksonly when potential benefits outweigh costsand potential loss. realizing this vision will enablewar fighters to exploit forecast uncertaintyinstead of becoming its victim—and thuswill promote the objectives of AFSo21. ❑Notes1. Hon. michael W. Wynne, secretary of the Air Force,“Letter to Airmen: Air Force Smart operations 21,” 8march 2006, http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070205-087.pdf.2. roger A. Pielke Jr. and richard t. conant, “BestPractices in Prediction for Decision-making: Lessons fromthe Atmospheric and earth Sciences,” Ecology 84, no. 6(2003): 1351–58, http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/admin/publication_files/2003.22.pdf.3. edward N. Lorenz, The Essence of Chaos (Seattle,WA: University of Washington Press, 1993), 77−79.4. Allan H. murphy, “the early History of ProbabilityForecasts: Some extensions and clarifications,” Weatherand Forecasting 13, no. 1 (march 1998): 5–15, http://ams.allenpress.com/archive/1520-0434/13/1/pdf/i1520-0434-13-1-5.pdf.5. maj Frank P. Scruggs Jr., “Decision theory andWeather Forecasts: A Union with Promise,” Air UniversityReview 18, no. 5 (July–August 1967): 53–57, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1967/jul-aug/scruggs.html.6. Brig Gen Lawrence A. Stutzriem, director of weather,to commander, Air Force Weather Agency, memorandum,4 october 2006.7. Air Force instruction (AFi) 90-901, Operational RiskManagement, 1 April 2000, 2, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/90/afi90-901/afi90-901.pdf.8. Yuejian Zhu et al., “the economic Value of ensemble-Based Weather Forecasts,” Bulletin of the American MeteorologicalSociety 83, no. 1 (January 2002): 73–83, http://ams.allenpress.com/archive/1520-0477/83/1/pdf/i1520-0477-83-1-73.pdf.9. in general, an optimal probability decision thresholdfor when to take action can mathematically be foundby considering things such as cost of taking action, potentialloss if the event occurs without protection, or gainmissed by not taking action. in the simple example here,the decision threshold of 35 percent would have come

IntegratingWeather in Net-Centric WarfareA Case for RefocusingHuman Resources in AirForce WeatherCol SCot t. HeCkman, USaFEditorial Abstract: Dwindling manpowerin Air Force Weather (AFW) and an increasinglynet-centric Air Force are forcinga change from the days of the face-to-faceweather briefing. Furthermore, the AirForce needs a better degree of forecast consistency.The author proposes that automatedforecasts and forecast tailoring representsignificant changes for AFW butthat their implementation will remove potentialhuman bottlenecks, enable greaterdetail for decision makers, and increasethe speed of access for all users.The weaTher briefer is obsolete,a victim of net-centricity. in a worldwhere everyone is connected, peopleaffected by weather will access relatedinformation directly and integrate it into theirdecision processes. No longer will “Stormy” theweather briefer, acting as both an expert anda bottleneck, serve as gatekeeper to weatherdatabases. To remain relevant to net-centricoperations, air force weather (afw) mustaggressively develop support for net-centricaccess and redefine the role of the weatherbriefer. Specifically, if it wishes to meet the demandsof increasingly net-centric decisionmakers, despite a shrinking manpower pool,afw must automate the forecast-tailoring pro­83

84 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008cess, remove the weather briefer, and addressinconsistency in the weather database.BackgroundUnderstanding the interaction between netcentricityand afw operations requires someawareness of the fundamental concepts ofeach. according to The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare, “NCw [network-centric warfare]is characterized by the ability of geographicallydispersed forces to attain a highlevel of shared battlespace awareness that isexploited to achieve strategic, operational,and tactical objectives in accordance with thecommander’s intent.” 1 increased sharing ofinformation via the network at all levels ofcommand likely will result in massed effects(increased combat power), decision superiority,heightened speed of command, and selfsynchronization.2 as described in the Net-Centric Environment Joint Functional Concept,when connected, units can pursue a commander’sintent without repeated contact withsuperiors to synchronize operations, relyingon shared awareness based on consistent informationto self-synchronize. 3The Transformation Planning Guidance of2003 specifically states that “implementationof the Department’s force transformationstrategy will shift us from an industrial age toan information age military. information agemilitary forces will be less platform-centric andmore network-centric.” 4 NCw will increaseconnectivity at lower echelons of commandand throughout functions other than commandand control (C2). The Net-Centric EnvironmentJoint Functional Concept notes that“since C2 nodes are already fairly well connected,the real power of the Net-Centric environmentwill be in connecting the otherfunctions and extremities of the force.” 5The Office of force Transformation monitorsthe progress of the transformation effort.The Transformation Planning Guidance directseach of the services to write a road map thataddresses, among other things, its conversionto NCw. Service NCw programs include theJoint Tactical radio System, air force Link-16airborne data link, Department of Defense(DOD)–wide Global information Grid networkinfrastructureprogram, Navy Cooperative engagementCapability data link, and armyforce XXi battle Command brigade and belowdata-link system. 6in addition, looking to improve theirforces’ shared situational awareness and collaborativedecision making, the services areactively increasing the connectivity of theirforces and experimenting with new tactics,techniques, and procedures to take advantageof the new capability. 7 Despite the newness ofNCw technologies and procedures, successstories have emerged from Operation iraqifreedom. for example, data links and theblue force Tracker system have reduced incidentsof fratricide, and procedures enabled bynew data links have allowed the developmentand striking of targets within 45 minutes. 8before discussing weather operations, weshould define the term decision maker as usedin this discussion. Specifically, such an individualreceives weather information and takesaction based on that information—a purposelybroad denotation since the environmentaffects virtually every mission and functionto some degree. indeed, the substance ofthis article could affect anyone who has accessto weather information.for weather operations, air force DoctrineDocument (afDD) 2-9.1 Weather Operations,describes how “air force weather operationsexecute five core processes—collection, analysis,prediction, tailoring, and integration—tocharacterize the environment and exploit environmentalinformation.” 9 Such characterizationincludes collection of environmentalmeasurements taken by the DOD, US government,and foreign instrumentation; analysisof the measurements; and prediction of thefuture state of the environment. These actionsproduce a four-dimensional representation(latitude, longitude, altitude, and time) of theenvironment, consisting of such environmentalparameters as wind speed/direction, temperature,pressure, humidity, clouds, and precipitation.in order for military decision makersto exploit this information, we must derivesuch decision parameters as ceiling, visibility,

INTEGRATING WEATHER IN NET-CENTRIC WARFARE 85cloud-free line of sight, and thermal contrastfrom the environmental parameters, some ofwhich (e.g., wind speed) double as decisionparameters. we tailor forecasted decision parametersto a particular mission by retrievingthem for the time(s) and location(s) needed,packaging the information into usable form(maps, tables, graphs, etc.), and formattingthe result for integration into the decisionmaker’s decision process. if the decisionmaker provides operational limitations (i.e.,thresholds), we may highlight these in thefinal product. we then measure or generateweather data and provide decision makersweather information in the form of a product—acollection of information in a particularpackage (text, map, or graph) and format(file type). in the future, we anticipate thatnet-centric data management and services willmake the processing and communication of atremendous amount of information feasibleand timely.weather information made available to decisionmakers must be accurate, timely, relevant,consistent, and accessible. accurate informationfacilitates correct decisions moreoften than incorrect ones. Timely informationprevents delayed decisions. relevant informationallows the decision maker to pinpointpertinent data. Consistent information guaranteesthat individuals involved in a collaborativedecision process do not receive conflictingstatements about the weather. and accessibleinformation permits decision makers to findwhat they need in a usable form.Trendsincreasing connectivity, net-centric decisionmaking with its demand for consistency,and decreasing afw manpower will reduceafw’s ability to support net-centric decisionmakers in the future unless it shifts resourcesfrom human-based forecast tailoring to amore automated approach.Increasing ConnectivityNCw’s network revolution will radically changecommunication modes, categorized here bythe degree of network-interface usage. in thisconstruct, machine communications require anetwork interface, but human communicationsdo not. for example, machine-to-machine(M2M) communication involves one computerapplication automatically requesting informationfrom another and the other automaticallyresponding via the network. human-to-human(h2h) communication does not require anetwork interface even though some voicecommunications will eventually take placeover the network (e.g., Voice-over-internetProtocol). examples include a briefing to acommander and his staff, a telephone conversationbetween action officers, or groundtroops passing target coordinates to aircraftover voice links. Machine-to-human (M2h)communication requires a network interface,as when a human uses a computer to access aweb page or query a database.as decision makers at all echelons gain networkaccess, the primary mode of communicationfor weather information will changefrom h2h to M2M and M2h. No longer theprimary mode, voice communications will yieldto network communication, which permitsthe transmission of detailed data. freed fromcommunications within line of sight or on certainfrequencies, decision makers will have accessto the entire network (via reachback).Major C2 nodes have traditionally possessedthis kind of access, but the vision for NCw entailsextending this kind of connectivity to themost tactical levels: the cockpit, tank, platoonmember, and so forth. Decision makers whohave experienced difficulty accessing weatherinformation in the past, due to limitations incommunications or afw personnel resources,will demand access—and the number of decisionmakers served will rise.Increasing Demand for ConsistencySelf-synchronization based on shared awarenessputs a premium on consistency of information.10 Contradictory information frustratesattempts to collaborate and self-synchronizesince collaborators must resolve conflicts beforeworking on the tactical decision at hand.

86 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008all decision makers in an operations areamust get their weather information from aconsistent and authoritative source to preventdisruption of coordinated operations. To citea simple example, a fighter mission launches,expecting marginal conditions in a refuelingtrack, but the tanker cancels since its informationshows conditions out of (the tanker’s)limits. although this scenario is manageable,imagine decision makers involved in a complexjoint and/or coalition operation attemptingto plan their part of the overall operationand trying to avoid or mitigate the effects ofweather. One of the four principles of afwoperations, consistency serves as the basis ofthe call for “one theater, one forecast,” foundin Joint Publication 3-59, Joint Doctrine, Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for Meteorological andOceanographic Operations. 11Decreasing Air Force Weather Manpowerrecent budget uncertainty caused by the ongoingglobal war on terror, the QuadrennialDefense Review Report of 2005, and former secretaryof defense Donald rumsfeld’s call fortransformation has resulted in a new plan forthe future of the air force. faced with replacingaging aircraft and no promise of additionalfunds, the service plans to cut approximately40,000 troops (12 percent) by the endof fiscal year 2009. 12 in addition, Secretary ofthe air force Michael wynne introduced airforce Smart Operations 21, a program designedto improve processes and reduce inefficiency.Secretary wynne seeks to institutionalize continuousprocess improvement and “look atinnovative ways to use our materiel and personnelmore efficiently.” 13These reductions continue a long patternof drawing down the air force after the collapseof the Soviet Union. reductions inafw’s enlisted personnel since 1985 haveproved slower than those in the overall airforce—not the case with officer reductions,which dipped in 2001 to as low as 43 percentof the 1985 levels compared to the overall airforce low of 62 percent in 2001. 14faced with pressure to reduce manpowerand costs, afw historically has automatedprocesses to reduce manpower, consolidatedwork centers to reduce overhead, and leveragedweather data produced by others (e.g.,the National Oceanographic and atmosphericadministration and US Navy capabilities).afw must cope with the challenge of simultaneouslyreacting to budget and manpower reductionswhile funding and managing a transformationto meet the demands of NCw.Continuing Human-Based Forecast Tailoringforecast tailoring entails translation of measuredor predicted environmental parameters(e.g., temperature, wind speed, relative humidity,etc.) to decision parameters (e.g., heatstressindex, crosswind, lock-on range, etc.)valid at mission-specific locations and times.for example, we utilize wind measurements atthe approach end of the runway to calculatethe crosswind component, which the supervisorof flying uses to decide whether to continueflight operations or divert aircraft to anotherfield.in 1997 afw began an ambitious reengineeringeffort that redefined much of theweather function’s organization and rearrangedtasks among weather units. in the June1998 edition of Flying Safety, brig Gen fred P.Lewis, air force director of weather, announcedhis decision to continue face-to-faceweather briefings, provided by weather flights,despite a decrease in manpower. 15 Operationalweather squadrons would perform some functionsof the old weather flights at regionalcenters, allowing smaller flights to concentrateon tailoring weather information fortheir supported decision makers. implementationof this concept emphasized havingweather technicians tailor information to everymission and deliver the resulting product tothe decision maker.arguably the optimum support methodology,dedicating a weather technician to every missionfaces even more limitations today than in1997. Obviously, the time required per productand number of weather technicians onduty at a given time constrain the rate of production.in order to provide quality support,these technicians must learn the missions and

INTEGRATING WEATHER IN NET-CENTRIC WARFARE 87environmental impacts for all of their supporteddecision makers—something that oftencalls for extensive on-the-job training. Tomake timely products, they must know themission schedule and profiles and adjust tochanges, such as delays in takeoff time orchanges in the route of flight. en route targetchanges prove almost impossible to supportunless we can dedicate a technician to a particularmission. The limited manpower availableto meet demands forces weather flightsto compromise by developing a single productto meet multiple missions (commonly referredto as a weather “flimsy” for multiple trainingmissions), putting in longer hours, reducingtime spent on each product, or simply admittingan inability to support some decisionmakers. This situation results in delayed, lessaccurate, and less detailed support, comparedto the product created by using M2M access toweather databases. Over the next few years,afw must contend with the prospect of askinga decreasing number of its technicians tosupport decision makers who prefer that theirdetailed weather information come from M2Mor M2h interfaces.Actions RequiredTo address this multifaceted and complexchallenge, afw must automate the forecasttailoringprocess to meet the increasing demandfor M2M and M2h access, change froma product-centric to an information-centricprocess, and reduce inconsistencies in theweather databases available to decision makers.Automate Forecast TailoringThe automation of forecast tailoring will permitdecision makers to access M2h web sitesor program their decision-support-system applicationsto access M2M-enabled weather databasesdirectly. They will no longer need to requestproducts from a weather technician.automation is preferable for several reasons:• forecast tailoring involves gathering informationfrom many sources, determiningvalues for the mission’s locations andtimes, and then putting the informationinto the proper package and format—tasks easily automated.• humans limit the level of detail that canbe provided in a timely manner. Networkaccess, however, allows decision makersto receive much more detailed information—forexample, by indicating conditions(winds, temperature, turbulence,icing, likelihood of thunderstorms, etc.)along a route of flight at every mile orminute instead of simply using maps thatrequire crew interpretation.• Unlike human processes, which introducea degree of inconsistency and errorbecause they are not perfectly repeatable,automated processes, when fullymature, quantify the error because oftheir repeatability. Using the earlierfighter/tanker example, we see that automatedforecast tailoring would ensurethat the fighter and tanker receive thesame refueling-orbit forecast since identicalalgorithms would generate it fromthe same information in the database.• Nearly instantaneous network access requiresneither human involvement norqueuing for a human response (i.e., no“Please hold for the next availablebriefer”).• The number of possible products increasesdramatically. Decision makers can usesoftware written for a particular mappingor graphing technique to create all typesof products without incurring a large manpowerrequirement or training burden.• Perhaps the most compelling argumentspeaks to the expandable nature of networkaccess—its ability to handle a largeinflux of decision makers without theneed for additional manpower. in large,complex contingency situations, in whichdeployment of weather personnel may lagbehind combat operations, such accesscanhandlethespikeinrequestsforweatherinformation without adding manpower.

88 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008• finally, in the few cases that justify usingh2h, weather personnel can employ thedeveloped M2h methodologies to developtheir responses to h2h requests.Of course, the quality of automation softwareremains critical to the success of implementingthis approach. Patient developmentand testing as well as gradual implementationwill prove key to building trust in the newtechnology. Several obstacles, however, blockthe path of a fully automated solution:• Decision makers who prefer M2h andM2M must accept the responsibility ofmaintaining access to weather informationand understanding the strengthsand weaknesses of the content. This fundamentalcultural change shifts the burdenof retrieving weather informationfrom the weather technician to the decisionmaker.• Some decision makers will resist usingnetwork-based access methods. The needfor h2h weather information, presentedby the person who made the forecast, repeatsthe argument used by afw reengineeringto retain human-based forecasttailoring. however, when pressed, manydecision makers admit they are trying toassess the uncertainty in the forecast byinteracting with the presenter. 16 The factthat afw has provided decision makersvery little in the way of uncertainty assessmentswith weather predictions constitutesa serious shortcoming in its pastsupport of those individuals. weatherpredictions’ varying degrees of uncertaintyarise from the initial indeterminatestate of the environment, primarily dueto shortcomings of observation methodologiesand coverage. Knowing this, decisionmakers must “look Stormy in theeye” to assess the uncertainty in the forecast.afw has recognized this shortcomingand is developing objective methodsto quantify uncertainty and include it inthe weather database for retrieval by decisionmakers—a new capability reflectedin afw’s Characterizing the EnvironmentEnabling Concept, released in april 2006. 17because we do not yet have a methodologyfor humans to quantify uncertainty objectively,we must use subjective methodsthat depend on the widely varying skillsof individual forecasters.• automation may affect accuracy. Currently,when forecasters tailor productsfor decision makers, they make adjustmentsto computer-based forecasts to accountfor model errors and biases, whichusually, but not always, improve the accuracyof the information. if taking thehuman out of forecast tailoring results ina significant drop in accuracy, decisionmakers will demand reintroduction ofthe human. People should remain partof the process until the decision maker canpull from the database a product equalto or greater in accuracy and detail thanthe one previously available. we shouldnot compromise accuracy for better accessand more detail. if a human can improvethe accuracy of weather information,his or her efforts must occur in the“prediction” process, thus making the resultsavailable in the weather-informationdatabase.• automating weather-impact assessmentspresents a challenge. afw has gone togreat lengths to catalogue environmentalimpacts on the various missions and operationsit supports, believing they servedecision makers better by providing notonly weather information but also the“so what” aspects. even though decisionmakers want impact assessments, weatherpersonnel may not possess adequate qualificationsto make them. Decision makersshould assess environmental impacts totheir operations because of their familiaritywith them and the possible workarounds.To help its personnel in thisendeavor, afw, in cooperation with thearmy research Laboratory, has developedrule sets to derive operational-impact assessmentsfrom decision parameters. 18 ina net-centric environment, conversion ofthese aids to a web-based service would

INTEGRATING WEATHER IN NET-CENTRIC WARFARE 89give decision makers full control over therule sets so they can modify them to suittheir situation.• Some decision processes require an environmentalexpert. in cases involving fluid,interactive decision processes and operationssensitive to the environment, decisionmakers may designate an individualto assess environmental impacts insteadof accessing the database themselves.This designated environmental expert(not necessarily a weather technician)could use M2h interfaces and web servicesto develop the necessary missiontailoredinformation.Change from Product-Centric to Info-Centrica decision to use network access in the futurewould require making any human adjustmentsto the information in the net-centric database—ashift that will force afw to change itsoperations from product-centric to informationcentric.afw must concentrate its efforts (particularlyits manpower) on optimizing the accuracyof decision parameters and rely onautomation to generate the products. Severaldisadvantages accompany the product-centricapproach:• in most cases, manual production tiesafw’s manpower to a schedule, eliminatingthe option to skip products or allowissuance of automated ones. Limited manpowerconstrains the number of differentproducts and the frequency of updates.• weather personnel must make the products,even during completely benignweather, when an automated productwould suffice.• if demand for a particular product increases,manpower must shift to meet it.an information-centric approach wouldinvolve deriving products from the database,freeing personnel to modify thedata as needed without concern aboutactual production.in this effort, afw can follow the lead ofthe National weather Service, which is adoptingan information-centric approach by implementingthe National Digital forecast Database. 19The service’s forecasters adjust a database atthe office and use product-generation softwareto create everything from terminal-aerodromeforecasts, to severe-weather warnings, to thevoice on the National Oceanographic and atmosphericadministration’s weather radio.afw is slowly working toward informationcentricoperations. in January 2006, it completedthe Exploit Environmental Information inNet-Centric Operations Enabling Concept—thebest statement of afw’s intent to move toinformation-centric processes. 20 Though placinghuman “adjustments” in the tailoring process,the document calls for making the resultsavailable in the weather database for access bydecision makers. afw’s Joint environmentalToolkit program, initiated in December 2005,includes some requirements for establishinginformation-centric forecast operations. Theprogram’s legacy requirements, which will beof use during the transition, may take priorityif the program continues over schedule andover budget. 21The transition still needs momentum. evenas of March 2007, air force instruction (afi)15-128, Air and Space Weather Operations: Rolesand Responsibilities, required very specific products,tasking weather flights to “develop andconduct a mission execution forecast processto tailor weather products for operational users”and to “provide tailored weather effectsproducts from Tactical Decision aids and theintegrated weather effects Decision aid topredict go/no go weather thresholds as coordinatedwith the host/parent unit.” 22Improving Consistencyas previously mentioned, NCw’s shared awarenessand collaborative decision making requireconsistent information. inconsistencymanifests itself in several forms, the simplestbeing redundancy. if two collaborating decisionmakers get their weather informationfrom different sources, they will likely receivevarying forecasts because of the differences in

90 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008forecast models, human forecasters, or eventailoring software. Temporal inconsistency appearswhen one uses new information to updatea forecast for a particular time and place.Since errors increase with time (e.g., the forecastfor Monday issued on friday [three-dayforecast] is less accurate than the one issuedon Saturday [two-day]), forecasts are updateduntil the last minute before an operation. Spatialinconsistency usually appears on boundariesbetween forecast models or agencies. inmost cases, due to the natural variability ofweather, spatial inconsistencies are not obvious.however, in some cases, usually in categoricalforecasts (e.g., light, moderate, or severeturbulence), an inconsistency occurs thatweather variability can’t explain. Unfortunately,inserting humans into the predictionmay often improve accuracy yet reduce consistencysince two forecasters given the same inputswill produce different outputs.To eradicate inconsistency completely, allindividuals involved in making collaborativedecisions must access the same, perfectly consistentweather database. To optimize consistencyin the database, we would have to adjudicateor fuse (otherwise known as “ensemble”)different forecast-model solutions and carefullymonitor any human involvement to ensureconsistency. 23 we can meet the first requirementin the net-centric world of thefuture, but control over information access isnot absolute. The second requirement becomespossible only by centrally controllingproduction processes and reducing humaninvolvement to a centrally manageable scale.finally, if humans do improve the accuracy ofthe information they process, would reducinghuman involvement sacrifice accuracy for thesake of consistency?afw, the Navy, and the National weatherService generate and maintain overlappingand redundant weather databases. within afw,redundant databases exist among the airforce weather agency’s production centerand regional operational weather squadrons.although headquarters USaf/a3O’s ManagingNet-Centric Environmental Data and ServicesEnabling Concept describes how afw will try tosolve this problem, implementation proceedsslowly. 24 we must still resolve interservice andinteragency issues regarding database authority.The Way AheadChanging afw without destroying its relationshipwith decision makers means thatafw leadership must develop the requiredtechnologies and carefully manage transitions,including actively changing afw’s anddecision makers’ cultures.Technologyafw’s future lies in the development of theflexible, automated forecast-tailoring applicationsadvocated here. if these applicationsprove unreliable or difficult to employ, decisionmakers will not use them and will insiston having a weather technician provide theirinformation at the same time the corporateair force is cutting weather manpower. weathersupport will suffer, and we will lose opportunitiesto anticipate and exploit weather information.we must ensure the effectiveness of applicationsthat enable weather technicians togenerate or adjust information in the weatherdatabases instead of creating mission-tailoredproducts. Prior to entering into development,afw must make some effort to verify that humaninvolvement improves the accuracy ofinformation. by assuming that humans alwaysimprove accuracy, afw could end up spendingprecious software-development funds (andtime) on applications that provide little or nobenefit to the decision maker.afw must implement standard M2h andM2M interfaces as soon as possible and makethem available to developers of decision supportsystems. if afw delays, it will also lose opportunitiesto integrate weather informationinto key decision cycles.Transitionswe must carefully manage three transitions toreach the proposed end state: changing decisionmakers’ interfaces from h2h to M2h orM2M by using automated forecast-tailoringapplications, changing weather technicians’

INTEGRATING WEATHER IN NET-CENTRIC WARFARE 91practice of creating mission-tailored productsto adjusting weather information in the weatherdatabase, and changing the DOD meteorologycommunity from decentralized to centralizedcontrol of distribution.The transition from h2h to M2h/M2M involvestwo parts. first, afw must establish acandidate M2h or M2M interface. Manageabilityrequires that decision makers have astandard interface with enough flexibility tofit many of their specific product needs. Traditionallyafw has allowed embedded weathertechnicians to develop products with theirsupported decision makers. Usage of a standardinterface, however, demands gathering,prioritizing, and translating those product requirementsinto a set of production capabilities.Second, we must convince decision makersof the advantages of transitioning to M2hor M2M, taking the steps necessary to adapttheir processes to the new mode of communication.we should identify prototype decisionmakers for initial transition in order to establishmodels for similar decision makers. forexample, a candidate f-16 unit should makethe transition and set procedures for otherf-16 units to follow. afw should centrallymonitor these efforts, not only to assist if problemsoccur but also to determine when it canmove weather technicians to other tasks andlocations, at which time afw must replacetheir expertise and availability to answer questionswith online information, a centralizedcall center, and/or traveling capability.The move from product-centric to informationcentricforecasting will require a major revisionof afw’s instructions and training syllabias they relate to forecast tailoring. This representsa significant change in afw culture, inwhich forecast tailoring has served as the centraljustification for military weather forces.Today, regional operational weather squadronsperform some functions in an informationcentricmanner insofar as they issue regionalproducts related to all missions and providethe basis for mission-tailored products. Moreweather technicians must switch focus frommission to weather. for example, a technicianat a weather flight would no longer produce aseries of mission-tailored flight weather briefings(DOD form 175-1) for C-130 intratheatersupply missions in iraq since automated forecast-tailoringsoftware would generate thoseproducts, based on the crews’ request. instead,the weather technician, probably at an operationalweather squadron working in a teamenvironment, would concentrate on accuratelyforecasting the temperature, winds, precipitation,turbulence, and icing associatedwith the cold front passing through iraq thatconsequently affects all missions in that region.Technicians in weather flights would no longergenerate products but would serve as “recognizedexperts, facilitating access to and understandingof environmental information.” 25finally, the DOD must come to grips withmultiple, conflicting sources of weather information.The Navy and air force have significantinfrastructures dedicated to producingthis information. although overlap has decreasedsomewhat in the last 15 years, oneagency must have authority to determine thedefinitive characterization of the environmentvalid at a given time and place. after thatagency begins to answer decision makers’ requestswith consistent information, it can takea hard look at the relative contributions ofvarious overlapping inputs and cut those thatfail to produce information cost-effectively, anaction that may result in the consolidation ofDOD centers.ConclusionThe DOD’s implementation of NCw willincrease connectivity at lower echelons ofcommand and throughout non-C2 functions.The services are actively increasing the connectivityof their forces and experimentingwith new tactics, techniques, and proceduresto take advantage of the new capability, lookingto improve their forces’ shared situationalawareness and collaborative decision making.as decision makers at all echelons becomeconnected, they will demand more access tomission-tailored weather information via thenetwork, without the direct involvement of aweather briefer. Given the increasing numbersof decision makers and the decreasing num­

92 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008bers of afw personnel, afw will not be ableto match demand (particularly in a large contingencyoperation) unless it automates theforecast-tailoring process. The need for consistentinformation in collaborative decisionmaking provides further impetus for automatedproduct generation, requiring thatsteps be taken to increase consistency in theweather database.Though it represents a significant changefor afw, automated forecast tailoring wouldremove potential human bottlenecks, allowgreater detail, and increase the speed of ac-cess. To assure effectiveness, afw must alsochange to information-centric forecasting,which captures human-adjusted forecasts anduncertainty estimates in databases that decisionmakers can access by using automatedforecast-tailoring services as well as M2h andM2M interfaces.weather information remains important toDOD operations, but the briefers’ days arenumbered. Net-centric access to weather informationis the wave of the future, and afwneeds to move ahead of that wave. ❑Notes1. The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare (washington,DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office offorce Transformation, 5 January 2005), i, http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_387_NCw_book_Lowres.pdf.2. David S. alberts, John J. Garstka, and frederick P.Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging InformationSuperiority, 2nd ed., rev. (washington, DC: CCrPPublications, february 2000), 2, http://www.dodccrp.org/files/alberts_NCw.pdf.3. Net-Centric Environment Joint Functional Concept, version1.0 (washington, DC: Department of Defense, 7april 2005), 23, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/netcentric_jfc.pdf.4. Transformation Planning Guidance (washington, DC:Department of Defense, april 2003), 9–10, http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_129_Transformation_Planning_Guidance_april_2003_1.pdf.5. Net-Centric Environment Joint Functional Concept, 2.6. Clay wilson, Network Centric Warfare: Background andOversight Issues for Congress, report rL32411 (washington,DC: Library of Congress, Congressional research Service,2 June 2004), CrS-15–19, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/rL32411.pdf.7. Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare, 50.8. wilson, Network Centric Warfare, CrS-22.9. afDD 2-9.1, Weather Operations, 3 May 2006, 8,https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/afDD_Page_hTML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd2-9-1.pdf.10. Consistency is defined as “the extent to which informationis free from variation or contradiction.” Net-CentricEnvironment Joint Functional Concept, 29.11. afDD 2-9.1, Weather Operations, 6; and Joint Publication3-59, Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Proceduresfor Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations, 23 March1999, v, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_59.pdf.12. Gen T. Michael Moseley, “CSaf’s Vector: Shapingand Transforming the force,” 23 august 2006, http://www.af.mil/library/viewpoints/csaf.asp?id=262.13. Secretary of the air force Michael w. wynne,“Letter to airmen: air force Smart Operations 21,” 8March 2006, http://www.af.mil/library/viewpoints/secaf.asp?id=219.14. Maj Tom blazek, headquarters USaf/a3O-wr, tothe author, personal communication, 15 September 2006.15. brig Gen fred P. Lewis, “air force weather: reengineeringfor aircrews,” Flying Safety, June 1998, 9–12.16. in the absence of a formal survey, my personalcommunication with Col Dennis Parnell (C-130 pilot withair force Special Operations Command) and Lt Col Stevehiss (b-1 pilot) confirms discussions and interactions i’vehad over the last 20 years.17. Characterizing the Environment Enabling Concept (washington,DC: headquarters USaf/a3O-w, april 2006), 10.18. richard C. Shirkey and Melanie Gouveia, “weatherimpactDecision aids: Software to help Plan Optimal Sensorand System Performance,” Crosstalk, December 2002,http://www.stsc.hill.af.mil/crosstalk/2002/12/shirkey.html.19. harry r. Glahn and David P. ruth, “The New Digitalforecast Database of the National weather Service,” Bulletinof the American Meteorological Society 84, no. 2 (february2003): 195–201, http://www.weather.gov/ndfd/resources/bamsarticle.pdf.20. Exploit Environmental Information in Net-Centric OperationsEnabling Concept (washington, DC: headquartersUSaf/a3O-w, January 2006), 1.21. See The Request for Proposal for the Joint EnvironmentalToolkit, http://herbb.hanscom.af.mil/esc_opps.asp?rfp=r582.22. afi 15-128, Air and Space Weather Operations: Roles andResponsibilities, 26 July 2004, 13–14, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/afi15-128.pdf.23. ensemble forecasts combine multiple forecasts todetermine a most likely answer and a range of possibleanswers.24. Managing Net-Centric Environmental Data and ServicesEnabling Concept (washington, DC: headquartersUSaf/a3O-w, May 2006), 1.25. Air Force Weather Operations Functional Concept (washington,DC: headquarters USaf/a3, November 2005), 15.

A Look down the Slippery SlopeDomestic Operations, Outsourcing, and the Erosion ofMilitary CultureMaj Bryan D. Watson, UsaF*Editorial Abstract: Two simultaneous trends inside America’s military culture—its increasinglydomestic role and its growing reliance upon defense contractors—illustrate considerablefundamental differences between uniformed military personnel and their commercially orientedcounterparts. Employing a future scenario, the author contends that the growing civilianinfluence over formerly military endeavors will likely lead to serious trouble over time. Ifthat is true, America’s long-term ability to project combat power may ultimately falter as well.This article takes the form of a fictional speech given by a senior Air Force officer to the Air Commandand Staff College’s (ACSC) class of 2017. In his presentation, the officer (himself a graduate ofthe class of 2007) conveys several warnings and historical perspectives, including personal opinionsformed in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom. As awork of fiction, this article discusses the potential impact of certain trends within the American militaryestablishment; it is not intended as a predictor of future events.*I am extremely grateful to Dr. Donald MacCuish of the Air Command and Staff College faculty for his guidance and mentorshipthroughout this project.93

94 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008Introduction to an Uncertain Future Good morning, ladies and gentlemen—members ofthe ACSC class of 2017. Today it is my distinct pleasureto introduce to you a distinguished guest of thecollege. He has served in a variety of leadership positionsthroughout his career, and he is uniquely qualifiedto speak to us concerning the future of the UnitedStates Air Force, in that he is currently in charge of theAir Force’s new Office of Force Reconstitution. Ladiesand gentlemen, please welcome our next guest.Thank you and good morning. Please takeyour seats.I have to say that when I was a student herein 2007, I didn’t dream that I would have thejob that I have now—or that such a job wouldeven be necessary. Mine is a new office, and,according to my title at least, I’m supposed tofigure out how to “reconstitute” our Air Force.Frankly, nothing would make me happierthan not having a need for my job. Today, in2017, recruiting has dropped to an all-timelow even though financial incentives for enlisteesremain at an all-time high. People tellme that morale is low, that Air Force familiesare disillusioned, and that some of our folksare treated poorly by local civilian communities.Essentially our institution no longer enjoysthe prestige it once held. In a larger sense,though, I wonder if these issues are meresymptoms rather than “the problem.”Back in 2007, our military establishment focusedon “transformation” with an eye towardwinning the global war on terror. 1 It probablyseems like ancient history to you, but when Iwas a student here, the terrorist attacks of 11September 2001 (9/11) were still fresh in everyone’smind, and we found ourselves in theearly days of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq.I remember that many of my instructors andclassmates were already veterans of those conflictsand that my peers were studying “fourthgenerationwarfare” as well as the challengesinherent in a counterinsurgency environment. 2Because of our intense concentration onthose issues, not many people (including me)noticed the emergence of two trend lines in2007. First, despite heavy emphasis on Iraqi operations,the American military had begun tosee the prospect of significant involvementwithin the United States. In retrospect, I believethat our government began to turn to the armedforces to meet domestic needs because we were“handy, convenient, and superficially at least, effective.”3 Second, in the meantime, we had undertakensubstantial efforts to employ contractorsto do work that, historically, militarymembers had performed. Today, I believe thatthese trend lines (domestic operations and ourreliance on contractors) have intersected—withserious, unintended consequences.Turning toward Home: Our Growing Domestic Role I don’t think many Americans noticed themilitary’s expanding function within the country.For much of our history, our military hasconcerned itself with enemies located outsidethe nation’s borders; however, with 9/11 camethe realization that external enemies can attackus from within.Accordingly, the military’s domestic rolebegan quietly increasing, without much debate.As one commentator observed, “[Despiteapparent legal restrictions,] the use of a militarysurveillance system to help local law enforcementcatch the Washington area sniperin the fall of 2002 drew little criticism.” 4 Weapplied the same principle when we used “theNational Guard to patrol airports or protectmilitary installations, or supplement the BorderPatrol.” 5 On a basic level, employing 5,300military troops to help guard the Olympics inSalt Lake City from terrorist attack seemedeminently reasonable, and military actions of“reinforcing civilian agencies . . . with drug interdiction,or [providing] security for . . .sporting events like the Super Bowl seemed,on the surface, functional and helpful.” 6But a few people did express some concern;for example, one commentator warned that“regular armed forces need to face outward,against American enemies, rather than inwardwhere a military force can become an institutionacting on behalf of one part of the communityagainst another. That corrodes themorale of the forces, harms recruiting, reduces

A LOOK DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE 95readiness, undermines the support of the countryfor the armed forces, and ultimately drivesa wedge between the military and society.” 7 In2007, however, most of us just didn’t appreciatethe risk of relying upon the American militaryto ensure domestic tranquility.This reliance was no secret. Indeed, the NationalStrategy for Homeland Security overtly favoreda “thorough review of the laws permitting themilitary to act within the United States in orderto determine whether domestic preparednessand response efforts would benefit from greaterinvolvement of military personnel.” 8 As you mayrecall, the Federal Emergency ManagementAgency came under intense criticism for its responseto Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and governmentleaders responded with plans for militarysolutions to domestic crises, includingnatural disasters. 9 Thus, a few weeks after thehurricane, Pres. George Bush watched HurricaneRita come ashore from Headquarters USNorthern Command and suggested that themilitary should “determine and mobilize the nationalassets needed to respond to disaster.” 10Thereafter, officials began planning for amore “rapid, robust role for active duty forces inresponding to catastrophic disasters or terroristattacks.” 11 In fact, one senior official observedthat “it is almost inevitable that the Departmentof Defense [DOD] will play a very substantialrole in providing resources, equipment, commandand control, and other capabilities in responseto a catastrophic event . . . [since] onlythe Pentagon can marshal such resources anddeploy them quickly during a time in whichthousands of American lives may be at risk.” 12Interestingly, the American military’s focus ondomestic operations proceeded despite objectionsfrom state officials: the Texas governor“oppose[d] the federalization of emergencyresponse efforts to natural disasters and othercatastrophic events,” and Arizona’s governorwarned that “moving disaster planning and responseto Washington would be a disaster.” 13That same year, world health officials predicteda possible influenza epidemic, and thedesire for military involvement in domesticoperations intensified. 14 Again, this trend metwith little opposition, likely because of sentimentssuch as the public acknowledgment bythe Centers for Disease Control that “theUnited States was vulnerable to chemical andbioterrorism acts.” 15 The military’s possible roleactually formalized in the National Strategy forPandemic Influenza in November 2005, whenthe federal government pledged to “developmechanisms to activate” those “infrastructuresustainmentactivities that the U.S. militaryand other government entities may be able tosupport during [such] a pandemic.” 16It was straightforward logic: because of itsproven ability to plan and execute, the militarywas well suited to confront domestic crises.As a student here at ACSC, I rememberlearning a bit about domestic operations; wespent time on graphs and organizational chartsbut not so much on the cultural problems inherentin domestic operations. I’m sure thathas since changed.At about that same time, our leaders beganto seriously study the implications of what ispopularly known as the Posse Comitatus Act. 17I’ve since learned that people frequently misunderstandthe term posse comitatus, which literallymeans “the power or force of thecounty,” referring to the traditional power of acounty sheriff to summon a posse to assist inkeeping the peace, pursuing and arresting felons,and suppressing riots. 18 Historically, mostjurisdictions permit a police officer to seek assistancein arresting or recapturing an escapedprisoner. 19 The Posse Comitatus Act representsa notable exception insofar as it forbidsusing federal troops for such a purpose, thusreflecting American skepticism regarding astanding army that keeps the civil peace. 20The principle underlying this act has an interestinghistory in the United States, and wewould do well to remember it. Specifically, despitethreats to our national security from severalpowerful European nations, our FoundingFathers decided to limit the domesticpowers of the American military. 21 Delegatesto the Constitutional Convention hotly debatedmilitary issues, even arguing “whetherthere should be a standing army at all, or ifdefense of the nation should rely entirely onthe state militias.” 22 Despite the fact that theConstitution ultimately provided for Congress’sability to raise a standing army, its

96 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008only expressly stated domestic role involved“suppress[ing] insurrections.” 23The danger of a standing military representeda point of serious contention. Conventiondelegate Luther Martin of Maryland declaredto his state legislature that “when agovernment wishes to deprive its citizens of freedom,and reduce them to slavery it generallymakes use of a standing army.” 24 Similarly, AlexanderHamilton argued that standing armiescan “place the population under military subordination”and that “by degrees the people arebrought to consider the soldiery not only astheir protectors, but as their superiors.” 25 On anotheroccasion, James Madison observed that“the liberties of Rome proved the final victim toher military triumphs” and that “[a] standingforce, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same timethat it may be a necessary, provision. On thesmallest scale it has its inconveniences. On anextensive scale its consequences may be fatal.On any scale it is an object of laudable circumspectionand precaution.” 26 These types of concernshave undergirded the Posse ComitatusAct for most of its life, and, ultimately, after passageof the act, “it was understood that federaltroops were not available to supplement civilianlaw enforcement officials.” 27Gradually, that attitude began to soften.Was there some kind of sinister conspiracy tohave the American military assume more andmore domestic responsibilities? No, I think theanswer is far simpler. I believe that the phenomenoninvolved simple “mission creep” during atime of intense anxiety over our society’s internalsafety. 28 I’m reminded of the words ofVice Adm Arthur Cebrowski, USN, retired,the Pentagon’s former transformation chief,who observed that the “post-9/11 reality” indicated“that we need[ed] a new way to rebalanceour overseas interests and our concernfor homeland security.” 29 In retrospect, hiswords heralded a larger domestic role forAmerica’s military.Ultimately, my advice is simple. As futureleaders, make sure that you have a firm understandingof the proper functioning of a militaryin a democratic society. Never forget that youare public servants, and never take your publicsupport for granted. That said, we should allrealize that not everyone who performs publicfunctions is necessarily a public servant.For Profit and Country: OurReliance upon ContractorsIn the early days of my career, I witnessed aremarkable increase in our reliance upon privatecontractors. During 1991’s Operation DesertStorm, 9,200 contractors deployed to supportmilitary operations. 30 By 1999 somemilitary observers were expressing sentimentssuch as, “Never has there been such a relianceon nonmilitary members to accomplish tasksdirectly affecting the tactical successes of an engagement.”31 This trend continued; as our militarydownsized, privatization increased, andIraqi Freedom certainly proved no exception. 32During that conflict, “estimates of the numberof government civilian employees and contractorpersonnel present in Iraq range[d] fromtwenty to thirty thousand, making civilian workersthe second largest contingent in-country.” 33In Iraq, arguably it became difficult to tellthe difference between functions performedby contractors and uniformed military members.Civilians “maintain[ed] complex weaponsystems such as the F-117 Nighthawk fighter,B-2 Spirit bomber, M1 Abrams tank, and TOWmissile system, and operat[ed] the Global Hawkand Predator unmanned aerial vehicles”;“conduct[ed] intelligence collection . . . andanalysis”; and “interrogated prisoners of warand other detainees.” 34True, the American military historically hasrelied upon contractors’ services, but in Iraqand Afghanistan, the reliance became unprecedented.35 In Iraq we employed contractors afterwe fielded systems so new that the servicescould not develop training courses for uniformedpersonnel. 36 For example, during thefirst combat deployment of the RQ-4A GlobalHawk unmanned aerial vehicle in support ofOperation Enduring Freedom, 56 contractorsdeployed as part of an 82-member military,civil service, and contractor “team.” 37 Subsequently,the use of contractors in this type ofrole grew further, to the point that contractorsbegan “conducting combat-type operations”

A LOOK DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE 97that included “operat[ing] the [Global Hawk]”and even “serv[ing] as Global Hawk pilots.” 38Despite recognition that this could createnumerous issues—not the least of which wasthe fact that UAV contractor pilots could beconsidered unlawful combatants under theLaw of Armed Conflict—the American militarycontinued to rely upon contractors. 39 Apublication generated right here at MaxwellAFB, Alabama, even addressed this issue in2004, warning that “the citizen must be a citizennot a soldier. . . . War law has a short shrift forthe noncombatant who violates its principlesby taking up arms.” 40Privatization continued as a result of deepcuts in military personnel, claims that contractorscould perform more efficiently, the increasingcomplexity and sophistication of weaponsystems, and, of course, desires to deploy contractorsin order to thwart troop ceilings mandatedby legislation or a host country. 41 Weeven specifically designed some weapon systemsto rely upon contractor support insteadof uniformed personnel, again amid claims of“cost-effectiveness.” 42 One observer even remarked,“Simply stated it is impossible to deploywithout [contractors].” 43Additionally, we started seeing more “privatesecurity companies” in conflicts aroundthe world—including Iraq. Although officialreports declared that such companies in Iraq“provide only defensive services,” the extentof these contractors’ activities became quitesubstantial and, in the opinion of some people,practically “indistinguishable from militaryoperations.” 44 In April 2003, for instance, employeesof Blackwater USA battled with insurgentsattacking personnel assigned to the USledCoalition Provisional Authority in Najaf.They fired thousands of rounds of ammunitionand hundreds of grenades, and Blackwatereven used its own helicopters to supply themduring the fighting. 45 Later, the company’sleadership even offered its services as an armyfor hire in the world’s “trouble spots,” statingthat Blackwater “stands ready to help keep orrestore the peace anywhere it is needed.” 46Furthermore, contractors’ activities weren’tlimited to entities affiliated with the DOD.One particular example comes to mind: inFebruary 2006, “private security workers undercontract with the State Department shotand killed two Iraqi civilians.” 47 We would havedone well to carefully note the anger expressedby the brother of one of the casualties:“I swear to God that I will take revenge formy brother. . . . They did not even stop to takehim to the hospital. . . . This is their new democracy,this is the freedom they brought.” 48On a more troubling note, the victims’ angryrelatives “did not appear to distinguish betweenU.S. troops and the contractors, whomany Iraqis say resemble foreign soldiers.” 49Additionally, in late 2007, Blackwater USAcame under intense public scrutiny followingallegations that innocent Iraqi civilians werekilled by the company’s employees. 50Whenever I tell stories like this, many peopleask themselves, “How did we get to this point?Isn’t the government supposed to do the fighting?”Well, I’ve asked myself that same question,and I’ve done a little research. It allstarted innocently enough, back in the 1950s,when the federal government “required itsagencies to procure all commercial goods andservices from the private sector, except when‘not in the public interest.’ ” 51 Years later, Congressrequired federal agencies to outsourcegovernment positions not “inherently governmental.”52 Of course, the requirement appliedto positions held by military personnel, and theDOD complied, mandating that “functionsand duties that are inherently governmentalare barred from private sector performance.” 53Eventually, reliance upon contractors simplybecame expedient. As defense budgets struggledunder increased missions and exhortationsto trim manpower, we began to use contractorsin place of uniformed personnel. 54Civilian ranks weren’t immune either. Between2000 and 2006, the military permittedthe private sector to compete against federalcivilian workers, with contractors winningabout 60 percent of the time. 55As we contracted out more and more militaryfunctions, many service members applaudedthe additional manpower they receivedwhen contractors filled voids left bycuts in military personnel. 56 Moreover, membersof the public appreciated the budgetary

98 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008savings promised by a smaller military, and aswe redirected federal dollars to contractors,those companies enjoyed remarkable revenues.57 Basically, most folks seemed happy.Back then, as a junior field-grade officer likeyou, I focused intently—as did my peers—onhow to just get the job done for my boss. If Ineeded a task accomplished but didn’t have amilitary member available, I thought, “Whydon’t we find a contractor to do it?” I freely admitthat I failed to fully grasp basic principlesthat underpinned my military service; that is, Iremembered my high school civics lessons, but Ididn’t really internalize them. My peers and Ithought that phrases like “the common defense,”the relationship between “military” and“civil” power, and “government of the people, bythe people, for the people”—as expressed in theConstitution, Declaration of Independence,and Gettysburg Address, respectively—were justplatitudes thrown around by academics and politicians.We were wrong. The ability to apply militaryforce is an obligation of profound significancefor the American people, and we didn’tfully appreciate that idea in the context of contractors.I think of a great quotation that I wish Ihad heard back when I sat where you do now:“[D]emocratic government is responsible government—whichmeans accountable government—andthe essential problem in ‘contractingout’ is that responsibility and accountabilityare greatly diminished.” 58As someone observed in 2005, “To put itbluntly, the incentives of a private companydo not always align with its clients’ interests—or the public good.” 59 After all, “even whencontractors do military jobs, they remain privatebusinesses.” 60 Therein resides even moreconcern: the possible lack of control over contractors’actions and, potentially, their qualifications.For example, “U.S. Army investigatorsof the Abu Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandalfound that . . . all of the translators and up tohalf of the interrogators involved were privatecontractors” while “approximately 35 percentof the contract interrogators lacked formalmilitary training as interrogators.” 61 Additionally,remember that private companies retainfull control over which contracts they will enterinto and can even refuse to perform a jobthat they’ve agreed to if it becomes too perilousor unprofitable. 62 Granted, if contractorsabandon their duties, they might incur somefinancial penalties—but rarely anything moreserious. On the other hand, if you—as a militarymember—walk off the job, you could becourt-martialed. 63Really, the contract itself provides the onlycontrol or oversight of contractors and theiremployees. With limited exceptions, commandersand their staffs cannot supervise contractors.64 Instead, service members must workthrough contracting officers if any changes toa contract become necessary, and commandershave no disciplinary authority over a contractor’semployees. 65Eventually, some analysts started askinghow to improve this arrangement, particularlygiven the possibility that third parties couldequate contractors’ actions with those of theAmerican government. One possible answerbecame reliance upon the Military ExtraterritorialJurisdiction Act (MEJA), which madesomeone, such as a contractor, who is “employedby or accompanying the Armed Forcesoutside the United States,” criminally liable ifhe or she engages in an act outside the UnitedStates that would have constituted a crime hadit occurred inside the United States. 66 Thatsaid, any such prosecution would remain atthe discretion of a US attorney. 67 This contrastsstarkly with provisions of the Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice (UCMJ), which has worldwideapplicability to American military personneland whose prosecutorial discretion resideswith commanders. 68 Sure, a change in the lawsupposedly made contractors subject to theUCMJ in times of a “declared war or a contingencyoperation.” 69 Nevertheless, as a matterof practicality, political realities rendered thechange exceedingly difficult to implement.Military reliance on contractors continued,with the term inherently governmental progressivelybecoming less meaningful. 70 Because ofadvancements in technology, even the operationof major weapon systems—such as the F­117A stealth fighter, M1-A tank, Patriot missile,and Global Hawk—became “contractordependent,” a situation that encountered onlyfew objections. 71 As time passed, contractors

A LOOK DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE 99guarded our fence lines and handled munitions.They shoveled snow, treated the sickand wounded, repaired buildings, paid thetroops, processed military awards and decorations,and even served as air traffic controllers.The response to anyone who objected was, “Ifthe Air Force can hire a contractor to remotelypilot a combat aircraft in Iraq, or if the federalgovernment can hire private employees tobattle insurgents, are any functions really ‘inherentlygovernmental’ anymore?”Furthermore, as contractors integrated themselvesmore completely into the Air Force’s operations,they actually began to compete withthe military for talent. 72 Positions offered bycertain private firms to military members allowedthem to earn “anywhere from two to tentimes what they made in the regular military”;for example, in Iraq, former special forces personnelearned as much as $1,000 a day as contractors.73 Most significantly, many contractorsactively recruited recent retirees or militarymembers trained for a specific job at governmentexpense. 74 We had started down a slipperyslope, and there was no end in sight.Ultimately, the military and private industrybegan to blend in ways we had never seenbefore, producing a direct impact upon ourmilitary culture. As a student here at ACSC,for example, I remember living in base housingin which only military members andtheir families resided. I drove through thatarea today and saw a lot of nonmilitary faces.Many years ago, government officials decidedto privatize a substantial portion of militaryfamily housing, thereby merging private corporations—andtheir understandable desirefor financial profit—with our housing communities.75 These arrangements permittedsuch companies to control on-base real estatefor 50 years, and we allowed civilians with nomilitary affiliation to live on our bases if thehousing areas weren’t full, thereby assuringcontractors a predictable stream of income. 76Thus, life on military installations graduallybecame less “military.” As civilians moved intoour housing areas, they brought varied lifestyles,including certain social practices that clashedwith traditional military ones. In response, manyof our families flatly refused to live in privatizedhousing, ultimately leading to even greater numbersof civilians living on base. I associate someof my fondest memories from my early years ofservice with the close personal and professionalrelationships that my family developed withother military families who lived in base housing.Sadly, those times are gone.To cite another example, the Air Force alsodecided to partially contract out the functionof military gate guards in order to make uniformedsecurity forces available for other missions.77 Yes, the effect came about only gradually,but in the end, no one called us “Sir” or“Ma’am,” and no one saluted officers whenthey entered the base. We didn’t complain becausewe feared being labeled self-important orpompous—but we should have complained.You see, we hear about the importance of militarycustoms and courtesies, but contracted civiliansreduced them to mere “customer service.”78 Perhaps most importantly, back whenmilitary personnel served as gate guards, theypresented an unambiguous image to membersof the American public who passed by our installations—butthat changed too. Outsourcingof that gate-guard function—though barely noticeablein the larger scheme of our nationaldefense—became a microcosm of the larger issue:the erosion of our military culture. Yousee, it was happening before our very eyes.A Possible FutureAgainst this backdrop, we entered thepost–Iraqi Freedom world. As I mentioned before,at this point, two trend lines began converging:increased military involvement in domesticissues and rise of the military’s relianceon contractors. When they collided, we foundourselves in trouble.Remember, our reliance on contractors beganlong before the bird-flu epidemic of 2008,the New York hurricane of 2010, or the AmericanMidwest earthquake of 2015. 79 As you recall,these events demanded significant domesticmilitary action, augmented by largenumbers of contractors.Think, if you will, about the bird-flu epidemic,when US Northern Command en­

100 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008forced a three-state quarantine by deployingthousands of active duty troops into metropolitanareas. Remember how masses of civilianstried to flee infected areas and how militaryaircraft threatened to shoot down civilianjetliners after their pilots tried to violate thequarantine. Remember the civilian deathsduring those months of turmoil and the claimsof many observers that somehow the militarywas responsible, either by acting too harshlyor by not acting quickly enough to quell violence.My point? Just think for a minute abouthow the military’s status suffered in the weeksand months that followed. That’s a danger inherentin domestic military operations.Next, think about the New York hurricaneof 2010, when we saw a near repeat of the birdfluriots. But also remember the huge numbersof contract security guards who augmentedmilitary forces and law enforcement.After the crisis, do you recall the allegations ofphysical abuse that many New Yorkers reportedthey had suffered at the hands of securityguards? How some civilians complained—perhaps rightfully—that we violated theirconstitutional rights? 80 I am reminded of thelessons that we should have learned from HurricaneKatrina in 2005, when discipline apparentlybroke down among some law-enforcementpersonnel in New Orleans. 81Finally, remember the earthquake of 2015.By that time, law-enforcement entities, themilitary, contractors, and other federal andstate agencies seemed to have blended into asingle organization. Remember how organizationalstructures overlapped to the extent thatno one knew who was in charge. At the time, Inoticed that contractors and military memberswore similar uniforms, and I rememberasking myself, “How did we get here?”I was in the affected area after the earthquake,and I can tell you without hesitationthat some Americans genuinely feared peoplein uniform. 82 Granted, they had already gonethrough a traumatic experience, but they alsosimply feared the very people that our governmenthad sent to help. Everyone rememberedthe bird-flu riots as well as the allegations ofabuse from New York. In the end, the publiccouldn’t tell the difference between a servicemember and a contractor; you see, each personin the “military-industrial complex”lookedalike, reported to the same boss, wore the sameclothes—and carried the same weapons. 83The Erosion of Military Culture?As I close, I ask you to consider the fact thatour government has “long recognized that themilitary is, by necessity, a specialized societyseparate from civilian society.” 84 Consequently,other governmental officials historically havehad a willingness to defer to the judgments ofmilitary decision makers. 85Well, according to some folks in our government,“a specialized society separate fromcivilian society” simply no longer exists. Theyargue that the blending of contractors and interagencyworkers into our domestic militarystructure has ended a separate culture. Afterall, why should military members fall intosome different category when they do thesame job as contractors? Today, does anythingreally set the military apart?To cite a quick example, currently in 2017you should know about the push to expandthe MEJA as a comprehensive replacementfor the UCMJ. 86 As you might recall from myearlier comments, the MEJA served as a mechanismfor addressing criminal activity amongcivilians in support of combat operations overseas.Now, however, some people argue thatcivilian laws should remain the sole means ofaddressing criminal activity by all members ofthe “defense team”—that we should treat contractors,military, National Guard, and otheremployees equally under the law. To the uninitiated,this argument might seem compelling.However, if this effort succeeds, commanderswill no longer be involved in even the mostserious disciplinary issues affecting their troops.Interestingly, some analysts say that these effortsarise from the fact that few lawmakersnowadays have any military experience. 87I ask you to consider carefully a couple offinal thoughts. First, think about GeorgeWashington’s famous admonition that “disciplineis the soul of an army.” 88 If that’s true—and I think it is— where does that leave us to­

A LOOK DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE 101day, when we rely so heavily on contractors?Second, as you think about the proper role ofa military in a democracy, I want you to considerChief Justice Earl Warren’s observationthat “the military establishment is, of course, anecessary organ of government; but the reachof its power must be carefully limited lest thedelicate balance between freedom and orderbe upset.” 89 Has our society somehow lost theability to limit the military establishment’s reach?Does it matter that the definition of our “militaryestablishment” has radically changed?In terms of the bottom line, we face sometough times, but I’m confident that we’ll workthrough them. This afternoon, I’m headedback to Washington to continue reconstitutingour force, but before I go, I really want toknow what you think. ❑Notes1. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC:Department of Defense, 2006), v–ix, http://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2006.pdf (accessed 17 April 2007).2. According to Col Thomas X. Hammes, fourthgenerationwarfare “is an evolved form of insurgency.” It is“rooted in the fundamental precept that superior politicalwill, when properly employed, can defeat greater economicand military power” and “does not attempt to win by defeatingthe enemy’s military forces.” Instead, it “directly attacksthe minds of enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy’spolitical will.” Fourth-generation wars are protracted affairs,“measured in decades rather than months or years.” ColThomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the21st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), 2.3. Richard H. Kohn, “Using the Military at Home: Yesterday,Today, and Tomorrow,” Chicago Journal of InternationalLaw 4 (Spring 2003): 182–83.4. Ibid, 183. According to Eugene Fidell, a formerCoast Guard judge advocate now in private practice, “Title10 of the U.S. Code carefully delineates the circumstancesunder which the Defense Department can make personnelavailable to operate equipment, at the request of a federallaw enforcement agency. Under Section 374, the defensesecretary can aid federal civil authorities with ‘aerial reconnaissance’—butonly in cases related to immigration,customs, narcotics trafficking or terrorism.” Noting thatthe first three do not relate to the sniper case, Fidell remarksthat during the investigation of the sniper case, USgovernment officials stated that they had no evidence ofany terrorism connection. Fidell also refers to Departmentof Defense Directive (DODD) 5525.5, DoD Cooperationwith Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, 15 January 1986,which prohibits the military from “directly assisting [civilianlaw-enforcement officials] in the surveillance or pursuitof individuals.” Elaine M. Grossman, “Former JAG:Military Aid in D.C. Sniper Pursuit May Have BrokenLaw,” Inside the Pentagon, 14 November 2002, http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2002/11/itp111402.html (accessed17 April 2007).5. Kohn, “Using the Military at Home,” 190.6. Grossman, “Former JAG”; and Kohn, “Using theMilitary at Home,” 190.7. Kohn, “Using the Military at Home,” 190.8. Pres. George W. Bush, National Strategy for HomelandSecurity (Washington, DC: White House, July 2002), 48,http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/index.html (accessed 17 April 2007).9. “Senators Collins, Lieberman Hold Katrina Hearing,Acting FEMA Director Testifies,” Senate Committeeon Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 6 October2005, http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&Affiliation=C&PressRelease_id=1113&Month=10&Year=2005 (accessed 17April 2007); and “U.S. Senate Homeland Security andGovernmental Affairs Committee Hearing on DHS Preparationfor and Response to Hurricane Katrina,” washingtonpost.com,15 February 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/15/AR2006021501475.html (accessed 17 April 2007). “PresidentBush started the buzz about an expanded domestic rolefor the military in September, when he lauded the militaryresponse to Hurricane Katrina. In his Sept. 15 addressto the nation from hurricane-stricken New Orleans,Bush said, ‘A challenge on this scale requires greater federalauthority and a broader role for the armed forces.’ ”John A. Tirpak, “Domestic Roles for Troops?” Air ForceMagazine 88, no. 12 (December 2005): 10, http://www.afa.org/magazine/Dec2005/1205watch.asp.10. Tom Philpott, “Posse Comitatus,” Air Force Magazine88, no. 11 (November 2005): 29, http://www.afa.org/magazine/nov2005/1105congress.asp.11. Ann Scott Tyson, “Pentagon Plans to Beef-Up DomesticRapid-Response Forces,” Washington Post, 13 October2005, 4.12. Ibid.13. Juliana Gruenwald, “Governors Oppose ExpandingMilitary’s Role in Disasters,” National Journal’s Congress-DailyAM, 20 October 2005, 1.14. “If the [bird-flu] virus gained the ability to passeasily between humans the results could be catastrophic.Worldwide, experts predict anything between two millionand 50 millions deaths.” “Q&A: Bird Flu,” BBC News, 20November 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3422839.stm (accessed 17 April 2007). “In October [2005,President] Bush suggested the military might take a leadingrole in responding to a flu pandemic. The military, hesaid, with the ability to ‘plan and move’ might be the bestsolution to effecting the quarantines.” Tirpak, “DomesticRoles for Troops?” 10–11.

102 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 200815. Edward P. Richards et al., “Bioterrorism and theUse of Fear in Public Health,” Urban Lawyer 34, no. 3(Summer 2002): 689, http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cphl/articles/urbanlawyer.pdf.16. Pres. George W. Bush, National Strategy for PandemicInfluenza (Washington, DC: White House, November2005), 9, http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/nspi.pdf(accessed 17 April 2007).17. “Whoever, except in cases and under circumstancesexpressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress,willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force asa posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall befined under this title or imprisoned not more than twoyears, or both.” Posse Comitatus Act, US Code, vol. 18, sec.1385. By its terms, the act is technically inapplicable to MarineCorps and Navy forces. However, it has been construedto apply to them by virtue of long-standing policy.18. “The entire population of a county above the ageof fifteen, which a sheriff may summon to his assistance incertain cases, as to aid him in keeping the peace, in pursuingand arresting felons, etc. Williams v. State, 253 Ark.973, 490 S.W.2d 117, 121.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed.,s.v. “posse comitatus.” See also Sean J. Kealy, “Reexaminingthe Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil LawEnforcement,” Yale Law and Policy Review 21 (Spring2003): 389.19. Kealy, “Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act,” 389.20. Ibid.21. Ibid.22. Ibid., 391.23. US Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 15, National ArchivesExperience, http://www.archives.gov/national-archives-experience/charters/constitution_transcript.html (accessed17 April 2007). This clause was invoked on only a limitednumber of occasions, including Shay’s Rebellion (1786–87), the Whiskey Rebellion (1794), the Dorr Rebellion(1842), and the Civil War (1861–65). Kealy, “Reexaminingthe Posse Comitatus Act,” 391.24. Kealy, “Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act,” 391.25. Ibid.; and Alexander Hamilton, “The Consequencesof Hostilities between the States,” Federalist no.8, 20 November 1787, The Federalist Papers, Library of Congress,http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_08.html(accessed 17 April 2007).26. James Madison, “General View of the Powers Conferredby the Constitution,” Federalist no. 41, n.d., TheFederalist Papers, Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_41.html (accessed 17 April 2007).27. Jack H. McCall Jr. and Brannon P. Denning, “MissionIm-Posse-ble: The Posse Comitatus Act and Use ofthe Military in Domestic Law Enforcement,” Tennessee BarJournal 39 (June 2003): 31, http://www.tba.org/Journal_Tbarchives/tbj-jun03.html.28. “For America’s military and political leaders, one ofthe central lessons of the 1990s was to avoid ‘mission creep,’where U.S. troops face an ill-defined and ever-expandingobjective for which they are neither well-prepared norsupported. . . . Today, mission creep is back. . . . Now itlooks like the Pentagon could soon supplement its military,reconstruction and diplomatic portfolios with domesticdisaster relief responsibilities.” Julianne Smith andDerek Chollet, “The Return of U.S. Mission Creep,” DefenseNews, 10 October 2005, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1164780&C=commentary (accessed17 April 2007).29. Vince Rawley, “Changing of the Guard: RevisedMissions, Chain-of-Command Pattern Emerging,” ArmyTimes, 25 November 2002, 23.30. Lt Col Michael J. Guidry and Col Guy J. Wills, “FutureUAV Pilots: Are Contractors the Solution?” Air ForceJournal of Logistics 28, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 6, http://www.aflma.hq.af.mil/lgj/Vol%2028%20No%204%20www.pdf.31. Lt Col Stephen M. Blizzard, “Increasing Relianceon Contractors on the Battlefield,” Air Force Journal of Logistics28, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 5, http://www.aflma.hq.af.mil/lgj/Vol%2028%20No%201%20www.pdf.32. “From 1989 to 1999, the active-duty force was reducedfrom 2,174,000 to 1,453,000. Meanwhile, the militarycontinued to fill its inventory with sophisticatedequipment, increasing the military’s dependency on civilianspecialists or contractors. ‘Highly technical and complexweaponry is flooding the Armed Forces, requiringcontractors to be hired to train military operators andmaintain and operate the systems.’ ” Guidry and Wills,“Future UAV Pilots,” 6. “In no conflict has the civilianfootprint supporting military operations been larger thanin Iraq.” Michael N. Schmitt, “Humanitarian Law and DirectParticipation in Hostilities by Private Contractors orCivilian Employees,” Chicago Journal of International Law 5,no. 2 (Winter 2005): 511, http://www.michaelschmitt.org/images/Schmitfinal.pdf.33. Schmitt, “Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation,”512.34. Ibid.35. Lt Col James E. Manker Jr. and Col Kent D. Williams,“Contractors in Contingency Operations: Panacea or Pain?”Air Force Journal of Logistics 28, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 14, http://www.aflma.hq.af.mil/lgj/Vol%2028_No3_WWW.pdf.36. “Contractors recently deployed with the 3d InfantryDivision to Iraq to support the high-tech digital commandand control systems still under development. Similarly,when the Air Force deployed the Predator unmannedaerial vehicle, contractor support was required because thevehicle was still in development, and Air Force personnelhad not been trained to maintain the Predator’s data linksystem.” Blizzard, “Increasing Reliance on Contractors,” 8.37. Guidry and Wills, “Future UAV Pilots,” 5.38. Ibid. For a discussion of the Global Hawk’s capabilitiesand operators’ responsibilities, see “RQ-4A GlobalHawk (Tier II+ HAE UAV),” FAS [Federation of AmericanScientists]Intelligence Resource Program, http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/global_hawk.htm (accessed 19 November2007).39. “UAV contractor pilots could be considered unlawfulcombatants [if they take a direct part in hostilities].”Ibid., 9–10. “Pursuant to Article 51.3 of the 1977Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions, . . . civiliansenjoy immunity from attack during internationalarmed conflict ‘unless and for such time as they take adirect part in hostilities.’ Those who do directly participatemay be legally targeted[,] . . . do not benefit from prisonersof war protections[,] . . . [and] may be punished for

A LOOK DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE 103their actions” (emphasis in original). Schmitt, “HumanitarianLaw and Direct Participation,” 519–20.40. Blizzard, “Increasing Reliance on Contractors,” 8.41. Ibid., 6.42. “A new Marine Corps truck was designed to be atleast partially contractor supported because the limitednumber of assets made contractor support more cost effective.Similarly, the Army’s Guardrail surveillance aircraftis entirely supported by contractors because it wasnot cost-effective to develop an organic maintenance capability.”Ibid., 8.43. Manker and Williams, “Contractors in ContingencyOperations,” 19.44. Schmitt, “Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation,”514.45. Ibid.46. Bill Sizemore, “Blackwater USA Says It Can SupplyForces for Conflicts,” Virginian-Pilot [Norfolk], 30 March2006, http://content.hamptonroads.com/story.cfm?story=102251&ran=202519&tref=po (accessed 17 April 2007).47. Jonathan Finer, “State Department ContractorsKill Two Civilians in N. Iraq,” Washington Post, 9 February2006, A18.48. Ibid.49. Ibid.50. See, for example, Brian Bennett, “America’sOther Army,” Time.com [in partnership with CNN], 18 October2007, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1672792,00.html?xid=feed-cnn-topics.51. Rebecca Rafferty Vernon, “Battlefield Contractors:Facing the Tough Issues,” Public Contract Law Journal33 (Winter 2004): 376.52. Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act, USCode, vol. 31, sec. 501.53. Vernon, “Battlefield Contractors,” 376; and Departmentof Defense Instruction (DODI) 3020.41, ContractorPersonnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. ArmedForces, 3 October 2005, par. 6.1.5.54. “Contractors have been used to fill the void createdby the drawdown in troop strength.” Blizzard, “IncreasingReliance on Contractors,” 7.55. George Cahlink, “Sharp Focus on Air Force Civilians,”Air Force Magazine 89, no. 2 (February 2006): 87,http://www.afa.org/magazine/feb2006/0206civilian.asp.56. P. W. Singer, “Outsourcing War,” Foreign Affairs 84,no. 2 (March/April 2005): 128; and Blizzard, “IncreasingReliance,” 7.57. Listings of contractors related to operations inIraq and Afghanistan are available online from “Windfallsof War: U.S. Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq,” Centerfor Public Integrity, http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow(accessed 17 April 2007).58. Singer, “Outsourcing War,” 126.59. Ibid., 124.60. Ibid.61. Ibid., 127, 125.62. Ibid., 124.63. “Article 86—Absence without Leave,” Manual forCourts-Martial (2005 Edition) (Washington, DC: GovernmentPrinting Office, 2005), IV-12, http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/mcm.pdf (accessed 17 April 2007).64. Such exceptions would constitute “personal servicecontracts,” which are generally prohibited. See FederalAcquisition Regulation (Washington, DC: General ServicesAdministration, Department of Defense, NationalAeronautics and Space Administration, March 2005),subpart 37.1, http://www.acqnet.gov/far (accessed 17April 2007).65. Ibid., subpart 1.6. “Contractors . . . remain privatebusinesses and thus fall outside the military chain of commandand justice systems.” Singer, “Outsourcing War,” 124.66. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, US Code, vol.18, sec. 3261.Contractor personnel fulfilling contracts with the U.S.Armed Forces may be subject to prosecution underFederal law, including but not limited to the MilitaryExtraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), 18 U.S.C. §3261 . . . which extends U.S. Federal criminal jurisdictionto certain DoD contingency contractor personnel,for certain offenses committed outside U.S. territory.. . . Pursuant to the War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §2441, . . . Federal criminal jurisdiction also extends toconduct that is determined to constitute a violation ofthe law of war when committed by a civilian nationalof the United States. In addition, when there is a formaldeclaration of war by Congress, DoD contingencycontractor personnel may be subject to prosecutionunder the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).DODI 3020.41, Contractor Personnel, par. 6.1.3.67. “The U.S. Attorney for the District in which therewould be venue for a prosecution may, if satisfied thatprobable cause exists to believe that a crime has beencommitted and that the person identified has committedthis crime, file a complaint. . . . As an alternative, the U.S.Attorney may seek the indictment of the person identified”(emphasis added). DODI 5525.11, Criminal Jurisdictionover Civilians Employed by or Accompanying the ArmedForces outside the United States, Certain Service Members, andFormer Service Members, 3 March 2005, par. 6.2.3.68. Military law consists of the statutes governing themilitary establishment and regulations issuedthereunder, the constitutional powers of the Presidentand regulations issued thereunder, and theinherent authority of military commanders. Militarylaw includes jurisdiction exercised by courts-martialand the jurisdiction exercised by commanderswith respect to nonjudicial punishment. The purposeof military law is to promote justice, to assistin maintaining good order and discipline in thearmed forces, to promote efficiency and effectivenessin the military establishment, and thereby tostrengthen the national security of the UnitedStates. (emphasis added)U.S. v. Solario, in Supreme Court Reporter, vol. 107 (1987),2924. See also “Preamble,” Manual for Courts-Martial, I-1.69. See P. W. Singer, “The Law Catches Up to PrivateMilitaries, Embeds,” and citations therein regarding theamendment to Article 2 of the UCMJ, DefenseTech.org,http://www.defensetech.org/archives/003123.html (accessed17 April 2007).

104 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 200870. Inherently governmental functions are not subjectto outsourcing although that concept may be changing.For a discussion of the apparently evolving definitionof the term inherently governmental, see Vernon, “BattlefieldContractors,” 376–77.71. Blizzard, “Increasing Reliance,” 8.72. According to Lt Gen Steven Blum, chief of the NationalGuard Bureau, “We find ourselves, in some cases,in a bidding war for some of our most experienced soldiersand airmen.” Matt Kelley, “Contractors, Military in‘Bidding War,’ ” USA Today, 31 July 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-07-31-contractors-private_x.htm (accessed 17 April 2007).73. Singer, “Outsourcing War,” 129.74. “There is a growing trend at the Pentagon to contractout intelligence jobs that were formerly done primarilyby service personnel and civil service employees. . . . Itshould come as no surprise that many younger militaryand government-trained intelligence personnel, whohave top security clearances, are resigning to take jobs inthe private sector.” Walter Pincus, “Increase In ContractingIntelligence Jobs Raises Concerns,” Washington Post,20 March 2006, 3.75. US Code, vol. 10, sec. 2871ff.76. Jim Garamone, “DoD’s Privatized Housing ProgramHits High Gear,” American Forces Information Service,16 February 1999, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb1999/n02161999_9902162.html (accessed 17 April2007). In many agreements, if privatized housing’s militaryoccupancyrates drop below specified amounts, vacanthousing may be leased to civilians with no military affiliation.This may raise substantial issues pertaining to suchindividuals’ status, along with issues concerning commanders’obligations to maintain good order and disciplineon the installation. See also General AccountingOffice, Military Housing: Continued Concerns in Implementingthe Privatization Initiative, Report to CongressionalCommittees, GAO/NSIAD-00-71 (Washington, DC: GeneralAccounting Office, March 2000), 29, http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ns00071.pdf (accessed 17 April 2007).77. See, for example, Gary Emery, “Civilian GuardsTapped to Control Base Gates,” Air Force Print News Today,19 May 2004, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123007764 (accessed 17 April 2007).78. “Military customs and courtesies go beyond basicpoliteness; they play an extremely important role in buildingmorale, esprit de corps, discipline, and mission effectiveness. Customsand courtesies ensure proper respect for the militarymembers and build the foundation for self-discipline”(emphasis added). Air Force Pamphlet (AFPAM) 36-2231,vol. 2, United States Air Force Supervisory Examination(USAFSE) Study Guide, 1 July 2005, 123, par. 7.1, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/36/afpam36-2241v2/afpam36-2241v2.pdf (accessed 17 April 2007).79. See generally Bush, National Strategy for PandemicInfluenza. For details concerning plans regarding theprospect of such a hurricane striking the New York metropolitanarea, see the New York City Office of EmergencyManagement’s guide: “NYC Hazards: Coastal Storms andHurricanes,” NYC.gov, http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/hazards/storms.shtml (accessed 17 April 2007). Fordetails concerning plans regarding a possible earthquakein the central United States, see the Missouri Departmentof Natural Resources’ guide: “Earthquake Facts about theNew Madrid Seismic Zone,” http://www.dnr.mo.gov/geology/geosrv/geores/techbulletin1.htm (accessed 17April 2007).80. “Civilian rule is basic to our system of government.. . . Military enforcement of the civil law leaves the protectionof vital Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in the hands ofpersons who are not trained to uphold these rights. It may alsochill the exercise of fundamental rights, such as the rightsto speak freely and to vote, and create the atmosphere of fearand hostility which exists in territories occupied by enemyforces” (emphasis added). Bissonette v. Haig, in Federal Reporter2d, vol. 776 (8th US Circuit Court of Appeals, 1985), 1384.81. Adam Nossiter, “New Orleans Probing Alleged PoliceLooting,” Washington Post, 30 September 2005, A10,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/29/AR2005092901975.html (accessed 17 April2007).82. See Bissonette v. Haig, 1384.83. Pres. Dwight Eisenhower warned against overreachingby a military-industrial complex:In the councils of government, we must guard againstthe acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought orunsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potentialfor the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists andwill persist. We must never let the weight of this combinationendanger our liberties or democratic processes.We should take nothing for granted. Only analert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshingof the huge industrial and military machinery of defensewith our peaceful methods and goals, so that security andliberty may prosper together. (emphasis added)“Military-Industrial Complex Speech, Dwight D. Eisenhower,1961,” Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/speeches/eisenhower001.htm (accessed 17 April 2007).84. Parker v. Levy, in Supreme Court Reporter, vol. 94(1974), 2547.85. “Courts must give great deference to the professionaljudgment of military authorities concerning the relativeimportance of a particular military interest.” Goldman v.Weinberger, in Supreme Court Reporter, vol. 106 (1986), 1310.86. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, US Code, vol.18, sec. 3261ff.87. For a listing of current members of Congress withmilitary backgrounds, along with limited details concerningtheir service, see “Veterans in 108th Congress (167),”House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, http://veterans.house.gov/vetlink/vetsincongress.html (accessed 17 April2007).88. Michael C. Thomsett and Jean Freestone Thomsett,War and Conflict Quotations: A Worldwide Dictionary of Pronouncementsfrom Military Leaders, Politicians, Philosophers, Writers andOthers (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1997), 36.89. Laird v. Tatum, in Supreme Court Reporter, vol. 92(1972), 2318.

APJFictionA Higher Form of Truth?DR. DAVID R. METSThe Art of Uncontrolled Flight by Kim Ponders.HarperCollins Publishers (http://www.harpercollins.com), 10 East 53d Street,New York, New York 10022, 2005, 192 pages,$19.95 (hardcover); 2007, 208 pages, $13.95(trade paperback).The Last Blue Mile by Kim Ponders. Harper-Collins Publishers (http://www.harpercollins.com), 10 East 53d Street, New York, New York10022, 2007, 320 pages, $24.95 (hardcover).I seldom review a fictional work, and theAir and Space Power Journal seldom prints suchessays. But The Art of Uncontrolled Flight is special.So is The Last Blue Mile—a sequel of sorts.Both are about the current Air Force, a maininterest of this journal, and both are by KimPonders—a major in the Air Force Reserve.She graduated from Syracuse University, wentthrough Officer Training School in 1989, andthen served as a weapons controller, flying inthe back end of an Airborne Warning andControl System (AWACS) early warning aircraft.She did so in various parts of the world,gaining credit for combat flying time in OperationDesert Storm during the process—oneof the firstwomen to do so. Along the line, shemet her husband-to-be, Bill Ponders, also anAir Force AWACS officer; they now live insouthern New Hampshire with their two children.She remains a major in the Air ForceReserve and serves as a speechwriter for itschief, Lt Gen John Bradley.The author’s first novel, The Art of UncontrolledFlight proves successful. I have sometimesthought that novelscan embody a higher formof truth than, say, biographiesor histories. Manyof us think that some conceptsdefy documentation—butwe strongly holdthem to be true by virtueof our intuitive judgment.Thus, a novelist can putthem into his or her work,but the historian or biographercannot because of the documentationissue—they cannot be proven in court. Clearlya better-than-average writer, Ponders neverthelesssometimes comes close to using purpleprose. In this book, she writes largely from herown experience, which gives the novel somecredibility, though whether it reaches the levelof a higher form of truth remains open toquestion.Annie Shaw, the heroine, has a tough childhood,living with a father who moves fromlover to lover after her mother dies at a youngage. She worships her father and has a guiltcomplex about her mother’s death that complicatesher journey in the Air Force. AnAWACS copilot, Annie is married to a goodand true man—a civilian in the petroleum industry—butfalls in love with her aircraft commander.In keeping with current style in thenovel business, she sleeps with him on theirvarious travels. On their combat tour, whenthe commander leaves the cockpit and shehas charge of the aircraft, she makes a serious105

106 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008blunder, and an enemy missile hits the plane.After the crash landing, Annie is the last oneto leave the aircraft, helping a male crew memberextract himself in the process. Pondersdoes not polish the image of her heroine,ironically relating that both she and her aircraftcommander receive the DistinguishedFlying Cross even though their mistake causedthe loss of the airplane in the first place. Shealso realistically depicts the media crush thatmakes a spectacle out of Annie’s medal whileignoring that of her commander. Still, the incidentleads to the end of her Air Force careerand her retirement to a Texas ranch with herhusband. The story is not altogether fantasy,and though the Air Force has never lost anAWACS to an accident, the idea of crew membersreceiving decorations instead of a deservedcourt-martial is not limited to the worldof fiction. Not very heavy, The Art of UncontrolledFlight nevertheless makes for fair entertainmentduring an evening’s read.The Last Blue Mile (thename used by cadets forthe corridor leading tothe Air Force Academycommandant’s offce) ismore substantial. Manyacademy graduates whoread this journal will beinterested in a tale abouttheir alma mater; again,however, whether thisbook can lay claim to ahigher form of truth than histories is open toquestion. In this case, Ponders finds herselfmore removed from personal experience(since she did not attend the academy), whichlimits the novel’s credibility in some ways. Shespent a couple of weeks on site interviewing anumber of people, including serving cadets.Clearly, she also gained a good deal of herknowledge of the institution from the press—which colors her work to some extent. Sheclaims that the fact that she is not a graduatedoes not necessarily disqualify her from writingabout the institution with authority—onthe contrary, in some ways it may enhance hercapability. Like Ponders, I did not attend theacademy, but I lived on the campus for fouryears and can testify that she has most of thephysical description of the place right (with acouple of possible exceptions: for most of itshistory, Fairchild Hall has not housed the superintendent’soffce, and if there are mountainsheep in the vicinity, I never saw any).The book flows quickly. Ponders seems tocapitalize on her reading of newspapers, buildingher story around current events startingin 2003. She focuses less on the sexual-assaultscandal of that year than on the religious issuethat hit the headlines a couple of yearslater. The story builds on assumptions thatthe older, conservative-Republican peoplewho had dominated the development of theacademy had come under pressure from afar-right evangelist group, the Cadets forChristian Fellowship, that threatened an extremereaction to the events of 2003. Thisorganization had a friend in court in the personof Col Silas Metz, the vice-commandantand a rigid martinet who answered to thecommandant, Brig Gen John Waller—a conservativebut flexible pragmatist and the traditionalfighter pilot, himself a graduate. Presidingover them both is the first femalesuperintendent (and the first female threestargeneral), Susan Long—an engineer/bureaucrat still on the march for higher rank,using as her vehicle something Ponderscalls “Culture for Transformation” (evidentlymeant to bring to mind the “Agenda forChange,” a program the Air Staff brought tothe academy in reaction to the sexual-assaultscandal of 2003).*The heroine among the cadets is a Massachusettsgirl, Brook Searcy—basically honestif a bit naïve. Another cadet, Paula Snowe,daughter of a senator who went to collegewith General Long, is not so honest and infact emerges as the principal figure in a cheatingscandal. The male cadets, for the most*The real-world Air Force currently does have a female lieutenant general, Terry Gabreski, but the academy has not yet had a female superintendent.

FICTION: A HIGHER FORM OF TRUTH? 107part, have secondary roles in the story. One,however, a third classman by the name of Bregs,indulges in Neanderthal-like hazing of the newcadets. (The depiction of him stomping hisboots on a prone fourth classman over a religiousissue seems unrealistic to me though.)The book’s theme of religious conflict appearsoverstated—even more than in the newspaperreports of 2005 and far more than inthe report of the investigators the chief of staffsent out that summer to look at the problem.Ponders makes it into a three-sided conflictwith Waller arguing a principled but pragmaticapproach, Metz representing the far-rightevangelists, and General Long keeping a carefuleye on her chances of making a fourth starby keeping a lid on the situation. Complicationsarise when the senator’s daughter iscaught cheating. General Waller wants to applythe honor code and expel her, but Long preventsthat outcome—partly for selfish reasonsof promotion and partly for the greater goodof the feminist cause at the national level (thesenator serving as an asset in the latter).The Last Blue Mile contains a couple of explicitsex scenes, one involving General Wallerand the other Cadet Searcy, that seem obligatoryin today’s novel market. Aside from appealingto the gallery, their purpose in developingthe plots is a little unclear to me, especiallythe Waller case. As for Searcy, the circumstancesof the incident seem somewhat bizarrebut not beyond the realm of possibility. Whathappens to her certainly lies within the definitionof sexual assault and date rape; furthermore,her reasoning in refusing to report theoffense rings true and does help one to understandwhy those offenses represent the mostunderreported crimes in our society.Ponders expends a number of pages on theglories of unpowered-glider flight, perhapsbased on interviews, that come into play againtoward the climax of the book. Our heroinecadet,along with the senator’s daughter, goesoff base to a party in which bad judgmentcauses the consumption of too much liquor.One of the two male cadets who accompaniedthem crashes a glider the next day, and theautopsy reveals alcohol in him, resulting inmuch grief all around.The climax itself involves both Searcy, in anunauthorized soaring flight that endangersher survival, and General Waller, who dashesafter her in a powered glider. I’ll leave it tothose who read the book to discover whetherhe prevents her from following her classmateto the grave in a mountain crash.What, then, are the messages of The LastBlue Mile? One, I suppose, conveys that officereducation is no cakewalk. The young haveminds of their own. Politics are important.Personal ambition is alive and well. Anothertheme suggests the existence of a built-in contradictionbetween the Air Force’s need fortechnical specialists and the requirement forwarriors. Still a third implies a need for anhonor system—one not always observed (atseveral levels). Maybe one can capture all ofthis in the idea that an eternal conflict existsbetween traditional values (some of which arevalid) and modern ones (some of which arealso valid). Unhappily, the author’s tendencyto lapse into diverse descriptive excursionsthat do not seem to have a direct connectionto the development of these messages detractsfrom the work.Why should a warrior-scholar bother with thisnovel? Granted, it offers an evening’s entertainment.But beyond that, academy graduateswill not find much that is new to themand will also judge parts as unrealistic—not ahigher form of truth. Those who did not attendshould exercise caution because of thenovelist’s need to exaggerate in order to builddrama—and to use popular stereotypes to doso (also not really a higher form of truth).Ponders’s first book, The Art of UncontrolledFlight, is preferable because it more closely reflectsher own experience. Readers seeking arealistic view of the academy would do betterwith a history such as George Fagan’s The AirForce Academy: An Illustrated History. Although acoffee-table book and somewhat dated, itnevertheless offers proper documentation anda candid treatment of such events as the cheatingscandal of 1965 and the integration ofwomen. Those seeking entertainment alongwith military insight should consult the hugelist of military fiction that would provide morehelp than the present work. C. S. Forester, a

108 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008favorite of mine (Captain Horatio Hornblower,Sink the Bismarck, etc.), covers more than thenaval aspect of things. The American CivilWar offers a great set of works—StephenCrane’s The Red Badge of Courage, for example.Readers who want fiction that involves airpowerneed only turn to World War II, whichyielded a vast, worthy literature—such as JohnHersey’s The War Lover. In the end, though,one must conclude that there is no higher form oftruth—higher truths perhaps, but all views,whether from the likes of Ponders or Fagan,can never be more than approximations ofthe truth. Again, we recall the blind men, sentout to examine and report on an elephant,who produce different descriptions—all ofthem true and none of them the whole truth.Some are better approximations than others,but none are perfect. In their study of war, aspiringair warriors can only hope to maketheir professional reading program inclusiveby studying as many diverse descriptions of waras possible, thus moving their own approximationsa little closer to reality. ❑

Effects-Based Information Battle in the Muslim WorldRemy m. mauduitImmedIately followIng the terroristattacks of 11 September 2001 inthe United States, western political leadersand policy makers were quick to recognizepublicly that Islam and the majority ofits followers were not to blame for the violence.liberal scholars inside and outside themuslim world proffered intellectual argumentsthat supported liberal, tolerant Islam. In spiteof such efforts, the indiscriminate use of termssuch as fanaticism, terrorism, fundamentalism, Islamism,and jihadists by western leaders andthe media has led, at best, to confusion andhas helped suggest that terror and Islam areone and the same.exacerbating the already-charged communicationenvironment, the terrorists’ rhetoricasserted that their mission and methods weremandated directly by Islamic tenets. early attemptsto demonize osama bin laden onlyincreased his stature and perceived poweramong his followers. In a sense, western politicaland, subsequently, media dialogue unwittinglycreated a “david and goliath” imageof bin laden standing toe-to-toe with the mostpowerful man on earth, the president of theUnited States, giving al-Qaeda exactly what itwanted—global exposure and inflated notoriety.Religious legitimacy became a vital enablerfor rallying public support and action in supportof bin laden’s (or any other charismaticextremist’s) “global jihad.”Contemporary Islam is in transition, engagedin an internal and external struggle over itsvalues, identity, and place in the world. Rivalsects are contending for spiritual and politicaldominance.for some, Islamic rhetoric became an instrumentof mobilization, serving as a coverfor nationalist, anti-imperialist, and reformistobjectives. however, it also had a social component,including denunciations of the injustices,corruption, and tyranny that have characterizedthe reigning oligarchies in theIslamic world. Islamism thus became one ofthe few available outlets for effective protestand action.generalizations about the various Islamicmovements and parties have caused confusionand ignore significant distinctions among thegroups. Islamic political parties are, in fact,quite dissimilar, often having nothing in commonother than references to the Prophet andIslam, which they interpret in a number ofconflicting or contradictory ways that span thepolitical spectrum from left to far right. thus,dangerous misunderstandings are inevitablewhen people talk about “fundamentalism.”we see the depths of muslim despair in thetrend to rally behind any muslim who appearspowerful and, most importantly, who challengesamerica’s power. this form of adulationis largely without moral scruple, as exemplifiedby the widespread support of Saddamhussein, a most unscrupulous and anti-Islamicleader, and bin laden, a self-admitted massmurderer who contemptuously disregards allIslamic prohibitions on killing innocent noncombatants.Such is the conflicted state of disillusionment,humiliation, and desperation109

110 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008throughout the Islamic world today—thebreeding ground for terrorists.one of america’s most difficult challengesin the war on terrorism concerns the informationbattle now waging in the Islamic world.to mitigate these challenges, we must separateIslam from terrorism in muslims’ consciousness.therefore, it is critical that US political,business, cultural, and religious leadersand their spokespeople refrain from framingterrorism in an Islamic religious context.we could take a first step by establishingwithin the department of defense a permanentIslamic Information Center chartered toassess, develop, disseminate, and coordinateinformation to the international muslim public.the main long-term objectives of this centerwould entail contributing to the promotionof democracy, good governance, freedom,and human rights in the muslim world. democracywill open the door for reinterpretationof Islamic sacred texts based on the needs,conditions, and priorities of muslim societiesin the twenty-first century. Interagency collaboration,coordination, and integration are keysto this strategic-communication approach.In the short range, we should assess the capabilityof the United States air force to supportthis center by developing informationalprogramming and broadcasts aimed at a largesegment of the world’s Islamic public. Repetitivebroadcasting of various humanitarian missionsto the predominantly muslim worldwould serve as a springboard for more ambitiousendeavors. Such activities would complementgrowing air force involvement in thecyber domain.Key information objectives/themes for thefirst phase of the center could include• actively promoting the values of freedomby supporting civil-society institutions,both local and regional, that are workingto promote and defend democracy;• supporting both secularists and moderateIslamists who renounce violence and advocatedemocracy, freedom, and equalityfor all citizens;• focusing on young people, pious traditionalistpopulations, muslim minoritiesin the west, and women;• educating people, muslims and nonmuslimsalike, on the critical questionsrelated to the compatibility between Islamand democracy;• discrediting extremist ideology and delegitimizingindividuals and positions associatedwith extremists by challenging theirinterpretation of Islam, exposing inaccuracies,revealing their linkage to illegalgroups and activities, and publicizing theconsequences of their violent acts; and• promoting divisions among extremistsby, among other things, encouragingjournalists to investigate issues of corruption,hypocrisy, and immorality in extremistand terrorist circles.The Air Force doctrines likewise must be flexible at all times and entirelyuninhibited by tradition.—gen henry h. “hap” arnold

One Day Too Long: Top Secret Site 85 and theBombing of North Vietnam by Timothy N. Castle.Columbia University Press (http://www.columbia.edu/cu/cup), 61 W. 62nd Street, New York,New York 10023, 1999, 368 pages, $73.50 (hardcover);368 pages, $21.00 (softcover).Dr. Timothy Castle’s book One Day Too Longchronicles an example of the difficult decisions themilitary makes in times of war and the consequencesof faulty decision making. In the 1960s,when senior Air Force leadership decided to locatea ground-based radar site within Laos (only 20miles from the North Vietnamese border), it actedupon several assumptions. First, since the location,named Site 85, would allow all-weather bombing ofHanoi, the leaders of Thirteenth and Seventh AirForces believed—as did the all-volunteer crewsmanning the site—that it would help shorten theVietnam War. Second, both military and embassyleaders felt that they would have ample time toevacuate the site in the event of attack (which theyknew would eventually occur). Third, the Air Forceassumed it could successfully execute all aspects ofthe mission “under radar,” even after the site’s evacuation.As in all Laos-based operations, “plausible deniability”would cover a host of secret sins.Unfortunately, all three assumptions turned outto be false. As Dr. Castle meticulously documents,the site quickly turned from focusing on Hanoi todirecting its efforts toward the enemy troops massingin the valleys below the mountaintop site. Healso shows, in stark detail, that both Air Force leadershipand the US ambassador to Laos bungled theevacuation, holding fast to the belief that evacuationwas unnecessary even after the attack began.(In their defense, even the men at Site 85 didn’tseem too concerned by the initial mortar attacklaunched by the Vietnamese and Pathet Lao.) Finally,Dr. Castle writes of the ultimately unsuccessfulattempts by the Air Force to deliberately misrepresentthe truth of what happened at Site 85 to thefamilies of the 11 men still missing and unaccountedfor to this day.The decisions made by our leadership often favorlarger goals at the expense of individuals. Militarymembers make sacrifices freely, understandingthat they serve at the behest of their commanders.But when the Air Force can show no greater gain tobalance out the loss of the individual, we must askwhy any sacrifice is warranted.Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, former Air Forcechief of staff, notes in a dust-jacket blurb that theloss of Site 85 “should be a subject for mandatorystudy in our professional military education system.”He is correct, and the more junior the officerreading One Day Too Long, the better. By instilling inour ranks a sense of shock over the problems thatDr. Castle squarely faces, hopefully this book canprevent such a tragedy from happening again.Mr. Glenn LeinbachCleveland, OhioRed Tail Captured, Red Tail Free: The Memoirs ofa Tuskegee Airman and POW by Lt Col AlexanderJefferson, USAF, retired. Fordham UniversityPress (http://www.fordhampress.com), UniversityBox L, Bronx, New York 10458, 2005, 133pages, $29.95 (hardcover).There tends to be something special aboutmemoirs and the recollections of the men andwomen who actually participated in the historymakingevents that we, unfortunately, are only ableto read about. When I saw Red Tail Captured, RedTail Free, I jumped at the chance to review this book.It is written by Lt Col Alexander Jefferson, USAF,retired, a Tuskegee Airman. What makes this bookso special is not necessarily his wartime exploits as afighter pilot, but the telling of his journey to be­111

112 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008come a Tuskegee Airman. Even more intriguing isthat he was shot down, captured, and had the opportunityto spend nine months as a guest of theGerman Reich as a prisoner of war. To date, therehas been very little written on the experiences ofblack prisoners of war during World War II.Red Tail Captured is written in a very unassumingformat that is easy and enjoyable to read. Manybooks of this nature, like I Flew for the Fuehrer byHeinz Knoke, one of my favorite wartime accounts,tend to be somewhat heavy handed in an attemptto lead the reader in a certain direction or espousea certain political point of view. Alexander Jeffersondoes neither. In his discussions about growingup in Detroit, the author puts the reader at ease,almost as if he were talking to an old friend. Butwith any historical topic that continues to be writtenabout, the question arises as to the book’s utilityand/or importance to the subject. Although it is agood memoir, I am somewhat ambivalent regardingits historical relevance.Readers looking for a wartime history of a Tuskegeepilot with a detailed synopsis of each of his sortiesshould look elsewhere. In fact, this book lacksmany of the items found in many of the best historicalstudies. For example, it would have beennice if the author had written more on the 18 missionshe completed before being shot down on his19th. Likewise, there are relatively few wartimephotographs of the author, the men of the 332ndFighter Group, or the aircraft they flew. Although Ican distinguish a P-40 from a P-51 or an Me-109 oran FW-190, some people cannot, and it would havebeen nice to see photographs of those aircraft.Likewise, any time I read a historical manuscriptthat describes distant places, I consider it essentialto have maps of the area or theater of operations.Although the author talks about his base inRamitelli, Italy, and several places in Germany,without a map, it is difficult to get an idea of wherehe is actually talking about. Hopefully if there is asecond reprinting, it will include these items.The author does, however, bring to light manyother fascinating stories such as his treatment andlife as a Kriege—a prisoner of war. It was interestingto know that at no time was he, as a black man,mistreated by the Germans. I found that to berather significant considering many of the more ardentGerman views on race at the time. AlthoughRed Tail Captured contains precious few photographs,what the book does have in abundance arethe drawings the author made while overseas. Arather accomplished sketch artist, the author fillsthe book with dozens of these excellent drawings.It is in these drawings that Alexander’s story isbrought more vividly to life.Overall, I liked Red Tail Captured, Red Tail Free.Although not the best aviation book on the TuskegeeAirmen—arguably not this book’s purpose—Jefferson’s memoir is an honest and fresh look atone man’s personal journey through life before,during, and after the war. It is more than a storyabout a pilot who flew P-51s against the Germans; itis about a man—at a time in American history whenblacks were expected to fail—who overcame all obstaclesand graduated from college with degrees inchemistry and biology, fought for his country, andthen led a life teaching and mentoring others. Thismemoir is truly a credit to this man and remains aworthwhile read. Although I consider this memoirimportant for anybody interested in this area of history,$29.95 may be quite a large investment for abook without photographs, maps, charts, or moredetailed descriptions of combat missions flown.Hopefully Fordham University Press will publish asecond edition and turn it into a much more affordablepaperback. It is regrettable that the steepprice tag will likely push some readers away frompurchasing this book.Lt Col Robert F. Tate, USAFR, RetiredMontgomery, AlabamaLockheed’s SR-71 “Blackbird” Family: A-12, F-12,M-21, D-21, SR-71 by James Goodall and JayMiller. Midland Publishing (http://www.ianallanpublishing.com/catalog/index.php?cPath=480),Riverdene Business Park, Molesey Road, Hersham,Surrey KT12 4RG, 2002, 128 pages, $24.95(softcover).Is this book worth your time? Yes, and here’s why.Lockheed’s SR-71 “Blackbird” Family is a well-writtenand well-documented work containing a militarystory that will fascinate the casual reader, informthe Air Force reader, and enrich the aviation-historybuff—and the many excellent pictures of jets willhold the interest of every aircraft enthusiast. AuthorsJames Goodall and Jay Miller offer a detailedreview of an exciting period of US history—specifically,one element of America’s military strengthduring the Cold War—distinguished by one of thiscountry’s greatest series of production aircraft:Lockheed’s Blackbird family, consisting of the A-12,F-12, M-21, D-21, and SR-71. The ability of theAmerican industrial base to produce such a tremendoustechnical marvel as the A-12/SR-71 speaks

BOOK REVIEWS 113volumes for US design ingenuity, engineering skill,and manufacturing capability from the 1950s throughthe 1970s. Correspondingly, the military’s determinationto fly such aircraft during the Cold War reflectsthe world situation and military strategy atthat time.This book tracks the development history of theentire family of A-12/SR-71 air vehicles, beginningwhen political and military leaders decided that theU-2 would soon need to be replaced. The text discussesthe various early designs for a follow-on aircraftto this reconnaissance air vehicle—a replacementthat needed to defeat a growing threat fromSoviet ground-to-air missiles. The authors describethe competition between Convair and Lockheed towin the government contract to build this new aircraft,which had to fly faster and higher than anyprevious production jet. The section highlightingthe manufacturing phase of the winning entry—the A-12—includes the design of the aircraft, itsearly testing, and considerable discussion on selectionof the all-important engines, which propelledthe platform to speeds in excess of Mach 3 and altitudesabove 90,000 feet. Another exciting portionof the book describes the operational experiencesof the CIA’s A-12 deployment and operations fromKadena AFB, Japan, during the 1960s.Intermingled with the major technological sectionson engines and flight characteristics is a slightbut rather important discussion of the acquisitionand political strategy within the power halls of severalfederal agencies and departments in Washington,DC, and Strategic Air Command. The authorsalso examine the decision to terminate the A-12CIA air vehicle just one year after its initial operationalmission in favor of a fleet of SR-71s procuredand operated by the Air Force. These insights presentthe reader with other dimensions of airplaneproduction that make this work a must-read foranyone interested in aviation. Other topics includethe interceptor version of the A-12 air vehicle aswell as development of the Mach 3 drone—the D­21—launched from both a derivative of the A-12(called the M-21) and from one of two speciallymodified B-52H aircraft.I found the final section, which focuses on theSR-71’s history of flight operations, extremely interesting.Goodall and Miller cover the history, construction,and operational use of the SR-71, whichserved the nation for over 25 years, in sufficient detailto satisfy the most ardent aviation reader. Ofspecial note is the information concerning the onboardsensors and especially the workings of the J­58 Pratt and Whitney engines, which performed insubsonic, transonic, and high-Mach regimes. Read­ers also learn about Pres. Lyndon Johnson’s announcementin the open press of the aircraft’s existence,the individual who attained the most flighthours in the SR-71, the termination of the program,and the final disposition of all aircraft (A-12, YF-12,and SR-71) as well as the D-21 drone.Although the authors do not include a descriptionof what an SR-71 flight was really like (I flewthe aircraft at Beale AFB, California, from 1982 to1986, accumulating 500 hours), they do a wonderfuljob of telling the story of the Blackbird’s family.Anyone who enjoys reading about aviation historywill find this book rewarding.Col Joe McCue, USAF, RetiredSpringfield, VirginiaDivining Victory: Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War by William M. Arkin. Air UniversityPress (http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress), 131 West Shumacher Avenue, MaxwellAFB, Alabama 36112-5962, 2007, 356 pages,$30.00 (softcover). Free download from http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Books/Arkin/ArkinDownload.html.Two pernicious myths have emerged from Israel’scampaign against Hezbollah in southern Lebanonin the summer of 2006. The first is that Israel indiscriminatelybombed civilian population and infrastructure.The second is that Israel failed to defeatHezbollah because it chose airpower as its principalmilitary instrument. William Arkin, the well-knownindependent military analyst, explodes both mythsin his new book, Divining Victory.With respect to the first myth, Arkin cites theUnited Nations Commission of Inquiry on the campaign,which noted “a significant pattern of excessive,indiscriminate and disproportionate use offorce by the IDF [Israeli Defense Force] againstLebanese civilians and civilian objects.” (See Reportof the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon Pursuant toHuman Rights Council Resolution S-2/1 [New York:United Nations, General Assembly, 23 November2006], 3, http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/specialsession/A.HRC.3.2.pdf.)However, Arkin shows, with meticulous documentation,that the Israelis were very discriminate intheir target selection. They decided, for example,to avoid striking the Lebanese electrical power gridand hit civilian residences only in known Hezbollahenclaves that could be directly linked to Hezbollahmilitary capabilities. That this broke down

114 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008during the last few days of the campaign, when Israelsowed large parts of southern Lebanon withcluster munitions, was more a reflection of Israel’sblindly growing sense of strategic frustration thanpart of a consistent effort to deliberately inflict civiliandamage. Arkin clearly shows that the Israelisconducted very discriminate target selection, evenif the targets they selected did not support Israel’sultimate, intended end state in a logical manner.With respect to the second myth, Arkin pointsto a school of thought in which “an ‘effects-based’operations mind-set and what IDF theorists call‘cognitive’ objectives rather than conventional approachesof attrition and ‘destroying’ the enemy . . .led to the ‘aerial arrogance’ on the part of manysenior IDF officers.” However, he maintains that “toequate an effects-based approach with aerial arroganceis a mistake” (p. 154). Arkin goes on to pointout that Israel conducted almost the antithesis ofan effects-based campaign, taking “the most conventionalof approaches” geared to destroying Hezbollah’sfighting ability on the ground in ways “almostdivorced from the overall campaign objectiveand desired strategic outcome,” especially in southernBeirut (p. 155). Effects-based theory and doctrinemaintain that the desired end state and objectivesshould drive all subordinate considerations.Arkin demonstrates how this did not happen in theIsrael-Hezbollah campaign.More importantly, the book examines the largerquestion of why Israel failed to achieve victory in aconflict that pitted a modern, Westernized nationwith a military built along US lines against an unconventionalterrorist enemy embedded within anindigenous civilian population. Arkin maintainsthat Israel went about the campaign in a fundamentallywrongheaded way. An approach based onend-state considerations devolved into an exercisein servicing a set of targets selected for what commandersconsidered immediate military advantage.Especially in southern Beirut, Israel ignored thestrategic-communications battle being waged successfullyby Hezbollah, which made each militarygain seem like a direct attack on innocent civiliantargets. Israel came under much criticism for notcommitting itself to a more aggressive effort on theground. Arkin counters that a large ground invasioninvolving more troops might indeed have produceda different outcome, but without any guaranteethat such an effort would have resulted indecisive victory, fewer political problems, fewer casualties,and less civilian destruction. Indeed, theIsraelis invaded and occupied southern Lebanonfrom 1982 to 2000 and emerged from that conflictwith an enemy that entrenched itself more firmlythere than their enemies had been in 1982. Invasionand more forceful action on the ground werefar from a panacea.So what would it have taken for Israel to have comeout better in this campaign? Arkin suggests thatsince Israel was not going to “win” the war against Hezbollahthrough statistical accumulation and was notgoing to fight Hezbollah to some total war victory, anequal objective had to be . . . also creating some degreeof sympathy and support for Israel’s right to defenditself. . . . Had Israel . . . concentrated its resourceson military forces and capabilities in the south and theBekaa [Valley], had it pursued a campaign more attunedto emerging humanitarian and internationalnorms regarding the use of cluster bombs, had Israelshown greater transparency in describing what it wasdoing and the intelligence basis for its decisions . . . itmight have—might have—bought more time and engenderedgreater sympathy . . . thus not only achievingmore militarily, but also in the fundamental longtermobjective of counterterrorism: not creating evenmore enemies tomorrow (p. 157).Divining Victory is chock full of primary documentation,tables of organization and equipment,target lists, and lists of damage inflicted (taking upnearly half the volume). Whether one agrees withits conclusions or not, it will serve as the most completeindependent source of data on the campaignfor some time to come. For this as well as for itsadmirably objective analysis of what went wrongwith Israel’s thinking about the war, this book willbe an invaluable addition to the library of airpowerpractitioners and of anyone interested in the challengeof using modern conventional military powerto fight terrorism.Lt Col John P. Hunerwadel, USAF, RetiredMaxwell AFB, AlabamaWhere Are the WMDs? The Reality of Chem-BioThreats on the Home Front and the Battlefieldby Al Mauroni. Naval Institute Press (http://www.usni.org/press/press.html), 291 Wood Road,Annapolis, Maryland 21402-5034, 2006, 272 pages,$28.95 (hardcover).At the outset of his book, Al Mauroni announcesthat “he has a reputation . . . for sounding off withbrash observations and untested concepts” (p. xi).This is not exactly the preferred intellectual foundationfor a solid analytical work on a complex,contentious, and highly technical topic. However,with a wide range of practical experience and solid

BOOK REVIEWS 115credentials, Mauroni appears well suited to this taskof explaining chemical, biological, radiological, andnuclear (CBRN) policy development and implementation.A former member of the Army ChemicalCorps, he has served as a consultant to the Joint Staffas well as the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretaryof the Army for the Elimination of ChemicalWeapons and has published a number of books andarticles on the subject. Thus, Where Are the WMDs?reflects Mauroni’s detailed knowledge of how theDepartment Defense (DOD) develops and implementscounterproliferation policy and consequencemanagement as well as the operational details ofdefending our military forces against CBRN threats.Consequently, this is not the television series 24.Readers will not find a Jack Bauer archetype betweenthese covers chasing terrorists and other evildoers.Instead, they will find conscientious midlevelpolicy makers, program managers, and operationalplanners navigating the DOD’s bureaucratic labyrinthin an effort to define a diffuse mix of CBRNthreats, set priorities, and design a useful mix ofpolicies, plans, and programs to protect our militaryforces as well as the homeland.This bureaucratic tour d’horizon may not be exciting,but it reflects the essential business of strategydevelopment, coordination, and implementation.It is within our national security bureaucracy thatthe ends (objectives) of national strategy are sliced,diced, strained, and turned into ways (policies) andmeans (resources). Although a bit unwieldy attimes, Where Are the WMDs? will help the diligentreader understand how we got to where we are todayand, by providing a road map for understandingthe bureaucratic labyrinth, thus avoid roadblocksand culs-de-sac. Therefore, although this book isnot for everyone, it is a necessary read for anyoneinvolved in developing policies, crafting operationalplans, and providing the resources to dealwith CBRN threats.The author introduces the overarching themein the first chapter when he correctly asserts thatthe “very term ‘WMD’ [weapon of mass destruction]has lost any definable parameters that wouldmake it useful for public discussions” (p. 17).“WMD” has indeed become a meaningless bugaboothat frightens the public, obviating analyticalrigor and useful risk assessment. Not all threats areequal, and not all unconventional weapons areWMDs. The qualitative and quantitative differencesin the range of unconventional CBRN threatspacked under the WMD rubric are vast, and eachthreat presents unique development, deployment,and employment challenges to our adversaries,thus presenting us a range of defensive challenges.For example, vast differences exist among the detonationof a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon in a majorAmerican city, an anthrax attack on the scale ofwhat occurred in 2001, and the use of a persistentnerve agent against deployed forces. Mauroni correctlyconcludes that the United States has a “genericized”counterproliferation strategy that doesnot make useful distinctions among the range ofthreats, the defense of the homeland, and militaryoperations (p. 100).The analytical point of disaggregating the WMDthreat is to allow the United States to set clear nationalcounterproliferation priorities for the homelandas well as our military forces and decide whatconstitutes acceptable risk. This is the crux of thethreat assessment and resource-allocation dilemmafacing senior policy makers. Unfortunately, the author,despite offering a number of sensible bureaucraticadjustments to our CBRN policy-developmentprocess, never steps up and actually offers his assessmentof what our national priorities should beand where we should accept risk. His thoughts onthis difficult policy question would have addedgreat value to his analysis.Mauroni’s discussion of the intelligence failureconcerning WMDs in Iraq is equally unsatisfying.In regard to the intelligence community’s nownotoriousnational intelligence estimate (NIE) titledIraq’s Continuing Program for Weapons of Mass Destruction(October 2002), Mauroni states that the reportwas “intended not to inform the president . . . butto convince Congress that there was a crediblethreat” (p. 121). Although perhaps an inadvertentslip of the author’s pen, this suggestion that theNIE was designed to convince Congress of the Iraqithreat implies that the intelligence communitydeliberately skewed intelligence on Iraq’s WMDprogram to support a policy end. The facts do notsupport this implication. The NIE represented acatastrophic analytical failure but not a deliberateattempt to tailor intelligence.However, anyone who thinks that the military didnot genuinely believe that Iraq had the capabilityto employ chemical and perhaps biological weaponsneeds to review US Central Command’s detailedpreparations, expertly explained by Mauroni,in the months and days leading up to OperationIraqi Freedom. One of the great strengths of hisbook, along with the understanding of bureaucraticorganizations and processes, is its depictionof the details of counterproliferation at the operationallevel of war. Joint planners preparing to deployforces into an area of operations with potentialchemical and biological threats would be well served

116 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008by reading chapter 6, “Operation Iraqi Freedom,”and chapter 8, “Lessons Learned.”In sum, this is a valuable work with virtues as wellas flaws that perhaps tried to accomplish too much.A book with a split personality, Where Are the WMDs?is strong in its understanding of the CBRN bureaucracyand operational-planning considerations butweak in its appreciation of the strategic context ofpolicy development or in its provision of usefulthreat assessments.LTC Richard S. Tracey, USA, RetiredFort Belvoir, VirginiaI Want You! The Evolution of the All-VolunteerForce by Bernard D. Rostker. RAND Corporation(http://www.rand.org/pubs), 1776 Main Street,P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, California 90407­2138, 2006, 832 pages, $48.50 (hardcover),$68.50 (hardcover with DVD).I Want You! is an exhaustive, ground-breakingstudy that explores this nation’s transition from aconscripted military to an established, all-volunteerforce that continues today despite three decades ofopposition and economic pressures. Words hardlydo justice to the thoroughness of Bernard Rostker’sresearch. He has produced an impressive work ofscholarship for the serious student. Not just alengthy narrative, it is a well-organized and wellwrittenstudy backed up by 2,300 primary documents.The notes in the print version are more than sufficientto support the text. However, the DVD versionis much more useful and well worth the extraexpense. Not only can readers perform searches ofkey words and phrases but also they can avail themselvesof direct links to 1,700 of the 2,300 sources.Some readers may be surprised to learn thatconscription is not the norm in American history.Only in 35 of America’s 230 years—spanning theCivil War, World War I, World War II, and the ColdWar—has the nation used conscription to raise andmaintain the military. The 18-month period of volunteerismthat followed World War II was replaced bya 25-year draft that became increasingly unpopularbecause of its inconsistent application. In the 1960s,for a variety of reasons, people began to view thedraft as an involuntary tax upon a small minority ofyoung men of draft age. Discussions and studiesabout how to end the draft and implement a volunteerforce began to gain momentum in the decadebefore 1973. Some studies indicated the desirabilityof an all-volunteer force, but most concluded thatthe time (i.e., the political climate) just wasn’t right.Not until presidential candidate Richard Nixonstated his intention to end the draft did these discussionsmove to the mainstream. Once elected, hepushed the measure to fruition despite strong opposition.The coalition of opponents included militaryleaders, politicians, and influential civilians ofall political persuasions. One of the most stridentpoints of opposition, as expressed by Senator EdwardKennedy (p. 95), emphasized the false concernthat an all-volunteer military would leave ournational defense on the shoulders of a mercenaryforce of poor and minorities while the elites reapedthe benefits of American citizenship. Young congressmanDonald Rumsfeld became an early proponentof the all-volunteer force (p. 35).The success of this force was not a foregone conclusion.The first decade of its existence proved especiallyhard. Economic woes and the Vietnam syndromeplayed havoc with the armed forces. Thepost-Vietnam military had become hollow. Standardswere generally low, and pay was poor. Excessiveinflation quickly overtook an initial, significantboost in military pay. The cutting of recruiting budgetsduring an upturn in the economy made itharder to entice quality young people in a competitivelabor market. By 1980 the situation had becomeso bad that even Nixon suggested a return tothe draft. A concerted effort on all fronts, underthe leadership of Pres. Ronald Reagan, however,brought improvement. Victory in the Cold War andthe Persian Gulf justified the all-volunteer force.Those successes were soon threatened in the 1990sby a 25 percent drawdown of the military and a robusteconomy that again drew quality recruits awayfrom the military. Today, the all-volunteer force facesunprecedented stress, and one regularly hears thecall for reinstitution of the draft—albeit most frequentlyfrom individuals pushing a larger politicalagenda. Even so, while the services struggle to recruitsufficient numbers, retention rates remainstable despite the dangers of the current global waron terrorism.Despite the all-encompassing nature of this bookregarding the technical establishment and maintenanceof the all-volunteer force, it fails to addresssome larger sociological questions. Granted, they donot fall within the purview of the study, but one shouldmention them in the interest of full discussion. Regardlessof the success of an all-volunteer force, itraises the question of whether every citizen has amoral obligation to participate in his or her own defenseand whether that obligation should be establishedby law. We live in a nation where fewer than

BOOK REVIEWS 117one in 100 citizens serves his or her country. Americais at war, but our leaders fail to make the case that warrequires sacrifice by all of its citizens. Some worryabout a growing gap—a chasm perhaps—betweenthe American military and the society it defends.Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer addressthis question in AWOL: The Unexcused Absenceof America’s Upper Classes from the Military—And HowIt Hurts Our Country (2006), maintaining that theelites not only absent themselves from service butalso actively discourage service by themselves andothers like them. They suggest that we are movingtoward the very force that early opponents of theall-volunteer force feared—one made up mostly oflower-income and minority Americans. Dr. Rostkersimply notes that elites traditionally don’t participatein national defense and have done so onlyduring those times of national emergency like theCivil War and World War II. Nevertheless, his bookdoes not address our current environment of elites’avoidance of military service, exacerbated by activediscouragement, or comment on whether thatshould affect the all-volunteer force.Even so, I highly recommend I Want You! to anyonewith a deep curiosity about our professionalmilitary. Even though volunteerism is the Americannorm, we must consider the all-volunteer force anexperiment whose outcome remains uncertain, asdoes Dr. Rostker: “Is the all-volunteer armed forcesustainable? Only time will tell” (p. 756).CSM Jim Clifford, USA, RetiredMcDonough, GeorgiaTwilight Warriors: Covert Air Operations againstthe USSR by Curtis Peebles. Naval Institute Press(http://www.usni.org/press/press.html), 291Wood Road, Annapolis, Maryland 21402-5034,2005, 352 pages, $29.95 (hardcover).Despite the subtitle, Twilight Warriors covers morethan air operations against the Soviet Union. Spanningthe entire Cold War, it is methodically researchedand, for the time being, serves as the authoritativetext on these activities. Curtis Peebles,author of seminal Cold War and intelligence texts,has assembled much data and background for thisquick-flowing study. It opens at the end of WorldWar II in Europe, when Britain and the UnitedStates, wishing to obtain intelligence on the SovietUnion, used former German agents in Eastern Europeand resistance groups in the Baltic region(Lithuania and Estonia) as well as the Ukraine toobtain fragments of data. These groups were resuppliedand infiltrated by air using refugees and displacedpersonnel flying C-47s. Through good research,Peebles lays out why the West used the tacticof air infiltration, explaining that other forms ofspying had not worked in totalitarian Russia. Theseinsights and additional data allow the reader to understandwhy either the Air Force or CIA and its predecessororganizations used certain aircraft or groupsto run covert air operations around the world.Peebles quickly moves from crisis to crisis duringthe Cold War in Albania, Korea, China, Tibet,Guatemala, and Cuba. Aircraft, deniability, andAmerican ingenuity shape each account. Air Forcereaders will see how changes in Air Staff thinkingon special operations formulated the size, scope,and aircraft of each decade as the service struggledto support global covert operations. Strategic AirCommand developed and practiced extensive plansto retrieve pilots and aircrews in the event of a nuclearstrike on the Soviet Union. DC-4s, C-47s, C-46s,and B-17s played a significant role. As the retrievalof covert personnel became a requirement, theCIA developed the gear and mechanisms for inflightrecovery. (Some older Air Rescue Servicepersonnel will remember the Fulton recovery yokeon the front of HC-130 aircraft.) During the 1950s,the CIA and its front companies perfected techniquesto retrieve agents from denied areas. Therecovery technique was also used to allow naval intelligenceteams to exploit Russian polar-researchstations on ice floes in the early 1960s.The postindependence Congo of the 1960s sawnumerous operations fronted by Cuban and Americanairmen. Casualties started to pick up as riskscontinued to grow. The B-26K, the standard covertair-operations bomber, also saw extensive service inthe Congo. Although air operations take the forefront,Peebles includes an explanation of why theywere required as well as compromises and lossessuffered in the struggle against Communist powersin the Cold War. A description of British traitorKim Philby sheds new light on his importance to theKGB since his activities compromised CIA and AirForce operations, leading to the deaths of thousands.The most extensive chapter is devoted to SoutheastAsia. After the Bay of Pigs operations, the CIAcame to the conclusion that future presidentswould not give it any airpower; consequently, theagency set up an airline, Air America, to conductcovert air operations. From the 1950s to the 1970s,Air America supported the struggle against NorthVietnam and other Communist groups in the region.The mistakes made by the agency and othersthat ran agents and set up covert activities resem­

118 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008bled those made in the 1947–48 time frame againstthe Soviet Union. The stories of Lima Site 85 inLaos closely mirror operations in the early 1940sthat needlessly cost people their lives. Althoughthreat perceptions and the lack of experiencedpersonnel can excuse early Cold War activities andlosses, the same does not hold true for the Vietnamyears. Clandestine air services provided critical servicesthroughout the Cold War.Twilight Warriors offers the right mix of scholarship,archival details, and spy stories to appeal toevery reader. The Air Force’s support of covert airoperations in 50 years of war is worthy of a separatestudy at some point in the future.Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, RetiredFairfax, VirginiaWith the Possum and the Eagle: The Memoir of aNavigator’s War over Germany and Japan, NorthTexas Military Biography and Memoir Series no.2, by Ralph H. Nutter. University of North TexasPress (http://www.unt.edu/untpress), P.O. Box311336, Denton, Texas 76203-1336, 2005, 368pages, $29.95 (softcover).Memoirs are usually interesting and almost alwaysas weak on historical underpinnings as are theworks of journalists. The general practice is to citejust enough sources to cover one’s backside or tofill in the blanks—find a readable volume on thebattle-of-anywhere to flesh out those memories ofbeing pounded by antiaircraft fire while trying tohold the plane steady enough to drop a load ofbombs into who-cares-where. Unsurprisingly, thebibliography is a scant two pages.Author Ralph Nutter had an interesting war. Hemight well have had a short war because his firstplane drew the backside of the B-17 formation andwent down early (the crew spent the war in a GermanPOW camp), but by then he was navigator inCol Curtis LeMay’s lead bomber. Was that better?The attrition rate for bombers flying over Germanyin daylight without fighter escort in 1942 and 1943was so high that, statistically, it was nearly impossibleto complete a tour without injury or death.Nutter was lucky, extremely so, but he was alsoskilled at his profession, which allowed him to moveinto a relatively sheltered position—but not untilafter he had finished more than his full complementof missions as group navigator under LeMayin Eighth Air Force over Europe. His move was notreally all that sheltered because he volunteered forPacific duty with Brig Gen Haywood Hansell inTwentieth Air Force. As head navigator for Hansell’sB-29s, he was adviser to the commander and headof navigator training. Although finished with combatflying, he served in a war zone rather than takingthe fully safe option of heading stateside. Thereis a touch of patriotic sacrifice in that choice thatsounds a different tone not all that common—or atleast not advertised—today. Nutter pursued a careerin law after the war, retiring as a presidingjudge after 55 years. He began his memoir whenformer members of his unit began dying; by thetime he finished, few were left.Although the author uses few secondary sources,he does have the advantage of having experiencedwhat he writes. Additionally, he took time duringhis research to get in touch with LeMay and theothers who feature in his story. After all, With thePossum and the Eagle is a memoir—not a defininghistory of this or that. Although a cut above thenorm, it will not win any Bancroft Prize for history.The book might wake up a few old-timersthough. At a level beyond the mere “what I did inthe war,” Nutter takes pains to delineate the debateover high-altitude formation bombing and addressesthe controversy over firestorms generated by Americanincendiaries in civilian areas, particularly Tokyo.He uses as foils for this discussion two of the men heserved under—Hansell and LeMay. One was unableor unwilling to abandon high-formation, targetspecificbombing even as it repeatedly demonstratedits unworkability. The other made the transitionand came as close as anyone to proving that bombingalone can defeat an enemy.Nutter has either a really good memory or a reallygood diary. He balances discussion of missionsand meetings with the telling anecdote—touchingor humorous but never inappropriate. This relativelysmall volume is easy to read, pleasurable, andinformative. It may not warrant inclusion on everywarrior’s bookshelf, but it does deserve at least acouple of hours of attention.Dr. John H. BarnhillHouston, TexasAmerican Defense Policy, 8th ed., edited by Paul J.Bolt, Damon V. Coletta, and Collins G. ShackelfordJr. John Hopkins University Press (http://www.press.jhu.edu), 2715 North Charles Street,Baltimore, Maryland 21218-4363, 2005, 496 pages,$60.00 (hardcover), $35.00 (softcover).

BOOK REVIEWS 119American Defense Policy is a collection of articlesfrom individuals with distinguished educationalbackgrounds who serve in key positions within thegovernment and private sector. The book addressesboth the process and content of defense policy.Part 1 begins with the context of American defensepolicy. Paul Carrese’s article “American Powerand the Legacy of Washington: Enduring Principlesfor Foreign and Defense Policy” is an exceptionaloutline of the difficulty of writing a constitutionthat protects the freedoms earned through bloodshedin the War for Independence. Most of all, ithighlights George Washington’s professionalism asboth a soldier and statesman whose devotion to theRepublic challenges every American to considerthe interest of the country before oneself or one’sparty. Additional articles in this section help developthe history of defense policy from the “justwar” theory on the morality of war and how it maybe applied to American defense issues facing policymakers in the next 20 years.Part 2 focuses specifically on the process of defensepolicy making. In the opening chapter, RichardKohn discusses the intent of the constitution in theseparation of powers, which Louis Fisher’s articlepoints out have been degraded by increasing executivepower to employ the military without the consentof Congress. This continuously requires Congress tocontrol involvement by limiting or withholding fundsto control the president’s use of the military in foreignaffairs. Roger Barnett’s “Legal Constraints” isan excellent review of just cause and the proportionalityof war, which has led to many conventionsand treaties establishing the Law of Armed Conflict.The remainder of part 2 explains the role ofthe media in developing policy and the commandand control structure for the military, including anarticle covering the Goldwater-Nichols Departmentof Defense Reorganization Act. It concludes withthe allocation of resources through the Planning,Programming, and Budgeting System.Part 3, “The Changing Instruments of AmericanDefense Policy,” initially reviews the history ofchange within the military from technical revolutionto today’s transformational defense policy.Andrew Krepinevich’s article points out four elementsto military revolutions and seven historicallessons learned. All of the essays emphasize that advantagesare limited over time as military technologyand techniques proliferate to adversaries. It moveson to examine the integration of military force withother instruments of national power to achieve nationalobjectives. Barry Posen’s article is a superboverview of the US military position in today’sworld, offering a realistic view of primacy versus selectiveengagement in supporting US foreign policy.Finally, this section looks at the development ofprofessional policy makers through the implementationof the professional military education (PME)program. The Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies article outlines the various stages of PME. Itsummarizes the requirement for ever-changingcurricula within the PME program to prepare militaryleaders for rapidly changing technological advances,increased jointness, and complex issues involvedin developing national security policy.Part 4 discusses the outcome of defense policyacross four areas: civil-military relations, conventionalforces, nuclear policy and missile defense,and homeland security. Most of these areas havechanged drastically as a result of the terrorist attacksof 11 September 2001 (9/11) and the proliferationof weapons of mass destruction. The essayson civil-military relations review the question ofprofessionalism. Must military members forfeit certainconstitutional rights to remain as apolitical advisersin the development of defense policy in orderto maintain civilian control? What is the role ofretired generals? How can we change PME to teachmilitary professionals how to engage in the politicalprocess? These questions will be discussed for centuriesto come but are more difficult to answer asmilitary leaders face new roles of diplomacy in implementingUS policy around the world. The essayson conventional forces look at the roles of air, land,sea, and space with advances in technology andchanging strategies. Gen Richard B. Myers’s articleon “Shift to a Global Perspective” brings to light theimportance of senior leaders’ ability to understandthe political-military situation on a worldwide scale.This view of the world and the way actions in onearea affect another are key to making decisions anddeveloping defense policy that will successfully supportthe national security strategy. The articles onnuclear policy continue the debate over developingthe Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator to kill deepearthtargets. The missile-defense studies cover thefeasibility of this system and the concept of thecapabilities-based acquisition program in regard tothe ground-based, midcourse defense system.The book concludes with a review of the 9/11attacks and the challenges of securing the homeland.Bruce Hoffman’s quick look at terrorism anddetailed examination of Osama bin Laden as thechief executive officer of terrorism should makeeveryone realize how difficult it will be to containthis vast network. The remaining articles raise questionson how we prosecute terrorists in the UnitedStates and how we use the military in homeland securitywithout violating the Posse Comitatus Act.

120 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008Many changes have already been implemented,such as the Department of Homeland Securityand the Director of National Intelligence. Butwithin these agencies, one finds the need to embracethe interagency concept in order to connectthe dots in foiling future terrorist attacks. As onecan surmise from this section, it is one thing todevelop American defense policy but quite anotherto implement it.As with all books based on a collection of essays,some articles stand out from the others, but eachone generates questions worth researching and discussing.American Defense Policy is unquestionably anexcellent book for anyone beginning in the field ofdefense policy; it gives people in the business achance to reflect on the changes in developing defensepolicy today in comparison to those faced byour founding fathers.Lt Col Brian S. Brandner, ANGAir Force FellowHarvard UniversityStand Well Clear: More Adventures in Military Aviationby D. K. Tooker. Naval Institute Press (http://www.usni.org/press/press.html), 291 Wood Road,Annapolis, Maryland 21402-5034, 2003, 192pages, $28.95 (hardcover).Author D. K. Tooker, a retired Marine lieutenantcolonel, served for 25 years, participated in significantcombat events, and accumulated many accoladesduring his career, including two DistinguishedFlying Crosses. He also wrote The Second-Luckiest Pilot(Naval Institute Press, 2000). Stand Well Clear, hismore recent book, is a collage of 19 adventures offlyers. Using a credible, easy-to-understand writingstyle, Tooker focuses on both aviation and the Airmenwho flew the missions. Because he actually experiencedmany of his stories, he writes from aunique vantage point. From nearly running out offuel in a supersonic jet to commuting in a Cessna150, he offers a wide array of flying experiences.Some of the tales teach lessons to up-and-comingflyers; others provide proof of the old saying “betterto be lucky than good.” Although the flying episodescertainly highlight the book, Tooker does occasionally“leave the air” to tell some stories aboutthe flyers’ ground exploits as well.Likely, flyers will relate directly to his style anddelivery. I enjoyed Tooker’s “pilotspeak” and waspleased that he included epilogues indicating thecurrent status of the aviators about whom he writes.Sadly, some of them died in ground or air mishaps.The book’s relevance to the Air Force communitylies directly in the history of the aviation stories,especially the mishaps. Each of these couldeasily fill hundreds of pages, but Tooker does a nicejob condensing them to a few relevant pages. Overall,Stand Well Clear is an easy read—just the rightlength for the aviation enthusiast to put in a briefcaseand read on his or her next commercial flight.Lt Col John Wood, USAFAir Force Fellow, RANDSanta Monica, CaliforniaIn Their Own Words: Conversations with the Astronautsand Men Who Led America’s Journey intoSpace edited by Scott Sacknoff. SpaceBusiness.com (http://www.spacebusiness.com), P.O. Box5752, Bethesda, Maryland 20824-5752, 2003, 224pages, $14.95 (softcover).Anyone with an interest in the US space programwill enjoy In Their Own Words. A fascinatingand enjoyable read that I had trouble putting down,it consists of 14 interviews, eight of which are withastronauts and the remainder with other famousfigures associated with the space program. A varietyof individuals conducted these interviews, whichreveal many little-known anecdotes. These tidbitsrange from the mundane and humorous to the surprisingand tragic. Although I began following thespace program very closely almost 40 years ago, I wassurprised by what I learned from this anthology.The only chapters presented in chronologicalorder include Robert Goddard’s and Alan Shepard’s.Although not an interview, Goddard’s chapter consistsof excerpts from his report of a launch in 1940of a liquid-propelled rocket weighing 500 pounds.His writings summarize the work that further advancesin spaceflight would require, including“fields of study and mathematical analysis, experimentation,invention, laboratory and shop work,ground tests, and air demonstrations” (p. 6).The modesty of Goddard in chapter 1 contrastssharply with the arrogance of Alan Shepard inchapter 2. Shepard refers to Pres. John F. Kennedyas “Jack” several times, indicates how he justly wonthe intense competition among the Mercury 7 astronautsto be selected for the first mission, andgives the reader the impression that the program“owed” him a mission to the moon. I was never afan of Shepard, and this interview reinforced myfeelings. Interestingly, the interview with WalterCronkite also mentioned how members of the press

BOOK REVIEWS 121thought Shepard was arrogant and how they evencirculated a petition to the National Aeronauticsand Space Administration requesting the selectionof the popular John Glenn as the first Americaninto space.The book picks up the pace in subsequent chapters,each interview shedding more light on thespace program—especially its human side. Most ofthe astronauts appear hard working, grateful tohave been chosen for the space program, and verysmart. Pete Conrad Jr. is a case in point. A Purduegraduate with an advanced engineering degreeand impeccable test-pilot credentials, he had muchmore personality than Neil Armstrong and addedlevity to his moon landing, which occurred justfour months after Apollo 11’s. In this interview, welearn that Apollo 11 landed four miles from itsplanned landing site and that the pinpoint accuracyof Apollo 12 was truly amazing, allowing the astronautsto take samples from a surveyor spacecraftlocated within sight of the lunar module.Interviews with Charles Duke, Jim Lovell, FredHaise, Guenter Wendt, Gen Bernard Schriever (fatherof the intercontinental ballistic missile), ScottGrissom (Gus Grissom’s oldest son), Jim McDivitt,Jack Lousma, and Walter Cronkite reveal additionalfascinating points:• The most beautiful sight from space was ofEarth rising above the moon, a “typical 2001impression . . . very stark and spectacular,” accordingto Charles Duke (p. 52).• Astronauts walking on the moon frequentlyfell because of the bulky pressure suits and themoon’s low gravity (one-sixth that of Earth).• Three of the four lunar-landing training vehiclescrashed during training, one crash almostkilling Neil Armstrong.• Gus Grissom would have probably been thefirst man on the moon had he not died in theApollo 1 disaster.• Scott Grissom, the astronaut’s oldest son, believesNeil Armstrong was not a good pick forApollo 11 because he was “very shy, very, veryreclusive” and not a good ambassador for thespace program (p. 76).The most memorable passages, especially thoseby Pete Conrad and Charles Duke, come from descriptionsof walking on the moon. As Conrad recounts,“I don’t think that anybody realizes what itmeans to say that the moon is one-quarter the sizeof the Earth until one stands on it. It is small. Myfirst impression was, ‘I can’t believe this. This thingis curving away from me. I can see it going over thehill.’ We were out walking around, a distance nottoo far away from the LM [lunar module], when werealized that we couldn’t see it anymore. The LMwas 23 feet tall!” (p. 42). When asked if he had exploredany craters, Duke responded, “Neither John[Young] nor I ventured to the bottom of a cratersuch as Plum or North Ray crater. These craterswere too deep for us and the walls too steep. Thedangers were considerable at a crater such as NorthRay which was almost two hundred feet deep. If youaccidentally fell into that crater and survived thefall there was no way to extract yourself as we hadno lifelines or the ability to pull one another out”(p. 61).Although the book offers many other exceedinglyinteresting stories and balanced interviewscovering both the support side of space and actualoperations, it does suffer from a few minor flaws.The interviews are choppy at times, jumping betweendifferent topics haphazardly, and misspellingsare common—probably the result of not adequatelyproofreading the transcriptions of therecorded interviews. But these shortfalls are minorand do not significantly detract from the book.With 125 shuttle flights now history, there isclearly plenty of material for a sequel to In TheirOwn Words. When Orion, the planned successor tothe space shuttle, begins taking astronauts back tothe moon and beyond, we will have even more interviewsto motivate and fascinate readers, especiallyyoung people who, like previous generations,will be eager to reach for the stars.Col Phil Bossert, USAFUniversity of HoustonFilling the Ranks: Transforming the U.S. MilitaryPersonnel System, Belfer Center for Science andInternational Affairs (BCSI) Studies in InternationalSecurity, edited by Cindy Williams. MITPress (http://www-mitpress.mit.edu), 55 HaywardStreet, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142­1493, 2004, 376 pages, $50.00 (hardcover),$25.00 (softcover).Normally, one does not expect too much froman anthology made up of chapters written by variousauthors. Usually, the quality varies from chapterto chapter, and the resultant book often lackscohesion around any central themes. Filling theRanks is the exception that proves the rule. Fromcover to cover, it is well written and edited; the vari­

122 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008ous authors are first-rate experts; and the book coheresaround the theme of how the United Statesmight convert its Cold War military personnel systemto one more suitable and affordable for thenew century.There is little doubt that the system needs anoverhaul and even less doubt that the task is a difficultone. Motivators are different; the requiredtalents are often quite different. The other superpoweris gone. Another peer competitor is not onthe horizon. US armed forces are no longer forwarddeployed, for the most part. Rather, they havebecome more expeditionary in nature. The draft isgone, and the supply of high-quality males is limited.Women are increasingly a major factor andnow are a growing element in the combat forces ofthe Air Force and Navy. Forces are older, and moreof them are married. Requirements for technologicallycapable people have continued to grow in asteady, upward curve. Potential adversaries includenot only the states of old but also all sorts of nongovernmentalorganizations posing a wide varietyof threats at all points of the compass. It seems thatquality has become relatively more important thanquantity. Yet, the Cold War personnel system goeson with its associated obligations that make it anincreasingly expensive consideration—but it issupported by a host of groups reluctant to acceptradical change.The distinguished contributors to Filling theRanks include Owen R. Coté Jr., Aline O. Quester,Stephen Peter Rosen, Bernard Rostker, ElizabethA. Stanley-Mitchell, and others. Most of them arefrom leading research institutes, Ivy League schools,or government. Prominent among them are peoplefrom the Center for Naval Analyses.One of the best essays, by Coté, predicts the kindof operational and technical world we will face asthe century goes on. He estimates that the disappearanceof the Cold World and the conventionalmilitary hegemony of the United States will increasinglylead to conflicts that avoid American strength.The conflicts will be more varied and harder to define,which in turn will require decentralization ofboth the operational and acquisition worlds. Thatmeans recruiting not only junior officers and enlistedpersonnel with a wider set of capabilities thanthose of the past, but also those willing and able toassume greater decision responsibilities. One implicationof that requirement is the need to decreasecosts through more-flexible pay systemssince the United States can no longer afford to paypeople in unskilled fields at the same rate requiredto attract and hold individuals with technologicaland operational skills of a higher order.The chapter by Rosen, one of America’s foremostscholars on military innovation, is most impressive.He understands that real personnel reform will requirea difficult culture change. The present leadershiphas a lifetime investment in learning andexperience that it is understandably reluctant tosacrifice for unproven virtues. One of Rosen’s examplesof obvious reforms difficult to change is theUS individual replacement system in place sinceWorld War II. He argues that the “regimental system”has long ago achieved greater combat powerby replacing losses by unit rather than by individual.Yet, we still have the traditional American system.He sees similar difficulties with the military’s systemof professional military education—the war collegesand command-and-staff schools, for example. Hesays that these are relics of the nineteenth century,when civilian colleges teaching the needed subjectswere not available. Now they are. The schools alsoserved as a means of storing officers capable ofcommand-and-staff work during times of peace sothat they would be available when mass mobilizationbecame necessary. Such mobilizations, accordingto Rosen, are not likely in the future. One of theimpediments of change is the difficulty of measuringcombat power in the absence of major war.Simulations cannot do it because they are full ofassumptions that may or may not be true. Competitionbetween units or services can help, but it is nota perfect tool. Rosen suggests that trying new paypolicies in one service might help demonstrate thepotential to attract more people with technologicaland leadership capabilities. Another of his suggestionsinvolves making reforms by stealth. Adm WilliamMoffett remained in the closet for a long timeby advocating airpower as a supplement, not a replacement,for battleships. In that way, he got themoney he needed for carrier and aircraft developmentout of battleship sailors without seeming tothreaten their well-being.Those are just two examples of the many firstclassessays in Filling the Ranks. Flexibility is a commonplea among them: the system pays a privatewithout a high school diploma the same as one withan associate’s degree. Pilots, engineers, scientists,and other technical people can easily transitioninto lucrative civilian jobs, but there is not much ofa civilian market for combat infantrymen. Yet, thesystem is not flexible enough to hold those with themost necessary skills. Another idea common to severalchapters is that options should exist for longercareers for some officers. The days of needingstrong and fast “yellowlegs” (cavalry) to chase Indiansare long gone. We are much healthier now. Yet,we often must retire folks after 20 or 30 years, just

BOOK REVIEWS 123as they are reaching their prime. Since the end ofthe Cold War, a major change has occurred in theutilization of reserve components. The days of theweekend warrior are over; this is the day of prolongedactivation and repeated deployments—adifficult situation for reservists, their families, andtheir employers. Unless we improve compensation,recruiting will surely suffer. In sum, Filling the Ranksis relatively free of the typical limitations of anthologies,and air warriors would do well to add it totheir reading lists.Dr. David R. MetsMaxwell AFB, AlabamaThe Rising Tide: A Novel of the Second World Warby Jeff Shaara. Ballantine Books (http://www.randomhouse.com/rhpg), 1745 Broadway, NewYork, New York 10019, 2006, 576 pages, $27.95(hardcover).Author Joseph E. Persico has said that JeffShaara has the ability to “make literature read likehistory and history read like literature.” Shaara hasdone so again in The Rising Tide, his newest novel.In my opinion, Shaara is the master of Americanmilitaryhistorical fiction. His ability to blend factinto fiction and breathe life into historical charactersplaces him in a genre all his own. He first completeda trilogy on the American Civil War begunby his father, Michael, with The Killer Angels (1996)(the inspiration for the film Gettysburg). Shaara putus into the thoughts and actions of Robert E. Lee,Ulysses S. Grant, and common soldiers of theUnion and Confederacy. He then wrote a book onthe Mexican-American War and a two-volume seton the American Revolution that can only be calledvisionary in depth and scope. To the Last Man(2004), his epic of World War I, focused on the actionsof American commanders.With The Rising Tide, the first installment of athree-volume set, Shaara now turns his attention toWorld War II, focusing here on the campaigns inNorth Africa and Sicily. The second book will resembleThe Killer Angels by concentrating entirelyon one battle—in this case, the historic D-day invasion.The third volume will pick up sometime afterthe Normandy invasion and take us through theend of the war in Europe.As with all of Shaara’s other works, The Rising Tidebegins with an introduction to the main players,including not only those with familiar names—Dwight Eisenhower, Mark Clark, Erwin Rommel,and George Patton—but also unknown frontlinesoldiers. This time the latter group includes a gunneron an American tank crew and a new breed ofwarrior: the paratrooper. Excelling at this point ofview, Shaara places us in the thick smoke of KasserinePass and high in the sky as the 82nd Airbornemakes the first of its combat jumps into Sicily.This book may in fact be better than any of theauthor’s other works. Shaara’s methodical researchenables his obvious flair for bringing historicalcharacters to life. In The Rising Tide, however, heseems to overlook the role of airpower somewhat,mentioning Jimmy Doolittle and Carl Spaatz onlyin passing, for example. He does, though, introduceus to the pilot who, on more than one occasion,transported General Eisenhower around theMediterranean in the B-17 Flying Fortress known asThe Red Gremlin—that flyer was none other than LtCol Paul Tibbets. In response to my question aboutwhether he felt that he ignored the role of airpowerin this book, Shaara replied,My approach to the World War II trilogy is to focus ona variety of characters, in a variety of roles. In everystory I do, the greatest challenge is what to include and whatto leave out. In To The Last Man, the contrast betweenthe experiences of pilots and Marine grunts was verypoignant to me, and made for what I thought was avery contrasting story line. I’ve caught grief from sailorsbecause I seem to have ignored the Navy in everybook I’ve done. In the Atlantic alone, there are volumesof great naval stories, from the submarine war tothe Bismarck. I barely mention any of that.Fair enough. After all, Shaara writes historical fictionfor general consumption—not to satisfy thedesires of a few airpower advocates.Readers who wish to take a break from the usualfare found in ASPJ but who don’t want to read fictionfor fiction’s sake should take a look at Shaara’slatest effort. The Rising Tide brings the story ofWorld War II to life in an unparalleled way, makingit living history.Capt Brian D. Laslie, USAFMaxwell AFB, AlabamaFiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq byThomas E. Ricks. Penguin Group (http://www.penguinputnam.com), 375 Hudson Street, NewYork, New York 10014, 2006, 416 pages, $27.95(hardcover).Thomas E. Ricks—senior Pentagon correspondentfor the Washington Post, author, and Pulitzer

124 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2008prize winner—dedicates his most recent work, Fiasco:The American Military Adventure in Iraq, to “the wardead.” This simple but powerful recognition setsthe tone for the rest of the book. In Fiasco, Ricks hasproduced an extremely well researched, well written,and, at times, painfully detailed chronicle of thepolitical posturing, military planning, and informationcampaigning that set the stage for America’sengagement in Operation Iraqi Freedom. His comprehensivewriting presents the reader with a fullydeveloped portrayal of the lightning pace of phaseone, the segue into phase two, and the onset ofprolonged phase-three operations that eventuallymorphed into the protracted phase-four undertakingin which the nation remains engaged afterthe cessation of principal combat. The author alsoprovides historical context for Iraqi Freedom byconcisely summarizing the political and military environmentas it transitioned from the first Gulf Warin 1991 to deliberations preceding the nationalsecuritydecisions in 2002 and 2003 to displaceSaddam Hussein’s regime. He offers in-depth,though at times pointedly opinionated, explanationsregarding the reasons and arguments for thenational-security shift away from a policy of containmenttoward a policy of preemption as the precursorto the US decision to displace Hussein. Hisefforts are instructive and thought provoking.The book’s title and the opening salvos hurledin the first several pages leave no doubt that Ricksviews the American-led invasion of Iraq as recklessand devoid of sufficient military planning and strategicforethought regarding an extended occupationof the country. He explains that “this book’ssubtitle terms the U.S. effort in Iraq an adventurein the critical sense of adventurism—that is, withthe view that the U.S.-led invasion was launchedrecklessly, with a flawed plan for war and a worseapproach to occupation” (p. 3).No one is spared Ricks’s biting comments thatindict our most senior civilian political, diplomatic,defense, and intelligence leaders as well as somemajor uniformed players, blaming them for thecurrent situation in Iraq. He is quick to point outwhat he perceives as personality flaws, professionalegotism, and decision-making ineptness among thesenior leadership involved in deliberations to invade;indeed, some readers may find the criticismscharacteristic of an exposé. However, no student ofsocial, political, diplomatic, and military historyshould allow the book’s title or its early passages todeter him or her from making this work a must-read.The author’s research on broad strategic issuesand his often excruciatingly meticulous accounts oftactical planning and events are impressive. Hisheuristic, consistent use of anecdotal material toexplain broader planning and engagement discussionsand implementation not only validates hispoints, but also provides context rarely seen inmass-appeal publications.Ricks’s fine definition of people and events isindicative of his enormous access to the people involvedand to details of the deliberative-planningdocuments. His arguments regarding the evolutionof the insurgency that now persists in Iraq are intriguingand essential to a critical evaluation of ourengagement there.The author has designed Fiasco to spur publicdebate regarding use of the military instrument toachieve national-security objectives. For the mostpart, he directs his frequent criticisms towardAmerica’s most senior leaders. His treatment of thesoldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines responsiblefor conducting the mission in Iraq is both compassionateand patriotic. Throughout, Ricks heraldsthe bravery, sacrifice, and commitment they exhibitin performing the war-fighting, security-enhancing,and nation-building tasks that form the foundationof our stated intent in that country. He credits seniorleadership where appropriate yet freely andfrequently takes to task those people, decisions,and events he deems counterproductive to thepublicly communicated mission there.Exceptional in its depth and breadth of reporting,Fiasco displays a panoramic view of all the majorpolitical and military actions that contributed toIraqi Freedom. Readers would do well to investtime in fully appreciating its war-reporting valueand importance.Col Robert A. Potter, USAF, RetiredMaxwell AFB, Alabama

Air and Space Power Journal, the US Air Force’sprofessional journal, is published in English,Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, French, and Chinese.Each version is independent and has an editor—anative speaker of the particular language and anexpert in the region of coverage—who selects itscontent. We’re always looking for good, thoughtprovokingarticles up to 5,000 words in length,written in any of our published languages. All submissionswill be edited in accordance with thestandards set forth in the Air University Style andAuthor Guide (available online at http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/Resources/style/austyle_guide.pdf). For details, please see our guidelines for submittingarticles at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/howto1.html. You can contactus by e-mail at aspj@maxwell.af.mil; regular mailat Air and Space Power Journal, 401 Chennault Circle,Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6004; phone at DSN493-5322 (commercial [334] 953-5322); or fax atDSN 493-5811.Printed copySubscribing to ASPJ: Both Printed and Electronic Subscriptions Are Available • The Journal is available free to all USAF organizationsas described below in the section “Is Your OrganizationReceiving Its Proper Number of ASPJCopies?” Other US government and foreign militaryorganizations may also receive the Journal for free bycontacting the editor at aspj@maxwell.af.mil.• Nonmilitary and nongovernmental organizations mayreceive the Journal by contacting the Superintendentof Documents by any of the following methods: writingto New Orders, Superintendent of Documents,c/o U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 979050,St. Louis MO 63197-9000; calling (202) 512-1800(voice), (866) 512-1800 (toll-free outside the DC area),or (202) 512-2104 (fax); or visiting http://bookstore.gpo.gov/collections/military_ journals.jsp on theInternet. The Journal’s official designation is AFRP10-1, Air and Space Power Journal, stock number 708­007-00000-5. The cost is $32.00 ($44.80 for internationalmail). Major credit cards are accepted.Free electronic copy• You can receive the Journal electronically by loggingon to the “Subscription Center” at the Air Force LinkWeb site http://www.af.mil/subscribe, selecting anyof the Air and Space Power Journal language editions,entering your name and e-mail address, and thenclicking on the “submit” button. You will immediatelyreceive an e-mail asking you to reply in orderto confirm your subscription. You won’t receive yoursubscription unless you reply to that message. Electronicsubscription is free.Is Your OrganizationReceiving Its Proper Numberof ASPJ Copies?The following criteria guide the free distributionof Air and Space Power Journal to military andgovernment organizations. These criteria are onlyplanning factors—not absolute limits. If your organizationhas different needs, please contactus at aspj@maxwell.af.mil.• One copy for each general on active duty with theUS Air Force or Air Reserve Forces.• One copy for every five active duty US Air Force officersin grades second lieutenant through colonel.• One copy for each US Air Force or Air Reserve Forcesoffice of public affairs.• Three copies for each Air Reserve Forces unit downto squadron level.• Three copies for each air attaché or advisory-groupfunction.• One copy for each US Air Force or US governmentlibrary.• Other US military, US government, or foreign militaryorganizations wishing to receive the Journal shouldcontact us at aspj@maxwell.af.mil.If your organization is not receiving the desirednumber of copies, please contact us.Cumulative Article IndexA cumulative index of ASPJ articles, listed alphabeticallyby the author’s last name, is available athttp://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aspjindex.html.The Editor125

OUR CONTRIBUTORS Gen Bruce Carlson (BA, University of Minnesota–Duluth;MA, Webster University; MA,Naval War College) serves as commander, AirForce Materiel Command, Wright-PattersonAFB, Ohio. His staff assignments have includedpositions at Tactical Air Command,Headquarters US Air Force, the Office of theSecretary of the Air Force, the Office of theSecretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff (asdirector of force structure, resources, and assessment).Additionally, he commanded theAir Force’s stealth fighter wing, the 49th, atHolloman AFB, New Mexico. Prior to assuminghis current position, he served as commander,Eighth Air Force, Barksdale AFB,Louisiana, and as joint functional componentcommander, Space and Global Strike, US StrategicCommand, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. Acommand pilot with more than 3,000 fl yinghours and combat experience in the OV-10,General Carlson has fl own multiple aircraftweapon systems.Lt Gen Stephen R. Lorenz (USAFA; MPA, Universityof Northern Colorado) is the commanderof Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.The general attended undergraduatepilot training at Craig AFB, Alabama. A commandpilot with 3,300 hours in eight aircraft,he has commanded an air-refueling squadron,a geographically separated operations group,an air-refueling wing that won the 1994 RiversideTrophy for Best Wing in Fifteenth AirForce, and an air-mobility wing that won the1995 Armstrong Trophy for Best Wing inTwenty-first Air Force. He also served as thecommandant of cadets at the US Air ForceAcademy and as deputy assistant secretary forbudget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of theAir Force for Financial Management andComptroller, Headquarters US Air Force,Washington, DC. General Lorenz is a graduateof Squadron Officer School, Air Commandand Staff College, Air War College, and theNational War College.Maj Geoffrey F. Weiss (BS in Aerospace Engineering,University of Virginia; MAS [Master ofAeronautical Science], Embry-Riddle AeronauticalUniversity; MMS [Master of Military Studies],Marine Corps University) is a student atthe School of Advanced Warfighting, Quantico,Virginia. He previously served as an executiveassistant to the assistant vice-chief of staff and asan influence-operations program manager onthe Air Staff in the Pentagon. Major Weiss hasalso held a number of group and squadron assignments,including senior director at theSoutheast Air Defense Sector, Tyndall AFB,Florida; chief, Standardization and Evaluations,932nd Air Control Squadron, 85th Group, Keflavik,Iceland; and chief, Current Operations,and flight commander, 966th Airborne AirControl Squadron, 552nd Air Control Wing,Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. In addition, he was thewing’s chief surveillance evaluator for two years.A graduate of Squadron Officer School, AirCommand and Staff College, and Marine CorpsCommand and Staff College, Major Weiss is asenior air-battle manager with over 1,800 hoursin the E-3 Sentry (AWACS) and 140 combatsupporthours in Southwest Asia.Maj Stephen Chambal (USAFA; MS, PhD, ArizonaState University) serves as deputy chief,Commander’s Action Group, Air Force MaterielCommand (AFMC), Wright-PattersonAFB, Ohio. He spent four years on the AirForce Institute of Technology (AFIT) faculty,with follow-on assignments to the National ReconnaissanceOffice, Air Command and StaffCollege, Air Force Research Laboratory, andnow on the AFMC staff. Additionally, he continuesto serve as an adjunct associate professorat AFIT, part-time faculty member at theUniversity of Dayton, and guest lecturer atWright State University.Capt Jeffrey G. Cunningham (USAFA; MS, NavalPostgraduate School) is an operational ensemblemodeler at Headquarters Air ForceWeather Agency, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. Hisprimary duties include ensemble-forecast systemdevelopment and war-fighter applications.At the Naval Postgraduate School, he specializedin numerical weather prediction. He hasalso served at Shaw AFB, South Carolina, as alead forecaster for Department of Defense facilitiesacross the southeastern United States.Captain Cunningham is a graduate of SquadronOfficer School.126

CONTRIBUTORS 127Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, retired (USAFA;MA, University of Colorado; PhD, Universityof Michigan), has 30 years of service as a commandpilot, staff officer, and educator. He flewC-130 and HC-130s in both Europe and thePacific, while also working in the Pacific AirliftControl Center. During Operation Desert Stormin 1991, he worked in the Plans Directorate onthe Air Staff in the Pentagon. He has taught atthe Air Force Academy as well as the Naval WarCollege and served as dean of the School ofAdvanced Airpower Studies (now the School ofAdvanced Air and Space Studies) at MaxwellAFB, Alabama. He is the author of five booksand over 75 articles on military theory and operations.Upon retiring from the Air Force in2000, Colonel Meilinger worked as a defensecontractor in the Washington, DC, area. Heretired again in 2006 and now lives in the Chicagoarea, where he is a freelance writer.Maj F. Anthony Eckel (BS, State University ofNew York–Cortland; MS, Air Force Institute ofTechnology; PhD, University of Washington) isan instructor in the Meteorology Departmentat the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,California. He previously served as chief of theMeteorological Models Branch at HeadquartersAir Force Weather Agency, Offutt AFB,Nebraska, where he pioneered the developmentof an ensemble-forecast system. He also servedin several operational weather-support positions,including a three-year tour at Yokota AB, Japan,as chief of weather operations. Recipientof the Air Force Institute of Technology’s Commandant’sAward for the most outstanding thesis,he has published articles in professional,atmospheric-science journals and has authoredAir Force training and education materials.Major Eckel is a graduate of Squadron OfficerSchool, Air Command and Staff College, andthe Air Force Institute of Technology (intermediatedevelopmental education).Col Scot T. Heckman (BS, Lyndon State College;MS, Colorado State University; MA, Naval WarCollege; MSS [Master of Strategic Studies], AirWar College) is the military assistant for environmentalmonitoring to the Office of the AssistantSecretary of Defense for Networks and InformationIntegration, Pentagon, Washington, DC. Hehas previously served on the staff of Air ForceSpace Command and Headquarters US AirForce. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, he commandedthe 36th Operations Support Squadronand the 7th Expeditionary Operations SupportSquadron at Andersen Air Base, Guam, supportingPacific Command’s deterrent operations. Amaster meteorologist, he was director of operationsduring the stand-up of the 20th OperationalWeather Squadron at Yokota Air Base, Japan, andled the Range Weather Flight at Cape CanaveralAir Station, supporting military, commercial, andNASA space launches. Colonel Heckman receivedhis commission in 1986 through the AirForce Reserve Officer Training Corps at LyndonState College, Vermont.Maj Bryan D. Watson (BA, JD, University ofMissouri–Columbia) is a military judge, stationedat Randolph AFB, Texas. He presides overcourts-martial, military tribunals, administrativeboards, judicial investigations, and specialhearings. In previous assignments, he has workedin the area of criminal law as both a prosecutorand defense counsel, including service as aspecial assistant US attorney. He has representedthe United States in various matters, includingtort claims, procurement contracts, and labor/employment law, and has worked in the areasof international/operations law. Previous assignmentsinclude Moody AFB, Georgia; F. E.Warren AFB, Wyoming; Langley AFB, Virginia;and Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He is licensed topractice before the Supreme Court of Missouri,the United States Court of Appeals for theArmed Forces, and the Air Force Court ofCriminal Appeals. Major Watson is a graduateof Squadron Officer School and a distinguishedgraduate of Air Command and Staff College.Dr. David R. Mets (USNA; MA, Columbia University;PhD, University of Denver) is professoremeritus at Air University’s School of AdvancedAir and Space Studies and military defenseanalyst at the Air Force Doctrine Developmentand Education Center. He studied naval historyat the US Naval Academy and taught the historyof airpower at both the Air Force Academyand West Point. During his 30-year career inthe Navy and Air Force, he served as a tankerpilot, an instructor navigator in strategic airlift,and a commander of an AC-130 squadronin Southeast Asia. On another tour there, hewas an aircraft commander for more than 900tactical-airlift sorties. A former editor of AirUniversity Review, Dr. Mets is the author of Masterof Airpower: General Carl A. Spaatz (Presidio,1988) and four other books.Maj Dale E. Hetke (USAFA; ML [Master ofLogistics], Air Force Institute of Technology)is a staff officer at Headquarters Air CombatCommand, Langley AFB, Virginia. He has servedthree operational tours as an F-16 pilot atOsan Air Base, Republic of Korea; Aviano AirBase, Italy; and Mountain Home AFB, Idaho.He has received four Aerial AchievementMedals for flying in combat zones such as Iraqand Kosovo. At the Air Force Institute of Technology,he earned the Distinguished GraduateAward. Major Hetke is a graduate of SquadronOfficer School, Air Command and Staff College,and the Air Force Institute of Technology(intermediate developmental education).

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