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Afghanistan's Control and Audit Office Requires Operational and ...

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APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGYTo assess the capabilities <strong>and</strong> performance of the CAO in fulfilling its m<strong>and</strong>ate, we reviewed relevantU.S., Afghan, <strong>and</strong> international laws, conventions, st<strong>and</strong>ards, <strong>and</strong> development strategies, as well asrelevant reports, guidance, <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ards issued by U.S. government agencies, internationalorganizations, <strong>and</strong> the CAO. We interviewed CAO leadership, advisors <strong>and</strong> department heads, as wellas officials at the Afghan Ministry of Education <strong>and</strong> Afghan Attorney General’s <strong>Office</strong>.To identify assistance provided by the United States <strong>and</strong> other donors to strengthen the CAO’sinstitutional development, we interviewed <strong>and</strong> received documentation from officials at U.S.government agencies <strong>and</strong> international organizations, including USAID; the Government Accountability<strong>Office</strong>; the World Bank; UNODC; the European Police Mission to Afghanistan; the United NationsDevelopment Program; the Embassy of the United Kingdom in Afghanistan; INTOSAI; <strong>and</strong> the AsianOrganization of Supreme <strong>Audit</strong> Institutions.To assess the effectiveness of U.S. assistance to the CAO, we used information obtained through thedocuments <strong>and</strong> interviews described above <strong>and</strong> developed conclusions based on that evidence. Afteridentifying gaps in the CAO legislative framework <strong>and</strong> operational shortcomings, we compared thosefindings with the provision of U.S. assistance to determine whether that assistance might effectivelyassist the CAO in filling those gaps <strong>and</strong> overcoming the shortcomings.This report is part of a series of SIGAR audits addressing U.S. efforts to combat corruption <strong>and</strong>strengthen the rule of law. We conducted work in Kabul, Afghanistan <strong>and</strong> Washington, D.C. fromDecember 2009 to April 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing st<strong>and</strong>ards.These st<strong>and</strong>ards require that we plan <strong>and</strong> perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidenceto provide a reasonable basis for our findings <strong>and</strong> conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believethe evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings <strong>and</strong> conclusions based on our auditobjectives. The audit was conducted by the <strong>Office</strong> of the Special Inspector General for AfghanistanReconstruction under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, <strong>and</strong> the Inspector General Act of 1978, asamended.SIGAR <strong>Audit</strong>-10-8 Anti-Corruption/<strong>Control</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Audit</strong> <strong>Office</strong> Page 20

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