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Département Réseau, Sécurité et Multimédia Rapport d'Activités 2008

Département Réseau, Sécurité et Multimédia Rapport d'Activités 2008

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monopoly s<strong>et</strong> prices. The performancemeasure we consider is social welfare, i.e. th<strong>et</strong>otal value that the system has for allparticipants. Under some assumptions on thepeers utility functions, we derive a necessaryand sufficient condition for symm<strong>et</strong>ry-basedsystems to outperform revenue-orientedmanagement.The figure below compares social welfare Wobtained by using each scheme to the maximalreachable value of social welfare W*(assuming user preferences are param<strong>et</strong>erisedby two independent values, a and b, with anexponential distribution of respective mean1/µ a and 1/µ b ).for a type of management to be preferable tothe other: it appears that profit orientedpayment-based schemes may be socially b<strong>et</strong>terthan symm<strong>et</strong>ric ones under some specificcircumstances, namely if the h<strong>et</strong>erogeneityamong user profiles is high.References[1] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole. Game theory.MIT Press, 1991[2] L. Toka and P. Maillé. Managing a Peer-to-Peer Backup System: Does Imposed FairnessSocially Outperform a Revenue-DrivenMonopoly?, in Proc. of the 4th InternationalWorkshop on Grid Economics and BusinessModels (Gecon’2007, Rennes, France), August2007.[3] P. Maillé and L. Toka. Managing a Peer-to-Peer Storage System in a Selfish Soci<strong>et</strong>y.Submitted.We obtain that user h<strong>et</strong>erogeneity tends tofavor pricing-based schemes that are moreflexible, and above a given user h<strong>et</strong>erogeneitythreshold even a monopoly-managed systemwill be socially b<strong>et</strong>ter than a system imposingsymm<strong>et</strong>ry. Those results have been presentedin [2], and a generalized version of the modelhas been submitted.ConclusionsIn this work we have addressed the problem ofuser incentives in a peer-to-peer storagesystem. Using a game theor<strong>et</strong>ical model todescribe selfish reactions of all systems actors(users and the operator), we have studied andcompared the outcomes of two possiblemanaging schemes, namely symm<strong>et</strong>ry-basedand profit oriented payment-based. Not onlythe size of the offered storage space wastarg<strong>et</strong>ed with incentives, but as the availabilityand reliability is a particularly important issuein storage systems, the model also aimed toreduce churn. By comparing the social welfarelevel at the outcome in the two cases, undersome assumptions on user preferences weexhibited a necessary and sufficient conditionPracom’s Annual Report <strong>2008</strong> 61

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