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[1st Dist.] 1996). A copy of the 1995 protective order was in troducedinto evidence as State’s exhibit 1, and there was testimonyre gard ing the 1995 protective order. No proof was presented,how ever, as to the 1993 order that was pled in the information.Additionally, in contrast to the State’s contentions, protectiveor ders are not renewed or continued.In conclusion, we hold ap pel lant did not commit thecrime alleged by the State as a mat ter of law. As previouslystated, protective or ders are valid for a time period notto exceed one year [now two years]. Te x.Fa m.Co d e An n.§71.13 (a). By its very nature, a protective or der au to matically expires one year [now two years] after its issuance.As the State er ro neously pled in the in for ma tion, on July26, 1995, it was le gally impossible for ap pel lant to vio latea protective order issued in 1993.Rohrscheib v. State, 934 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. App.—Houston [1stDist.] 1995).The defendant must have notice of the protective order. InSmall v. State, 809 S.W.2d 253 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991,pet.ref’d), the appellant appealed his conviction for violatinga protective order, alleging that there was no evidence that heac tually knew of the court order and that he therefore could notvio late an order he knew nothing about. Id. at 254. The courtheld it was an essential element of the offense that the Stateprove the appellant knowingly and intentionally violate thecourt order in question beyond a reasonable doubt. The courtfound that “[u]nless a defendant is somehow aware of what heis prohibited from doing by a specific court order, he cannot beguilty of knowingly and intentionally violating that court or der.”Id. at 256. Further, in reversing the conviction, the court in Smallnoted that “aside from indicating that the appellant was servedwith notice of the hearing on the protective order, there [was]no evidence in [that] record that the appellant agreed to a protectiveorder, attended any hearing or in any way participated,that he was ever served with a copy of the protective order, orthat he in any way received notice, formal or informal, of theis suance or existence of the court order in question prior to”his violating it. Id. at 256–57.In Ramos v. State, 923 S.W.2d 196 (Tex.App.—Austin 1996),the conviction for violating the protective order was affirmedeven though there was no proof of actual service of the protectiveor der on the defendant. In that particular case, the defendanthad previously pled guilty to violating the same order prior tocom mit ting the new offense that was the basis of his appeal.The State did not have to prove that he had actually received acopy of the protective order, only that he knew of the existenceof the order before he violated it.In Harvey v. State, the Defendant was convicted in the331st Judicial District Court, Travis County, Bob Perkins, J., ofviolating a family protective order. The Court of Appeals foundthe indictment alleged that defendant acted intentionally andknow ingly but not that he knew or intended to violate a protective order. The Court of Appeals reversed, saying that thein dict ment and subsequent jury charge omitted the elementthat the Defendant knowingly and intentionally vio lated thepro tec tive order. Harvey v. State, 48 S.W.3d 847 (Tex.App.—Austin2001).The Court of Criminal Appeals re versed that holding inHarvey v. State, 78 S.W.3d 368 (2002). The Court con cludedthat the charge was sufficient when it stated “a person commitsthe offense of violation of a protective order if, in violation ofa protective order issued af ter notice and hearing, the personknow ingly or in ten tion ally commits family violence.” The Courtput a lot of emphasis on the fact that the defendant did not objectto the charge or request a different charge. The Court heldthat the defendant must know of the existence of the order butneed not know all its provisions.Forgetful State’s WitnessIn this case, we find that the trial court erred in allowingStern to testify in front of the jury. When Stern responded,‘I don’t remember,’ to every substantive question askedon voir dire, the State was put on notice that his trialtes ti mony would likely be the same. It is well-settled thata party may not call a witness pri marily for the purposeof impeaching the proposed witness with evidence thatwould otherwise be inadmissible.See Barley v. State, 906 S.W.2d 27, 37 n. 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995),cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1176, 116 S.Ct. 1271, 134 L.Ed.2d 217(1996); Pruitt v. State, 770 S.W.2d 909, 910–11 (Tex.App.—FortWorth 1989, pet. ref’d). “We find, therefore, that it was improperfor the State to call Stern as a witness, knowing that he wouldfeign a memory loss only to introduce facts into evidence by askinglead ing questions.” See Sills v. State, 846 S.W.2d 392,396–97(Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref’d); Gannaway v.State, 823 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d).These excerpts are from Arm stead v. State, 977 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1998).In another similar case, Sills v. State, the State called a witnessnamed Cham bers, who testified to his name and the fact28 VOICE FOR THE DEFENSE October 2009