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doubt going to be required. The State bears the burden by a preponderance of the evidence to show that the defendant did infact “undermine the judicial process” by “procuring or coercingsi lence” of the complainant. In this circumstance, if the showingis made, a defendant forfeits his/her confrontation claims.Crawford Does Not ApplyCrawford does not apply to probation revocation hearings. Diazv. State, 172 S.W.3d 668 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, 2005). Crawforddoes not apply to suppression hearings. Vanmeter v. State,165 S.W.3d 68 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005).Excited UtterancesHearsay Exception under Rules of EvidenceTexas Rule of Evidence 803(2) is an exception to the hearsayrule allowing statements relating to a startling event or conditionmade while the declarant was under the stress of excitementcaused by the event or condition. The availability of the declarantis irrelevant. The exception is rooted in the theory that such statementsare involuntary and do not allow the declarant adequateop por tunity to fabricate. Reyes v. State, 48 S.W. 3d 917 (Tex.App.—Ft. Worth 2001). Factors that courts have held should becon sidered include whether the statement was made in responseto questioning and how much time elapsed between the startlingevent and the statement.The Court of Criminal Appeals dealt with this is sue in Zulianiv. State, 97 S.W.3d 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). In that case,the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion instatements made by the victim to the victim’s sis ter where a policeofficer requested that the sister take the vic tim into a separateroom to “find out what had happened.” This conversation tookplace twenty-four hours after the alleged as sault. In its holdingthe Court states:[I]t is not dispositive that the statement is an answer to aques tion or that it was separated by a period of time fromthe startling event; these are simply factors to consider inde ter min ing whether the statement is admissible underthe excited utterance hearsay exception97 S.W. 3d at 596Perhaps the court was persuaded by additional facts,which included that the victim had not been separated fromthe defendant during the 24-hour period, the victim stated shefeared the defendant, the victim stated to the husband of thesis ter, “help me, help me, help me,” prior to their arrival on thescene, and the victim had a scalp injury requiring stitches thathad been left untreated. The court stated, in its conclusion, “thekey is whether the declarant was still dominated by the emotions,ex cite ment, fear, or pain of the event.”In Apolinar v. State, 155 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005),the court held that a statement of the victim of an aggravatedrob bery made to his daughter four days after he was attackedwas admissible under the excited utterance exception to thehear say rule. In that case, the court relied upon the fact that thevictim had been in surgery, heavily medicated, unconscious, orincoherent up until the day he made the statement to his daughter.Further, the court states that the victim appeared “mad” and“excited” during his very first conversation with his daugh terabout the attack while in the hospital. The court posed theques tion, “Can there ever be a ‘suspended excitement’ or ‘suspendedanimation’ variation of the excited utterance hearsayexception?” They answered, in their holding, this question inthe affirmative.In Lane v. State, 111 S.W.3d 203 (Tex. App.—Eastland,2003), the court held that the alleged victim’s statements madeto medical personnel and officers at the hospital were admissibleas excited utterances and under the medical diagnosis exceptionto the hearsay rule. In that case, the alleged victim took the standand stated she had lied to the medical personnel and officers atthe hospital. She testified at trial that appellant had never assaultedher and she made the statements because she was angry.The Court of Criminal Appeals, in Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188(Tex. Crim. App. 2004), upheld this ruling due, in part, to thefact that trial counsel did not properly preserve error.In Glover v. State, 102 S.W.3d 754 (Tex. App.—Texarkana2002, pet.ref’d), the court held that the excited utterance ex ceptiondid not apply to a situation where a mother interrogatedher 14-year-old daughter about sneaking out and having sexwith a 26-year-old man. The court, however, did hold thatthe statements were admissible under 803(24) as a “statementagainst social interest” since a reasonable person in the 14-yearold’sposition would not have made such statements since shewould be subjected to her mother’s disgrace unless she believedthem to be true.In Aguilera v. State, 75 S.W.3d 60 (Tex. App.—San Antonio2002), the court held that statements made one year after thedate of the event were not excited utterances and the trial courtabused its discretion in admitting the statements.In Liggens v. State, 50 S.W. 3d 657 (Tex. App.—Ft. Worth2001), store employees’ statements to police were admitted asex cited utterances even though the declarants were not spe cifically identified.26 VOICE FOR THE DEFENSE October 2009