The OMC inclusion and national social NGOs: From enthusiasm to ...
The OMC inclusion and national social NGOs: From enthusiasm to ... The OMC inclusion and national social NGOs: From enthusiasm to ...
emained invisible on both sides of the Rhine (see also Maucher 2005), new resources werenot acquired, “good practices” not included in the NAPs, policies not influenced through theprocess (see also Brandsen et al 2005). While at EU-level, EAPN and FEANTSA are strongactors closely following the OMC inclusion, they cannot be said to have had significantimpact on the work of the SPC and the ISG. Hardly a good overall picture.When attempting to explain these results it seems helpful to me to differentiate betweeninternal (within NGOs) and external factors. External factors then again must be divided intonational and European ones.Addressing the internal reasons for the quite limited implementation (success), I can onlypartly draw on my own research. What became clear, however, is that social NGOs often lackthe resources to extensively deal with European issues as well as, often enough, the languageskills (Kröger 2006a). Either as a consequence of both and or as the consequence ofgeneralised scepticism, they also showed no significant interest in foreign NAPs as sources ofinformation and learning. Maucher confirms this when concluding that “the elementsexchange of information and good practices are fundamentally under-used” (Maucher 2005:10). A research project led by a German institute in 2001-2002, called “Networks of socialwork in Europe”, which can rely on an impressive number of qualified interviews, found outseveral things of interest here 35 . European topics would be on the working agendas only oncein a while, the EU only occasionally figured as part of the self-image, which, consequently,contributed to the percentage of EU-related publications to be low. Financial aspects seemedto be the most important reasons to get involved with the EU. Finally, only half of theinterviewed NGOs reported regularly to their members and supporters about their EUactivities, a result that the findings of Warleigh confirm (Warleigh 2001). I can indeed reportfrom my own research that it was impossible for me to find NGOs representatives at the subnationallevel in France, which were knowledgeable enough about the OMC (or at all) to beinterviewed. The same trend appeared in Germany where one NGO key officer stated thatNGOs had not mobilised enough (internally) and where another key officer estimated that theOMC was at best known at the regional level of its organisation. In Germany, however, this ismore surprising as the large welfare organisations are organised from the ground to thefederal level – which is not the case in France. This lack of information, consultation and35 Information, unfortunately only in German, can be found at :http://www.uni-mainz.de/FB/Paedagogik/netzwerke_europa/German social NGOs were at the center of attention.
mobilisation of the constituencies leads Warleigh to conclude that “NGOs are, currently atleast, unable to act as catalysts for the Europeanization of civil society, since their internalgovernance procedures are insufficiently democratic” (Warleigh 2001: 623).At EU-level, structural diversity of social NGOs, limited resources, ideological differences,the competition for the same funds can keep them from forming closer alliances which couldeventually lead to more influence. Subsequently, social NGOs at EU-level “have mainlyremained small, poor and weak organisations” with a great deal of freedom, but littleinfluence (Geyer 2001: 480-481).With respect to the external domestic reasons, the poor results in France are at first sightdifficult to explain. The German case can be explained with respect to the many importantveto players and the strongly anchored and defended principle of subsidiarity (NGOsincluded), already existing channels of dialogue and negotiation between social NGOs and thestate, traditional opposition against strong social competences of the EU (Rhodes 1999;Scharpf 2002) and of being ranked by it, the absence of a policy evaluation culture (Maucher2005), of a tradition in terms of exclusion discourse and approach and of interministerialcoordination (Miebach 2004). In both countries, the resistance and / or ignorance of theregional and local levels where social exclusion operates has contributed to the poor deliveryas well as the lack of foreign language(s), which often stood in the way of deepening one’sknowledge about other member states’ practices.One possible explanation of the poor results in France is that the minister of social affairs,Borloo, is not too interested in the EU and that its ministry has suffered from a decrease ininterministerial importance in the diverse governments since 2002. Additionally, the absenceof a consultation culture undoubtedly contributed to the difficult implementation. But thesefactors alone do not explain for the poor delivery in both member states – as in other memberstates where good consultation processes are reported (United Kingdom and Sweden, seeBrandsen et al 2005) but where actors, the governments included, agree that the NAPs havenot developed into an important policy-making tool, or worse, even did not become part of thepolicy planning cycles at all 36 .The main barrier in both member states was the lack of support by the higher politicalleadership (see also Armstrong 2005; Brandsen et al 2005; Friedrich 2006; Halvorsen andJohansson 2005; Idema 2004; Miebach 2004; Sacchi 2004). Both governments did not displaysufficient political will or, in other words, their disposition to make use of the OMC inclusion36 These are the official governmental evaluations of the United Kingdom and Sweden.
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emained invisible on both sides of the Rhine (see also Maucher 2005), new resources werenot acquired, “good practices” not included in the NAPs, policies not influenced through theprocess (see also Br<strong>and</strong>sen et al 2005). While at EU-level, EAPN <strong>and</strong> FEANTSA are strongac<strong>to</strong>rs closely following the <strong>OMC</strong> <strong>inclusion</strong>, they cannot be said <strong>to</strong> have had significantimpact on the work of the SPC <strong>and</strong> the ISG. Hardly a good overall picture.When attempting <strong>to</strong> explain these results it seems helpful <strong>to</strong> me <strong>to</strong> differentiate betweeninternal (within <strong>NGOs</strong>) <strong>and</strong> external fac<strong>to</strong>rs. External fac<strong>to</strong>rs then again must be divided in<strong>to</strong><strong>national</strong> <strong>and</strong> European ones.Addressing the internal reasons for the quite limited implementation (success), I can onlypartly draw on my own research. What became clear, however, is that <strong>social</strong> <strong>NGOs</strong> often lackthe resources <strong>to</strong> extensively deal with European issues as well as, often enough, the languageskills (Kröger 2006a). Either as a consequence of both <strong>and</strong> or as the consequence ofgeneralised scepticism, they also showed no significant interest in foreign NAPs as sources ofinformation <strong>and</strong> learning. Maucher confirms this when concluding that “the elementsexchange of information <strong>and</strong> good practices are fundamentally under-used” (Maucher 2005:10). A research project led by a German institute in 2001-2002, called “Networks of <strong>social</strong>work in Europe”, which can rely on an impressive number of qualified interviews, found outseveral things of interest here 35 . European <strong>to</strong>pics would be on the working agendas only oncein a while, the EU only occasionally figured as part of the self-image, which, consequently,contributed <strong>to</strong> the percentage of EU-related publications <strong>to</strong> be low. Financial aspects seemed<strong>to</strong> be the most important reasons <strong>to</strong> get involved with the EU. Finally, only half of theinterviewed <strong>NGOs</strong> reported regularly <strong>to</strong> their members <strong>and</strong> supporters about their EUactivities, a result that the findings of Warleigh confirm (Warleigh 2001). I can indeed reportfrom my own research that it was impossible for me <strong>to</strong> find <strong>NGOs</strong> representatives at the sub<strong>national</strong>level in France, which were knowledgeable enough about the <strong>OMC</strong> (or at all) <strong>to</strong> beinterviewed. <strong>The</strong> same trend appeared in Germany where one NGO key officer stated that<strong>NGOs</strong> had not mobilised enough (internally) <strong>and</strong> where another key officer estimated that the<strong>OMC</strong> was at best known at the regional level of its organisation. In Germany, however, this ismore surprising as the large welfare organisations are organised from the ground <strong>to</strong> thefederal level – which is not the case in France. This lack of information, consultation <strong>and</strong>35 Information, unfortunately only in German, can be found at :http://www.uni-mainz.de/FB/Paedagogik/netzwerke_europa/German <strong>social</strong> <strong>NGOs</strong> were at the center of attention.
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