The OMC inclusion and national social NGOs: From enthusiasm to ...
The OMC inclusion and national social NGOs: From enthusiasm to ... The OMC inclusion and national social NGOs: From enthusiasm to ...
checked regularly whether a sneaky erosion of national competencies can happen” 22 . Also,one finds in Germany a strong rejection of everything that has to do with quantified targetsetting at the European level, ranking, and naming and shaming strategies 23 : “It is notacceptable to us if the useful, necessary and openly qualitative comparison is overlaid by afactual grading of even some sort of ranking” 24 .Here, the consultation of the relevant actors resembles the one in France with the exceptionsof the regions (Länder) who repeatedly and officially voiced their dissent with the OMCinclusion. Unlike in France, the NAP process has had different ministerial affiliations over theyears in Germany which are important as no institutional continuity could be assured at thetop levels of political leadership; yet, as in France, the people at the working level whocoordinate the process have largely remained the same since 2001, changing from oneministerial affiliation to the other.Comparable to the CNLE in France, there is in Germany a so-called permanent advisoryboard gathering regional and local representatives, social partners, NGOs and a fewacademics which has been created as a consultative body for the National Report on Povertyand Wealth (NARB) and was extended, in 2002, to the consultation process of the OMCinclusion. Whereas the CNLE meets every 1-2 months, this board convenes 1-2 times a year.However, this body has not been used in order to discuss general issues related to theimplementation of the OMC inclusion (see also Miebach 2004: 28). The regions can use thesecond chamber, the Bundesrat, to issue opinions and decisions.For the three rounds, there were consecutively one, two and again one meeting(s) 25 . In 2004,the government proceeded to a voluntary update of its NAP deemed necessary in the light ofthe so-called Agenda 2010. The advisory board was consulted once but without apparentimpact. Finally, in 2005, the advisory board was not consulted at all. While there was noparliamentarian debate in 2001, there have been debates 26 on the NAPs in 2003 and 2005,however after their transmission to the Commission. However, the Parliament received the22 “We shape the change!”, Ministry for Health and Social Affairs, 2004: 45.23 See the opinion of the German government (9.3.2005) on the communication of the Commission of 9 February2005 – COM (2005) 33 final. This evaluation was confirmed by all interviews conducted with the implied civilservants as well as with a German participant of a peer review.24 Ulrike Mauscher, Parliamentary Secretary of State in the Ministry for Work and Social Order, at the meetingof the conference of regional ministers for work and social affairs (ASMK) in November 2001.25 Friedrich 2006 and Miebach 2004 come to the same conclusions about the nature of the consultation processesof the first two rounds.26 “Debate” should be taken with caution: 45 minutes were accorded to six parliamentarians, advancing theirrespective proposals without any further discussion and without any particular reference to the document or tothe larger European context
NAPs only after their adaptation by the respective cabinets and after their handing over to theCommission.The second chamber (Bundesrat) has been very critical towards the OMC inclusion from thebeginning on. This does not come as a surprise as the German regions hold importantcompetencies in the social field as well as financial responsibility, but were in no wayincluded in the establishment of the OMC inclusion at EU-level which is perceived as adouble intrusion – by the EU and the federal government – in their competencies (Büchs andFriedrich 2005). Resistance is particularly strong when originating in regions with an opposedpolitical leadership to the one in Berlin. If the regions have been opposing the process, thesituation is different as far as cities and counties are concerned: here, the OMC inclusion haslargely remained unidentified and where it is known, it is clearly rejected 27 as intrusion intoown competencies and a bureaucratic process leading nowhere.The very little amount and the nature of “consultation” – in committees not accessible to thepublic or the media – led to a very low degree of visibility of the NAPs and the OMC processmore generally. All interviewees in both countries agree that it remained very low if existentat all. Interestingly, one French civil servant had doubts if the minister of social affairs evenknew about the NAPs 28 , adding that “Europe” was not his thing.With these descriptions of the consultation processes in mind, it cannot come as a surprisethat NGOs evaluated their impact on the NAPs as being minimal. For the first round (2001-2003), they find that there has been no impact at all. In the second round, French actors reportthat the issue of mobilising all actors (common objective 4) was taken up due to therecommendation of the NGOs. However, the measures mentioned in the same NAP werenever realised, relativising this “success”. In the German case, slight impacts of the NGOinvolvement can be tracked down. The suggestion to have a focus on particularly weak peoplewas incorporated and the problems of homelessness and illiteracy were mentioned. However,again, this “success” must be relativised as the new focus was not dealt with in the final NAPin any serious way, as criticise NGOs in the comment on the NAP. Furthermore, in an annex,some more 17 good practices were attached seven out of which described practices of NGOs.The lack of influence on the content of the NAPs in both member states is also observablewhen looking at the statements NGOs produced when commenting the NAPs. Besides ageneral welcome of the process, criticism about the advanced policies is broad and often27 Interview employee in the headquarters of the German association of counties, 7.7.2005.28 Interview, DGAS, 22.9.2005
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NAPs only after their adaptation by the respective cabinets <strong>and</strong> after their h<strong>and</strong>ing over <strong>to</strong> theCommission.<strong>The</strong> second chamber (Bundesrat) has been very critical <strong>to</strong>wards the <strong>OMC</strong> <strong>inclusion</strong> from thebeginning on. This does not come as a surprise as the German regions hold importantcompetencies in the <strong>social</strong> field as well as financial responsibility, but were in no wayincluded in the establishment of the <strong>OMC</strong> <strong>inclusion</strong> at EU-level which is perceived as adouble intrusion – by the EU <strong>and</strong> the federal government – in their competencies (Büchs <strong>and</strong>Friedrich 2005). Resistance is particularly strong when originating in regions with an opposedpolitical leadership <strong>to</strong> the one in Berlin. If the regions have been opposing the process, thesituation is different as far as cities <strong>and</strong> counties are concerned: here, the <strong>OMC</strong> <strong>inclusion</strong> haslargely remained unidentified <strong>and</strong> where it is known, it is clearly rejected 27 as intrusion in<strong>to</strong>own competencies <strong>and</strong> a bureaucratic process leading nowhere.<strong>The</strong> very little amount <strong>and</strong> the nature of “consultation” – in committees not accessible <strong>to</strong> thepublic or the media – led <strong>to</strong> a very low degree of visibility of the NAPs <strong>and</strong> the <strong>OMC</strong> processmore generally. All interviewees in both countries agree that it remained very low if existentat all. Interestingly, one French civil servant had doubts if the minister of <strong>social</strong> affairs evenknew about the NAPs 28 , adding that “Europe” was not his thing.With these descriptions of the consultation processes in mind, it cannot come as a surprisethat <strong>NGOs</strong> evaluated their impact on the NAPs as being minimal. For the first round (2001-2003), they find that there has been no impact at all. In the second round, French ac<strong>to</strong>rs reportthat the issue of mobilising all ac<strong>to</strong>rs (common objective 4) was taken up due <strong>to</strong> therecommendation of the <strong>NGOs</strong>. However, the measures mentioned in the same NAP werenever realised, relativising this “success”. In the German case, slight impacts of the NGOinvolvement can be tracked down. <strong>The</strong> suggestion <strong>to</strong> have a focus on particularly weak peoplewas incorporated <strong>and</strong> the problems of homelessness <strong>and</strong> illiteracy were mentioned. However,again, this “success” must be relativised as the new focus was not dealt with in the final NAPin any serious way, as criticise <strong>NGOs</strong> in the comment on the NAP. Furthermore, in an annex,some more 17 good practices were attached seven out of which described practices of <strong>NGOs</strong>.<strong>The</strong> lack of influence on the content of the NAPs in both member states is also observablewhen looking at the statements <strong>NGOs</strong> produced when commenting the NAPs. Besides ageneral welcome of the process, criticism about the advanced policies is broad <strong>and</strong> often27 Interview employee in the headquarters of the German association of counties, 7.7.2005.28 Interview, DGAS, 22.9.2005
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