The OMC inclusion and national social NGOs: From enthusiasm to ...

The OMC inclusion and national social NGOs: From enthusiasm to realityBy Sandra KrögerWork in progress – comments most welcome!Paper prepared for the fourth ESPAnet annual conference in Bremen, 21 – 23September 2006.When the OMC inclusion was introduced in 2000, social NGOs were quite enthusiastic about what seemed to bean important step forward in the construction of a “social Europe”. Additionally, the adoption of a commonobjective such the “mobilisation of all relevant bodies” seemed to reserve for them a particular place in theimplementation process of this OMC. In the course of the last five years, however, the prior enthusiasm has beensomewhat calmed by the experiences gained.This contribution will describe the experiences with the OMC inclusion of French and German social NGOs: inhow far were they able to mobilize their own constituencies, in how far did the governments consulted themthroughout the drafting process of the National Action Plans, did their consultation have an impact on the latter?A brief light will also be shed on the implication of European NGOs at the EU-level.The analysis reveals that in both member states, this OMC has been an opportunity structure for national socialNGOs insofar as it has contributed to an increased awareness about the European level and helped internalinstitutional capacity building. With respect to greater impact on national policy development, however, theOMC inclusion has not been of great help. This must mainly be explained by the general lack of support by thehigher political leadership for the OMC inclusion.Sandra KrögerGraduate Programme “The Future of the European Social Model”Georg-August Universität GöttingenHumboldtallee 3D – 37073 GöttingenFon: +49-30-48.49.34.35e-mail: sandra_kroeger@gmx.net

1. IntroductionFrom the first anti-poverty programme in the 1970s over the discussion about the Europeansocial model in the 1980s and 1990s to the introduction of the Open Method of Coordination(OMC) inclusion, the social dimension of the EU has remarkably advanced, even though itstill lags far behind the degree of economic and financial integration (Scharpf 1996) and mostprobably will continue to do so in the future due to strong national political resistance againstfurther harmonization in the field of social policy. NGOs did particularly benefit from thedifferent anti-poverty programmes as these and the support of the European Commission(hereafter Commission) led to the creation of the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN) in1990 which since became an important political lobbying organisation and informationprovider at EU-level (Halvorsen and Johansson 2005), gathering some 21 national povertynetworks as well as additional 26 European associations.What about national social NGOs, however? Where they capable of using the institutionbuildingat EU-level (de la Porte 2005) so as to increase their impact on domestic policydevelopment? This is the question that the present paper will address. More concretely, itaddresses the question how national social NGOs have reacted to and dealt with the OMCinclusion (2001-2005) and whether its framework has allowed them to increase their impacton national policy-making. National social NGOs have been chosen as the OMC inclusionclearly is an intergovernmental instrument. The realisation of its high ambitions, due to itsnon-bindingness, completely depends upon member states’ will to implement it. Therefore,the success or failure of this OMC must mainly be researched and evaluated at domestic level.In order to address this question, I am particularly relying on semi-structuredinterviews that I have conducted in France and Germany between January 2004 andSeptember 2005 1 . Furthermore, I have conducted semi-structured interviews with officialsfrom the Commission and several delegates both to the Social Protection Committee (7) andto its Indicator-Sub Group (6), the political and technical steering committees of this OMC aswell as 40 people who participated in the supportive peer review programme. Additionally,official statements from NGOs as well as governmental plans have been taken into1 For France, I am drawing on 12 in-depth interviews with involved actors that I conducted between January2004 and September 2005, four of which with the concerned administrations, two with a Sénateur which is at thesame time the president of the CNLE (see further down) and seven with representatives of the main NGOs,partly having leading functions within the French and European branches of the European Anti-Poverty Network(EAPN). For the German case, I am drawing on 19 in-depth interviews (three on the federal level, six on theregional level, two on the local level, six of national NGOs and two with involved researchers). The interviewswere conducted between May and November 2005.

consideration. The picture is completed by field research done by other scholars, more so inGermany than in France 2 .This contribution is a first account of the empirical findings related to the topic of interesthere. It therefore will contend itself with first ad-hoc plausibilisations, to be systematised andre-thought in a next step. The structure of the text is as follows. The next section will reviewhow the OMC inclusion can generally be researched and the place of social NGOs in itparticularly (2). The third part will proceed to the empirical account of the “relationship”between this OMC and national social NGOs, with a brief look at the EU-level (3). Finally, apreliminary explanation of the results will be provided before turning to a more generaldiscussion of the issues at stake (4).2. Researching the OMC inclusion in general and the role of national socialNGOs in particularThe OMC inclusion exists since 2000. At the end of that year, common objectives wereendorsed and one year later common indicators adopted. Member states agreed to writebiennial National Action Plans (NAPs) in which they lay out their policies and examples ofso-called good practices; the indicators can be found in the annexes. A Joint Report of theCommission and the Council follows which resembles more a summary than an evaluation ofthe NAPs. Since 2004, there have also been peer reviews 3 . Finally, a Communitarian actionprogramme against social exclusion is meant to support this OMC 4 .Researching the OMC inclusion – as well as other social OMCs – is quite difficult. This is sofor several reasons. First, this OMC has no binding elements at the EU-level other than thatthe member states did agree, in 2000, to develop such a process with common objectives andto write biennial action plans. However, as the common objectives are quite vague 5 and asmember states cannot be forced to translate them into national legislation or programmes, it isquasi impossible to causally relate a certain policy development to this OMC with any sort ofcertainty. Second, the much debated multi-level system that the EU forms adds to the(methodological) difficulties, leaving space for many intervening factors at varying levels of2 To my knowledge, only a single French researcher has conducted field research about this OMC.3 These take place 7-8 times a year. These take place in alterning member states, last one and a half days and aremeant to discuss and present particular “good practices” in greater detail, see Kröger 2006a.4 This action programme runs for the period 2002-2006 and mounts up to 75 million Euro – a small sumcompared with its ambitions. It is run by the Commission and has three motivations: foster research andstatistical work, support exchange of policies and networking.5 1) Access to employment and to resources, rights, goods and services, 2) prevention of the risks of exclusion,3) help for the most vulnerable and 4) mobilisation of all relevant actors.

policy development and implementation. Third, and more related to this OMC (as well as tothe other social OMCs) is their very low degree of public visibility, or, as a French actor putit, their existence clandestine, making it difficult to discover traces of the process - other thanthe official documents, but even these are not always made public – as well as to control forwhat one hears or reads. Which leads to fourth, a more general difficulty, but particularlypresent in such a sensitive policy area, that the interviewees are all actors with institutionaland / or political and normative interests to be defended against various other actors, makingit even harder to come to a balanced conclusion. If an actor mentions the OMC as anargument that change occurred, this can be strategically motivated and must not necessarilybe true just as the absence of reference must not mean that the OMC had no consequences(Büchs 2004).These – and other – considerations have been broadly absent or ignored in the conceptual anddescriptive OMC literature which has tended to see the OMC as a tool for supranationallearning, mostly concluding that it can promote learning processes and eventually, that it hasalready promoted them. I have attempted to show that this scholarly majority is mislead withthe learning assumption, or more precisely, in connecting the OMC inclusion to (significantand organizational) learning processes, in the way of which stand institutional, organisational,political and normative differences as well as the organisation of the OMC itself (Kröger2006a; Kröger 2006b forthcoming). Interviewees have repeatedly stated that they thought thatlearning processes were taking place in the EU, not through this OMC, however. Instead, itmakes more sense to evaluate the OMC in the well-known categories of effectiveness andlegitimacy (Offe 1998; Scharpf 1999). Due to the non-binding character, effectiveness,however, needs to be defined and evaluated in different ways (than looking at policyperformances and programmes as these cannot be clearly tracked back to the OMC). Withinmy PhD research, I am differentiating between internal effectiveness and externaleffectiveness, the prior relating to the domestic, the latter to the EU level (Kröger 2005). Bothlevels are analysed in terms of institutional capability building, a necessary predecessor ofpolicy development, and therewith effectiveness (Sacchi 2004). Institutional capabilitybuilding happens if resources are increased, if knowledge and awareness are increased andeventually lead to learning processes, if interministerial coordination is increased, if timelydata (indicators) exists and is made available, if one succeeds at placing the process at a highlevel of the involved institutions – a precondition of which is that the process is politicallyaccepted. Summarizing, the OMC inclusion could said to have been effective if it contributed

existing tasks. This seems to have been easier in Germany as the large social NGOs hadalready begun to establish at least half-time jobs related to EU matters. In both member states,the government did not allocate particular resources to this OMC, to programmes, or tohuman resources.With respect to new internal structures, one must divide into two levels. Whereas this OMCdid not lead to new structures within single NGOs (except for the large protestant welfareorganisation in Germany where a working group was set up), new structures have emergedamongst them. This is particularly true for the French case. Here, the landscape of charityorganizations is very broad, often following the principle of autonomy and subsidiarity(historical catholic influences). This variety of welfare stood in the way of effectivecommunication towards the state authorities and towards the European level. This is why in2003 occurred a reorganisation of the respective consultation structures so as to allow formore flexible action towards the state and the EU. NGOs took advantage of the process toproceed to an internal re-organisation, concerning the two main umbrella organizations inFrance, UNIOPPS and EAPN-France 10 , which found a way of close cooperation. WhileUNIOPSS is an organisation of approximately 40 NGOs, which operate nation-wide, EAPN-France often comprises the same national NGOs, but additionally nearly all the social NGOsoperating exclusively locally. Evidently, these often very small NGOs do not have thefinancial and human resources to accompany political processes. This is why it was decidedthat the UNIOPSS commission against poverty would furthermore be open to members ofEAPN-France. The group consists of about 40 persons, meets on a monthly basis and nowalso deals with EU issues. When communicating within France, it uses the logo “Alerte”,when communicating with the EU, the same commission operates under “EAPN-France” 11 .For the French case, it meant a real gain of synergies and the link to the OMC is clearly madeby the president of the working group: ”The NAP was the catalyst for the French NGOs tothink together. We had started a little bit, but this was the strongest catalyst” 12 .In Germany, the restructuring was not as important, but this should not surprise as the largewelfare organisations had already been well organised and connected before. However, theyalso set up a working group particular related to this OMC, and already in spring 2001 (vs.French case: June 2003). The regularity of the meetings varies greatly between monthly10Union Nationale Interfédérale des œuvres et Organismes Privés Sanitaires et Sociaux and European Anti-Poverty Network – France.11 Interviews with the president of the UNIOPSS commission against poverty, 26.1.2004 and with the then inplace President of EAPN-France, 10.6.2004.12 Ibid.

meetings and two meetings a year and largely follows the NAP agenda. In June 2003, aworkshop was organised in order to link this working group and the one working aroundlabour market policies. Both working groups – the French and the German – havecontinuously commented on the successive NAPs.Finally, even where no new structures were set up – and this holds true for almost all NGOsinterviewed here, it is reported that the awareness about the European dimension increased.But the social NGOs have not only mobilized internally, they also tried to mobilise outside oftheir own boundaries. This is true particularly for Germany where several attempts weremade, in different regions and originating in different large welfare organisations, to connectthis OMC to the regions and the local authorities, without success, however. A project meantto increase the awareness about this OMC has been initiated by a group of NGOs and waslargely financed by the Communitarian Action Programme against social exclusion. Theopening conference took place in June 2005 (!) and three regional workshops are organized in2005-2006 in order to bring the different stakeholders together, sensibilise them about theEuropean anti-poverty strategy and exchange about approaches to combat poverty regionallyand locally. Having been at the opening conference myself, a deficit that one can regularlyobserve at these types of events is the absence, by and large, of representatives of the regionaland local government and the economy. Rather, one will tend to find representatives ofNGOs, of local administrations and eventually of the academic community. This structuraldeficit, the absence of common fora for all actors, obviously does not increase the chances offinding solutions accepted at least by a large majority 13 and helping to significantly reducepoverty and social exclusion.For France, it is reported that since 2003 and for two years, the NGOs have tried to organise aconference about the regional implementation of the NAP 14 . Whereas the centraladministration was apparently supportive in the beginning, tensions between the central stateand the regions have increased since the regional elections in March 2004 which resulted in ashift to the left: “It’s the big problem, in France, with respect to the European process, thatthere is no participation of the sub-national authorities whatsoever. We have tried, in 2005, to13 Even though the existence of such for a does not imply that all actors are speaking the same (ideological)language.14 Interview with the president of EAPN-France, 29.9.2005.

develop a consultative mechanism. It was not possible due to political reasons” 15 . Politicalactors do simply not wish to implement a process established by another political majority 16 .Unsatisfied with their consultation by the central administrations, NGOs in both memberstates have asked for regular working groups within the respective administrations to beestablished. This was the case in Germany in 2002, and in 2003 in France. In both cases, therequest was rejected, or, as in the French case, where a letter was sent, not even answered.Turning to the issue of information gathering and learning, the results are quitedisillusionating. Information about other member states’ policies and so-called good practicesis provided in the NAPs; this information is meant to support supranational learning processesby providing inspiration for domestic policies from abroad. Two thirds of the intervieweeshad not seen a single other NAP, the rest indicated having seen a few. Equally, only a few hadtaken notice of the Joint Reports of the Commission and the Council. Those who hadacknowledged a few NAPs stated that they did not influence own approaches and that the“good practices” were of limited use. This scepticism is widely shared, stemming fromdomestic experiences. In France, the successive governments did never include a single NGOpractice in their NAPs but restricted themselves to governmental programmes. In Germany,the NGOs succeeded to place a good amount of practices in one of the annexes (not as official“good practice”) of the NAP 2003-2005. NGOs generally criticise that these “good practices”are not sufficiently contextualised, lack information on their financing, and that it is not clearwhether the target groups would also qualify the policies as “good practices”. The scepticismtowards the NAPs is also inspired by the domestic experiences insofar as these are seen asgovernmental reports, aligning policies already in place with a marked tendency to keep silentabout shortcomings and difficulties of the governmental policies. Finally, some intervieweesmentioned the language barrier as a reason for not having read other NAPs.For NGOs, and in both member states, “learning” seems to have meant to discover theEuropean dimension of the fight against poverty and social exclusion. This is stated by severalof the interviewees in both member states. Here, without any doubt, EAPN and its nationalbranches have played a pivotal role in disseminating information and mobilising theirmembers.15 Interview Direction Générale de l’Action Sociale (DGAS), September 2005. The DGAS is the coordinator ofthe process in France.16 Interview NGO key officer, September 2005.

Asked if the social NGOs had themselves undertaken evaluations of the OMC process ingeneral and the NAPs in particular, most answered “no”, with two exceptions in France andone in Germany, all of which large NGOs. Additionally, the six large German welfareassociations proceeded to an internal evaluation, in 2002, of the implementation of the NAP(2001). The trend to no evaluation probably must be linked to the above-mentioned lack offinancial and human resources. As time went by, it certainly also had to do with theunwillingness to invest (time) resources in a process that the governments quite apparently didnot take serious.After this overview how national social NGOs used this OMC internally, I will now turn tothe larger policy-making process around it.3.2 The “external” implementation of the OMC inclusionWhen analysing and evaluating the domestic implementation and for the methodologicalreasons mentioned above, one necessarily and almost exclusively has to turn to the processesof consultation around the elaboration of the NAPs as these are the only times where some“OMC activity” can be tracked down. Since the launch of this OMC, there have been threesuch rounds (2001, 2003 and 2005).In France, the monitoring of the NAPs lays with the Direction Générale de l’Action Sociale(DGAS) that belongs to the ministry of work, social cohesion and housing. The DGAS has atits disposal eleven consultative bodies, amongst which the Conseil National des politiques deLutte contre la pauvreté et l’Exclusion sociale (CNLE), a political body made up of publicelected representatives, administrations, civil society organisations and qualified members.Also, there exists since 1998 an interministerial committee in the fight against poverty andsocial exclusion, which, however, has only convened once since (July 2004).Here, consultation is reported to have been either non-existent or minimal in all three rounds.While the first NAP was “elaborated by a few heads” 17 , the administration did consult theCNLE once in the second round, even though only little time before the handing-over of thefinal document to the Commission 18 . At this meeting, however, representatives of thedevolved authorities were broadly absent, as seems to have been the case repeatedly 19 .According to several interviewees, there has been no consultation and participation17 Interview DGAS key officer, 15.6.200418 See also Brandsen et al (2005: 23).19 Interview president of the CNLE, 21.9.2005.

whatsoever of the regions, départements and local communities 20 . Since the delegation ofcompetencies to the départements in the social field, in January 2004, one could expect agreater involvement of the respective authorities in the process – due to political opposition,this did not happen so far. The last exercise, in 2005, seems to have followed the samepattern. Interviewees reported that in 2005, the exercise had been even more formal than in2003, the meeting mainly being a presentation of the Plan de cohésion sociale, presented inspring 2005. The French government does not foresee parliamentarian debate of the NAPs(see also Legros 2005).Besides the consultation process directly linked to the elaboration of the NAPs, there havebeen in France a number of initiatives where it is hard to tell whether they can be drawn backto the OMC inclusion, even though involved actors claim a direct connection. In December2003, the then in place Prime Minister Raffarin received a delegation of NGOs in order tolearn about their concerns. At this meeting, the participants agreed that there should be a firstnational conference on poverty and social exclusion, to be continued on an annual rhythm.This conference took place in July 2004 and gathered, amongst others, all the ministersconcerned. It was directly after the conference that the interministerial committee againstsocial exclusion convened for the first time. The second “annual” conference took place inApril 2006. Another rather recent development has been the decision to create a text called“document de politique transversale inclusion sociale” (DPT) in the context of the financialact, which regulates the yearly state budget 21 . Finally, the unit in charge of the OMC at theDGAS has commissioned an office with the development of an measurement system of theimpacts of the policies in the fight against social exclusion on their recipients, which washanded over in September 2005.The German government’s position towards the OMC inclusion cannot be called but sceptical(see also Huster et al. 2004). There is a profound mistrust that the Commission is slowly butsurely seeking to extend its competencies in the area of social policies, an idea that is totallyand repeatedly rejected: „The OMC holds risks for the protection of national competencies. Itshould not mutate to a vehicle for system comparison but help to find answers for concretequestions. The ministry refuses an inflation of common objectives and indicators. It should be20 In 2003, this may be explained by the fact that the main competencies in the social field still led with thecentral government, whereas main competencies were shifted to the départements and local communities as fromJanuary 2004 on.21 Namely the Loi Organique relative aux Lois de Finances (LOLF), an act dating back to 1959 and revised since2005. In France, there are currently eight such documents in different policy areas; their aim is to facilitate andimprove interministerial cooperation.

checked regularly whether a sneaky erosion of national competencies can happen” 22 . Also,one finds in Germany a strong rejection of everything that has to do with quantified targetsetting at the European level, ranking, and naming and shaming strategies 23 : “It is notacceptable to us if the useful, necessary and openly qualitative comparison is overlaid by afactual grading of even some sort of ranking” 24 .Here, the consultation of the relevant actors resembles the one in France with the exceptionsof the regions (Länder) who repeatedly and officially voiced their dissent with the OMCinclusion. Unlike in France, the NAP process has had different ministerial affiliations over theyears in Germany which are important as no institutional continuity could be assured at thetop levels of political leadership; yet, as in France, the people at the working level whocoordinate the process have largely remained the same since 2001, changing from oneministerial affiliation to the other.Comparable to the CNLE in France, there is in Germany a so-called permanent advisoryboard gathering regional and local representatives, social partners, NGOs and a fewacademics which has been created as a consultative body for the National Report on Povertyand Wealth (NARB) and was extended, in 2002, to the consultation process of the OMCinclusion. Whereas the CNLE meets every 1-2 months, this board convenes 1-2 times a year.However, this body has not been used in order to discuss general issues related to theimplementation of the OMC inclusion (see also Miebach 2004: 28). The regions can use thesecond chamber, the Bundesrat, to issue opinions and decisions.For the three rounds, there were consecutively one, two and again one meeting(s) 25 . In 2004,the government proceeded to a voluntary update of its NAP deemed necessary in the light ofthe so-called Agenda 2010. The advisory board was consulted once but without apparentimpact. Finally, in 2005, the advisory board was not consulted at all. While there was noparliamentarian debate in 2001, there have been debates 26 on the NAPs in 2003 and 2005,however after their transmission to the Commission. However, the Parliament received the22 “We shape the change!”, Ministry for Health and Social Affairs, 2004: 45.23 See the opinion of the German government (9.3.2005) on the communication of the Commission of 9 February2005 – COM (2005) 33 final. This evaluation was confirmed by all interviews conducted with the implied civilservants as well as with a German participant of a peer review.24 Ulrike Mauscher, Parliamentary Secretary of State in the Ministry for Work and Social Order, at the meetingof the conference of regional ministers for work and social affairs (ASMK) in November 2001.25 Friedrich 2006 and Miebach 2004 come to the same conclusions about the nature of the consultation processesof the first two rounds.26 “Debate” should be taken with caution: 45 minutes were accorded to six parliamentarians, advancing theirrespective proposals without any further discussion and without any particular reference to the document or tothe larger European context

NAPs only after their adaptation by the respective cabinets and after their handing over to theCommission.The second chamber (Bundesrat) has been very critical towards the OMC inclusion from thebeginning on. This does not come as a surprise as the German regions hold importantcompetencies in the social field as well as financial responsibility, but were in no wayincluded in the establishment of the OMC inclusion at EU-level which is perceived as adouble intrusion – by the EU and the federal government – in their competencies (Büchs andFriedrich 2005). Resistance is particularly strong when originating in regions with an opposedpolitical leadership to the one in Berlin. If the regions have been opposing the process, thesituation is different as far as cities and counties are concerned: here, the OMC inclusion haslargely remained unidentified and where it is known, it is clearly rejected 27 as intrusion intoown competencies and a bureaucratic process leading nowhere.The very little amount and the nature of “consultation” – in committees not accessible to thepublic or the media – led to a very low degree of visibility of the NAPs and the OMC processmore generally. All interviewees in both countries agree that it remained very low if existentat all. Interestingly, one French civil servant had doubts if the minister of social affairs evenknew about the NAPs 28 , adding that “Europe” was not his thing.With these descriptions of the consultation processes in mind, it cannot come as a surprisethat NGOs evaluated their impact on the NAPs as being minimal. For the first round (2001-2003), they find that there has been no impact at all. In the second round, French actors reportthat the issue of mobilising all actors (common objective 4) was taken up due to therecommendation of the NGOs. However, the measures mentioned in the same NAP werenever realised, relativising this “success”. In the German case, slight impacts of the NGOinvolvement can be tracked down. The suggestion to have a focus on particularly weak peoplewas incorporated and the problems of homelessness and illiteracy were mentioned. However,again, this “success” must be relativised as the new focus was not dealt with in the final NAPin any serious way, as criticise NGOs in the comment on the NAP. Furthermore, in an annex,some more 17 good practices were attached seven out of which described practices of NGOs.The lack of influence on the content of the NAPs in both member states is also observablewhen looking at the statements NGOs produced when commenting the NAPs. Besides ageneral welcome of the process, criticism about the advanced policies is broad and often27 Interview employee in the headquarters of the German association of counties, 7.7.2005.28 Interview, DGAS, 22.9.2005

sharp. In France, it is more fundamental which has to do with the poor institutionalised linkswith the state and its funding schemes. The government is accused of failing to make povertyeradication a strategic priority of its policy and the objectives mentioned, so NGOs, were notimplemented either through legislation or programmes. More concretely, they criticise that thegovernment would not properly address the two most significant crises, that is those ofunemployment and of (lack of adequate social) housing, but also the cutting-back of theuniversal health scheme (CMU) in 2003. The absence of a clear and precise financial planwhich would allow identifying how much money is spent on a particular policy is criticised asis the insufficient dialogue between NGOs and policy-makers, the shortage of time and thelack of public visibility of the process (EAPN 2003). Evidently, the German reaction is not asfundamental but still severe. Criticism focuses on the newly introduced so-called Agenda2010 and its poverty-enhancing effects which are not dealt with in the NAP, but also the overrelianceon work as a means of integration, simply not available for all people. Further pointsare the absence of policies for the most vulnerable, insufficient gender mainstreaming andconsultation of civil society as well as the absence of concrete target setting, to name onlysome of them (BAGFW / NAK 2004).Finally, the lack of influence of NGOs on the implementation of the OMC inclusion is alsodetectable when looking at the new mainstreamed OMC social protection and socialinclusion. While all NGOs, as well as the French administration, have pled for a continuedseparated OMC inclusion, they did not succeed in rescuing the old OMC and are now dealingwith an OMC that covers such diverse issues as inclusion, health and pensions. The most citedreason for a separate OMC inclusion was the fear that in a streamlined OMC and next to thefinancially powerful issues of health and pensions, poverty and social exclusion matterswould receive even lower attention of the politicians.3.3 Evaluation of OMC inclusion by NGOsHow do the NGOs evaluate the OMC inclusion process? With regard to the poor quality anddegree of the consultation process and the quasi zero impact they had on the NAPs, theirevaluation is amazingly balanced which should be understood in the light of their interest tofurther develop the process. In both countries, more so in France, the understanding is thatthe political leadership had refused to take the NAPs as a reference and even to communicateabout it, thereby showing its lack of political support. The insufficient mobilisation of (all)actors is also often mentioned, more so in Germany than in France. Here, NGOs find that theinsufficient consultation lead to an insufficient incorporation of their views. One interviewee

found that the consultation process in the framework of the permanent advisory board ratherresembled a gathering where one could give one’s blessing to the NAP than real consultation– a view confirmed by an observing researcher 29 -, evaluated by another NGO representativeas “rather anecdotic” 30 . Interestingly, however, the issue of democratic legitimation washardly perceived as problematic. Only one (NGO) interviewee in Germany and two in Franceproblematised the absence of the parliament in the process. Other remarks relate to the toonarrow time frame and poor public visibility. The lack of engagement of the territorialauthorities is widely regretted, particularly in Germany, where it is partly attributed to a toostrong control of the process by the executive. Overall, federal, regional and local levels aswell as the NGOs seem to agree that it did not have any impact on poverty policies inGermany whereas the answers varied between I could not tell and no (impact) in France.These answers are reflected in the official governmental evaluations of this OMC in 2005 inwhich the German government states that this OMC did not have any impact on policymakingwhereas the French government at least officially welcomes it as an instrument in linewith French national and European priorities.French interviewees repeatedly found that the process had improved interministerialcoordination, where, so an interviewee, “the OMC inclusion provided a common frameworkin which the administration and NGOs could work together”. In Germany, and according toseveral interviewees from NGOs and the federal and the regional levels, the OMC inclusionhas not improved interministerial coordination. The respective actors explain this bydiverging interests both between the different resorts within a government and between theregions and the federal government.More on the political side of the coin, actors agree that the process has helped to keep theissue on the agenda (see also Maucher 2005), that it forces the government to draft the report(NAP), that it supports a European discourse on social exclusion and visualizes “socialEurope”. Finally, it would force member states to engage in processes of comparison,apprehended as a positive development. All these assessments are more or less sharedbetween the interviewees; the only real divide can be found in their evaluation whether the29 If one acknowledges that these meetings take place 1-2 times a year, during four hours of discussion, gatheringup to 80 people, and that the NAPs are not the only subject treated here, this account may come close to thetruth.30 Interview NGO key officer, 2.6.2005.

OMC inclusion is helpful in its original goal that is the reduction of poverty and socialexclusion.3.4 The European implementationAs indicated above, this part is more cautious as it also bears on the findings of otherresearchers. At the EU-level, there are two central places in which the OMC inclusionmaterialises: the Social Protection Committee (SPC) and its Indicator Sub-Group (ISG), bothconsisting of two national delegates per member states as well as two officials of theCommission which provide the secretariat. While the SPC is responsible for the politicalsteering of the three OMC processes (inclusion, health, pensions) and their furtherdevelopment, the ISG is a more technical group where political discussions basically do nottake place, but where attention is centred around the development of common indicators. Bothcommittees meet 9 – 10 times a year, mostly for a short day and in closed sessions. Other thanthese two committees, the Council of social affairs takes the main political decisions aboutthese OMCs, in closed sessions, and the Commission assures its role of coordinating theprocesses. As the official routes all take place in closed sessions, one could expect socialNGOs to particularly address the Commission in order to introduce and represent theirinterests. And indeed, an official of the Commission reported that “the bureau of the chairmanof the SPC generally meets the evening before a session. This is the occasion (for NGOs) tocome in” 31 . So, there seem to be two ways of participating in the process: in formal ways (ifadmitted to the closed sessions) or in informal ways (by lobbying the Commission).At the NGO side, there are two big organisations, which have accompanied the OMCinclusion at EU-level, EAPN and FEANTSA 32 . While EAPN is the federation of nationalpoverty conferences (national federation of poverty associations) and therefore has a quitebroad coverage of associations and issues, FEANTSA represents national associationsworking with the homeless. Both European organisations are almost totally funded by theCommission, which is therefore a privileged interlocutor.Turning to the formal way, consultation of NGOs has apparently been very limited. Thesecretariat of the Commission reported that FEANTSA participated several times in the SPC.31 Interview with former secretariat (2000-2005) of the SPC, June 2005.32 Fédération Européenne des Associations Nationales travaillant avec les Sans-Abris, an NGO that lobbies forthe homeless.

With what results, however, remains largely unclear. With respect to the ISG, only the officialfrom the Commission and the chairman of the ISG mentioned that, again, FEANTSA tookpart several times in the sessions whereas EAPN is reported to never have asked toparticipate 33 . This participation (and the lobbying of FEANTSA) seems to have slight impactsas the Commission commissioned a study about the appropriate definition of homelessnessand related EU-wide indicators. However, a consensus about indicators measuringhomelessness has not been found yet. Several national delegates stated that there has been noconsultation of NGOs, at the national level and with respect to the OMC indicators. Here, themain actors (besides the national delegates) are officials from Eurostat, OECD or people withan academic background. These findings are confirmed by Friedrich who found that noformal participation rules existed for NGOs and that a limited degree of access was possibleupon request (Friedrich 2002).As far as the informal way is concerned, both European NGOs have produced a number ofpapers, comments about and evaluations of this OMC 34 and evidently try to influence theCommission in informal meetings. Camarasa Casals reports that while EAPN criticises thelack of openness of this OMC, it still considers that it influences the process. Contrastingly,FEANTSA finds that mobilisation has more resembled information instead of realconsultation and that it did not have any impact on the EU agenda (Camarasa Casals 2005).4. ExplanationBefore turning to the explanation, let me briefly summarise the results. NGOs in both memberstates used the OMC inclusion in order to create structures to accompany the process andthrough which awareness raising about the European process could be developed; this wasparticularly remarkable in France where a major effort for gaining synergies was made. Inboth member states, they tried to mobilise regional and local actors beyond those mobilised(or not) by the central administrations, this time more so in Germany, without successhowever. In both cases, consultation by the central administrations was deemed insufficient,even though French NGOs perceived an improvement to previous years. Little if no learningoccurred through the NAPs which are perceived with great scepticism and as governmentalreports aligning measures already in place (see also Brandsen et al 2005), the process33 Interview with the secretariat of the ISG, 21.10.2005.34 These can be found at their respective web sites: www.eapn.org and www.feantsa.org.

emained invisible on both sides of the Rhine (see also Maucher 2005), new resources werenot acquired, “good practices” not included in the NAPs, policies not influenced through theprocess (see also Brandsen et al 2005). While at EU-level, EAPN and FEANTSA are strongactors closely following the OMC inclusion, they cannot be said to have had significantimpact on the work of the SPC and the ISG. Hardly a good overall picture.When attempting to explain these results it seems helpful to me to differentiate betweeninternal (within NGOs) and external factors. External factors then again must be divided intonational and European ones.Addressing the internal reasons for the quite limited implementation (success), I can onlypartly draw on my own research. What became clear, however, is that social NGOs often lackthe resources to extensively deal with European issues as well as, often enough, the languageskills (Kröger 2006a). Either as a consequence of both and or as the consequence ofgeneralised scepticism, they also showed no significant interest in foreign NAPs as sources ofinformation and learning. Maucher confirms this when concluding that “the elementsexchange of information and good practices are fundamentally under-used” (Maucher 2005:10). A research project led by a German institute in 2001-2002, called “Networks of socialwork in Europe”, which can rely on an impressive number of qualified interviews, found outseveral things of interest here 35 . European topics would be on the working agendas only oncein a while, the EU only occasionally figured as part of the self-image, which, consequently,contributed to the percentage of EU-related publications to be low. Financial aspects seemedto be the most important reasons to get involved with the EU. Finally, only half of theinterviewed NGOs reported regularly to their members and supporters about their EUactivities, a result that the findings of Warleigh confirm (Warleigh 2001). I can indeed reportfrom my own research that it was impossible for me to find NGOs representatives at the subnationallevel in France, which were knowledgeable enough about the OMC (or at all) to beinterviewed. The same trend appeared in Germany where one NGO key officer stated thatNGOs had not mobilised enough (internally) and where another key officer estimated that theOMC was at best known at the regional level of its organisation. In Germany, however, this ismore surprising as the large welfare organisations are organised from the ground to thefederal level – which is not the case in France. This lack of information, consultation and35 Information, unfortunately only in German, can be found at :http://www.uni-mainz.de/FB/Paedagogik/netzwerke_europa/German social NGOs were at the center of attention.

mobilisation of the constituencies leads Warleigh to conclude that “NGOs are, currently atleast, unable to act as catalysts for the Europeanization of civil society, since their internalgovernance procedures are insufficiently democratic” (Warleigh 2001: 623).At EU-level, structural diversity of social NGOs, limited resources, ideological differences,the competition for the same funds can keep them from forming closer alliances which couldeventually lead to more influence. Subsequently, social NGOs at EU-level “have mainlyremained small, poor and weak organisations” with a great deal of freedom, but littleinfluence (Geyer 2001: 480-481).With respect to the external domestic reasons, the poor results in France are at first sightdifficult to explain. The German case can be explained with respect to the many importantveto players and the strongly anchored and defended principle of subsidiarity (NGOsincluded), already existing channels of dialogue and negotiation between social NGOs and thestate, traditional opposition against strong social competences of the EU (Rhodes 1999;Scharpf 2002) and of being ranked by it, the absence of a policy evaluation culture (Maucher2005), of a tradition in terms of exclusion discourse and approach and of interministerialcoordination (Miebach 2004). In both countries, the resistance and / or ignorance of theregional and local levels where social exclusion operates has contributed to the poor deliveryas well as the lack of foreign language(s), which often stood in the way of deepening one’sknowledge about other member states’ practices.One possible explanation of the poor results in France is that the minister of social affairs,Borloo, is not too interested in the EU and that its ministry has suffered from a decrease ininterministerial importance in the diverse governments since 2002. Additionally, the absenceof a consultation culture undoubtedly contributed to the difficult implementation. But thesefactors alone do not explain for the poor delivery in both member states – as in other memberstates where good consultation processes are reported (United Kingdom and Sweden, seeBrandsen et al 2005) but where actors, the governments included, agree that the NAPs havenot developed into an important policy-making tool, or worse, even did not become part of thepolicy planning cycles at all 36 .The main barrier in both member states was the lack of support by the higher politicalleadership (see also Armstrong 2005; Brandsen et al 2005; Friedrich 2006; Halvorsen andJohansson 2005; Idema 2004; Miebach 2004; Sacchi 2004). Both governments did not displaysufficient political will or, in other words, their disposition to make use of the OMC inclusion36 These are the official governmental evaluations of the United Kingdom and Sweden.

in order to Europeanise national social policy debates was more than limited, resulting in lowinvestments in terms of mobilisation 37 ; and in occupying officials with no policy-makingpower with the OMC (Miebach 2004: 41; Scharpf 2002: 654) who don’t really read thereports nor have the time to discuss them; in lack of adequate information, transparency andpublic visibility as well as in the absence of additional resourcing. This is particularly wondersome for the French case where little would have needed to be done in order to at leastsynchronize the existing national debates with the European agenda.Finally, the external, EU-related reasons for the poor delivery must be addressed. Looking atthe tool box of the OMC inclusion at EU level and its embeddedness is essential whenseeking to understand its limited impact on national policy-making in general and on socialNGOs in particular. With respect to the latter, it seems useful to recall that the OMC(inclusion) is an intergovernmental instrument meaning that its implementation is totally leftto governments’ ambitions. As long as its objectives, amongst which the goal to mobilise allrelevant actors, follow a voluntarist logic, this OMC “does little to empower NGOs vis-à-visstate interests” (Edquist 2006: 502) and does not change the traditional channels of policymakingwhich offer few opportunities to get engaged and influence the policy process(Warleigh 2001). Second, the traditional “ally” of NGOs, the Commission, has a rather weakposition in this process and therefore is not in the position to significantly support NGO’sinterests. It can also be debated if the traditional support by the Commission has beenuniversal (goal: more effectiveness and legitimacy) or particularistic (goal: increase power ofCommission by seeking external support for an initiative or an argument). Finally and notleast importantly, EU social policy, in particular since the revision of the Lisbon Strategy in2005, has become even more centred on employment and competitiveness, leaving less spacefor the more encompassing approach of combating social exclusion that social NGOsgenerally defend. If they nevertheless get involved with the OMC inclusion, this cansubsequently incorporate the risk of distortion of their policy position or cooptation (Edquist2006). If NGOs choose to hang on to their philosophy and their role as a critical voice, thenthey risk to the contrary not being in line with the funding demands of the Commission(which include strategic policy choices) and therefore being excluded from importantresources (Halvorsen and Johansson 2005).37 One German key officer stated that the little amount of consultation was mainly due to the Commission forwhom the mobilisation of all relevant actors was an important issue. Without that, so its conclusion, there wouldhave been no consultation at all – as mostly happened for the first NAPs (2001-2003).

More generally, it is not reasonable to expect far-reaching results of a mechanism in thehighly sensitive area of poverty and social exclusion which is not legally binding, whichremains rather vague about its goal(s), which does not foresee a mandate for independentevaluation as well as for the dissemination of information, etc. More particularly, far-reachingresults cannot be expected of the OMC inclusion in a situation where other, macro-economic,financial and employment-focused processes have more binding instruments at their disposaland therefore foster processes of “negative” integration while rendering steps of “positive”integration ever more difficult (Scharpf 1996). For these and the above mentioned reasons,social NGOs should a) not focus almost exclusively on the Commission in their lobbyingactivities; b) should do all they can in order to overcome the structural limitations forincreased cooperation at EU-level and c) must make greater efforts in order to mobilise theirown constituencies so as to form more powerful pressure groups.6. ReferencesBAGFW / NAK, 2004, Stellungnahme zum Entwurf der Aktualisierung 2004 des NationalesAktionsplans Soziale Ausgrenzung 2003-2005.Brandsen, T. et al, 2005, The National Action Plan on Social Inclusion, Third Sector EuropeanPolicy Working Papers, nr. 14., http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/TSEP/publicdocfind.htm.Büchs, M., 2004, Asymmetries of policy learning? The European Employment Strategy and its role inLabour market policy reform in Germany and the UK, Paper prepared for the ESPAnetconference 'European Social Policy', 9-11 September 2004, Oxford,http://www.apsoc.ox.ac.uk/Espanet/espanetconference/streams/s11.htmBüchs, M. and D. Friedrich, 2005, Surface Integration - the National Action Plans forEmployment and social inclusion in Germany, in: Zeitlin, Jonathan, Pochet, Philippeand Lars Magnusson (eds.) The Open Method of Coordination in Action: TheEuropean Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang).Camarasa Casals, M., 2005, “The participation of European Networks in the Open Methodof Co-ordination in Social Inclusion”, Paper presented at the First European conference ofEMES and ISTR: Concepts of the Third Sector, The European Debate Civil Society, VoluntaryOrganizations, Social and Solidarity-Based Economy, Paris , 27 to 29 April 2005.De la Porte, Caroline, The emergence of the Open Method of Co-ordination in social inclusion, Paperprepared for the annual ESPANET conference, Fribourg, Switzerland, 22 – 24 September2005 .EAPN-France, 2003, Position d’EAPN France sur le plan national d’action pour l’inclusion (PNAI)2003-2005, July 2003.

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