<strong>The</strong> challenges to bus rapid transit includecompeting demand for road space, lack <strong>of</strong>coordination between neighboring cities,and opposition by taxi and private minibusowners.<strong>The</strong> BRT experienceAmong WBG-supported programs, the BRTSs that aremost developed are those <strong>of</strong> Bogota and Mexico City. Inboth cases, the WBG worked with willing clients, who hadalready concluded that BRTS was a desirable alternative.In Bogota (box 4.1), a sequence <strong>of</strong> learning-by-doingloans totaling $887 million (together with non-<strong>Bank</strong> carbonrevenues) supported expansion <strong>of</strong> BRT corridors andtheir integration into a citywide trunk and feeder system,with attention to bikeways and pedestrians. Systemexpansion was complemented with serious demand-sidemeasures, including doubling parking fees, boosting thegasoline tax, and restricting car travel during peak hours.Cooperatives were formed to <strong>of</strong>fer employment to the formerbus drivers as part <strong>of</strong> the new feeder routes. Companiesparticipating in the new routes were required to scrapfour to nine old buses for each new articulated bus addedto the system.Box 4.1<strong>The</strong> TransMilenio BRTSWithout an explicit goal to reduce CO 2emissions, the <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> has been financing urban transport projects inBogota since the mid-1990s and has contributed to the development <strong>of</strong> Bogota’s TransMilenio BRT system. One <strong>of</strong>the earliest programs <strong>of</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> support for a BRTS, this is an example <strong>of</strong> learning by doing.Under the first <strong>Bank</strong>-funded Urban Transport Project, the <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> helped finance traffic management systemsalong existing bus ways and connecting roads to improve the traffic throughput to an existing BRT corridor.This project also funded background studies that led to the development <strong>of</strong> a better parking policy for the city.According to the project completion report, this effort more than doubled average bus speeds, boosting themfrom an initial 12 kilometers per hour to 27 kilometers per hour post-project.<strong>The</strong> second project, the $130 million Bogota Urban Services, was designed to help implement the secondcorridor in the BRTS and promote nonmotorized traffic (an extensive network <strong>of</strong> bike paths). A third project, the$757 million Integrated Mass Transit System, was designed to support the critical second (post-demonstration)phase <strong>of</strong> Bogota’s BRTS as a citywide integrated trunk-and-feeder system with 14 additional corridors andan integrated fare system, and to introduce a number <strong>of</strong> transport demand-management initiatives. Mostimportantly, the Integrated Mass Transit System expanded BRTSs to five other cities, replicating the experience<strong>of</strong> Bogota but tailoring it to specific conditions <strong>of</strong> those selected cities.By 2004, Bogota’s BRTS already consisted <strong>of</strong> 58 kilometers <strong>of</strong> dedicated bus ways and 309 kilometers <strong>of</strong> feederroutes and moved more than 800,000 passengers per day. According to Wright (2004), carbon emissions reductionhas been achieved through a combination <strong>of</strong> improved public transport and the introduction <strong>of</strong> complementarytransport demand management policies to discourage the use <strong>of</strong> private vehicles and roadway space. <strong>The</strong>20 percent increase in gasoline taxes, 100 percent increase in parking fees, and restriction on private car travelduring peak hours are said to have reduced car traffic by 40 percent per day.Wright and Fulton (2005) list the key factors contributing to emission reduction:• Replacing four to five smaller buses with larger articulated buses and requiring the destruction <strong>of</strong> four toeight older buses for every new articulated vehicle introduced into the system; articulated buses are more fuelefficient per passenger-kilometer traveled.• Increasing the vehicle load factor to approximately 80–90 percent by implementing global positioning systemcontrolledmanagement <strong>of</strong> the fleet, allowing the optimization <strong>of</strong> demand and supply during peak and nonpeakhours.• Enforcing emission standards, requiring buses to be EURO II emission level–compliant.• Increasing the share <strong>of</strong> public transport ridership in total transit. By 2002, the share <strong>of</strong> private car and taxi trips intotal trips was said to have been reduced from 19.7 to 17.5 percent and the share <strong>of</strong> public transit trips increasedfrom 67 to 68 percent (Karekezi, Majaro, and Johnson 2003).One <strong>of</strong> the main barriers to system expansion was resistance to expansion <strong>of</strong> the BRT from current bus owners—anissue endemic to BRT implementation. <strong>The</strong> two corridors <strong>of</strong> Phase I <strong>of</strong> the TransMilenio BRT were designed tomeet only about 10 percent <strong>of</strong> the public transportation demand, with the remaining 90 percent being met50 | Climate Change and the <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> Group
y conventional transport systems, in particular a number <strong>of</strong> small bus owners competing with each other forpassengers. Hence, the first phase did not displace many bus owners. <strong>The</strong> subsequent phases (with an additional14 corridors), however, were designed to increase the share <strong>of</strong> BRT in total public transit to 70 percent and coulddrastically reduce the role <strong>of</strong> the remaining small bus owners.<strong>The</strong> solution to this has been to form cooperatives or holding companies that would employ many <strong>of</strong> thebus owners/drivers (the balance being placed in alternate jobs through financial transfers). <strong>The</strong> difficulties inimplementing this solution are ongoing but declining.A related problem has been the difficulty in enforcing the phase-out <strong>of</strong> old buses. This phase-out affects theexpected reduction in externalities determined at appraisal—particularly GHG reductions. Despite a monitoredscrapping program in which the low-quality minibuses were exchanged for higher-quality articulated buses atthe prescribed exchange rate and their destruction supervised, the total number <strong>of</strong> minibuses in the city did notdecline as expected. <strong>The</strong> inability to enforce regulations, such as licenses and routes for minibuses, resulted in newentrants and the use <strong>of</strong> secondhand mini-buses. It also generated congestion in other parts <strong>of</strong> the city. <strong>The</strong> hopedforreduction in CO 2emissions from scrapping buses will be frustrated if other old buses are pressed into serviceand increase their annual mileage.Maintaining and increasing ridership is also a challenge. Gilbert (2008) points to contractual arrangements thatnecessitate raising fares when ridership projections are lower than anticipated. That creates a spiral <strong>of</strong> decreasingridership caused by higher prices and leading to new rounds <strong>of</strong> price increases and the inability to ensure safetyon the new lines, which also contributes to ridership loss. In addition, the cost differential between extending theBRTS and extending the metro is declining as the system expands into more difficult terrain. As a result <strong>of</strong> all <strong>of</strong>this, the middle class (whose rate <strong>of</strong> BRT usage is highest relative to the lower income and higher income groups)has started voicing support for new metro lines at the expense <strong>of</strong> the BRT network.<strong>The</strong> Bogota experience has piqued global interest in BRTSs. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> and other donors have facilitated visits by<strong>of</strong>ficials from other countries to see the experiment in Bogota. In fact, many other countries are learning fromthis experience and are now designing or implementing their own systems. However, the program is not yet fullyimplemented, and it is too early to judge whether it will realize the full benefits anticipated from expansion to amultiline, citywide, integrated system.Sources: Wright 2004, Gilbert 2008, TransMilenio PDD 2004.However, even as the old buses are scrapped and their driversassimilated into the system, it has been difficult to excludenew entrants who import additional second-handbuses. Although the system was initially successful in attractingriders, there are signs <strong>of</strong> an incipient rising fare/declining ridership cycle; concerns about passenger safetyare also eroding ridership, and public sentiment is shiftingtoward new metro lines (Gilbert 2008). Overall, however,the system is viewed as having demonstrated BRTS feasibility,and the <strong>Bank</strong> has actively facilitated visits to the projectby potential foreign emulators. Current projects seek to addeight more BRT lines to the Bogota system and replicate itin five other cities.<strong>The</strong> most developed systems were initiallysuccessful, but the future is uncertain.In Mexico City, the BRTS was largely financed domestically,but the <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> had two catalytic interventions.First, a $6 million GEF-funded <strong>Bank</strong> project supportedinstitutional development for implementing the system.Second, a <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong>–financed carbon project arrangedfor $2.4 million in carbon credit purchase. This is a smallportion <strong>of</strong> the total $49.4 million project cost, but the proponentsclaim that the association with carbon has helpedpopularize the project. In addition, the project was responsiblefor developing the second CDM-approved methodologyfor assessing GHG reductions in public transport,opening the way for CDM finance <strong>of</strong> BRTS elsewhere.ImpactsDedicated bus lanes (precursors to BRTS) have been shownto increase travel speeds for bus passengers by 20–60 percent,based on completion reports (for example, from21.4 to 30 kilometers per hour in the Liaoning project inChina, 15.6 to 25 kilometers per hour in the Shijiazhuangproject in China, and 15 to 22 kilometers per hour in theDhaka project in Bangladesh). <strong>The</strong> Dhaka urban transportair-quality project also showed a dramatic drop in localair pollutants (31 percent decrease in PM 10, 59 percent inhydrocarbons, 28 percent in carbon monoxide) after threewheelers with highly polluting two-stroke engines wereremoved, generating $25 million per annum in health benefitsfor the city.Beyond Energy: <strong>Low</strong>-<strong>Carbon</strong> Paths in Cities and Forests | 51
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IEG PublicationsAnalyzing the Effec