Sellers and micr<strong>of</strong>inanciers find it costly to service thesepopulations.Against these barriers the WBG has deployed a number <strong>of</strong>instruments:• Most projects employed subsidies. <strong>The</strong>se subsidieswere to buyers or renters, dealers or manufacturers, orwinning concessionaires under a fee–for-service model.Subsidies were <strong>of</strong>ten 10–20 percent <strong>of</strong> cost, but rangedup to 60 percent. <strong>The</strong>y aimed at making the systemsmore affordable and at expanding overall productionand thus pushing the entire industry down the learningcurve, resulting in sustained cost reductions. In Boliviaand China, dealer/manufacturer subsidies were contingenton meeting quality standards.• Consumer credits addressed the financing barrier andwere provided through three primary mechanisms:dealer extended credit, credit through local banks, andcredit through micr<strong>of</strong>inance institutions.• Investor financing (beyond subsidies) was provided insome projects.• Technical assistance and support for standards and certificationaddressed the quality barrier.WBG-supported projects deployedsubsidies and consumer credit.Project outcomesActive promotion <strong>of</strong> SHS now dates back two decades, toa time when solar modules (the main component <strong>of</strong> SHS)were much more expensive than they are now. Reviewslooking over the first decade <strong>of</strong> that experience pointed tothe persistence <strong>of</strong> price and credit as barriers (Martinot,Ramankutty, and Frank 2000; GEF 2004a; GEF 2004b).Disappointment in these outcomes has led the GEF—themain financier <strong>of</strong> these projects—to deemphasize them.An IFC self-assessment (IFC 2007) was pessimistic also,concluding that without some level <strong>of</strong> subsidies, solarphotovoltaic power in developing countries is <strong>of</strong>ten tooexpensive for the average rural consumer; that “the rural,<strong>of</strong>f-grid, solar photovoltaic industry in emerging markets isa low-margin, high-risk business”; and that IFC has “beenunable to significantly transform markets and create sustainablebusiness as originally anticipated.”However, emerging evidence from evolving <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong>experience paints a more positive picture—though stillwith the qualifications that SHS appears to be a small nichemarket rather than a rural panacea and is largely still dependenton subsidies.All projects in the evaluation portfolio had the developmentobjectives <strong>of</strong> (i) increasing access to electricity in rural areasin an environmentally sustainable manner and (ii) facilitatinggreater participation by the private sector in advancingthe commercialization <strong>of</strong> photovoltaic technology. In addition,4 <strong>of</strong> the 12 projects specifically spelled out the goal <strong>of</strong>fostering economic growth or improving the delivery <strong>of</strong> socialservices such as health and education through the provision<strong>of</strong> electricity services. <strong>The</strong> global environmental objective<strong>of</strong> the solar photovoltaic projects was to remove barriersto the adoption <strong>of</strong> emissions-reducing energy technologies.Outcomes for four <strong>of</strong> the five evaluatedprojects with large SHS components wererated satisfactory.Table 2.8 reports the rated outcomes <strong>of</strong> the five completedprojects in the evaluation sample with large SHS components.With the exception <strong>of</strong> Indonesia—where the 1997macroeconomic crisis crippled consumer demand—all theprojects performed well against targets. But good measures<strong>of</strong> SHS longevity are lacking. 13Table 2.8 Rated Outcomes <strong>of</strong> Completed Projects with Large SHS ComponentsProject Number <strong>of</strong> installed SHS Total capacity <strong>of</strong> installed SHS (MWp)Targets Actual Targets ActualChina Renewable Energy <strong>Development</strong> Project 350,000 400,000 11 10India Renewable Resources <strong>Development</strong>ProjectNA 2.5 – 3 2.145IndonesiaSHSs200,000 (appraisal)70,000 (revised)8,054 NASri LankaEnergy Services Delivery30,000 (appraisal)15,000 (revised)21,000 NASri Lanka Renewable Energy for Rural economic<strong>Development</strong> (RERED)87,000 by 2009 (appraisal)155,000 by 2011 (revised)105,398 (as <strong>of</strong>June 30, 2009)4.622Sources: Implementation and Completion Reports and Sri Lanka RERED Statistics and Reports (http://www.energyservices.lk/statistics/index.htm).Note: MWp = peak megawatts; SHS = solar home systems.28 | Climate Change and the <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> Group
<strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> experienceTwo factors accounted for the success <strong>of</strong> the projects inBangladesh, Sri Lanka, and China. Consumer finance wascrucial. In Sri Lanka’s energy services delivery project, theSHS vendors and commercial banks were expected to providefinancing but proved ill suited to deal with collectingpayments from the highly decentralized <strong>of</strong>f-grid customers,and the project languished. <strong>The</strong> project took <strong>of</strong>f aftershifting to a micr<strong>of</strong>inance model.<strong>The</strong> Bangladesh Renewable Energy for Rural Economic<strong>Development</strong> project also relied on well-functioning micr<strong>of</strong>inanceinstitutions. China’s Renewable Energy <strong>Development</strong>Project (REDP) achieved success despite lack <strong>of</strong>financing arrangements in provinces where many clientswere yak herders who could self-finance a system throughsales <strong>of</strong> their animals.Micr<strong>of</strong>inance was a critical input forsuccess in several projects.<strong>The</strong> second factor was the use <strong>of</strong> output-based producersubsidies. <strong>The</strong> development <strong>of</strong> the Chinese industry isnoteworthy, as it illustrates an effective set <strong>of</strong> mechanismsto promote manufacturing quality and capabilities.Demand-driven grants enabled companies to improve theirtechnologies and financial management systems. Technology-neutralsubsidies—contingent on achieving qualitystandards—served as an incentive to improve quality, providedsmall firms with capital for expansion, and were tosome degree passed on to consumers, boosting demand.As a result, the SHS companies doubled their employment,tripled sales and service outlets from 266 to 721, and morethan tripled sales. <strong>The</strong> inland city <strong>of</strong> Xining emerged as amanufacturing center and began to export products.Quality-contingent output-based producersubsidies were important.It is difficult to discern the impact <strong>of</strong> certification or labelingon consumer perception <strong>of</strong> quality and therefore ondemand. China REDP supported the development <strong>of</strong> a“Golden Sun” quality label, but rural familiarity with thelabel appears to be low, and exporters seek internationallyrecognized certification.Projects in Argentina, Bolivia, Indonesia, Mongolia, andSri Lanka aimed to support the development <strong>of</strong> policyframeworks for <strong>of</strong>f-grid electrification. <strong>The</strong> Sri Lanka effortwas most clearly successful. In Sri Lanka, the energyservice delivery project indirectly influenced the governmentto rationalize a photovoltaic module import tariff,which was reduced from 35 to 10 percent. Toward the end<strong>of</strong> the project, the government also introduced its newrural electrification policy, which aims to promote sustainablemarket-based provision <strong>of</strong> rural service. In contrast,in China, India, and the Philippines, multiple competingprograms for SHS promotion sometimes worked at crosspurposes, with heavily subsidized programs undercuttingthe progress <strong>of</strong> more market-oriented ones.IFC experienceIFC’s attempts at promoting private sector developmentin the SHS market were generally less successful than the<strong>Bank</strong>’s. A candid IFC review (IFC 2007) points to a lack <strong>of</strong>flexibility; this is consistent with internal evaluations andwith the views <strong>of</strong> an industry participant and former client(Miller 2009). A $41 million effort initiated in 2000, the Solar<strong>Development</strong> Group, comprised for-pr<strong>of</strong>it private equity financeand nonpr<strong>of</strong>it technical assistance—in two arms thatwere intended to cooperate but failed to do so. <strong>The</strong> equityfinance arm collapsed having disbursed only $650,000, avictim <strong>of</strong> unrealistic expectations about industry pr<strong>of</strong>itabilityand rigid procedures. <strong>The</strong> technical assistance arm, moreflexible and less demanding <strong>of</strong> returns, disbursed about$2.2 million to 53 small companies spread across manycountries, so that the overall impact was highly diluted. IFCnoted also a failure to coordinate IFC activities with <strong>World</strong><strong>Bank</strong> support for favorable renewable energy policies.IFC’s approach has been less flexible thanthe <strong>Bank</strong>’s and has had less success.A more recent IFC-GEF effort, the Photovoltaic MarketTransformation Initiative, provided $30 million to supportphotovoltaic enterprises in India, Kenya, and Morocco.Initially overly bureaucratic, it was restructured for moreflexibility. It has been successful in India, where it hassupported performance guarantees and higher-qualityproducts, though initially it was poorly coordinated with the<strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> project. <strong>The</strong> Initiative has been less successfulin Morocco and Kenya.ImpactsA goal <strong>of</strong> these projects was to sustainably reduce the price <strong>of</strong>SHS and thereby increase access. In general, closed projectsall observed reduction in the cost <strong>of</strong> photovoltaic systems.Under China REDP, photovoltaic system costs declinedfrom about $16/Wp to $9/Wp. In Uganda, the photovoltaicsystem cost declined from $20/Wp to $12–17/Wp by the end<strong>of</strong> 2008. <strong>The</strong>se declines probably reflect increased domesticcompetition. <strong>The</strong> programs are too small to have affected theglobal market for solar modules, where increased Europeandemand drove down prices over the decade.Projects have generally reduced the localcost <strong>of</strong> photovoltaic systems.Renewable Energy | 29
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Phase II: The Challenge of Low-Carb
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE WORLD BANK G
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Figures1.1 GHG Emissions by Sector
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Executive SummaryUnabated, climate
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Table C.2Completed Low-Carbon Energ
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TAble C.4Reviewed energy efficiency
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IEG PublicationsAnalyzing the Effec