The Challenge of Low-Carbon Development - World Bank Internet ...
The Challenge of Low-Carbon Development - World Bank Internet ... The Challenge of Low-Carbon Development - World Bank Internet ...
Figure 1.2Agriculture14%Industry8%Low-Cost GHG Abatement Potential,Non-OECD Countries, 2030Forestry11%Waste5%Energy supply11%Buildings38%Transport13%Source: Metz and others 2007.Note: Cost< $20/ton of CO 2. Estimated economic potentials for GHGmitigation at a sectoral level in 2030 for different cost categoriesusing the SRES B2 and International Energy Agency World EnergyOutlook (2004) baselines. Total abatement potential is 9.2 Gt CO 2e.GHG = greenhouse gas; OECD = Organisation for EconomicCo-Operation and Development.global mitigation costs affordable. (There is, however, noagreement yet on how those costs might be apportioned.)The long-run goal of stabilizing the levelof atmospheric GHGs cannot be achievedwithout mitigating actions in all majoremitting nations.The need for action is urgent. If installed today, inefficientcoal-fired power plants, poorly insulated buildings, andpoorly targeted energy subsidies will be needlessly pumpingGHGs into the atmosphere through mid-century. ThoseGHGs will linger in the atmosphere for many decades longer,intensifying warming and increasing the chance that theclimate will pass a critical threshold—leading to acceleratedwarming, dieback of the Amazon forest, or other climaticdisruptions.There are many routes to mitigationHow might mitigation take place? GHG emissions arise inmany ways, in many sectors. To motivate the sectors coveredin this evaluation, consider first the current patternsof emissions.In the developing world, 83 percent of emissions come, inroughly equal proportions, from power generation; industrialprocesses (including steel manufacture, cement production,oil refining); deforestation; and agriculture (largely methanefrom rice paddies and livestock). Transportation accountsfor another 7 percent. However, energy and transport emissionsare expected to grow rapidly as economies expand.Emphasis on energy efficiency now buys timefor renewable energy costs to fall and for developmentof advanced energy technologies.Costs and benefits of mitigation differ by sector and are thesubject of intense investigation. The consensus estimate ofthe Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is summarizedin figure 1.2, which shows low-cost abatementopportunities. Like many other analyses, this one pointsto increased energy efficiency (in buildings and industry)as the largest and most economically attractive option formitigation over the next few decades.An emphasis on energy efficiency in the next few decadesbuys time for solar and wind power to become more costcompetitive with fossil fuels and to develop and deploy advancedlow-carbon energy technologies (such as carboncapture and storage and nuclear fusion) in the second halfof the century. Energy efficiency helps preclude constructionof coal power plants that might otherwise stay in servicefor 40 years or more.Because mitigation is a global public good, it makes economicsense to compensate countries, firms, farms, andother actors for their contribution to mitigation. The questto use global demand for climate stability as a means offinancing climate-friendly development has shaped bothUnited Nations and WBG approaches to climate change.Global Mitigation Context and the WBGThe WBG’s approach to climate change has coevolvedwith the international climate regime. One line of coevolutionwas with the Global Environment Facility (GEF),which was established in 1991 as a pilot program withinthe Bank. The GEF mobilized donor funds to addressclimate change, biodiversity loss, and other global environmentalproblems. Recognizing that climate and biodiversityare global public goods, the GEF’s approach wasto pay countries for the incremental costs of supplyingthese goods.The GEF rapidly realized that its funds were too limited toplug the funding gap (project by project) and shifted to activitiesaimed at catalyzing replicable win-win actions. TheGEF became an independent agency in 1994, but the Bankremained its trustee and largest implementing agency. Thishas been an important avenue for fostering attention to climatechange inside the Bank and to developing a cadre ofstaff and managers with climate expertise.The WBG’s approach to climate change hascoevolved with the international climateregime and carbon market development.Another line of coevolution was with the carbon market.The UNFCCC, which became effective in 1994, didnot specify how its mitigation goals would be accomplished.Attention turned to an economic approach that4 | Climate Change and the World Bank Group
would allow industrialized countries to seek cost-effectiveopportunities for GHG reduction in developed or transitioncountries. This was in line with the UNFCCC’s principleof “common but differentiated responsibilities andrespective capacities.” It would take advantage of low-costoptions to retrofit aging infrastructure in transition countriesand to install cleaner greenfield equipment in rapidlygrowing developing countries.This approach was piloted in the Activities ImplementedJointly Program, in which the World Bank participated.It evolved into the Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted in1997 (but did not enter into force until 2005).The Kyoto Protocol assigned GHG emissions allowancesto industrialized countries. To exceed its emissions limit,a country was obliged either to purchase allowances fromanother industrialized country or to purchase a carbonoffset from a developing or transition country (see box5.2). The World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF;whose staff had been involved in GEF and the ActivitiesImplemented Jointly Program), put in place after Kyotoand launched in 1999, was intended to pilot the concept ofcarbon offsets and help catalyze this avenue for investmentin GHG mitigation.The 2001 WBG Environment Strategyincluded win-win approaches andmobilization of concessional funds.The dual-track approach—win-win opportunities complementedby mobilization of concessional funds—was includedin the 2001 WBG Environment Strategy and hasbeen pursued since. An independent review (Nakhooda2008) assessed 54 Country Assistance Strategies issuedover 2004–07 and found that 32 discussed GHG mitigationin a sectoral context. At the 2004 Bonn InternationalConference on Renewable Energies, the WBG committedto expand its lending for renewable energy (excluding largehydropower) and energy efficiency by 20 percent per yearover 2005–09 from a baseline of $209 million. The Banksurpassed its commitment by a large margin (see chapter2). In 2007, the Bank endorsed an Investment Frameworkfor Clean Energy and Development. The frameworkhad a broader scope than its name suggests, emphasizingelectricity access and including climate adaptation as wellas mitigation. The mitigation component focused on mobilizationof concessional funds for investments in cleantechnologies and promotion of carbon trading.Meanwhile, the UNFCCC process began to focus on the eraafter 2012, when the Kyoto provisions expire. The 2007 BaliAction Plan emphasized mitigation, adaptation, and financialand technological support for developing countries.It opened the negotiations to include reducing emissionsfrom deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), a majorsource of emissions not addressed in the Kyoto Protocol.And it called for setting a long-term global goal for emissionsreductions. The Bali Action Plan was widely expectedto culminate in a new international agreement at the 2009Copenhagen climate meetings.Development and Climate Change: A Strategic Frameworkfor the World Bank Group was adopted in 2008. Althoughthe SFDCC recognizes the primacy of the UNFCCC in theclimate area, its goals are to support sustainable development,including “climate-related economic opportunities,”and to “facilitate global action.”The SFDCC emphasizes six action areas (box 1.1), alignedwith the Bali Action Plan. Four of these areas are concernedwith mobilizing finance, from traditional and novel sources,and with supporting technology investments. The frameworkcommits the WBG to increase the share of energylending devoted to low-carbon projects (including largehydro) from 40 percent in 2009 to 50 percent in 2011, byincreasing financing of energy efficiency and new renewableenergy by 30 percent per year. It coincides with the mobilizationof the $6.2 billion Climate Investment Funds, a newsource of financing for pilot projects aimed at initiatingtransformational changes. The core of the Climate InvestmentFunds is the $5.1 billion Clean Technology Fund, providingfinancing for demonstration, large-scale deployment,and transfer of low-carbon technologies. These funds wereseen as transitional devices, pending mobilization of muchlarger-scale financing as part of a new climate agreement.The 2008 strategic framework emphasizessix action areas, four of which concernfinance and investment.However, the 2009 meeting in Copenhagen did not resultin a comprehensive, binding climate agreement. This leavesthe WBG to operate in a partial vacuum.If there were an agreed, funded operationalization of theUNFCCC goal of GHG stabilization that spelled out roles,responsibilities, and funding sources, the WBG and itsclients would be better able to make development choicesconsistent with a low-carbon growth path. Absent suchan agreement, each development choice is fraught withambiguity, as in the controversy over coal-fired power generation(see chapter 4). And it is not clear when, if ever,anticipated multibillion dollar per year climate financingsources may come into being.Evaluation QuestionsBefore the SFDCC, the WBG had limited objectives explicitlyrelated to climate change. Where such objectives exist,IEG can assess performance against them. Activities withIntroduction | 5
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- Page 5 and 6: Table of ContentsAbbreviations . .
- Page 7 and 8: Figures1.1 GHG Emissions by Sector
- Page 9 and 10: AcknowledgmentsThe report was prepa
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- Page 57 and 58: on average (Iyadomi 2010). (Reducti
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Figure 1.2Agriculture14%Industry8%<strong>Low</strong>-Cost GHG Abatement Potential,Non-OECD Countries, 2030Forestry11%Waste5%Energy supply11%Buildings38%Transport13%Source: Metz and others 2007.Note: Cost< $20/ton <strong>of</strong> CO 2. Estimated economic potentials for GHGmitigation at a sectoral level in 2030 for different cost categoriesusing the SRES B2 and International Energy Agency <strong>World</strong> EnergyOutlook (2004) baselines. Total abatement potential is 9.2 Gt CO 2e.GHG = greenhouse gas; OECD = Organisation for EconomicCo-Operation and <strong>Development</strong>.global mitigation costs affordable. (<strong>The</strong>re is, however, noagreement yet on how those costs might be apportioned.)<strong>The</strong> long-run goal <strong>of</strong> stabilizing the level<strong>of</strong> atmospheric GHGs cannot be achievedwithout mitigating actions in all majoremitting nations.<strong>The</strong> need for action is urgent. If installed today, inefficientcoal-fired power plants, poorly insulated buildings, andpoorly targeted energy subsidies will be needlessly pumpingGHGs into the atmosphere through mid-century. ThoseGHGs will linger in the atmosphere for many decades longer,intensifying warming and increasing the chance that theclimate will pass a critical threshold—leading to acceleratedwarming, dieback <strong>of</strong> the Amazon forest, or other climaticdisruptions.<strong>The</strong>re are many routes to mitigationHow might mitigation take place? GHG emissions arise inmany ways, in many sectors. To motivate the sectors coveredin this evaluation, consider first the current patterns<strong>of</strong> emissions.In the developing world, 83 percent <strong>of</strong> emissions come, inroughly equal proportions, from power generation; industrialprocesses (including steel manufacture, cement production,oil refining); deforestation; and agriculture (largely methanefrom rice paddies and livestock). Transportation accountsfor another 7 percent. However, energy and transport emissionsare expected to grow rapidly as economies expand.Emphasis on energy efficiency now buys timefor renewable energy costs to fall and for development<strong>of</strong> advanced energy technologies.Costs and benefits <strong>of</strong> mitigation differ by sector and are thesubject <strong>of</strong> intense investigation. <strong>The</strong> consensus estimate <strong>of</strong>the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is summarizedin figure 1.2, which shows low-cost abatementopportunities. Like many other analyses, this one pointsto increased energy efficiency (in buildings and industry)as the largest and most economically attractive option formitigation over the next few decades.An emphasis on energy efficiency in the next few decadesbuys time for solar and wind power to become more costcompetitive with fossil fuels and to develop and deploy advancedlow-carbon energy technologies (such as carboncapture and storage and nuclear fusion) in the second half<strong>of</strong> the century. Energy efficiency helps preclude construction<strong>of</strong> coal power plants that might otherwise stay in servicefor 40 years or more.Because mitigation is a global public good, it makes economicsense to compensate countries, firms, farms, andother actors for their contribution to mitigation. <strong>The</strong> questto use global demand for climate stability as a means <strong>of</strong>financing climate-friendly development has shaped bothUnited Nations and WBG approaches to climate change.Global Mitigation Context and the WBG<strong>The</strong> WBG’s approach to climate change has coevolvedwith the international climate regime. One line <strong>of</strong> coevolutionwas with the Global Environment Facility (GEF),which was established in 1991 as a pilot program withinthe <strong>Bank</strong>. <strong>The</strong> GEF mobilized donor funds to addressclimate change, biodiversity loss, and other global environmentalproblems. Recognizing that climate and biodiversityare global public goods, the GEF’s approach wasto pay countries for the incremental costs <strong>of</strong> supplyingthese goods.<strong>The</strong> GEF rapidly realized that its funds were too limited toplug the funding gap (project by project) and shifted to activitiesaimed at catalyzing replicable win-win actions. <strong>The</strong>GEF became an independent agency in 1994, but the <strong>Bank</strong>remained its trustee and largest implementing agency. Thishas been an important avenue for fostering attention to climatechange inside the <strong>Bank</strong> and to developing a cadre <strong>of</strong>staff and managers with climate expertise.<strong>The</strong> WBG’s approach to climate change hascoevolved with the international climateregime and carbon market development.Another line <strong>of</strong> coevolution was with the carbon market.<strong>The</strong> UNFCCC, which became effective in 1994, didnot specify how its mitigation goals would be accomplished.Attention turned to an economic approach that4 | Climate Change and the <strong>World</strong> <strong>Bank</strong> Group