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From the Heart of Kurdistan Region - Kurdish Globe

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The<strong>Kurdish</strong><strong>Globe</strong> No. 370, Tuesday, October 02, 2012 12The<strong>Kurdish</strong><strong>Globe</strong> No. 370, Tuesday, October 02, 2012 13With <strong>the</strong>ir time to shine, SyrianKurds must seize <strong>the</strong> momentBy Bashdar Pusho IsmaeelBattle <strong>of</strong> Words betweenAKP and BDP: One fact, TwoIncompatible PerceptionsMany observers <strong>of</strong>ten describe<strong>the</strong> Syrian Kurds assitting on <strong>the</strong> fence in <strong>the</strong>Syrian conflict, waiting on aclear outcome before choosingsides. It may be true thatKurds have not necessarilytaken a more natural anti-Assad position but this ismore to do with <strong>the</strong> politicalclimate and strategic ploysthan any adoration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>regime.If Sunni’s feel that <strong>the</strong>yhave got a raw deal under<strong>the</strong> current dictatorship<strong>the</strong>n how must <strong>the</strong> largelyrepressed and disenfranchisedKurds feel?This makes it all <strong>the</strong> moreironic that Kurds continueto remain divided and areslow in taking measures thatnecessitate decisiveness tocapitalise on <strong>the</strong> historicalopportunities on <strong>the</strong> table.It also says much abouthow <strong>the</strong> Kurds view <strong>the</strong> predominantlySunni Arab nationalistFree Syrian Army(FSA) or Syrian NationalCouncil (SNC) when manypresidewith <strong>the</strong> mentality<strong>of</strong>“better <strong>the</strong> devil you know”due to <strong>the</strong>ir lack <strong>of</strong> convictionfor a new Syria.Then <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> Turkishconnection. Clearly, a lot <strong>of</strong>Syrian Kurds look at both<strong>the</strong> SNC and Turkey withsuspicion. The PKK has afirm fan base amongst SyrianKurds and coupled withTurkey’s track record with<strong>the</strong>ir own restive <strong>Kurdish</strong>population, <strong>the</strong>y remainsceptical that <strong>the</strong> autonomyor rights <strong>the</strong>y demandwould be enshrined in anew Syria.Coming <strong>of</strong>f <strong>the</strong> fenceSometimes if you sit on<strong>the</strong> fence for too long waitingto make your move, <strong>the</strong>fence may break forcingyou to unwillingly land onone side.The Kurds have beenwidely acknowledged as<strong>the</strong> wild card in <strong>the</strong> struggleagainst Assad and a forcewith considerable numbersand sway that can tip <strong>the</strong>scale <strong>of</strong> revolution.However, <strong>the</strong> Kurds havebeen too disparate, at timestoo slow, spending muchtime quarrelling amongstone ano<strong>the</strong>r and lackingclear leadership.There are only 2 millionor so Kurds in Syria, yetdozens <strong>of</strong> political parties.The Erbil agreement in Julythat brought <strong>the</strong> DemocraticUnion Party (PYD) and <strong>the</strong><strong>Kurdish</strong> National Council<strong>of</strong> Syria (KNCS) toge<strong>the</strong>runder <strong>the</strong> stewardship <strong>of</strong><strong>Kurdistan</strong> President MassaudBarzani was morethan a welcome step, butit remains brittle, inconsistent,unbalanced in itsimplementation and lackinga real nationalistfeel.A cloud still remains on<strong>the</strong> PYD and with its powerfulsupport base and responsibilityas <strong>the</strong> only realarmed group, it must workon enhancing <strong>the</strong> <strong>Kurdish</strong>cause in Syria and becominga real nationalisticon.However, it still remainsshrouded under <strong>the</strong> shadow<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PKK and has hardlytaking <strong>the</strong> bulls by <strong>the</strong> hornsagainst Assad.It must not be forgotten,that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Kurdish</strong> populationin Syria is far by <strong>the</strong> smallestamongst <strong>the</strong> four majorparts <strong>of</strong> <strong>Kurdistan</strong>. Nationalismnever really had firmroots in terms <strong>of</strong> a definitivemovement, <strong>Kurdish</strong> inhibitedareas are much moregeographically spread-out,and more importantly <strong>the</strong>Kurds do not have internationalor regional supportfor <strong>the</strong>ir own autonomousentity let alone from SunniArabs.The <strong>Kurdish</strong> struggle inSyria must for now be disconnectedfrom <strong>Kurdish</strong>struggles elsewhere. <strong>Kurdish</strong>groups and <strong>the</strong> PYD inparticular should deviateaway from too much focuson Turkey or <strong>the</strong> PKKstruggle that resides <strong>the</strong>re.This is a historical momentfor Syrian Kurds and all energiesmust be channelledto overcome constraints andwithin nationalist goals andnot narrow minded partypolitics.Ousting or workingwith <strong>the</strong> regime?The Kurds made headlineswhen <strong>the</strong>y took historic control<strong>of</strong> some <strong>Kurdish</strong> townsand districts in July, shortlyafter <strong>the</strong> Erbil Agreement.However, it was hardly awhirlwind revolution withan all guns blazing legacybuta largely peaceful transition.No doubt a deal was madebetween <strong>the</strong> Assad governmentand <strong>the</strong> <strong>Kurdish</strong>forces for relinquishment<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se areas. At <strong>the</strong> time,<strong>the</strong>re was much talk <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Kurds seizing Qamishli ando<strong>the</strong>r <strong>Kurdish</strong> towns butmonths later Syrian <strong>Kurdistan</strong>remains relatively quietand subdued.Assad has much to gain byworking and seceding territoryto <strong>the</strong> Kurds and <strong>the</strong>new <strong>Kurdish</strong> administrationis as much to do with a newA <strong>Kurdish</strong> child in a pro-unity march in Syrian <strong>Kurdistan</strong>.<strong>Kurdish</strong> drive as smart manipulationby Assad.By ceding control <strong>of</strong> borderterritories to <strong>the</strong> Kurds,Damascus seeks to servera double blow to Ankara.Firstly, it creates a bufferagainst any future Turkishincursion with <strong>Kurdish</strong>fighters well positionedand secondly it creates afertilecross-border groundfor <strong>the</strong> PKK to swing <strong>the</strong>pendulum in <strong>the</strong>ir favouragainst Turkey.Assad fur<strong>the</strong>r continues tocreate cracks in <strong>the</strong> SNC bysplitting <strong>Kurdish</strong> sentimentand at <strong>the</strong> same <strong>the</strong> withdrawalwas calculated by<strong>the</strong> need for Assad forcesto focus energieson <strong>the</strong>battle against Syrian rebelsin <strong>the</strong> key economic hub <strong>of</strong>Aleppo.Finally, as a last measureand bare minimum fall backposition for Assad, an Alawiteregion or even statewould be established, with<strong>the</strong> proviso <strong>of</strong> a <strong>Kurdish</strong>region aiding division andestablishment <strong>of</strong> future regions.Now is <strong>the</strong> time,not <strong>the</strong> futureA lot <strong>of</strong> Kurds seem intentto save <strong>the</strong>ir firepowerand energy for what <strong>the</strong>ydeem <strong>the</strong> real battle – onceAssad is overthrown and anew scramble for power inSyrian ensues akin to Iraq.Kurds seem convinced thatonce <strong>the</strong> FSA finish pointing<strong>the</strong>ir guns at Assad, <strong>the</strong>ywill simply reposition <strong>the</strong>barrel at <strong>the</strong> Kurds instead.While some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>sefears and concerns havesubstance, after all Sunniopposition groups well before<strong>the</strong> Arab Spring began,hardly supported <strong>the</strong> <strong>Kurdish</strong>cause or united with<strong>Kurdish</strong> opposition groupsand remained loyal to Arabunity and nationalism thanany promotion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Kurdish</strong>struggle.The time for Kurds to actis now. Waiting for a clearoutcome in <strong>the</strong> battle leadsto an uncertain conclusion.If <strong>the</strong> rebels advance andbeat Assad, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> Kurdswill be backed in to an uncomfortablecorner and dilutedbargaining positionand if Assad manages tostay in power, <strong>the</strong>n how can<strong>the</strong> Kurds trust a dynastythat has seen <strong>the</strong>m suffermercilesslywith thousandsnot even worthy <strong>of</strong> a citizenshipstatus.The Kurds in Syria mustunite and set aside <strong>the</strong>re differencesfor <strong>the</strong> sake <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>Kurdish</strong> people, <strong>Kurdish</strong>nationalism and <strong>the</strong> decades<strong>of</strong> pain and tears enduredunder dictatorial rule. Theinsistence on promotingparty based political agendawill see all Kurds fail.The Kurds do not need toPhoto PYD-Facebooktake sides with <strong>the</strong> SNC orAssad; <strong>the</strong> real side <strong>the</strong>yshould choose are <strong>the</strong> Kurds<strong>the</strong>mselves.Now is <strong>the</strong> time to chargeinto Qamishli and oustAssad forces, followed byall <strong>Kurdish</strong> towns and citiesin Syria.The <strong>Kurdish</strong> forces, boththose loyal to <strong>the</strong> PYD andthose consisting <strong>of</strong> largely<strong>Kurdish</strong>defectorsfrom <strong>the</strong>Syrian army under a unitedfront and can easily assumecontrol <strong>of</strong> <strong>Kurdish</strong> populationin Syrian. Assad canhardly contain one battlefront in Syria, let alonetwo.The passive <strong>Kurdish</strong>stance in AleppoMuch <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Syrian revolutionhas congregatedaround Aleppo over <strong>the</strong> pastseveral weeks. Aleppo ishome to a significant <strong>Kurdish</strong>population but <strong>the</strong>y haveremained largely idle. Thereare contrasting reports <strong>of</strong> anew battle field opening in<strong>the</strong> predominantly <strong>Kurdish</strong>neighbourhood <strong>of</strong> SheikMaksoud, with some reportsclaiming that PKK affiliatedmilitiaswith leveragein <strong>the</strong> district had supportedregime forces while o<strong>the</strong>rsstating <strong>the</strong>y had stayed out<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> battle.Whilst, Kurds look at <strong>the</strong>FSA with suspicion, <strong>the</strong><strong>Kurdish</strong> support is a wildcardthat could easily tip<strong>the</strong> war in favour <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>rebels. The Kurds must usethis opportunity to drive ahard bargain with <strong>the</strong> SNCand FSA in return for directsupport in ousting Assad.A continuation <strong>of</strong> passive<strong>Kurdish</strong> stance or worseresistance against Syrianrebels in Aleppo gives anundeserving hand to Assad.Syria is ablaze and willdramatically alter not only<strong>the</strong> political map <strong>of</strong> Syriaitself but also <strong>the</strong> whole region.Tip-toeingwithpeacefulmotions, insistence onnarrow minded party interestor sitting on <strong>the</strong> fence isakin to political suicide for<strong>the</strong> Kurds. Having sufferedbrutallyfor decades andwaited patiently to rewrite<strong>the</strong> wrongs <strong>of</strong> history, <strong>the</strong>Kurds dare not waste thishistorical opportunity.The reality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>Kurdish</strong> nationand its politiciansis evaluated as acontradiction by <strong>the</strong>Turkish nation andits political ratio. Itstands out as one <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> major barriersto a peacefulsolution to <strong>the</strong><strong>Kurdish</strong> issue.Once again heavy clasheshave intensified between <strong>the</strong><strong>Kurdistan</strong> Workers' Party(PKK) and Turkish militaryforces. Wide-ranging operationshave increased across<strong>the</strong> mountainous terrain <strong>of</strong>north <strong>Kurdistan</strong>, especiallyin Hakkari's Semdinli andSirnak's Beytussebap districtsas well as in rural regions<strong>of</strong> Diyarbakir.While <strong>the</strong> fierce clashesbetween Turkish militaryforces and PKK in <strong>Kurdistan</strong>Mountains severely continue,it also reflects on <strong>the</strong>political arena between <strong>the</strong>ruling Justice and DevelopmentParty's (AKP) and<strong>the</strong> pro-<strong>Kurdish</strong> Peace andDemocracy Party (BDP)as a political struggle and abattle <strong>of</strong> words.Lately, Turkish PrimeMinister Recep Tayyip Erdoganaddressed severalspeeches in which he harshlycriticized <strong>the</strong> BDP. Heindicated that Turkish judiciaryshould come into playand initiate a case againstsome BDP MPs for openlyshowing <strong>the</strong>ir sympathieswith guerillas <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PKKin Semdinli district, a province<strong>of</strong> Hakkari. His maingoal was to lift <strong>the</strong> parliamentaryimmunity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>seMPs, including Aysel Tuglukand Gultan Kisanak."If BDP lawmakers wantto work within <strong>the</strong> TurkishParliament, <strong>the</strong>y must actwithin <strong>the</strong> framework <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution and <strong>the</strong> law.O<strong>the</strong>rwise, we've alreadytold <strong>the</strong> judiciary what isBy Mehmed Sabri AkgönülPRESS PHOTOBDP and AKP representatives fighting inside <strong>the</strong> General Assembly <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Turksih Parliament in Ankara.necessary. We [<strong>the</strong> AKP]will also do what is necessaryin Parliament," Erdogansaid.Erdogan's attitudes wereevaluated by <strong>Kurdish</strong> politicalcadres as <strong>the</strong> first steptowards to dissolve <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>BDP. BDP MPs respondedcritics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir meeting withPKK guerillas by saying<strong>the</strong>y would leave <strong>the</strong> negotiationtable set for <strong>the</strong>drafting <strong>of</strong> Turkish newconstitution. Besides, BDPvowed that if <strong>the</strong> parliamentaryimmunity <strong>of</strong> MPsis lifted it would 'return to<strong>the</strong> people' [Sine-i Millet].In <strong>the</strong> political discourse in<strong>Kurdish</strong> politics, returningto <strong>the</strong> people refers leavingTurkish Parliament andquesting <strong>the</strong> support andstrength <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Kurdish</strong>people.Commenting on <strong>the</strong>BDP's responses, Erdogansaid if <strong>the</strong> BDP MPs arelooking for a more comfortableplace, <strong>the</strong>y can go toQandil, <strong>the</strong> mountain rangewhere most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PKKguerillas and PKK leadersare settled. "BDP MPs aresaying <strong>the</strong>y will 'return to<strong>the</strong> people'. Do <strong>the</strong>y think<strong>the</strong>y have any place among<strong>the</strong> people? They can only'return to <strong>the</strong> PKK'," headded.Also, Erdogan slammedBDP co-chair SelahattinDemirtas and described himas "co-chair <strong>of</strong> an extension<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> divisive terrorist organization"by adding that<strong>the</strong> BDP MPs are on a parwith PKK guerillas ("terrorists")."If Demirtas wasnot barefaced, he would goto Qandil Mountain. He isnot a representative <strong>of</strong> thisnation; how could he hastaken oath in <strong>the</strong> Parliament"Demirtas criticized PMErdogan for telling <strong>the</strong> BDPto choose between TurkishParliament and <strong>the</strong> QandilMountains. He emphasized<strong>the</strong> BDP is a party thatmade its choice and <strong>the</strong>yhave chosen to participatein democratic politics bysaying that "its place is inParliament, and not Qandil.There are not two choices;<strong>the</strong>re is single choice ahead<strong>of</strong> us."Discussions related to 'returnto <strong>the</strong> people' are notnew in <strong>Kurdish</strong> politics.In 2009, after being closeddown <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> DemocraticSociety Party (DTP) by<strong>the</strong> Turkish ConstitutionalCourt, <strong>the</strong> representatives <strong>of</strong>DTP had declared that <strong>the</strong>ywould 'return to <strong>the</strong> people'.In those days, <strong>Kurdish</strong>nation was expectingthat DTP would not returnto <strong>the</strong> Turkish Parliamentfrom which <strong>the</strong>y had beenexpelled. However, DTPfell short <strong>of</strong> this expectationand turned back to <strong>the</strong>Turkish Parliament.Actually, Erdogan's wordsagainst BDP imply, on <strong>the</strong>one hand, a reality <strong>of</strong> <strong>Kurdish</strong>nation and its politicalentities; and show, on <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r hand, a contradictionaccording to Turkish nationand its political entities.BDP shares <strong>the</strong> same politicallines, goals and principleswith PKK. There isno need to be a strategicanalyst in order to realizethis association and anyoneconcerned about <strong>Kurdish</strong>politics may see this reality.Additionally, BDP's electoratesconsist <strong>of</strong> PKK proponentsor followers. It is acommonly known fact thata <strong>Kurdish</strong> family memberis a deputy in <strong>the</strong> Turkishparliament while <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rfamily member fights as aguerilla in <strong>Kurdistan</strong> Mountains.Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, some <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> BDP <strong>of</strong>ficials and mayors'children or close relativescould be a PKK guerilla.Therefore, 'return to<strong>the</strong> people' [Sine-i Millet]is going to be still a 'returnto <strong>the</strong> PKK' [Sine-i PKK]just <strong>the</strong> because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> factthat directly or indirectlyBDP electorates have concreterelations with PKK.Attempting to insult BDPwith <strong>the</strong> phrase <strong>of</strong> 'return to<strong>the</strong> PKK', indeed, TurkishPM draws <strong>the</strong> attention to<strong>the</strong> truest point <strong>of</strong> <strong>Kurdish</strong>politics.Ei<strong>the</strong>r Turkish politicalcadres or Turkish popularmedia has made calls toBDP for keeping itself fromPKK persistently. Theyfound <strong>the</strong> direct or indirectrelation between <strong>the</strong> BDPand <strong>the</strong> PKK contradictory.Prominent figures <strong>of</strong> Turkishpolitics have urged BDPmany times to call PKK asa "terrorist organization."According to <strong>the</strong>m, <strong>the</strong> fact<strong>of</strong> <strong>Kurdish</strong> question and <strong>the</strong>existence <strong>of</strong> PKK are nodoubt isolated from eacho<strong>the</strong>r and <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong>PKK could under no circumstancesbe associatedwith <strong>Kurdish</strong> question. Forthis reason, <strong>the</strong>y do no<strong>the</strong>sitate to consider <strong>the</strong> embrace<strong>of</strong> PKK guerillas withBDP deputies in Semdinlias an abnormal case or evena contradiction.It can easily be stated that<strong>the</strong> main obstacle in <strong>the</strong> way<strong>of</strong> solving <strong>Kurdish</strong> questionis that: <strong>the</strong> same fact hasbeen perceived and evaluateddifferently by <strong>Kurdish</strong>nation and its political entitiesand Turkish nation andits political cadres. In o<strong>the</strong>rwords, <strong>Kurdish</strong> questioncorresponds to a normalcase or a political realitybefore <strong>Kurdish</strong> nation andits political entities while itaccounts for a crime whichis to be punished or a politicalcontradiction in <strong>the</strong>eyes <strong>of</strong> Turkish nation andits political representatives.If <strong>the</strong> reality <strong>of</strong> <strong>Kurdish</strong> nationcoincides with <strong>the</strong> contradiction<strong>of</strong> Turkish nation,is it really possible for <strong>the</strong>setwo political entities to liveunder <strong>the</strong> same politicalro<strong>of</strong>? In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>Kurdish</strong>political and intellectualcadres make a good analysisand create <strong>the</strong> right answerto this question, <strong>Kurdish</strong>nation will take <strong>the</strong> firststep on <strong>the</strong> path <strong>of</strong> being asovereign-political agent inits own territory.

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