Twenty years after the Windhoek Declaration on press freedom

• Encourage members of <strong>the</strong>
community to participate in
<strong>the</strong> planning, production and
presentation of programmes,
and
• Promote ownership of media by
low income groups of society
i.e. <strong>the</strong> poor and vulnerable.
Compare that with what <strong>the</strong> policy
demands of private media:
• Provide a vibrant broadcasting
industry that will play a key role
in nation building by reflecting
<strong>the</strong> rich cultural, linguistic,
religious and regional diversity
of Uganda
• Promote <strong>the</strong> development of
national sporting events, music
dance and drama
• Ensure a significant percentage
of local content
• Ensure high professional standards
of journalism and integrity,
and
• Provide programmes of specific
interest to <strong>the</strong> poor and <strong>the</strong>
vulnerable.
The framers of this policy appear
to have been inspired by a vision of
<strong>the</strong> public broadcaster as a benevolent
communicator for <strong>the</strong> nation.
But with a largely unfunded public
service mandate, UBC has resorted
to tussling it out in <strong>the</strong> market to
bankroll its mission.
To be able to compete with its less
restrained private and commercial
rivals, <strong>the</strong> public broadcaster has had
no choice o<strong>the</strong>r than to compete
on <strong>the</strong> same terms. This has thrust
UBC on a collision course with its
commercial competitors who argue
that it should not have it both ways:
claiming public money and simultaneously
jostling with tax-paying
commercial broadcasters for advertising
revenue.
Private broadcasters have gone so
far as to argue that <strong>the</strong>y do a better
job on some mandates of UBC
92 | Media in Africa - 2011
(such as quality programming) even
without <strong>the</strong> funding guarantees,
however meagre, it enjoys from <strong>the</strong>
state.
Evidently, <strong>the</strong> compulsion to be everything-to-everybody,
as <strong>the</strong> policy
demands of <strong>the</strong> public broadcaster,
has left it in a vulnerable position.
Both pro- and anti-government
critics accuse it regularly of partisanship.
Most revealing though
is <strong>the</strong> fact that UBC is being challenged
by ano<strong>the</strong>r (partially) stateowned
media conglomerate, <strong>the</strong>
Vision Group, whose properties include
a stable of newspapers among
which is <strong>the</strong> highest circulation daily,
The New Vision, as well as TV and
FM radio stations.
In principle, <strong>the</strong> Vision Group is to
some extent bound by many of <strong>the</strong>
same public mandates as those imposed
on UBC. But because its original
core business was newspaper
publishing, it was never subjected
to <strong>the</strong> same policy requirements
as UBC. The Vision Group contends
that <strong>the</strong> state does not control its
editorial policies, although government
is its single largest shareholder
with just fewer than 50% of <strong>the</strong>
shares.
The company’s critics contest this
proposition. They point to <strong>the</strong>
decidedly anti-opposition news
framing that its media outlets
employed in <strong>the</strong>ir coverage of <strong>the</strong>
elections of February 2011. The
elections returned President Yoweri
Museveni and his party, <strong>the</strong> National
Resistance Movement.
Most revealing is <strong>the</strong> Vision Group’s
strategy of aggressive expansion
that has led many to wonder whe<strong>the</strong>r
<strong>the</strong> government is encouraging it
to effectively supplant <strong>the</strong> public
broadcaster. Driven by its robust
business savvy, <strong>the</strong> Vision Group has
acquired radio stations in lucrative
markets and also set up TV and radio
stations on its own.
Unrestrained in ways UBC is, Vision
Group media have exploited <strong>the</strong>
company’s commercial acumen and
<strong>the</strong> veil of autonomy from state
control to score political points
for <strong>the</strong> government and to deliver
bountiful returns to its private
investors.
These developments lay bare <strong>the</strong>
unbridled blurring of lines between
what is public and what is private
in both conceptual and practical
terms. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> forces at work
have as much to do with media
economics as with <strong>the</strong> political
economy of <strong>the</strong> industry.
In this situation lurk some critical
implications for media policy.
Here is <strong>the</strong> question that should
engage policymakers in African
countries where <strong>the</strong> reality is similar
to Uganda’s: “Is <strong>the</strong>re any value
in distinguishing among <strong>the</strong> old
categories of community, public
or state and private or commercial
media?”
If Uganda’s national broadcasting
policy is anything to go by, in
practice <strong>the</strong>re are fewer and fewer
au<strong>the</strong>ntic differences to be found
amongst <strong>the</strong> mandates prescribed
for public, community, and private
media.