HUNGARIAN STUDIES 11. No. 1. Nemzetközi Magyar ... - EPA
HUNGARIAN STUDIES 11. No. 1. Nemzetközi Magyar ... - EPA HUNGARIAN STUDIES 11. No. 1. Nemzetközi Magyar ... - EPA
70 SAMUEL J. WILSONoriginally pursued the Austrians instead of concentrating on Buda, it is stilldoubtful whether he could have taken the offensive successfully across theLeithia. As Clausewitz put it, "In strategy everything is very simple, but noton that account very easy." The great powers would never have allowedAustria to be destroyed, and Hungary did not possess the strength to causethis destruction. Like Lee, Görgey never possessed the illusion that he couldtotally destroy his opponent's forces. Rather, he wanted to make the cost ofdestroying his army far beyond the price the Austrians were willing to pay.In this regard he was more like Washington. Unfortunately for Görgey, afterhis victories Windisch-Graetz was replaced with more resolute commanders,including Baron Haynau; Italy had been suppressed; and Russia wasentering the contest. In his last speech as minister of war, Görgey still hopedto defeat Austria before the Russians became heavily involved in thecontest. 27 His strategic plans reflected this objective; however, the situationhad changed because of the overwhelming opposition against him. Unlikefor Washington's enemies, distance was not a problem for Görgey's opposition.Görgey was himself a realist who understood the situation in a cynicalmanner void of illusion. He believed Hungary could not defeat Austria andachieve independence without outside interference. Regardless of what actionGörgey pursued, he needed to destroy the Austrian army in the hope ofnegotiating the best possible settlement with the government. He had to keephis force alive as a negotiating piece. As the Austrian army withdrew fromHungary, they drew closer to their supply lines. Fresh troops and ammunitionwould become more easily accessible. Paskevich was in the process of sending13,000 Russian troops and 48 guns under General Fyodor Panyutin by rail toPozsony to support the Austrians. 28 So, for Görgey's critics, the questionremains, how far would he have to go to win acceptance of independence byAustria and the great powers, which were so vehemently opposed to any shiftin the balance of power? Görgey believed that with Buda in Hungarian hands,he could negotiate a compromise from a position of strength. Even thoughvictory over the Austrian army could have forced the negotiations he desired,in the final analysis, Görgey's conquest of Buda hurt his own plans forHungary. It was a waste of time, scarce ammunition, and valuable personnel.It would have be more practical to encircle the Austrian garrison in the castlearea and continue the pursuit of the Austrian troops to the Leithia, whileholding out an olive branch to the new emperor. Görgey's actions, no matterhow questionable, were consistent with his political objectives to preserve the1848 constitution. Such is the result when a soldier allows politics to determinehis judgement. According to Clausewitz, "War is not merely a political act, but
GÖRGEY, LEE, AND PERCEPTIONS 71also a real political instrument, a continuation of policy carried out by othermeans."Consequently, Görgey saw Hungary's salvation as being a defensive proposition,not an offensive one. To conquer Austria was out of the question. Hehad to keep Hungarian independence alive, which could be achieved only byinducing the West to intervene or by compelling Austria to abandon thecontest and seek a negotiated settlement. Kossuth had staunchly based hispolicy on the former. Görgey, a soldier, realized that without Western supportthe struggle could not be won; however, he was not prepared to risk thefortunes of Hungary on the uncertainties of Europe, but rather, to force theissue with Austria as long as Hungarian human, material, and spiritualresources could absorb the strain. Görgey believed the events of 14 Aprilnegated any assistance against Austria. 29 He also knew Austria's main problemwas tactical - they had to defeat Hungary's armed forces, subdue the willof its people, and occupy the country. Such a solution could be achieved onlyby force of arms. Görgey understood the difficulty of this undertaking andcorrectly assumed that Austria could not accomplish this objective withoutRussian support. Therefore, when Nicholas made the decision to assist Austriaand send 190,000 Russian troops into Hungary, Görgey knew that he had toforce quickly the issue with Austria before the Russian action would dictate afinal settlement.Retreat and SurrenderThe combined forces Hungary faced in the summer of 1849 numbered over360,000 soldiers. Görgey's army consisted of about 62,000 troops. Haynau'sArmy of the Danube included four army corps and a Russian infantrydivision, loaned from Paskevich, and enjoyed a total strength of 83,000 menand 330 artillery pieces. 30 On 23 June Görgey convinced ministers and seniormilitary officers to concentrate forces around Komárom in a last ditch effortto defeat the Austrians before they joined with the Russian troops enteringHungary from the north. Görgey rejected Dembinski's immediate plan to gosouth to Szeged since his army at Komárom was further from Szeged thaneither the Russians at Miskolc or the Austrians on the Czonczó line. Hebelieved Dembinski could not execute an offensive against either enemywithout immediately facing an engagement by both forces. 31 Komárom offeredthe Hungarians a base to supply repeated attacks on the Austrians as long assupplies and morale lasted. 32 Interior lines favored Görgey's Komárom plan;Komárom was closer to his supply lines. But the campaign's failure andGörgey's injury determined that the war should go to Szeged.
- Page 22 and 23: 20 MIHÁLY SZEGEDY-MASZÁK"Wozu Dic
- Page 24 and 25: 22 MIHÁLY SZEGEDY-MASZÁKand Wilme
- Page 26 and 27: 24 MIHÁLY SZEGEDY-MASZÁKbeen the
- Page 28 and 29: 26 MIHÁLY SZEGEDY-MASZÁKBolond, k
- Page 30 and 31: 28 MIHÁLY SZEGEDY-MASZÁK6. Emery
- Page 32 and 33: 30 ZSUZSANNA OZSVÁTHand breaks as
- Page 34 and 35: 32 ZSUZSANNA OZSVÁTHThe drama echo
- Page 36: 34 ZSUZSANNA OZSVÁTHcontinents at
- Page 39 and 40: FROM CAIN TO NAHUM 37which, as Csap
- Page 41 and 42: \FROM CAIN TO NAHUM 39and bears and
- Page 43 and 44: FROM CAIN TO NAHUM 41who sees what
- Page 45 and 46: FROM CAIN TO NAHUM 438. "A félelme
- Page 47 and 48: HELP ME, PASTORAL MUSE:THE VIRGELIA
- Page 49 and 50: HELP ME, PASTORAL MUSE 47compete! W
- Page 51 and 52: HELP ME, PASTORAL MUSE 49of a priva
- Page 53 and 54: HELP ME, PASTORAL MUSE 51Once again
- Page 55 and 56: HELP ME, PASTORAL MUSE 53Eighth Ecl
- Page 57 and 58: HELP ME, PASTORAL MUSE 55have that
- Page 59: HELP ME, PASTORAL MUSE 57Paul de Ma
- Page 62 and 63: 60 SAMUEL J. WILSONWe did, however,
- Page 64 and 65: 62 SAMUEL J. WILSONbeings and contr
- Page 66 and 67: 64 SAMUEL J. WILSONHungarians would
- Page 68 and 69: 66 SAMUEL J. WILSONthe Austrians. G
- Page 70 and 71: 68 SAMUEL J. WILSONnorth-eastern Zi
- Page 74 and 75: 72 SAMUEL J. WILSONGörgey's decisi
- Page 76 and 77: 74 SAMUEL J. WILSONfrom occurring,
- Page 78 and 79: 76 SAMUEL J. WILSON8. Artúr Görge
- Page 80 and 81: 78 STEVEN TÖTÖSY de ZEPETNEKtört
- Page 82 and 83: 80 STEVEN TÖTÖSY de ZEPETNEKThe c
- Page 84 and 85: 82 STEVEN TÖTÖSY de ZEPETNEKher u
- Page 86 and 87: 84 STEVEN TÖTÖSY de ZEPETNEKthe b
- Page 88 and 89: 86 STEVEN TÖTÖSY de ZEPETNEKrooti
- Page 90 and 91: 88 STEVEN TÖTÖSY de ZEPETNEKcriti
- Page 92 and 93: 90 STEVEN TÖTÖSY de ZEPETNEK'My f
- Page 94 and 95: 92 STEVEN TÖTÖSY de ZEPETNEKshe d
- Page 96 and 97: 94 STEVEN TÖTÖSY de ZEPETNEKNotes
- Page 99 and 100: BERLIN ET PARIS DE LAJOS TIHANYIVAL
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- Page 118 and 119: 116 KEVIN E. KELLYfilms Lugosi made
- Page 120 and 121: 118 KEVIN E. KELLYthe provinces, no
GÖRGEY, LEE, AND PERCEPTIONS 71also a real political instrument, a continuation of policy carried out by othermeans."Consequently, Görgey saw Hungary's salvation as being a defensive proposition,not an offensive one. To conquer Austria was out of the question. Hehad to keep Hungarian independence alive, which could be achieved only byinducing the West to intervene or by compelling Austria to abandon thecontest and seek a negotiated settlement. Kossuth had staunchly based hispolicy on the former. Görgey, a soldier, realized that without Western supportthe struggle could not be won; however, he was not prepared to risk thefortunes of Hungary on the uncertainties of Europe, but rather, to force theissue with Austria as long as Hungarian human, material, and spiritualresources could absorb the strain. Görgey believed the events of 14 Aprilnegated any assistance against Austria. 29 He also knew Austria's main problemwas tactical - they had to defeat Hungary's armed forces, subdue the willof its people, and occupy the country. Such a solution could be achieved onlyby force of arms. Görgey understood the difficulty of this undertaking andcorrectly assumed that Austria could not accomplish this objective withoutRussian support. Therefore, when Nicholas made the decision to assist Austriaand send 190,000 Russian troops into Hungary, Görgey knew that he had toforce quickly the issue with Austria before the Russian action would dictate afinal settlement.Retreat and SurrenderThe combined forces Hungary faced in the summer of 1849 numbered over360,000 soldiers. Görgey's army consisted of about 62,000 troops. Haynau'sArmy of the Danube included four army corps and a Russian infantrydivision, loaned from Paskevich, and enjoyed a total strength of 83,000 menand 330 artillery pieces. 30 On 23 June Görgey convinced ministers and seniormilitary officers to concentrate forces around Komárom in a last ditch effortto defeat the Austrians before they joined with the Russian troops enteringHungary from the north. Görgey rejected Dembinski's immediate plan to gosouth to Szeged since his army at Komárom was further from Szeged thaneither the Russians at Miskolc or the Austrians on the Czonczó line. Hebelieved Dembinski could not execute an offensive against either enemywithout immediately facing an engagement by both forces. 31 Komárom offeredthe Hungarians a base to supply repeated attacks on the Austrians as long assupplies and morale lasted. 32 Interior lines favored Görgey's Komárom plan;Komárom was closer to his supply lines. But the campaign's failure andGörgey's injury determined that the war should go to Szeged.
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