HUNGARIAN STUDIES 11. No. 1. Nemzetközi Magyar ... - EPA
HUNGARIAN STUDIES 11. No. 1. Nemzetközi Magyar ... - EPA HUNGARIAN STUDIES 11. No. 1. Nemzetközi Magyar ... - EPA
66 SAMUEL J. WILSONthe Austrians. Görgey's Vác Proclamation, which saved the Hungarian armyfrom dissolution, gave purpose to his army and its goals. The Army of theUpper Danube would not be the tool of any political party. Officers andsoldiers who had previously served in the Habsburg army and sworn an oathto the king did not betray that loyalty. The Hungarian army would fight andcontinue to exist until Austria realized the futility of the struggle and agreedto a compromise that would guarantee the constitution and the honor of thearmy. It was Görgey's responsibility to safeguard the army as a force, to useit wisely and obey only the orders of the "responsible Royal HungarianMinister of War." The Army of the Upper Danube was fighting for its countryand its king, "the constitution of Hungary was worth a sanguinary contest." 14Görgey was thereby following Washington's example.The Vác Proclamation also rescued the army from the naive and militaryunsound orders of the Hungarian government. For example, as the governmentabandoned Pest-Buda for Debrecen in early 1849, Görgey was orderedto fight a decisive battle west of Buda against the Austrians. The occupationof Buda would not only disorganize the Hungarian government, but couldserve as a visible sign to the people that its cause had perhaps failed. Görgey,who realized that such a battle would almost certainly end in a resoundingdefeat, would not risk the destruction of his army in such a frivolous manner.Such a defeat would be tantamount to the defeat of the country. Görgey,growing increasingly irritated with Kossuth and the Committee of Defense,issued the proclamation to protect the army from politicians who failed tounderstand its importance. According to Ian Roberts,Kossuth... was first and foremost a politician who found himself having to deal withmilitary affairs by virtue of the office he held. Görgey was a professional soldier of adistinctly practical nature. Soldiers needed discipline, boots, bullets and pay, rather thanhigh-flown oratory about the defence of freedom and their native land. 15The psychological significance of Pest-Buda was not lost on Görgey;however, he knew the rebellion would not end with its capture. 16 Although theAustrian commander, Windisch-Graetz, might have favored this moreJominian tactic of territorial occupation, it is essential to point out that Moscowfell to Napoleon, but his invasion of Russia ended in his defeat. Hannibalinvaded Italy and lost. Charles XII of Sweden was defeated in Russia. Theturning point of the American Civil War was at Gettysburg, the climatic defeatof Lee's last invasion of the North. Görgey knew that the Austrians could notwin unless the independent Hungarian army was destroyed; and, just asimportant, this destruction would have to be registered in Hungary.
GÖRGEY, LEE, AND PERCEPTIONS 67Görgey continued to move the Austrians farther away from their bases ofsupply and into unfamiliar and hostile territory. They would now fight on landof Görgey's choosing and on his terms. In late January 1849, Windisch-Graetz, believing the end of the struggle was at hand, requested the surrenderof Görgey's army; he was answered with a copy of the Vác Proclamation. 17The proclamation was Görgey's gauntlet. The rebellion would not end untilthe Army of the Upper Danube, like Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, eitherceased to exist or was victorious in the achievement of its goals. For Görgeyit was a struggle for survival of the nation and self-defense, not independence.It was these objectives, the political goals of the struggle, that served as thegreatest difference between the army and the politicians. But like the armies ofXerxes, Napoleon, Hannibal, Charles XII, Lee, and countless other invasionforces, Windisch-Graetz and his invading army were defeated and forced towithdraw from Hungary at a time when victory seemed close at hand.Afterward, on 12 April 1849, Windisch-Graetz was dismissed by the youngemperor Franz Joseph.Görgey's Winter Offensive and Siege of BudaIn battle tactical success will often hinge on which commander blunders theleast. Ultimately victory goes to the army making the least mistakes. Movinggreat masses of men and material against a large force, which is betterequipped and equally committed to your destruction, will undoubtedly leave agreat deal to chance. "War," according to Clausewitz, "is the province ofchance." This axiom is quite evident in Görgey's winter offensive against theAustrians following the Vác Proclamation. He was fortunate to have a staff oftalented corps commanders in whose hands he entrusted the tactical aspects ofhis battle plans. His corps commanders, in particular, János Damjanich,György Klapka, Richárd Guyon, and Lajos Aulich were all soldiers of merit.Görgey possessed sound leadership principles by having talented subordinates,leaving them alone, and interfering only when it was absolutely necessary. 18He showed great leadership under fire. ("He who, himself in danger, inspiresothers with courage, most strengthens his own.") 19 He had the ability tocounter decisions of the enemy, and like U.S. Grant, to think and react coollyunder the most difficult circumstances.The intricacies of the winter campaign are beyond the scope of this work;however, to summarize, on 5 February at Branyiszkó against the Austriansunder General Count Franz Schlick, Görgey's forces, led by Guyon, brokethrough a heavily defended mountain pass to endanger the Austrian rear andforce Schlick's retreat. This action followed a successful operation in the
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66 SAMUEL J. WILSONthe Austrians. Görgey's Vác Proclamation, which saved the Hungarian armyfrom dissolution, gave purpose to his army and its goals. The Army of theUpper Danube would not be the tool of any political party. Officers andsoldiers who had previously served in the Habsburg army and sworn an oathto the king did not betray that loyalty. The Hungarian army would fight andcontinue to exist until Austria realized the futility of the struggle and agreedto a compromise that would guarantee the constitution and the honor of thearmy. It was Görgey's responsibility to safeguard the army as a force, to useit wisely and obey only the orders of the "responsible Royal HungarianMinister of War." The Army of the Upper Danube was fighting for its countryand its king, "the constitution of Hungary was worth a sanguinary contest." 14Görgey was thereby following Washington's example.The Vác Proclamation also rescued the army from the naive and militaryunsound orders of the Hungarian government. For example, as the governmentabandoned Pest-Buda for Debrecen in early 1849, Görgey was orderedto fight a decisive battle west of Buda against the Austrians. The occupationof Buda would not only disorganize the Hungarian government, but couldserve as a visible sign to the people that its cause had perhaps failed. Görgey,who realized that such a battle would almost certainly end in a resoundingdefeat, would not risk the destruction of his army in such a frivolous manner.Such a defeat would be tantamount to the defeat of the country. Görgey,growing increasingly irritated with Kossuth and the Committee of Defense,issued the proclamation to protect the army from politicians who failed tounderstand its importance. According to Ian Roberts,Kossuth... was first and foremost a politician who found himself having to deal withmilitary affairs by virtue of the office he held. Görgey was a professional soldier of adistinctly practical nature. Soldiers needed discipline, boots, bullets and pay, rather thanhigh-flown oratory about the defence of freedom and their native land. 15The psychological significance of Pest-Buda was not lost on Görgey;however, he knew the rebellion would not end with its capture. 16 Although theAustrian commander, Windisch-Graetz, might have favored this moreJominian tactic of territorial occupation, it is essential to point out that Moscowfell to Napoleon, but his invasion of Russia ended in his defeat. Hannibalinvaded Italy and lost. Charles XII of Sweden was defeated in Russia. Theturning point of the American Civil War was at Gettysburg, the climatic defeatof Lee's last invasion of the <strong>No</strong>rth. Görgey knew that the Austrians could notwin unless the independent Hungarian army was destroyed; and, just asimportant, this destruction would have to be registered in Hungary.