© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten

And also:‘Reaffirming their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are thefoundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one hand byan effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding andobservance of the human rights upon which they depend.’196. It emerges from the above quotations that the ECHR is a codification of long-standing, deeprootedconvictions on human rights and democracy. Those convictions pre-date the theUnited Nations itself and the rights in question (including the right of access to the court)that are codified already existed at the founding of the United Nations. That is alsoexpressed, indeed, in the existence of section 29 of the Convention. The argument of theDistrict Court derived from the notion that the United Nations is older than the ECHR isconsequently erroneous. It is on the right of access to the court that the United Nations inpart derives its rationale and reason to exist.197. The District Court gives the appearance in its judgment as if older norms should havepriority over younger norms. That judgment has no foundation and is erroneous, and theDistrict Court also fails to underpin its judgment.198. The limitation that the District Court attaches to Article 6 ECHR on the basis of the fact thatthe United Nations is greater than the countries who are signatories of the ECHR is alsocontrary to the law. That limitation derives from an erroneous notion that the right isdetermined by the size of an organisation. That line of reasoning is the antithesis of theprotection of rights. The necessity for the legal protection of the citizen growsproportionately with the size of the concentration of power. It is not the power itself butthe person over whom the power is exercised who must be protected at law. That is theessence of fundamental human rights.Judgment of the ECJ regarding Kadi & Al-Barakaat© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten page 84 of 99