© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten

© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten © Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten

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137. It was known at the UN – and by the State of the Netherlands – that a genocide threatenedin Srebrenica even before Dutchbat was despatched to Srebrenica. The UN expected alreadyin 1993 that genocide would be committed in Srebrenica. The purpose of setting up theSrebrenica Safe Area was precisely the prevention of genocide. Moreover, as appears fromthe UN Report of 30 April 1993 cited above, the Bosnian Serbs had no respect at that timefor the UN and their resolutions. The UN and the State of the Netherlands accordingly knewalready in 1993 that they could not trust that the Bosnian Serbs would respect the SafeArea. They knew that the inhabitants of the Safe Area needed protection against thethreatened genocide.138. The ICJ also held in its ruling of 26 February 2007, under legal consideration 438, that theclimate of ingrained hate between the population groups was known and that:‘(…) given all the international concern about what looked likely to happen at Srebrenica,(…), it must have been clear that there was a serious risk of genocide in Srebrenica.’139. Genocide occurred in Srebrenica and the UN and the State of the Netherlands did not doenough to prevent that genocide despite the knowledge of the UN and the State of theNetherlands that such genocide threatened. As a result, the UN and the State of theNetherlands have breached international law. The United Nations and the State of theNetherlands indeed acted contrary to the principal rule of the Genocide Convention,namely, the prevention of genocide. That is an entirely different principal rule than thattaken by the District Court as a startingpoint, namely, punishment and not oneselfcommitting genocide.Enforcing the norm of the Genocide Convention140. The District Court held under legal consideration 5.19 that neither the GenocideConvention, nor any other treaty, nor customary international law or the practice of statesgave a ground for an obligation on the Netherlands Court to uphold the norms of theGenocide Convention by way of a civil action.141. The Association et al. for the moment points out that the reference by the District Court tocustomary international law or the practice of states comes across somewhat cynically.There are no precedents for the present case. A practice can be confirmed only when© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten page 62 of 99

similar cases are brought before the court. The caselaw of the European Court of HumanRights shows very positively that in relatively less serious cases of violations of humanrights, such as acting contrary to the prohibition on torture within the meaning of Article 3ECHR, enforcement of the norm by way of civil proceedings does occur. The Association etal. refers to the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights of 21 November 2001 in thecase of Al-Adsani v. the UK (no. 35763/97). The Association et al. will address in detail thatruling in the context of the following ground of appeal.In anticipation thereof it is observed that in that case the immunity of the State of Kuwaitwas upheld because a legal remedy existed in Kuwait. It was actually self-evident for theEuropean Court of Human Rights that the prohibition on torture created a directlyenforceable right for the individual citizen.Enforcement of the norm by the individal142. The District Court observed that the ICJ in its ruling of 26 February 2007 made no mentionof any obligation on States to enforce the Genocide Convention by way of a civil action.There was no reason for any such consideration by the ICJ with the result that noconclusions can be drawn therefrom for the present case. The ruling concerned in fact aclaim by one state against another.143. Some provisons in treaties give – irrespective of the wording of the provision in question –the posibility to invoke them directly. In this case it concerns the most important provisionof the most important treaty, namely, the obligation under Article 1 of the GenocideConvention to use all means to prevent genocide. The Association et al. has the right to suethe government, a state or the organization that represents all the world’s states in respectof their obligation under that Article. The obligation to prevent genocide would degenerateinto an empty shell if it were to be dependent on the benevolence of a state to implementthe obligation in question by application to the ICJ. The fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina failedto apply to the ICJ must not entail that the State of the Netherlands and the United Nationsget away with violation of the principal obligation of the Genocide Convention. It is ratherthe (groups of) citizens who rightly should be protected against genocide and not the statesor the UN or both. A personal right in the citizens ensues therefore from the GenocideConvention.© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten page 63 of 99

similar cases are brought before the court. The caselaw of the European Court of HumanRights shows very positively that in relatively less serious cases of violations of humanrights, such as acting contrary to the prohibition on torture within the meaning of Article 3ECHR, enforcement of the norm by way of civil proceedings does occur. The Association etal. refers to the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights of 21 November 2001 in thecase of Al-Adsani v. the UK (no. 35763/97). The Association et al. will address in detail thatruling in the context of the following ground of appeal.In anticipation thereof it is observed that in that case the immunity of the State of Kuwaitwas upheld because a legal remedy existed in Kuwait. It was actually self-evident for theEuropean Court of Human Rights that the prohibition on torture created a directlyenforceable right for the individual citizen.Enforcement of the norm by the individal142. The District Court observed that the ICJ in its ruling of 26 February 2007 made no mentionof any obligation on States to enforce the Genocide Convention by way of a civil action.There was no reason for any such consi<strong>der</strong>ation by the ICJ with the result that noconclusions can be drawn therefrom for the present case. The ruling concerned in fact aclaim by one state against another.143. Some provisons in treaties give – irrespective of the wording of the provision in question –the posibility to invoke them directly. In this case it concerns the most important provisionof the most important treaty, namely, the obligation un<strong>der</strong> Article 1 of the GenocideConvention to use all means to prevent genocide. The Association et al. has the right to suethe government, a state or the organization that represents all the world’s states in respectof their obligation un<strong>der</strong> that Article. The obligation to prevent genocide would degenerateinto an empty shell if it were to be dependent on the benevolence of a state to implementthe obligation in question by application to the ICJ. The fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina failedto apply to the ICJ must not entail that the State of the Netherlands and the United Nationsget away with violation of the principal obligation of the Genocide Convention. It is ratherthe (groups of) citizens who rightly should be protected against genocide and not the statesor the UN or both. A personal right in the citizens ensues therefore from the GenocideConvention.<strong>©</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> <strong>Advocaten</strong> page 63 of 99

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