© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten

© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten © Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten

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prevent the genocide. Worse still, with that the State of the Netherlands actively botchedthe little military action that was undertaken to prevent genocide. Additionally, theobserved war crimes should have been reported, which could have saved many lives. TheUnited Nations and the State of the Netherlands also took it upon themselves to play anactive role in separating the men and the women. It is here repeated that the ICJ has ruledthat for the violation of Article I of the Genocide Convention it is not relevant whether theemployment of all available measures would have prevented the genocide. The Associationet al. here also records again that numerous other violations of human rights occurred. TheAssociation et al. refers to points 412 through 417 of the originating writ of summons.134. In reviewing the question whether there was violation of Article I of the GenocideConvention it is not relevant that the allegedly culpable conduct (alternatively, theallegedly culpable omissions) has (have) occurred prior to the genocide that was committedfrom 13 July 1995. The prevention of genocide is, after all, by definition conduct that occursprior to the commission of the genocide. The ICJ in its ruling of 26 February 2007 held onthis that (see legal consideration 431):‘(…) a State can be held responsible for breaching the obligation to prevent genocide only ifgenocide was actually committed. (…) This obviously does not mean that the obligation toprevent genocide only comes into being when perpetration of genocide commences; thatwould be absurd, since the whole point of the obligation is to prevent, or attempt toprevent, the occurrence of the act. In fact, a State’s obligation to prevent, and thecorresponding duty to act, arise at the instant that the State learns of, or should normallyhave learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed. From thatmoment onwards, if the State has available to it means likely to have a deterrent effect onthose suspected of preparing genocide, or reasonably suspected of harboring specific intent(dolus specialis), it is under a duty to make such use of these means as the circumstancespermit.’135. The above ruling means that the UN and the State of the Netherlands had to employ allavailable means from the moment that they knew, or should reasonably have known thatgenocide would occur. As has been discussed above and as will be addressed again below,the UN and the State of the Netherlands were from 1993 already aware of the threatenedgenocide. Furthermore, the UN and the State of the Netherlands knew that the BosnianSerbs were continuing to attack the Safe Area and that the objective of the Bosnian Serbs© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten page 60 of 99

was the ethnic cleansing of this area. The facts and circumstances set out above that wereplayed out under the eyes of Dutchbat were an unmistakable signal of what would occur.The majority of the murders occurred in the days following the fall of the Safe Area.136. The following shows that the UN and the State of the Netherlands had specific knowledgethat genocide threatened. The UN Report of 30 April 1993 (UN, S/25700, Report of theSecurity Council established pursuant to resolution 819 (1993)) contains the following:‘(14) UNPROFOR had participated actively in the drafting and the process of convincingthe Bosnian Commander to sign the agreement (addition of the attorney: demilitarisationagreement of 18 April 1993). The alternative could have been a massacre of 25,000people.(…)(17) There is no doubt that had this agreement not been reached, most probably amassacre would have taken place, which justifies the efforts of the UNPROFORCommander.(…)(19) During the Mission’s briefing at Srebrenica, the representative of ICRC informed itthat the Serbs were not allowing surgeons to enter the city, in direct violation ofinternational humanitarian law. There were many wounded requiring surgery. The onlysurgeon in the city has not been authorized to stay by the Serbs. To impede medicalassistance is a crime of genocide. This action, together with the cutting of the watersupply and electricity, have put into effect a slow-motion process of genocide.(…)(27) (g) (…) The attitude of defiance of the Serbs towards the United Nations in general isa matter that should concern the Council. The Serbs obviously have little respect forUNPROFOR’s authority.’© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten page 61 of 99

was the ethnic cleansing of this area. The facts and circumstances set out above that wereplayed out un<strong>der</strong> the eyes of Dutchbat were an unmistakable signal of what would occur.The majority of the mur<strong>der</strong>s occurred in the days following the fall of the Safe Area.136. The following shows that the UN and the State of the Netherlands had specific knowledgethat genocide threatened. The UN Report of 30 April 1993 (UN, S/25700, Report of theSecurity Council established pursuant to resolution 819 (1993)) contains the following:‘(14) UNPROFOR had participated actively in the drafting and the process of convincingthe Bosnian Comman<strong>der</strong> to sign the agreement (addition of the attorney: demilitarisationagreement of 18 April 1993). The alternative could have been a massacre of 25,000people.(…)(17) There is no doubt that had this agreement not been reached, most probably amassacre would have taken place, which justifies the efforts of the UNPROFORComman<strong>der</strong>.(…)(19) During the Mission’s briefing at Srebrenica, the representative of ICRC informed itthat the Serbs were not allowing surgeons to enter the city, in direct violation ofinternational humanitarian law. There were many wounded requiring surgery. The onlysurgeon in the city has not been authorized to stay by the Serbs. To impede medicalassistance is a crime of genocide. This action, together with the cutting of the watersupply and electricity, have put into effect a slow-motion process of genocide.(…)(27) (g) (…) The attitude of defiance of the Serbs towards the United Nations in general isa matter that should concern the Council. The Serbs obviously have little respect forUNPROFOR’s authority.’<strong>©</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> <strong>Advocaten</strong> page 61 of 99

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