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© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten

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State immunity versus immunity of international organisations62. For a proper un<strong>der</strong>standing of the immunity of the UN the Association et al. will brieflyrepeat its viewpoint thereon. A discussion arose during the motions at first instance on theimmunity of states and international organisations. That difference of opinion wasimportant as the State of the Netherlands supported its motions by appeal to literature andcaselaw that was exclusively concerned with the immunity of states. The District Court alsorecognized (more or less) that the immunity of states differed from that of internationalorganisations. The District Court proceeded in its consi<strong>der</strong>ations from a fundamentalmisun<strong>der</strong>standing by holding that the one immunity did not go further than the other.Contrary to the situation with international organisations when a state is sued there isalways a court that has jurisdiction, namely, the court of the state that is being sued (seeC.G. van <strong>der</strong> Plas, De taak van de rechter en het IPR, Serie On<strong>der</strong>neming en Recht, Kluwer2005, page 263 et seq.). For this reason the immunity of states does indeed extend ‘ingeneral terms’ much ‘further’ than that of international organisations. The caselaw on theimmunity of states is therefore of less utility in the present proceedings. The followingserves as explanation.State immunity63. The immunity of states from jurisdiction differs from the immunity of internationalorganisations both as respects scope as basis. The immunity of states is founded on theprinciple of sovereignty, independence and equality of states and <strong>der</strong>ives from the maxim,‘par in parem non habet imperium’; among equals is no-one supreme (see for example:ECHR 21 November 2001, Al-Adsani/The United Kingdom, 35763/97, legal consi<strong>der</strong>ation 54;P.H. Kooijmans, Internationaal publiekrecht in vogelvlucht, 9 e druk, 2002, page 67). Inpractical terms this means that the court of one state cannot give a judgment in a casewhere another state is a defendant. However, this principle is no longer accepted as validlaw in the event of serious violations of human rights. The Association et al. refers to thejudgment of the Italian national courts regarding the serious violations of human rightscommitted by German military forces during the Second World War. The German State,supported in this by the Italian State, on 23 December 2008 brought a case on this issuebefore the ICJ. Both of the states involved based themselves in that case on the positionthat the Italian courts lacked jurisdiction and that the German State could be summoned<strong>©</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> <strong>Advocaten</strong> page 27 of 99

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