© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten
© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten © Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten
functional necessity. In that context the Association et al. will examine the judgment in theManderlier case. The Association et al. will also raise the issue that with reference to theliterature and the Report of the Advisory Commission on Issues arising under PublicInternational Law (CAVV) that given the functional character of the immunity of the UN theright of access to the court weighs more heavily than immunity. The basis for the immunityof the UN is Article 105 paragraph 1 of the UN Charter. That Article confines immunity towhat is necessary for the fulfilment of purposes. Immunity is thus functionally determinedand is not itself an objective. Given the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of 13February 1946, which derives from the UN Charter, the UN – to the extent that it isestablished that there exists a functional necessity for immunity – should have waived itsimmunity. The Association et al. will address further in the context of this ground of appealthat the Convention prescribes access to the court in order to be able to bring proceedingsagainst the UN (Section 29). The existence of that section demonstrates that an absoluteimmunity was never intended by the Member States and was never created. Furthermore,the substance and import of the Vienna Convention on Treaties is entirely different to thatwhich the District Court has ascribed to it. In the context of discussing that treaty theAssociation et al. will cite foreign literature on the incorrectness and injustice of anabsolute immunity. Subsequently in this ground of appeal attention will be paid to thelearned opinion of the International Court Justice (ICJ), which opinion expressly opens thepossibility not to accord immunity on the ground of ‘the most compelling reasons’. TheAssociation et al. will demonstrate that such compelling reasons exist pre-eminently in thiscase. Finally, the Association et al. will examine the fact that the District Court indicatedthat it took international practice in part as the criterion for its decision. The District Courtactually failed to understand that the practice is entirely different to its understanding ofit, even if such practice actually were to exist. Here the question can be raised whether‘the practice’ does justice to this case.61. The District Court erroneously, at least insufficiently, reviewed whether the necessity for afunctional immunity for the UN existed in this exceptional case. If and insofar as such areview was conducted the District Court erred at law regarding the functional immunity ofthe UN.© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten page 26 of 99
State immunity versus immunity of international organisations62. For a proper understanding of the immunity of the UN the Association et al. will brieflyrepeat its viewpoint thereon. A discussion arose during the motions at first instance on theimmunity of states and international organisations. That difference of opinion wasimportant as the State of the Netherlands supported its motions by appeal to literature andcaselaw that was exclusively concerned with the immunity of states. The District Court alsorecognized (more or less) that the immunity of states differed from that of internationalorganisations. The District Court proceeded in its considerations from a fundamentalmisunderstanding by holding that the one immunity did not go further than the other.Contrary to the situation with international organisations when a state is sued there isalways a court that has jurisdiction, namely, the court of the state that is being sued (seeC.G. van der Plas, De taak van de rechter en het IPR, Serie Onderneming en Recht, Kluwer2005, page 263 et seq.). For this reason the immunity of states does indeed extend ‘ingeneral terms’ much ‘further’ than that of international organisations. The caselaw on theimmunity of states is therefore of less utility in the present proceedings. The followingserves as explanation.State immunity63. The immunity of states from jurisdiction differs from the immunity of internationalorganisations both as respects scope as basis. The immunity of states is founded on theprinciple of sovereignty, independence and equality of states and derives from the maxim,‘par in parem non habet imperium’; among equals is no-one supreme (see for example:ECHR 21 November 2001, Al-Adsani/The United Kingdom, 35763/97, legal consideration 54;P.H. Kooijmans, Internationaal publiekrecht in vogelvlucht, 9 e druk, 2002, page 67). Inpractical terms this means that the court of one state cannot give a judgment in a casewhere another state is a defendant. However, this principle is no longer accepted as validlaw in the event of serious violations of human rights. The Association et al. refers to thejudgment of the Italian national courts regarding the serious violations of human rightscommitted by German military forces during the Second World War. The German State,supported in this by the Italian State, on 23 December 2008 brought a case on this issuebefore the ICJ. Both of the states involved based themselves in that case on the positionthat the Italian courts lacked jurisdiction and that the German State could be summoned© Van Diepen Van der Kroef Advocaten page 27 of 99
- Page 2: Against:1. The State of the Netherl
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functional necessity. In that context the Association et al. will examine the judgment in theMan<strong>der</strong>lier case. The Association et al. will also raise the issue that with reference to theliterature and the Report of the Advisory Commission on Issues arising un<strong>der</strong> PublicInternational Law (CAVV) that given the functional character of the immunity of the UN theright of access to the court weighs more heavily than immunity. The basis for the immunityof the UN is Article 105 paragraph 1 of the UN Charter. That Article confines immunity towhat is necessary for the fulfilment of purposes. Immunity is thus functionally determinedand is not itself an objective. Given the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of 13February 1946, which <strong>der</strong>ives from the UN Charter, the UN – to the extent that it isestablished that there exists a functional necessity for immunity – should have waived itsimmunity. The Association et al. will address further in the context of this ground of appealthat the Convention prescribes access to the court in or<strong>der</strong> to be able to bring proceedingsagainst the UN (Section 29). The existence of that section demonstrates that an absoluteimmunity was never intended by the Member States and was never created. Furthermore,the substance and import of the Vienna Convention on Treaties is entirely different to thatwhich the District Court has ascribed to it. In the context of discussing that treaty theAssociation et al. will cite foreign literature on the incorrectness and injustice of anabsolute immunity. Subsequently in this ground of appeal attention will be paid to thelearned opinion of the International Court Justice (ICJ), which opinion expressly opens thepossibility not to accord immunity on the ground of ‘the most compelling reasons’. TheAssociation et al. will demonstrate that such compelling reasons exist pre-eminently in thiscase. Finally, the Association et al. will examine the fact that the District Court indicatedthat it took international practice in part as the criterion for its decision. The District Courtactually failed to un<strong>der</strong>stand that the practice is entirely different to its un<strong>der</strong>standing ofit, even if such practice actually were to exist. Here the question can be raised whether‘the practice’ does justice to this case.61. The District Court erroneously, at least insufficiently, reviewed whether the necessity for afunctional immunity for the UN existed in this exceptional case. If and insofar as such areview was conducted the District Court erred at law regarding the functional immunity ofthe UN.<strong>©</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Diepen</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>der</strong> <strong>Kroef</strong> <strong>Advocaten</strong> page 26 of 99