September 11th: The Intelligence Angle - International Spy Museum

September 11 th :The IntelligenceAngleLessonPlansandActivities

IntroductionIn commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the September 11,2001 terrorist attacks, the International Spy Museum has createdthese lesson plans and activities to support student understandingof the role that intelligence played leading up to, during, andfollowing the events of that day. This pivotal event has greatlychanged the world in which today’s students live. Examining9/11 through the lens of intelligence provides students with acritical perspective on this historic event: the actions taken by thegovernment connected to the attacks and the consequences ofthose actions.These lesson plans and activities are designed to assist teachersin integrating new 9/11 content into the curriculum as well as toexplore the following concepts: the balance of national securityand civil liberties, the role that intelligence plays in informingpolicy decisions, and domestic legislation stemming from nationalsecurity threats.For more educator and student resources, please visit theInternational Spy Museum website at www.spymuseum.org andclick on the Educator Resources tab.

Lesson Plans and Activities9/11:The Intelligence AngleContentsLesson Plan #1: The Presidential Daily Brief Deconstructed04August 6th Presidential Daily Brief (excerpt)Diagram: The U.S. Intelligence CycleDiagram: The 16 U.S. Intelligence AgenciesFrom the National Security Archive:The President’s Daily Brief by Thomas S. BlantonExcerpts from the April 8th, 20004 Testimony of Dr. Condoleezza RiceBefore the 9/11 Commission Pertaining to the President’sDaily Brief of August 6, 2001Article: Analysis and Policy / The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949 by Jack DavisLesson Plan #2: Action / Reaction40Domestic Security Legislation ChartActivity Idea:53Intelligence Analysis: Collecting the Dots/Connecting the DotsActivity Idea:5420/20 HindsightGallup Organization Article: September 17, 2011Gallup Organization Article: September 10, 2011

Lesson Plan 1The PresidentialDaily Brief Deconstructed9/11:The Intelligence AngleBackground BriefingEach morning the President of the United States receives a top-secret documentproduced by the Director of National Intelligence called the Presidential Daily Briefor PDB. The document is intended to provide the President with new intelligencewarranting attention as well as an analysis of sensitive international situations.Production of the PDB is closely linked to that of another publication, historically calledthe National Intelligence Daily, that contains many of the same items but is distributedconsiderably more widely than the PDB. There has only been one PDB declassifiedsince the mid 1960’s and this is the August 6th, 2001 PDB—a section of which wasdeclassified as part of The 9/11 Commission Report. This activity, which is based onthis declassified section, provides students with a unique opportunity to view theintelligence put before President George W. Bush five weeks prior to the 9/11 attacks.This activity encourages to students to evaluate hypothetical Presidential actions basedon existing intelligence. Provocative actions—some of which were taken after the 9/11attacks, and some of which are illegal—are provided. The goal of this activity is tomake students aware that in this case, as in so many cases, insufficient intelligencewas available to support definitive actions that would maintain national security.ObjectivesAfter completing this lesson students will be able to:• define the function of the Presidential Daily Brief (PDB).• explain the intelligence cycle.• discuss various policy decisions that can be made as a result of collectedand analyzed intelligence.• distinguish between the intelligence provided and the policy decisions madeby the President.• describe at least one other historic case in which collected intelligence hadan impact on policy decisions.04 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Activity1. Distribute to each student for their review:a. Declassified excerpt of August 6th PDB (page 15)b. The U.S. Intelligence Cycle diagram (page 17)c. The 16 U.S. Intelligence Agencies (a/o September, 2011) diagram (page 18)2. Divide the class into four small groups.3. After they review the handouts, have each group prepare a Presidential Courseof Action Planning Worksheet (pages 07 -14). The courses of action include thefollowing options:• Do nothing—wait for more intelligence to come in.• Designate a no fly zone in New York City and Washington DC and authorize theU.S. military to shoot down airplanes in those zones.• Ground all commercial airlines until more intelligence comes in.• Secure all U.S. borders by eliminating the immigration of all Muslims and putall Muslims residing in the U.S. in internment camps.4. Have each group report out on their course of action using their Presidential Courseof Action Planning Worksheet (pages 07 -14).5. Optional: Distribute for review and discussion:a. The National Security Archive article: The Presidential Daily Brief by ThomasBlanton (page 19)b. The National Security Archive Excerpts from April 8, 2004 Testimony ofDr. Condoleezza Rice Before the 9/11 Commission Pertaining toThe President’s Daily Brief of August 6, 2001 (pages 20-26)September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 05©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

The Presidential Daily Brief DeconstructedLesson Plan 1, continuedSummative DialogueGoing through the activity and then examining the U.S. Intelligence Cycle diagramprovides students with a better understanding of the role of intelligence gathering andsubsequent analysis, and its role in policy-making by the President. It is not the roleof the intelligence community to create policy, but to inform the policymakers of the“ground truth,” the collected intelligence and its analysis. Intelligence and its analysisis a “product” that is “consumed” by policymakers. The cycle of intelligence illustratesthis process. Note that it is ongoing, as policy makers may require more intelligencecollection based on their questions about what has been provided or they may havenew questions; and the process begins again. The critical relationship between theintelligence and policymaking entities has changed over time. Into the 1970s, theintelligence community operated in an “ivory tower” producing intelligence reports thatwere not necessarily useful or wanted by policymakers. Since then the intelligencecommunity has been more directly responsive to policymaker’s need. Most expertsagree that a close working relationship between the two is beneficial as long as thepolicymakers do not in any way influence the analysis of the collected intelligence,meaning, dictate a desired outcome. See the article: Analysis and policy: The Kent-Kendall Debate of 1949 by Jack Davis on page 27 for more historical background onthis topic.06 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Presidential Course of Action Planning WorksheetGroup #1Presidential Course of Action, AUGUST 6, 2001:Do nothing – wait for more intelligence to come in.Describe how this course of action would be implemented (list the steps):Defend this course of action. In what ways does it protect the American public?What are the possible downsides of this course of action (economic, political, etc.)?September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 07©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Presidential Course of Action Planning WorksheetGroup #1, continuedConsidering the potential downsides of this action and the available intelligence at this time (August 6,2001) could the President justify this course of action?Can you think of a time in history when this course of action or a similar course of action was taken?What was that outcome?08 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Presidential Course of Action Planning WorksheetGroup #2Presidential Course of Action, AUGUST 6, 2001:Designate a no fly zone in New York City andWashington DC and authorize the U.S. military toshoot down airplanes in those zones.Describe how this course of action would be implemented (list the steps):Defend this course of action. In what ways does it protect the American public?What are the possible downsides of this course of action (economic, political, etc.)?September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 09©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Presidential Course of Action Planning WorksheetGroup #2, continuedConsidering the potential downsides of this action and the available intelligence at this time (August 6,2001) could the President justify this course of action?Can you think of a time in history when this course of action or a similar course of action was taken?What was that outcome?10 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Presidential Course of Action Planning WorksheetGroup #3Presidential Course of Action, AUGUST 6, 2001:Ground all commercial airlines until moreintelligence comes in.Describe how this course of action would be implemented (list the steps):Defend this course of action. In what ways does it protect the American public?What are the possible downsides of this course of action (economic, political, etc.)?September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 11©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Presidential Course of Action Planning WorksheetGroup #3, continuedConsidering the potential downsides of this action and the available intelligence at this time (August 6,2001) could the President justify this course of action?Can you think of a time in history when this course of action or a similar course of action was taken?What was that outcome?12 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Presidential Course of Action Planning WorksheetGroup #4Presidential Course of Action, AUGUST 6, 2001:Secure all U.S. borders by eliminating theimmigration of all Muslims and put all Muslimsresiding in the U.S. in internment camps.Describe how this course of action would be implemented (list the steps):Defend this course of action. In what ways does it protect the American public?What are the possible downsides of this course of action (economic, political, etc.)?September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 13©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Presidential Course of Action Planning WorksheetGroup #4, continuedConsidering the potential downsides of this action and the available intelligence at this time (August 6,2001) could the President justify this course of action?Can you think of a time in history when this course of action or a similar course of action was taken?What was that outcome?14 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 15©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

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Diagram: The U.S. Intelligence CycleSeptember 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 17©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Diagram: The 16 U.S. Intelligence Agencies18 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Article from the National Security ArchiveThe President’s Daily Brief by Thomas S. BlantonUpdated April 12, 2004Washington, D.C., 12 April 2004 - President Bush on Saturday, 10April 2004, became the first sitting president ever to releasepublicly even a portion of his Daily Brief from the CIA. The pageand-a-halfsection of the President’s Daily Brief from 6 August2001, headlined “Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US,” hadgenerated the most contentious questioning in last week’s testimonyby national security adviser Condoleezza Rice before the commissioninvestigating the September 11th attacks. Dr. Rice continued toinsist that the Brief did not amount to a real warning, whileseveral commissioners seemed to think otherwise.These contrasting interpretations dominated the weekend’s news.For example, President Bush commented on Sunday that the “PDB saidnothing about an attack on America. It talked about intentions,about somebody who hated America - well, we knew that. … Thequestion was, who was going to attack us, when and where, andwith what.” Meanwhile, the Sunday news analysis in The New YorkTimes began with the following summary: “In a single 17-sentencedocument, the intelligence briefing delivered to President Bushin August 2001 spells out the who, hints at the what and pointstowards the where of the terrorist attacks on New York andWashington that followed 36 days later.”The American people can decide for themselves about the warningquotient, now that the text of the Brief is public. Even with thetext, we don’t really know what the President knew and when heknew it. According to the CIA and the 9/11 commission, there were40 other mentions of Al Qaeda or Bin Laden in the President’sDaily Briefs before 9/11. Most of those presumably came duringwhat Dr. Rice called “the threat spike” of June and July 2001.The August 6 Brief came on the downside of that spike, so theother PDB reports may be more (or less) alarming. Until these arereleased - and Saturday’s release shows it can be done with minordeletions to protect sources - neither the American public nor the9/11 commission can move on to the next question: “What did thePresident do and when did he do it?” Or, perhaps most important,how do we fix our vulnerabilities, rather than just hide them?But the release of the Brief raises a number of questions notaddressed so far in the press coverage. One is the contrast betweenthe now-released text and what various White House officials saidabout it over the past two years. A second revolves around renewedclaims by the White House and the CIA that this release sets noprecedent for release of similar or future information. A thirdpoints to the larger question of whether the sustained secrecyaround this Brief really made our country more secure, or less so.September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 19©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Article: National Security ArchiveExcerpts from April 8, 2004 Testimony of Dr.Condoleezza Rice Before the 9/11 CommissionPertaining to The President’s Daily Brief ofAugust 6, 2001Commission member Richard Ben-VenisteBEN-VENISTE: I want to ask you some questions about the August 6, 2001, PDB. We had been advisedin writing by CIA on March 19, 2004, that the August 6th PDB was prepared and self-generated by a CIAemployee. Following Director Tenet’s testimony on March 26th before us, the CIA clarified its version ofevents, saying that questions by the president prompted them to prepare the August 6th PDB. Now, youhave said to us in our meeting together earlier in February that the president directed the CIA to preparethe August 6th PDB. The extraordinary high terrorist attack threat level in the summer of 2001 is welldocumented.And Richard Clarke’s testimony about the possibility of an attack against the United Stateshomeland was repeatedly discussed from May to August within the intelligence community, and that iswell-documented. You acknowledged to us in your interview of February 7, 2004, that Richard Clarke toldyou that Al Qaida cells were in the United States. Did you tell the president, at any time prior to August6th, of the existence of Al Qaida cells in the United States?RICE: First, let me just make certain...BEN-VENISTE: If you could just answer that question, because I only have a very limited...RICE: I understand, Commissioner, but it’s important...BEN-VENISTE: Did you tell the president...RICE: ... that I also address... (APPLAUSE) It’s also important that, Commissioner, that I address the otherissues that you have raised. So I will do it quickly, but if you’ll just give me a moment.BEN-VENISTE: Well, my only question to you is whether you...RICE: I understand, Commissioner, but I will...BEN-VENISTE: ... told the president.RICE: If you’ll just give me a moment, I will address fully the questions that you’ve asked. First of all, yes,the August 6th PDB was in response to questions of the president -- and that since he asked that this bedone. It was not a particular threat report. And there was historical information in there about various aspectsof Al Qaida’s operations. Dick Clarke had told me, I think in a memorandum -- I remember it as being only aline or two -- that there were Al Qaida cells in the United States. Now, the question is, what did we need to doabout that? And I also understood that that was what the FBI was doing, that the FBI was pursuing these AlQaida cells. I believe in the August 6th memorandum it says that there were 70 full field investigations underway of these cells. And so there was no recommendation that we do something about this; the FBI was pursuingit. I really don’t remember, Commissioner, whether I discussed this with the president.BEN-VENISTE: Thank you.RICE: I remember very well that the president was aware that there were issues inside the United States.He talked to people about this. But I don’t remember the Al Qaida cells as being something that we weretold we needed to do something about.20 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Article: National Security Archive, continuedExcerpts from April 8, 2004 Testimony of Dr. Condoleezza Rice Before the 9/11 CommissionPertaining to The President’s Daily Brief of August 6, 2001BEN-VENISTE: Isn’t it a fact, Dr. Rice, that the August 6th PDB warned against possible attacks in thiscountry? And I ask you whether you recall the title of that PDB?RICE: I believe the title was, Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States. Now, the ...BEN-VENISTE: Thank you.RICE: No, Mr. Ben-Veniste ...BEN-VENISTE: I will get into the ...RICE: I would like to finish my point here.BEN-VENISTE: I didn’t know there was a point.RICE: Given that - you asked me whether or not it warned of attacks.BEN-VENISTE: I asked you what the title was.RICE: You said, did it not warn of attacks. It did not warn of attacks inside the United States. It was historicalinformation based on old reporting. There was no new threat information. And it did not, in fact,warn of any coming attacks inside the United States.BEN-VENISTE: Now, you knew by August 2001 of al-Qaida involvement in the first World Trade Centerbombing, is that correct? You knew that in 1999, late ‘99, in the millennium threat period, that we hadthwarted an al-Qaida attempt to blow up Los Angeles International Airport and thwarted cells operating inBrooklyn, New York, and Boston, Massachusetts. As of the August 6th briefing, you learned that al-Qaidamembers have resided or traveled to the United States for years and maintained a support system in theUnited States. And you learned that FBI information since the 1998 blind sheik warning of hijackings tofree the blind sheik indicated a pattern of suspicious activity in the country up until August 6th consistentwith preparation for hijackings. Isn’t that so?RICE: Do you have other questions that you want me to answer as a part of the sequence?BEN-VENISTE: Well, did you not -- you have indicated here that this was some historical document. AndI am asking you whether it is not the case that you learned in the PDB memo of August 6th that the FBIwas saying that it had information suggesting that preparations -- not historically, but ongoing, along withthese numerous full field investigations against Al Qaida cells, that preparations were being made consistentwith hijackings within the United States?RICE: What the August 6th PDB said, and perhaps I should read it to you...BEN-VENISTE: We would be happy to have it declassified in full at this time, including its title. (APPLAUSE)RICE: I believe, Mr. Ben-Veniste, that you’ve had access to this PDB. But let me just...BEN-VENISTE: But we have not had it declassified so that it can be shown publicly, as you know.RICE: I believe you’ve had access to this PDB -- exceptional access. But let me address your question.BEN-VENISTE: Nor could we, prior to today, reveal the title of that PDB.September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 21©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Article: National Security Archive, continuedExcerpts from April 8, 2004 Testimony of Dr. Condoleezza Rice Before the 9/11 CommissionPertaining to The President’s Daily Brief of August 6, 2001RICE: May I address the question, sir? The fact is that this August 6th PDB was in response to thepresident’s questions about whether or not something might happen or something might be planned by AlQaida inside the United States. He asked because all of the threat reporting or the threat reporting thatwas actionable was about the threats abroad, not about the United States. This particular PDB had a longsection on what bin Laden had wanted to do -- speculative, much of it -- in ‘97, ‘98; that he had, in fact,liked the results of the 1993 bombing.RICE: It had a number of discussions of -- it had a discussion of whether or not they might use hijackingto try and free a prisoner who was being held in the United States -- Ressam. It reported that the FBI hadfull field investigations under way. And we checked on the issue of whether or not there was somethinggoing on with surveillance of buildings, and we were told, I believe, that the issue was the courthouse in whichthis might take place. Commissioner, this was not a warning. This was a historic memo -- historical memoprepared by the agency because the president was asking questions about what we knew about the inside.BEN-VENISTE: Well, if you are willing...RICE: Now, we had already taken...BEN-VENISTE: If you are willing to declassify that document, then others can make up their minds aboutit. Let me ask you a general matter, beyond the fact that this memorandum provided information, notspeculative, but based on intelligence information, that bin Laden had threatened to attack the UnitedStates and specifically Washington, D.C. There was nothing reassuring, was there, in that PDB?RICE: Certainly not. There was nothing reassuring. But I can also tell you that there was nothing in thismemo that suggested that an attack was coming on New York or Washington, D.C. There was nothing in thismemo as to time, place, how or where. This was not a threat report to the president or a threat report to me.BEN-VENISTE: We agree that there were no specifics. Let me move on, if I may.RICE: There were no specifics, and, in fact, the country had already taken steps through the FAA to warnof potential hijackings. The country had already taken steps through the FBI to task their 56 field officesto increase their activity. The country had taken the steps that it could given that there was no threatreporting about what might happen inside the United States.BEN-VENISTE: We have explored that and we will continue to with respect to the muscularity and thespecifics of those efforts. The president was in Crawford, Texas, at the time he received the PDB, you werenot with him, correct?RICE: That is correct.BEN-VENISTE: Now, was the president, in words or substance, alarmed or in any way motivated to takeany action, such as meeting with the director of the FBI, meeting with the attorney general, as a result ofreceiving the information contained in the PDB?RICE: I want to repeat that when this document was presented, it was presented as, yes, there weresome frightening things -- and by the way, I was not at Crawford, but the president and I were in contactand I might have even been, though I can’t remember, with him by video link during that time. Thepresident was told this is historical information. I’m told he was told this is historical information and therewas nothing actionable in this. The president knew that the FBI was pursuing this issue. The presidentknew that the director of central intelligence was pursuing this issue. And there was no new threatinformation in this document to pursue.22 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Article: National Security Archive, continuedExcerpts from April 8, 2004 Testimony of Dr. Condoleezza Rice Before the 9/11 CommissionPertaining to The President’s Daily Brief of August 6, 2001Commission member Robert KerreyKERREY: Actually it won’t be a question. In the spirit of further declassification, this is what the August6th memo said to the president: that the FBI indicates patterns of suspicious activity in the United Statesconsistent with preparations for hijacking. That’s the language of the memo that was briefed to thepresident on the 6th of August.RICE: And that was checked out and steps were taken through FAA circulars to warn of hijackings. Butwhen you cannot tell people where a hijacking might occur, under what circumstances -- I can tell youthat I think the best antidote to what happened in that regard would have been many years before tothink about what you could do for instance to harden cockpits. That would have made a difference. Weweren’t going to harden cockpits in the three months that we had a threat spike. The really difficult thingfor all of us, and I’m sure for those who came before us as well as for those of us who are here, is thatthe structural and systematic changes that needed to be made -- not on July 5th or not on June 25th ornot on January 1st -- those structures and those changes needed to be made a long time ago so that thecountry was in fact hardened against the kind of threat that we faced on September 11th. The problemwas that for a country that had not been attacked on its territory in a major way in almost 200 years,there were a lot of structural impediments to those kinds of attacks.RICE: Those changes should have been made over a long period of time. I fully agree with you that, inhindsight, now looking back, there are many things structurally that were out of kilter. And one reasonthat we’re here is to look at what was out of kilter structurally, to look at needed to be done, to look atwhat we already have done, and to see what more we need to do. But I think it is really quite unfair tosuggest that something that was a threat spike in June or July gave you the kind of opportunity to makethe changes in air security that could have been -- that needed to be made.Commission member Timothy RoemerROEMER: Let me ask you a question. You just said that the intelligence coming in indicated a big, big, bigthreat. Something was going to happen very soon and be potentially catastrophic. I don’t understand, giventhe big threat, why the big principals don’t get together. The principals meet 33 times in seven months,on Iraq, on the Middle East, on missile defense, China, on Russia. Not once do the principals ever sit down-- you, in your job description as the national security advisor, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense,the president of the United States -- and meet solely on terrorism to discuss in the spring and thesummer, when these threats are coming in, when you’ve known since the transition that Al Qaida cells arein the United States, when, as the PDB said on August, bin Laden determined to attack the United States.Why don’t the principals at that point say, Let’s all talk about this, let’s get the biggest people together inour government and discuss what this threat is and try to get our bureaucracies responding to it?RICE: Once again, on the August 6th memorandum to the president, this was not threat-reporting aboutwhat was about to happen. This was an analytic piece that stood back and answered questions from thepresident. But as to the principals meetings...ROEMER: It has six or seven things in it, Dr. Rice, including the Ressam case when he attacked the UnitedStates in the millennium.RICE: Yes, these are his...ROEMER: Has the FBI saying that they think that there are conditions.September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 23©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Article: National Security Archive, continuedExcerpts from April 8, 2004 Testimony of Dr. Condoleezza Rice Before the 9/11 CommissionPertaining to The President’s Daily Brief of August 6, 2001RICE: No, it does not have the FBI saying that they think that there are conditions. It has the FBI sayingthat they observed some suspicious activity. That was checked out with the FBI.ROEMER: That is equal to what might be...RICE: No.ROEMER: ... conditions for an attack.RICE: Mr. Roemer, Mr. Roemer, threat reporting...ROEMER: Would you say, Dr. Rice, that we should make that PDB a public document...RICE: Mr. Roemer...ROEMER: ... so we can have this conversation? RICE: Mr. Roemer, threat reporting is: We believe thatsomething is going to happen here and at this time, under these circumstances. This was not threatreporting.ROEMER: Well, actionable intelligence, Dr. Rice, is when you have the place, time and date. The threatreporting saying the United States is going to be attacked should trigger the principals getting together tosay we’re going to do something about this, I would think.RICE: Mr. Roemer, let’s be very clear. The PDB does not say the United States is going to be attacked. Itsays bin Laden would like to attack the United States. I don’t think you, frankly, had to have that report toknow that bin Laden would like to attack the United States.ROEMER: So why aren’t you doing something about that earlier than August 6th? (APPLAUSE) RICE: Thethreat reporting to which we could respond was in June and July about threats abroad. What we tried todo for -- just because people said you cannot rule out an attack on the United States, was to have thedomestic agencies and the FBI together to just pulse them and have them be on alert.ROEMER: I agree with that.RICE: But there was nothing that suggested there was going to be a threat...ROEMER: I agree with that.RICE: ... to the United States.ROEMER: I agree with that. So, Dr. Rice, let’s say that the FBI is the key here. You say that the FBI wastasked with trying to find out what the domestic threat was. We have done thousands of interviews hereat the 9/11 Commission. We’ve gone through literally millions of pieces of paper. To date, we have foundnobody -- nobody at the FBI who knows anything about a tasking of field offices. We have talked to thedirector at the time of the FBI during this threat period, Mr. Pickard. He says he did not tell the fieldoffices to do this. And we have talked to the special agents in charge. They don’t have any recollection ofreceiving a notice of threat. Nothing went down the chain to the FBI field offices on spiking of information,on knowledge of Al Qaida in the country, and still, the FBI doesn’t do anything. Isn’t that some of theresponsibility of the national security advisor?24 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Article: National Security Archive, continuedExcerpts from April 8, 2004 Testimony of Dr. Condoleezza Rice Before the 9/11 CommissionPertaining to The President’s Daily Brief of August 6, 2001about how the Predator has gotten hung up because the CIA doesn’t really want to fly it. And he says,if you don’t fight through this bureaucracy -- he says, at one point, They’re going to all sign on to thisNSPD because they won’t want to be associated -- they won’t want to say they don’t want to eliminatethe threat of Al Qaida. He says, But, in effect, you have to go in there and push them, because we’ll allwonder about the day when thousands of Americans and so forth and so on.So that’s what this document is. It’s not a warning document. It’s not a -- all of us had this fear. I thinkthat the chairman mentioned that I said this in an interview, that we would hope not to get to that day.But it would not be appropriate or correct to characterize what Dick wrote to me on September 4th as awarning of an impending attack. What he was doing was, I think, trying to buck me up, so that when Iwent into this principals meeting, I was sufficiently on guard against the kind of bureaucratic inertia thathe had fought all of his life.ROEMER: What is a warning, if August 6th isn’t and September 4th isn’t, to you?RICE: Well, August 6th is most certainly an historical document that says, Here’s how you might thinkabout Al Qaida. A warning is when you have something that suggests that an attack is impending. And wedid not have, on the United States, threat information that was, in any way, specific enough to suggestthat something was coming in the United States. The September 4th memo, as I’ve said to you, was awarning to me not to get dragged down by the bureaucracy, not a warning about September 11th.26 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Analysis and policyThe Kent-KendallDebate of 1949Jack Davis9/11:The Intelligence AngleSherman Kent’s Strategic Intelligence for AmericanWorld Policy, published in 1949, is probably themost influential book ever written on US intelligenceanalysis. Indeed, Kent’s carefully drafted blueprintfor meeting the challenges facing intelligence in thepostwar world has regularly been cited by defendersand critics alike of the performance of the CentralIntelligence Agency. Almost all experienced Agencyanalysts are generally familiar with Kent’s themes,though probably more from informal discussionsthan from a careful reading.One of Kent’s most finely honed doctrines addressesthe relationship between producers and consumersof intelligence analysis. Effective ties, whilemanifestly essential for the well-being ofboth groups, were difficult to achieve. Kent’srecommended fix: to warrant scholarly objectivity,provide analysts with institutional independence;to warrant relevance, urge them to strive to obtain“guidance” from policymakers. IWiIImoore Kendall’s “The Function of Intelligence,”a 1949 review of Strategic Intelligence, agreed withKent on the importance of getting right therelationship between experts and decisionmakersbut on little else. Kendall’s bold and prescientarguments deserve more attention from bothstudents and practitioners of intelligence analysis.Kendall rejected what he depicted as Kent’s ideal ofbureaucratic scholars processing information tounderstand the outside world for the benefit ofbureaucratic policy planners. The function of theintelligence as Kendall saw it was directly to help“politically responsible” leaders achieve theirforeign policy goals in large measure by identifyingthe elements of an issue that were susceptibleto US influence. In addition, Kendall observedthat if the intelligence mission were to illuminatedecisionmaking with the best expert knowledgecan provide, Kent’s aversions to taking account ofdomestic US politics and social science theory wereself-defeating. 2This article first sets out the major lines of doctrinaldisagreement between Kent and Kendall in thecontext of the late 1940’s. It then sketches theimpact of the opposing views on CIA doctrine andpractice during the ensuing 40 years. Finally, itaddresses requirements for effective producerconsumerrelations in the 1990s, a period in whichchallenges to both policymakers and analysts arelikely to increase even as resources committedto national security become scarcer. If for noother reason, doctrinal choices require thoughtfulexamination at this juncture.Kent’s PerspectiveKent, born in 1903 into a politically prominentCalifornia family, spent some 20 years before WorldWar II at Yale University, as undergraduate andgraduate student and as a faculty member. Hismajor interests were the teaching of Europeanhistory and the study of 19th-century Frenchpolitics. His world and political views then andsubsequently would characterize him as an easternestablishment liberal. A colorful one though, asindicated by the many references to his earthyvocabulary and humor. 3Kent was a 37-year-old assistant professor at Yale in1941 when he answered the call to scholars forenlistment in the national defense. He joined theResearch and Analysis Branch (R&A) in whatstarted as the Office of the Coordinator ofInformation and was transformed in 1942 intothe Office of Strategic Services. R&A was quicklydubbed the “Four-Eyes Brigade,” whose mostpowerful weapon was the index card. 4 At war’s endthough, Kent described it as an institution “of almostbewildering power, resourcefulness, and flexibility.” 5Kent was proud as well of his own wartimeachievements, especially the Herculean researcheffort in support of planning for the 1942 Alliedinvasion of North Africa. He won recognition for hisbureaucratic as well as his research skills, especiallyhis ability to manage often reluctant fellow scholarsto work as teams and to meet deadlines as well asstandards. For the North African exercise, his unitworked around the clock for several days andSeptember 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 27©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

impressed the military consumers with the wealth Kent’s Doctrine: 1949of useful information uncovered from R&A’s perch inthe Library of Congress.For his efforts, Kent was recognized as the seniorR&A division chief when, upon the abolition of OSSin 1945, the 1,500-strong research unit was movedto the State Department. He rose quickly to deputyand then acting director of the newly createdOffice of Research and Intelligence. No pride here;rather, dismay. His two bosses quit in response toState’s gutting of R&A. Kent himself resigned inmid-1946. He was unable to accept the scatteringof the research cadre to the various geographicpolicy bureaus, who went to work directly under thecommand of the assistant secretaries. 6Kent arranged for an extension of his leave ofabsence from Yale, in order not to cut loose eitherfrom the Washington scene or from his concernsabout the future of “strategic intelligence.”First, he spent a semester teaching at the newlyformed National War College. Then, with the fundsfrom a Guggenheim Fellowship and in an office atthe War College, he proceeded to draft the bookthat, as he put it, “wild horses” could not keep himfrom turning out. If he had a priority goal,it was to preserve what he saw as the rapidlyfraying bonds between first-rate scholarships andnational defense. 7Kent relied mostly on his experience as historian andanalyst, though he also read through the “infantile”student essays on intelligence at the War Collegelibrary and conducted bull sessions and exchangesof letters with an impressive array of R&A, YaleUniversity, and the War College colleagues. His thirdand final draft was completed late in 1947, at whichtime he did return to teaching history at Yale.In 1950, in the wake of Korean War emergency,Director of Central Intelligence Agency Gen. WaiterBedell Smith in effect drafted Kent back intointelligence service. Kent was named deputy andheir apparent to his old R&A boss William Langer forthe new Office of National Estimates (ONE). Kentwas recognized as one of the leading US authoritieson intelligence research. Indeed, General Smith’sdeputy, William Jackson, had lobbied to havehim named to the top ONE post.8 Kent served ashead of ONE from 1952 until his retirement fromthe agency in 1967. As with his R&A experience,he impressed his colleagues with a talent forleadership as well as scholarship. 9One reason for the continued attention by academicspecialists on intelligence to a book now over 40years old is that little else of Kent’s thoughts on thesubject is readily available. Kent made a point ofnottalking or writing publicly about the “business,”even after retirement. 10 Those, including myself,who served under Kent and have access to otherswho worked with him during his 17 years with CIAhave a handicap of their own. They have to takecare to distinguish between the Kent of the bookand the practicing Kent.In the final chapter of Strategic Intelligence, Kentcharacterized the relationship between “producersand consumers of intelligence” as “one of utmostdelicacy.” The relationship did not establish itselfbut required “a great deal of conscious effort, and islikely to disappear when that effort is relaxed.”What could be counted on to work at the desk levelbecame more problematic at higher levels. Indeed,the more “august” the issue, the less one could relyon effective ties. 11Kent provided several reasons, the most prominentbeing the fact that policy makers do not naturallytrust the quality and utility of the product ofintelligence makers, nor the latters’ readiness totake responsibility for their assessments. Kentquipped, “I will warrant that the Light Brigade’sG-2 was high on the list of survivors in thecharge at Balaclava.” What to do about it? Kent’srecommendations are colored by his view of themission of strategic intelligence as well as “byhis concern that the relationship required specialhandling. Kent believed that the function of theintelligence unit was to provide expert knowledgeof the external world, on the basis of which soundpolicy would then be made by those with expertknowledge of US politics. While the intelligence unit“wished above all else to have its findings proveuseful in the makings of decisions,” its role hadclear limits.Intelligence is not the formulator of objectives... drafter of policy ... maker of plans ... carrier outof operations. Intelligence is ancillary to these; ...it performs a service function. Its job is to see thatthe doers are generally well informed ... to standbehind them with the book open at the right page,to call their attention to the stubborn fact theymay be neglecting, and-at their request-to analyzealternative courses without indicating choice.28 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

According to Kent, policymakers are very much inneed of the intelligence unit’s service, which at onepoint he defines as knowledge about foreign countriesthat is “complete ... accurate ... deliveredon time and . . . capable of serving as a basis foraction.” 12 To be worthwhile, though, intelligence hasto provide objective scholarship. Getting too close topolicy would undercut the whole purpose of such aneffort. In this context, policy did “not necessarilymean officially accepted high United States policy.”... but something far less exalted. What Iam talking of is often expressed by the words“slant,” “line,” “position,” and “view.”Kent made much of the point that analysts hadenough difficulty avoiding unsound judgements ontough issues without worrying about whatconclusions a policymaking boss wanted to see intheir intelligence assessments.Other difficulties that would emerge if intelligenceanalysts worked directly for policy officials could befixed at least in part by good administration: thetendency of operational bosses to put analysts towork as operators, to preoccupy them with trivialquestions that precluded serious research, to permitresearch standards and coordination across regionaldesks to suffer. But in Kent’s considered judgementthe problem of the skewing of analysis to fit thewishes and fears of the bosses had no solution.Kent was well aware of the need for analysts to putsomething on the table for policymakers in additionto scholarship. Analysts, he averred, were not paidto pursue knowledge for its own sake but rather for“the practical matter of taking action.” He went onestep further: intelligence that is ignored, forwhatever reason, is “useless.” To avoid this,analysts have to bend every effort to obtainguidance from their customers. Today this is calledtasking and feedback.Intelligence cannot serve if it does not knowthe doer’s mind; it cannot serve if it has not hisconfidence; it cannot serve unless it can havethe kind of guidance any professional manmust have from his client.Kent put the challenge of getting the relationshipright into a well-known phrase: “Intelligence mustbe close enough to policy, plans, and operations tohave the greatest amount of guidance, and mustnot be so close that it loses its objectivity andintegrity of judgement.” He conceded that thedanger to the relationship of intelligence beingtoo far from policy was greater than that of beingtoo close. But he could not leave matters there,warning instead that “the absorption of intelligenceproducers by intelligence consumers may prove tooheroic a cure for both disease and patient.” Thus,Kent recommended what he called the customarycompromise, in effect the “bargain” of his book:Guarantee intelligence its administrative andsubstantive integrity by keeping it separatefrom its consumers; keep trying every knowndevice to make the users familiar with theproducers’ organization, and the producers withthe users’ organization.He ended chapter and book with still anotherexpression of concern about the “delicacy” ofthe relationship between men of study and menof action. He warned policymakers that, if theyignored the intelligence arm when its consideredjudgements disagreed with their “intuition,” theywould be turning their back “on the two instrumentsby which Western man has since Aristotle steadilyenlarged his horizon of knowledge-the instrumentsof reason and the scientific method.”Kendall’s PerspectiveKendall’s perspective on intelligence and policy ismuch more difficult to capture within the confines ofa short paper than is Kent’s. Kendall seems by farthe more complex man. Unlike Kent, he left little orno commentary on his doctrine of intelligence; andsome of his recommendations require understandingof his philosophical positions on broader matters ofpolitics, government, and the Constitution.Born in Oklahoma in 1909, Kendall was a childprodigy, who at the age of four began reading adultmaterial to his father, a blind, circuit-ridingMethodist minister. Kendall’s education andworld view had more varied stations than didKent’s. Kendall attended the Universities of Tulsa,Oklahoma, Northwestern, Illinois, and Oxford (as aRhodes Scholar). After completing all course workfor a doctorate in Romance languages, he switchedinterests and obtained his degree in politicalphilosophy. In the mid-1930’s, his ideology wasleftist, perhaps even Trotskyite. In the 1940’s, hebecame a staunchly anti-Communist conservative.At the time of his death in 1967, he wasconsidered to have been a major (to some, theSeptember 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 29©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

major) contributor to the postwar development ofAmerican conservative political philosophy. 13In 1942, Kendall was an assistant professor ofpolitical science at the University of Richmondwhen he made the move to Washington to jointhe war effort. Most of his wartime posts appearto have been as an operational official rather thanas an intelligence analyst. He served, for example,in Washington and in Bogota, Columbia, withthe Office of the Coordinator of Inter-Americanaffairs, which was engaged in propaganda andpsychological warfare. This wartime creation wasindependent of OSS, but was moved to State’sOffice of Research and Intelligence in 1945along with R&A.Kendall’s hands-on experience with intelligenceanalysis apparently was limited to a year or so.For some months in 1946, he was chief of LatinAmerican research in State’s troubled intelligenceoffice. In August 1946, Kendall moved to the newlycreated Office of Research and Evaluation (soonrenamed Reports and Estimates) of the CentralIntelligence Group (shortly thereafter, CIA). Heserved there as chief of the Latin American Branch,one of several large units of that office. By thefall of 1947, he had joined the Political ScienceDepartment of Yale University as associateprofessor, the same time that Kent had rejoinedthe History Department as full professor. 14Little information is available on Kendall’s briefexperience in intelligence analysis. Two who servedwith him during his CIA tour remember him ascontemptuous of his fellow branch chiefs and of hisstaff; ready to lecture those few he deemed capableof learning about political philosophy, effectiveargumentation, and the intelligence mission; andequally combative about bureaucratic perquisitesand substantive judgments. He was not aparticularly good “listener.” And he was seenregularly as an obstacle to “getting the job done.”If one reads backward from his subsequentendeavors-at Yale from 1947 to 1961 and as asenior editor of the National Review from 1955to 1963-one also concludes that the promotion ofteamwork and other bureaucratic values was nothis strong suit. Yale administrators saw him as adisruptive force and were happy to purchase histenure rights to have him off their campus. Thestory at National Review: Kendall was never onspeaking terms with more than one fellow staffer ata time. One observer of his operating style inconservative intellectual circles claimed Kendall waswithout peer in his speed for turning a discussioninto a shouting match. 15“Controversial,” “isolated,” a natural “aginner” areall characterizations Kendall would probably haveproudly accepted. A memorial collection of hisessays in fact was entitled Willmoore Kendall ContraMundum. 16 His brillance, according to one observerwas “his capability to think his way throughconvention and assumption finally to arrive at theirreducible and crystalline truth.” 17Back to the I 940s. The future of Americanintelligence was a frequently discussed topic inthe nations’s capital. And whatever the extentof Kendall’s direct experience, his “intellectualcharisma,” according to one observer, warrantedan audience for his views in various circles.Kendall continued working in Washington for thegovernment part-time after he took his appointmentat Yale, once again on psychological warfare. Butafter his 1949 essay, he left little evidenceof a continued interest in intelligence analysis. 18Kendall’s DoctrineKendall’s review of Strategic Intelligence praisedKent for his talent in describing the terminology andorganizational map of intelligence. But he criticizedKent’s recommendations for improving theperformance of intelligence as well as of hisunderlying “general theory” of intelligence.Apparently, Kendall was at least as alarmed as Kentover the postwar shortfalls of American intelligence,and he was much less willing to accept existing(“official Washington”) compromises based onexperience and expediency. He wished Kent wouldhave carried his guarded criticisms about thedeclining quality of personnel, the misdirection ofclandestine collection, the excessive concern withsecurity to their logical ends, so that the readermight see the “intelligence arrangements ... [Kent]would set up if all the resistances were removed.”As the book was written, Kendall concluded that:... if all of Mr. Kent’s reproofs were actedupon, and all his proposals adopted, the resultwould be an improvement in United Statesintelligence operations. But the improvementwould, like the infant mentioned in Marx’sfamous footnote, be very small. 1930 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Kendall charged Kent with a misguided view of thefunction of intelligence, in the first instance becauseof a preoccupation with an “essentially wartimeconception” of the analysts’ role. Excessiveconcentration on building knowledge about currentand potential enemy countries diverts attentionfrom support for “the big job-the carving out ofUnited States destiny in the world as a whole.”Kendall also criticized Kent (and through himprevailing practice) for a “crassly empiricalconception of the research process,” one favored byhistorians. Kendall calls instead for:... an intelligence operation built upon aconception of the research process in the socialsciences that assigns due weight to “theory” as itis understood in economics and sociology and,increasingly one hopes, in politics ...Throwing in .as well the charge of an excessivelybureaucratic concept of how the US Governmentshould work, Kendall would free intelligence officersfrom “the tidal wave of documents” Kent wouldhave them process. Kendall would recruit a“considerable percentage” of the intelligenceunit “precisely for its theoretical training andaccomplishments ... and enable them to workunder conditions calculated to encourage thought”(emphasis in the original). He would supply theanalysts, via telephone to the field, with “thedata that really matter,” information on currentlydeveloping situations, rather than with “out-of-date”traffic and documents.Kendall’s major salvos against Kent concern “therelation of intelligence to policy in a democraticsociety,” a matter of vital importance “since it isAmerican policy on which the future of the freeworld seems to depend.” He agreed with Kent onthe need for “guidance” from policymakers to getthe intelligence job done, and on the absence ofsuch guidance “as regards the great decisions aboutforeign policy.” He chides Kent for not facing up tothe danger to the nation from such an alarmingstate of affairs.More specifically, Kendall charges Kent (andthe reigning leaders of intelligence) with a“compulsive preoccupation with prediction(emphasis in the original), with elimination of‘surprise’ from foreign affairs.”The shadow of Pearl Harbor is projected into themists of Bogota, and intelligence looksshamefaced over its failure to tell Secretary [ofState] Marshall the day and hour at which arevolution will break out in Colombia. The courseof events is conceived not as something you tryto influence but as a tape all printed up inside amachine; and the job of intelligence is to tell theplanners how it reads.Kendall sees the intelligence function as helping thepolicymakers “influence” the course of events byhelping them understand the operative factors onwhich the US can have an impact. His most specificlanguage appears in a footnote which starts withexamples of “absolute” (and thus inappropriate)predictions:” ‘General DeGaulle will come to powerthis day six months’; or ‘Japan will attack PearlHarbor on the x-day at y-hour.’ “ His example of a“contingent” or appropriate prediction:“The following factors, which can be influencedin such and such a fashion by action fromoutside, will determine whether, and if so, when,General DeGaulle will come to power.”Kendall had two additional criticisms of what heconsidered Kent’s flawed theory of producerconsumerrelations. He sees Kent’s endorsementof the traditional separations of intelligence fromdomestic affairs as self-defeating, if the goal of theintelligence unit is to bring to bear the knowledgeon which foreign policy decisions are to be made.According to Kendall, Kent’s definition of mission:... puts [foreign affairs} in the hands of a distinctgroup of officials whose “research” muststop short at the 3-mile limit even when thethread they are following runs right across it,and yet which tells itself it is using the scientificmethod. (This ends up with intelligence reportsthat never, never take cognizance of UnitedStates policies alternative to the ones actualin effect, such problems being “domesticmatters.”) 20Finally, he charged that Kent, yet again endorsingcurrent practices, would have the intelligence unitlaboring for a mid- rather than top-level audience.Kendall rejected the intelligence function asresearch assistant to bureaucratic “policy planners,”such as George Kennan at the State Department.September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 31©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

The issue here is fundamental: if you conceivethe intelligence function [as Kent does], youare excluding from its purview what this writerwould call its most crucial aspect-i.e., thatwhich concerns the communications to thepolitically responsible laymen of the knowledgewhich, to use Mr. [Walter] Lippmann’s happyphrase, determines the “pictures” they have intheir heads of the world to which their decisionsrelate. 21Was There a Debate?I have found insufficient evidence to conclude that aKent-Kendall debate took place in the late 1940—some kind of doctrinal shootout between championsof the detached and close-support approachesto the producer-consumer relationship. The twodid exchange views at least from time to time inWashington and in New Haven. In the preface tothe 1949 edition of Strategic Intelligence, Kentthanks Kendall and three others “for readings of themanuscript and many kinds of advice.” The Samepreface, though, also expresses obligations to some30 additional “friends, associates, and disputants.” 22Apparently, Kent did not think Kendall’s doctrinalrebuke worth taking into account either in his finaldraft for the book or in his subsequent writings onintelligence. 23The latter issue was not entirely ignored. 25 Kent’sdeliberate argument in Strategic Intelligencetook aim at those in the State Department andpresumably elsewhere in Washington who saw nogreat value in an independent intelligence unit. Hisdoctrinal standards (administrative independenceand scholarly objectivity balanced by vigorouspursuit of guidance), if not the “official Washington”view as Kendall charged, probably seemed in theball park to most discussants. Indeed, supportersof a strong central intelligence entity had a motiveto play down, at least in public discussion, theinfluence of intelligence on policy: to ward offcritics’ charges that such an organization wouldbecome too powerful and thereby threatenAmerican democracy.What of Kendall’s doctrines? Some discussants, asindicated, probably thought the views espoused byKent went too far in attempting to insulateintelligence practitioners from their policycounterparts. But did many stand with Kendall? Inother words, did he too represent a major party tothe debate, a large or at least respected faction?Or, as so often in his later career, was Kendall allbut outside the contemporary lines of argument, acompulsive critic of conventional wisdom striving tohave others see the issue as he saw it in his mind’seye? I believe the latter was the case.Whether or not the two debated much with eachother, the future of American intelligence was amatter for frequent discussion in informed andinfluential circles during the early postwar years.First, a Central Intelligence Agency was proposed,opposed, blessed, and staffed. In addition to WhiteHouse plans and disposition, Congressionalhearings, and continuous conflict amongbureaucrats representing various intelligenceorganizations, discussion was fueled by severalmajor investigations of intelligence organization andperformance (the so-called Eberstadt, Lovett, andDulles-Jackson-Correa reports).Most of the controversy, though, concerned whatkind of central intelligence entity to constructand its relations with departmental intelligenceorganizations. The investigations, the recentlydeclassified official CIA histories of the period,and-excepting Kendall-the reviews of StrategicIntelligence spend little or no time on policyrelations per se. 24After all, Kendall was calling for intelligenceprofessionals to step over their own shadowinterms of writing directly to the perspective ofelected officials, taking account of domestic politicsas well as policy prerogatives, and shedding suchtraditional preoccupations as staying on top ofthe traffic and investing in empirical researchon potential enemy countries. At least somecontemporary observers, probably including Kent,thought Kendall’s juggling of the intelligence andpolicy roles to be “irresponsible.” 26Kendall’s apparent recommendation that theintelligence unit serve the policymaking needsof congressional leaders is one indication ofhow far his views were from the mainstream in1949. Kendall was an antagonist of the “imperialpresidency” and an advocate instead of rule by“politically responsible laymen” in Congress.Judging by the hard edge of mutual criticism, Kentand Kendall probably saw little that wascomplementary in their concepts about the functionof intelligence; that is a belief that the national32 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

interest would benefit from both a detached anda close-support service, performed at differentlevels of the intelligence unit or under differingcircumstances. This might make sense today,but in the context of 1949 the two seemed tobe describing two separate functions. Kent’sintelligence unit was to focus on “roIling back theinventory of ignorance” about an uncertainpostwar world, 27 so that policy units would beeffectively served when the need arose. His goalwas to have the nation’s best scholars make acareer of being intelligence professionals, muchthe way in preceding generations they made theircareers as part of the professoriate.Kendall, in contrast, was indelibly antibureaucraticconcerning both government and university. He didnot believe “guidance” would come frompolicymakers, unless analysts put more on thetable than Kent would have them commit. Thus,Kendall’s intelligence unit was focused as much onoperational “solutions” as on problems overseas.His discription of the intelligence function-wisemen who are part of the political and policymakingprocesses-sounds much like the role played in the1940s by the “policy planners” he scorned. Perhapseven closer models to much of what Kendall hadin mind are the regional and functional directors ofthe National Security Council staff as that institutiondeveloped in subsquent decades.Four Decades of Doctrine and PracticeIn my view, which is marked by years of laborwithin an “intelligence unit,” the untidiness ofpractice is seen regularly to obscure the clarityof doctrines on producer-consumer relations.Leadership’s attempts to set a standard bypronouncement, incentive, and example routinelyevoke working-level pleadings on why said standardcould not work on this subject, at this time, withthis analyst, for this consumer. The history ofproducer-consumer relations demands andis worthy of book-length treatment, to determinewhat actually has worked, what has not, and why.Here only one point is developed: If on nothingelse, Kent cannot be faulted for saying “a great dealof conscious effort” is required to extract the fullpotential of the producer-consumer relationship.Over the years, diversity in practice on the part ofCIA analytic units has been propelled by a parade ofdiverse personalities, opportunities, and obstacles.Thus, any attempt to characterize a decade isimmediately put at risk to a large number ofexceptions. That said, one can make the case thatKent’s doctrine as projected in Strategic Intelligencehad considerable currency in practice during the 1950s.First, President Eisenhower’s administrative style fornational security issues-regularly planned NSCmeetings to discuss if not to decide policy-providedan orderly place for the scholarship of intelligence.Because National Intelligence Esitmates wereregularly included or taken account of in briefingbooks for meetings over which the President was topreside, policymaking officials had a stake in beinginformed on, and in trying to inform intelligencejudgments. Second, both the intelligence and policycommunities were staffed at high levels by peoplewho regularly sought and gave “guidance.” Theclose ties between DCI and Secretary of StatefirstGenerals Smith and Marshall and the brothersDulles-are well known. But there were othervaluable connections. For example, during part ofthe decade, CIA’s Deputy Director for Intelligenceand State’s director of the Policy Planning Staff, whowere former collegues as Harvard law students,drove to and from work together. 28During the 1960s, ready made opportunities forguidance were reduced, as President Kennedy’smore ad hoc operating style frequently left theintelligence analysts a day late and a dollar short.Ray Cline, who served with ONE during the 1950sand as CIA’s Deputy Director for Intelligence duringthe 1960s, used a sports metaphor to contrast theperiods. Under Eisenhower, the making of policywas like a football game, with a play for intelligenceanalysts called in each huddle. Under Kennedy,it was like a basketball game with the playersin constant motion. 29 The tendency to bypassintelligence judgments accelerated sharply in the1970s, as a result of the antagonisms toward CIAanalysis on the part of President Nixon and NationalSecurity Adviser Kissinger. Even when Kissingerbecame Secretary of State, his low regard foranalysts continued to extend to State Departmentintelligence as well as CIA. 30Removal of CIA quarters, in the early 1960s, from acentral location in the District of Columbia to amuch less aaccessible location in suburban Virginiaadded psychological as well as social distancebetween intelligence and policy professionals.As the analytic cadre at CIA became moresubstantively specialized, careerist, andSeptember 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 33©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

ureaucratic during the 1960s and 1970s, it alsobecame more introverted and self-satisfied. Thus,as a rule the absence of guidance awas not viewedas an insuperable obstacle by analysts, who thoughtthat the quality and integrity of their assessmentswould be sufficient to command the attention of thepolicy community.Kent himself during the latter years of his service(until 1967) and in his lectures on intelligencein the ensuing decade seemed to place heavieremphasis on independence of judgment and less onseeking guidance. 31 Some of his statements indicatea fear that extensive contact with policy officials,even with institutional independence, could corruptthe analytic process. He warned one colleague that“analysts and estimators who go downtown willbecome policy advocates and begin to serve powerrather than truth.” 32Kent was resisted by other Agency leaders and bymembers of his ONE staff in his retreat from hisown prior insistence on the importance of guidance.This was undertaken apparently without directknowledge of Kendall’s views. The Ray Cline storywas part of his effort to increase emphasis onintelligence memorandums at the exposure ofKent’s National Intelligence Estimates, on thegrounds that the former would more effectivelymeet the consumers’ needs. Chester Cooper, Cline’sappointment to the new position of AssociateDeputy Director for Intelligence for Policy Support,also tried to wrest the doctrinal banner from Kentby emphasizing the importance of staying in closetouch with the policy world. 33 And a number ofanalytic units and individual analysts, largelyinnocent of the doctrinal dispute, went abouttheir business trying to maximize their service toconsumers of intelligence by seeking taskingand feedback.I believe, though, that most CIA analysts andmanagers during the 1960s amd 1970s identifiedwith Kent’s fear of corruption of objectivity andhis aversion to close ties to policy officials. Kent’sfinal published words on the delicate relationshipspeak loudly of independence and say nothing ofseeking guidance.I suppose that if we in intelligence were one daygiven three wishes, they would be to knoweverything, to be believed when we spoke, andin such a way to exercise an influence to thegood in the matter of policy. But absent theGood Fairy, we sometimes get the order of ourunarticulated wishes mixed. Often we feel thedesire to influence policy and perhaps just stopwishing here. This is too bad, because to wishsimply for influence can, and upon occasiondoes, get intelligence to the place where itcan have no influence whatever. By striving toohard in this direction intelligence may come toseem just another policy voice, and an unwantedone at that.On the other hand, if intelligence strives foromniscience and strives to be believed, givinga third place to influence, serendipity may takeover. Unselfconscious in’telligence work, evenin the speculative and highly competitive areaof estimates, may prove (in fact, has providedmany times) a key determinant in policydecision. 34With one final notice that characterizations bydecades are an author’s convenience, the 1980ssaw a resurgence of emphasis, in both Agencydoctrine and practice, on the obligation ofanalysts to see that their work in fact was usefulto policymakers. For one thing, more and moremanagers and analysts came to take seriously thecriticism of CIA analysis from vocal policymakersand to grasp the limitations of the “to whom it mayconcern” approach to the relationship that wasroutinely employed in the previous period. 35More important, Robert M. Gates, as DeputyDirector for Intelligence from 1982 to 1986, pusheda new doctrinal line that in effect reflected Kent’s1949 emphasis on seeking guidance as well asmajor elements of the activism recommended byKendall. Gate’s views on what kinds of analysiswould be appreciated rather than scorned bypolicymakers were developed during his serviceon the National Security Council staff during the1970’s. He observed that CIA analysts knew howevery government in the world worked-except theirown. At a minimum, he wanted every intelligenceassessment to make explicit the implications for USpolicy of its key judgments. Better yet, he wantedeach assessment to highlight some opportunityor threat that the targeted policy audience faced.At one point, he echoed Kent’s 1949 dictum thatanalysts could not earn their pay if they were notthroughly familiar with the world of policy makers.In Gates’s words:34 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Unless intelligence officers are down in thetrenches with the policymakers, understand theissues, and know what US objectives are, howthe process works, and who the people are,they cannot possibly provide either relevant ortimely intelligence that will contribute to betterinformed decisions. 36Gates, even though supported by DCI WilliamCasey, met resistance at both the practical anddoctrinal levels. Changes in practice were slow incoming, largely because many analysts preferredto continue doing what they were trained for andaccustomed to doing. But doctrinal considerationswere also brought to bear. I teach a coursecommissioned by Casey and Gates on intelligencesuccesses and failures. J7 During the mid-1980’s,the students, experienced CIA analysts and firstlinesupervisors, regularly raised the name ofSherman Kent to ward off Gates’s efforts to closetheir distance from the policy world.Resistance notwithstanding, bureaucraticallyimpressive changes have taken place in CIAanalytic practice in the past 10 years-toward bothKent’s vigorous pursuit of guidance and Kendall’smore activist policy-supported standard. Thenumber of informal “typescript” memorandumswritten at the request of policy officials or tosatisfy their specifically targeted intelligence needshas grown sharply. Oral briefings and especiallyinformal exchanges with individual policy officialshave also grown apace. The establishment of CIAcenters for counterterrorism and counternarcoticsthat combine analysts with collectors andoperational officers also serves to increase theties between producer and consumer. At least onesenior policy official gives CIA analystshigh marks for their enterprise and substantivecompetence in supporting policymaking during1989-90. (Though he also notes that he madea considerable effort to establish effective,professional relations.) 38 Finally, President Bush’sreadiness to ask questions of his former Agencyprovides, at least temporarily, guidance of thehighest order.Purists who will settle for nothing less than seeingKendall’s view’s on close policy support become thedominant CIA doctrine will still find much to criticizeon that score. The change has been from a weakto a substantial, but by no means an all-out, effortto make intelligence assessments more “userfriendly.” More specially, Kendall’s recommendedapproach of pointing out the aspects of externalsituations that the US can influence is not broadlyapplied. The final issue for this article is the matterof what additional changes in the CIA’s practicesregarding relations with policy makers are needed tomeet the challenges of the 1990s.Producer-Consumer Relations in the 1990sCurrently, all aspects of US national securityorganization, priorities, and funding have comeunder uncommon scrutiny. The new decade alreadybears witness to the fact that external challenges toUS well-being, while not as awesome as during theheight of the Cold War, will be more numerous,more diverse, more nettlesome. And budgetaryproblems that will have an impact on nationalsecurity resources sooner rather than later beg formore efficient use of intelligence expertise on foreigncountries and global problems.The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, inFebruary 1991, launched a major review of themissions and functions of US intelligence agencies.The newly appointed chairman of the intelligencecommittee in the House of Representatives has alsoshown interest in reassessing practices and priorities. 39I trust these and any other examinations will give dueimportance to producer-consumer relations. For thosewho would address the issue, I would like to table fiverecommendations for consideration.First, pay attention to the latter-day evocation ofKendall’s doctrine, as espoused by Roy Godson, theCoordinator of the Consortium for the Study ofIntelligence. Every intelligence manager and analystshould understand why “opportunities-orientedanalysis” appeals to those with experience on thestaffs of top-level decision makers. Most simply put,assessments that address the factors that the UScan influence to reduce threats to and enhanceopportunities for our national interests providebesieged policy officers with the actionable insightsthey need to complete their arduous daily rounds.And I can understand the latters’ irritation whenthe intelligence product is restricted solely todescriptions of the events and trends with whichthey must contend. 40 Intelligence analysts shouldbe trained to deploy their expertise in an variety ofmore “user friendly” yet professional ways. I haveargued elsewhere that the costs of such training willbe considerable; some form of jump-start effort iscalIed for that includes experienced as well as newanalysts. 41September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 35©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Second, do not forget the Kent of the 1949 book. Ifintelligence analysts were made mere extensions ofthe various policymaking staffs, the nation wouldlose some important advantages it has heavilyinvested in over the past half-century:• Cadres with the time and incentive to developin-depth understanding of issues which suddenlybecome important, such as ethnic groups inthe USSR and in the Persian Gulf, and who arecommitted to calling attention to “the stubbornfact” that could complicate policy initiatives.• Members of the national security team whoseprimary interest is how foreign governmentswork, even as they mightily seek guidance onhelping the US Government to work better.• An intelligence unit that can provide a level playingfield for the many policymaking contenders forinfluence on the President’s decisions.And one more thing that Kent did not pay muchattention to: an intelligence unit with sufficientindependence of the administration’s policymakingteams to command the respect and trust ofCongress.Third, recognize that the doctrines of Kent andKendall are not mutually exclusive. A growingnumber of intelligence veterans believe thatanalysts and their managers can maintain theirbasic identities as men and women of studywhile playing cameo roles in direct support of thepolicymaking process. For example, a time-honoredtradition allows intelligence analysts to be secondedto a policymaking unit for a tour of a year or two,during which time they carry out the normal dutiesof that unit and, incidentally, learn much about itsrequirements for intelligence support. When thenational interest requires and the benefits exceedthe risks, why cannot an intelligence professionaltake a one-week or one-day tour to bring expertisemore immediately to the task of drafting orimplementing policy? Such initiatives require theunderstanding and support of both intelligenceand policy leaders so that the analyst’spolicymaking activities are not paraded asintelligence assessments.program of changed priorities that does nottake account of the need to encourage servingprofessionals to accept new ways will be a longtime in paying off. As indicated above, enhancedand improved training is an essential ingredient foreffective. change of organizational norms. Top-downmanagement, rather than analyst coverage of therisks of innovation in producer-consumer relationsand explicit top-level recognition of achievement,say in employing new art forms, will also speed thespread of change through the ranks.Lastly, because policymakers ultimately determinethe relevance of analysts, get the consumers ofintelligence to identify their priority needs as clearlyas possible. I expect in a period of diminishingresources at least some policymaking units willpress upon intelligence units for all kinds of timeconsumingsupport previously provided by in-housestaffs. Other units will likely prefer to criticizeintelligence’s shortcoming rather than to take stepsneeded to encourage cooperation.While the intelligence unit has to take the majorshare of responsibility for improving relationships;large steps forward also require that policymakingunits take seriously any efforts to redraw the linesof engagement. This really has to start with clearand persistent signals at the level of the Office ofthe President. Indeed, formal training in making therelationship work would suit policymakers as well asintelligence makers.NOTES1.2.Strategic Intelligence was published in 1949 andreprinted in 1951 and 1965. Except for minoradjustments for two footnotes added in 1951, thepage content of the text is identical in all editions.A second substantive preface was added in1965. The book also was published in severalpaperback and foreign language editions.Kendall’s review appeared in the then new journalWorld Politics (Vol. I, No.4, July 1949). Thejournal was published by the Institute ofInternational Studies, then located at YaleUniversity, where both Kent and Kendall servedon the faculty.Fourth, promote enhanced analyst utility to thepolicymaking process and eliminate wasted effortsin all corners, but do not underestimate the tenacityand cleverness of bureaucracies under siege. Any36 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

3.4.5.6.7.8.The most complete source on Kent’s life andcareer is contained in the transcripts of a dictateddraft memoir, executed in the I 970s and availablein the Sherman Kent Papers at the Yale UniversityLibrary. The two most informative publishedaccounts are Harold P. Ford, “A Tribute toSherman Kent.” Studies in Intelligence (Winter1958), pp. 1-8; and Robin Winks, Cloak & Gown:Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-61 (1987),especially pp. 82-96, 449-450.In today’s terms, OSS would be an “agency,”and the R&A Branch would be equivalent to an“office,” The constituent units of R&A were“divisions,” probably what they would be calledtoday. Kent’s version of his R&A service isfound in Kent Papers, Series II, Tapes 4-7. Seealso Winks, pp. 62-115.Kent to Harold Nicholson, 31 December 1946,Kent Papers, Box 5, 112.Kent’s strong feelings about the experience atState are recorded in Kent Papers, Series II,Tapes 7-8; and in “How Effective Is OurIntelligence?” an article published in TheReporter, Vol. 3, No.6, 12 September 1950), pp ..17-19, in which Kent avers that R&A was “notdemobilized but demolished” by the old hands atState.Kent’s brief depiction of his work on the book isfound in Kent Papers, Series II, Tape 8, pp.18-19 and Tape 9, pp. 8-9:Jackson had served along with Allen Dulles ona group commissioned by the National SecurityCouncil to review CIA practices in 1948, atwhich time he had access to part of Kent’s draftmanuscript. (William Darling, The DCIHistorical Series: The Central Intelligence Agency: AnInstrument of Government, to 1950,written in 1953, declassified 1989, p. 54).Jackson met Kent in 1949, in conjunction withwriting a favorable review of his “very remark-ablebook.” (The New York Times Book Review 1 May1949, pp. 4, 20). Some accounts haveKent seeking to return to intelligence work, butKent’s own account indicates his return 1950 was atGeneral Smith’s insistence (Kent Papers, Series II,Tapes 10 and 13).9.10.11.Ford, pp. 1-8.Thomas Powers reports that Kent was one of onlythree CIA veterans who refused to be interviewed inconnection with his The Man Who Kept the Secrets:Richard Helms and the CIA (1979), p. xi, 312.Unless otherwise indicated, all citations for thissection are from Strategic Intelligence, pp. 180-206.12. Ibid., p. 5.13.14.15.George H. Nash, The Conservative IntellectualMovement in America Since 1945 (1976), pp.227-248,402,410, provides informative coverageof Kendall’s early life and his subsequent politicalwritings, but almost no coverage of his intelligenceperiod in the 1940s.I am indebted to Ambassador Charles Lichtenstein,who met Kendall as a student at Yale and remaineda colleague until Kendall’s death in 1967, forinformation on the 1941-46 period (interviews, 9and 19 November 1990). See also the entry underKendall in the 1961 American Political ScienceAssociation Biographical Dictionary, p. 131.Interviews with Gen.(R.) William Tidwell and RussellJack Smith, May 1991. Tidwell was Kendall’s deputyin the Latin America branch. Smith was deputy chiefof the current intelligence staff. Without namingKendall, Smith describes his perceived limitationsin The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades With theAgency (1989), pp. 31-33.16. Nash, pp. 230, 247, 403-404.17.18.Edited by Nellie D. Kendall (1971). The introductorychapter by Jeffrey Hart, “Willmoore Kendall:American,” is an informative short essay on Kendall’spersona and philosophy. The quotation is fromIbid., p. 9.Lichtenstein interview, 19 November 1900;interview with Howard Penniman, 5 February1991. Penniman was a colleague of Kendall’sstarting in the late 1930’s. Neither man couldrecall Kendall mentioning his views on intelligence.19. All citations are from World Politics, Vol. I,No.4 (July 1949), pp. 542-552.September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 37©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

20. Emphasis in the original.21. Emphasis in the original.22. Strategic Intelligence, 1949 edition, p. x.23.24.25.26.27.28.The Kent Papers show no major changes in thethree drafts of the chapter on producer-consumerrelations. Kent kept a torn-out copy of the WorldPolitics review, on which he mocked Kendall’sreference (p. 547) to his experience as anintelligence “official.”The Darling volume (note 8) contains much usefuland interesting information. The first volume ofLudwell Lee Montague’s five-volume history of theBedell Smith period (The DCI Historical Series:Gen Walter Bedell Smith As Director of CentralIntelligence, October 1950-February 1953: Volume I,The Essential Background, written in 1971, approvedfor release, 1990) is easier to read for broad trendsand probably more reliable.William Langer’s review of Kent’s book, Knowledgefor Security, Yale Review, Winter 1950, p. 366, refersto “the relationship of gence work to policy-making”and other aspects of the intelligence task as “still aburning issue in Washington that deserves deep andprolonged thought.” The Eberstadt and Dulles reportsrecommended that analyst-generated reports bereplaced with reports dedicated to the requirementsof policy officials (Darling, pp. 101-102).Ambassador Lichtenstein (interview, 19 November1990) recalls characterizing Kendall’s views as“irresponsible,” in a discussion with Kent during theearly 1950s.The phrase comes from Edward Proctor, as acharacterization of what attracted him and otherscholars to CIA in the early 1950s. Proctor laterbecame Deputy Director for Intelligence. Interview,October 1988.Robert R. Bowie, “Analysis of our Policy Machine,” TheNew York Times Magazine, 9 March 1958, pp. 16,68-71. Interview with Bowie, January 1991. ChesterL. Cooper, “The CIA and Decision-Making,” ForeignAffairs, January 1972 (50:2), pp. 223-236. interviewwith Cooper, 5 March 1991.29.30.31.Cline’s remarks were delivered at a staff meeting in1963 attended by the author. Cline remembers tryingto make the point, but not the metaphor. Interview,December 1989.Ray S. Cline, “Policy Without Intelligence,” ForeignPolicy, Winter 1974-75, pp. 121-135,takes Kissinger to task for ignoring intelligenceassessments. Cline had recently resigned fromhis position as director of State’s intelligencebureau.Recalling practices in ONE in his draft memoirs(Series II, Tape 12, p. I.), Kent seemed proudof the fact that he never bothered to know thepositions of key policymakers on the issues underassessment in National Intelligence Estimates.32. Ford, p. 8, and interview, January 1991.33.34.35.36.Cooper, 234-236. Interview, 5 March 1991. Cooperhad been Kent’s Deputy Director in ONE in 1962, andshifted to working as Cline’s deputy in good measurebecause of disagreement with Kent on the issue ofproducer-consumer relations.Foreign Service Journal, April 1969. The articlewas adapted by Kent from his presentation beforean Intelligence Methods Conference in London inSeptember 1966. Kent’s subheading for the twoparagraphs was “Truth Before Power.”Robert M. Gates, “An Opportunity Unfulfilled:The Use and Perception of Intelligence at theWhite House,” Washington Quarterly, Winter 1989,starts with the citiations of high-level displeasurewith intelligence analysis. The article was firstpublished in 1980, in a classified version, in Studiesin Intelligence, a quarterly CIA journal founded bySherman Kent. On increased self-criticism, see alsoL. Keith Gardiner, “Dealing with Intelligence-PolicyDisconnects,” Studies in Intelligence, Summer 1989.Roy Godson, Editor, Intelligence Requirementsfor the 1990s: Collection, Analysis,Counterintelligence, Covert Action (1989),p.111. See also, Robert Gates, “CIA and theMaking of American Foreign Policy,” ForeignAffairs, Winter, 1987/88.37. Letter from Director, Public Affairs, CIA, ForeignPolicy, Spring 1985, p. 171.38 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

38.39.Ambassador Robert Blackwill, then a SeniorDirector of the National Security Council staff, inremarks at Harvard University, March 1990.The Washington Post, 6 February 1991, p. A-17;The New York Times, 8 February 1991, p. A-18.40. Godson, pp. 4-7.41. Jack Davis, review of Godson, IntelligenceRequirements for the 1990s, in Studies inIntelligence, Winter 1989, pp. 69-71.September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 39©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Lesson Plan 2Action/Reaction9/11:The Intelligence AngleBackground Briefing9/11 was not the first time that the United States has experienced terror on its soil.Throughout American history, the U.S. government has taken a variety of actions toimprove national security as a result of acts of terror, including creating legislation andestablishing government agencies like the FBI, CIA, and the Department of HomelandSecurity. By examining a Domestic Security Legislation Chart and researching fivehistoric actions that the U.S. government has taken in response to terrorist incidents,students can form a better understanding of the range of these government actions,how our domestic security systems have evolved, and compare the historic actions/reactions to those taken after the 9/11 attacks.ObjectivesAfter completing this lesson students will be able to:• identify a range of key U.S. government actions taken in response to terroristactivity in the past.• determine whether these actions are still being used to fight terror today.• identify the legislation that authorizes these actions.• discuss how the actions taken after the 9/11 terrorist attacks have influencedlegislation that are guiding current and future government actions.ActivityDivide the class into five small groups. Assign each group one of the U.S. governmentactions that has been taken in the past (listed on the worksheets provided). Eachgroup will do the following:• Research when the federal action was taken.• Try to determine whether the action was considered successful incombating terror.• Determine if the resulting legislation is still in effect today and/or if newlegislation has replaced the historic legislation and why.• Write a team briefing report (worksheets provided).• Report to the class on their findings.40 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Group #1 Action / Reaction WorksheetHistorical Context: First Red ScareIn 1919, a series of bombings targeted prominent politicians and industrialists including Attorney GeneralA. Mitchell Palmer. These targets were supporters of anti-immigration legislation and judges who presidedat trials of labor unionists.Government Actions: The Palmer Raids: Arrests and DeportationIn November 1919 and January 1920, under the leadership of the United States Department of Justiceradical leftists, especially anarchists and communists, were arrested and deported from the United States.Research the events surrounding this period in American history and find out the following:Who were all the key players (individuals/groups)?Describe in detail the specific acts of terror.Describe the government’s actions more fully:September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 41©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Group #1 Action / Reaction Worksheet, continuedWere these government actions effective? Why or why not?Was there resulting legislation? (consult the dates on the Domestic Security Legislation Chart)Do you think these actions would be effective or legal today? Would they be reasonable actions for the9/11 case?42 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Group #2 Action / Reaction WorksheetHistorical Context: World War IIDuring World War II, there was widespread fear that the U.S. mainland would be attacked by German,Italian, and Japanese agents. Suspicion turned to these immigrant communities and some Americansfeared that their neighbors, many of whom had lived in the country for decades, were spies or saboteurs.Government Actions: Relocation and DetentionIn 1942 Presidential Executive Order 9066 authorized the forcible relocation of American citizens ofJapanese descent and resident aliens, and specific German- and Italian-Americans into detention camps inthe U.S.Research the events surrounding this period in American history and find out the following:Who were all the key players (individuals/groups)?Describe in detail the specific acts of terror.Describe the government’s actions more fully:September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 43©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Group #2 Action / Reaction Worksheet, continuedWere these government actions effective? Why or why not?Was there resulting legislation? (consult the dates on the Domestic Security Legislation Chart)Do you think these actions would be effective or legal today? Would they be reasonable actions for the9/11 case?44 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Group #3 Action / Reaction WorksheetHistorical Context: Left-wing political and social violence inthe 1970sIn the early 1970s, the United States faced a new wave of terrorism as long simmering tensions over theVietnam War, social reform, and civil rights erupted into violence.Government Actions: Discredit, Destroy, and DisruptThe FBI targeted radical groups/individuals through wire-tapping, leaking false information, infiltratingmeetings, and conducting clandestine searches of private homes.Research the events surrounding this period in American history and find out the following:Who were all the key players (individuals/groups)?Describe in detail the specific acts of terror.Describe the government’s actions more fully:September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 45©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Group #3 Action / Reaction Worksheet, continuedWere these government actions effective? Why or why not?Was there resulting legislation? (consult the dates on the Domestic Security Legislation Chart)Do you think these actions would be effective or legal today? Would they be reasonable actions for the9/11 case?46 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Group #4 Action / Reaction WorksheetHistorical Context: The 2nd Red ScareIn the years prior to and throughout the Cold War, Americans were concerned that Communists were athreat to American security.Government Actions: Congressional hearings and arrestsThroughout this period the government conducted a wide range of activities to discover and thwart thespread of Communism, ranging from Congressional hearings, spying against American citizens, andarresting suspected Communists.Research the events surrounding this period in American history and find out the following:Who were all the key players (individuals/groups)?Describe in detail the specific acts of terror.Describe the government’s actions more fully:September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 47©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Group #4 Action / Reaction Worksheet, continuedWere these government actions effective? Why or why not?Was there resulting legislation? (consult the dates on the Domestic Security Legislation Chart)Do you think these actions would be effective or legal today? Would they be reasonable actions for the9/11 case?48 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Group #5 Action / Reaction WorksheetHistorical Context: Right-wing extremist violence from themid-1980s to the presentAnti-government and conspiracy-oriented groups to racial and religious supremacists, right-wingextremism has been on the rise in the U.S. since the mid-1980s.Government Actions: Increased inter-agency coordinationto monitor domestic groups and new criminal penalties foractivities relating to terrorism.The increasing violence of a range of far-right extremist groups, such as the standoff between the ATF andRandy Weaver at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, in 1992 and the government’s siege and storming of the Branch Davidianreligious sect’s compound in Waco Texas in 1993, culminating with the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. MurrahFederal Building in Oklahoma City, which killed 168 people, served as a wake-up call to the rise of homegrownterrorism. Limits on FBI authority to investigate potentially dangerous domestic groups were eased.Research the events surrounding this period in American history and find out the following:Who were all the key players (individuals/groups)?Describe in detail the specific acts of terror.Describe the government’s actions more fully:September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 49©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Group #5 Action / Reaction Worksheet, continuedWere these government actions effective? Why or why not?Was there resulting legislation? (consult the dates on the Domestic Security Legislation Chart)Do you think these actions would be effective or legal today? Would they be reasonable actions for the9/11 case?50 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

DOMESTIC SECURITY LEGISLATION CHARTOfficialNamePopularNameDescriptionNaturalizationAct,Alien Act,AlienEnemies Act,Sedition ActThe AlienandSeditionActsCollective title for four acts passed by Congress in the span of one month.The laws strengthened the federal government in the face of a war withFrance. The Naturalization Act increased the residency requirement forcitizenship from 5 years to 14. The Alien Act authorized the Presidentto deport “dangerous” aliens during peacetime. The Alien Enemies Actallowed the wartime arrest and detention of enemy aliens. The SeditionAct declared that any treasonable activity, including the publication of“any false, scandalous and malicious writing,” was a high misdemeanor,punishable by fine and imprisonment.AlienImmigrationActCodified existing immigration law and substantially adding to the list ofinadmissible immigrants. The act was also the first to exclude immigrantsbased on their beliefs, by deeming as inadmissible “anarchists, or personswho believe in, or advocate, the overthrow by force or violence thegovernment of the United States, or of all government, or of all forms oflaw, or the assassination of public officials.”EspionageActBarbourEspionageActImposed heavy punishment on any activities that weakened or imperiledthe country’s national defense in both wartime and peace. Punishable offensesincluded obtaining information on military operations and passingdocuments, blueprints and photographs to others with the intent of injuringthe U.S. To assist in military recruitment in World War I, the act alsooutlawed public objection to the war.Sabotage ActMade it a crime to damage or destroy property or utilities used in connectionwith the war.Sedition ActDeclared it unlawful for any person to publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous,or abusive language intended to cause contempt for the government,Constitution, or flag of the United States.DeportationActProvided that aliens convicted under the Espionage Act, Sabotage Act, orother criminal acts of the United States could be taken into the custodyon a warrant and deported ‘if the Secretary of Labor, after hearing, findsthat such aliens are undesirable residents of the United States.’ImmigrationActEstablished a quota system for immigration based on nationality thatseverely restricted immigration.ForeignAgentsRegistrationActPropagandaAgency ActRequires every agent of a foreign government to register with the Departmentof Justice and file forms outlining its agreements with, incomefrom, and expenditures on behalf of the foreign government.AlienRegistrationActSmith ActRequired the registration and fingerprinting of all aliens over age 14.Makes punishable the advocacy of the overthrow of any government- federal, state or local - by force and violence and organization of ormembership--past or present-- in any group which so advocates.EnactmentJune 18, 1798[NaturalizationAct]June 25, 1798[Alien Act]July 6, 1798[Alien EnemiesAct] July 14,1798 [SeditionAct]March 3, 1903June 17, 1917April 20, 1918May 16, 1918May 10, 1920May 26, 1924June 8, 1938June 28, 1940StatuteNaturalization Act -Chapter 54, 1 Stat.566 Alien Act -Chapter 58, 1 Stat.570 Alien EnemiesAct - Chapter66, 1 Stat. 577 SeditionAct - Chapter73, 1 Stat. 596Chapter 1012, 32Stat. 1213Chapter 30, 40 Stat.217Chapter 59, 40 Stat.533Chapter 75, 40 Stat.553Chapter 174, 41Stat. 593Chapter 190, 43Stat. 153Chapter 327, 52Stat. 631Chapter 439, 54Stat. 670UpdateNaturalization Act -Repealed 1802Alien Act - Expired 1800Alien EnemiesAct - Expired 1801Sedition Act -Expired 1801Act Repealed.Amended. Various sectionsrevised and codified in 18USC §§11, 791-794, 2388,3241; 22 USC §§220-222,401-408; 50 USC §§191,192, 194Enactment repealed by Actof June 25, 1948. Some sectionsrevised and codified in18 USC §§2151-2156Act Repealed.Act Repealed.Act Repealed.Codified at 22 USC §§611-621Enactment repealed by Actof June 25, 1948. Revisedand codified in 18 USC§§2385.September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 51©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

DOMESTIC SECURITY LEGISLATION CHART, continuedOfficialNamePopularNameDescriptionEnactmentAnti-SubversiveActivitiesActVoorhisAnti-PropagandaActBarred political groups in the US from eitherreceiving or contributing funds to subversiveorganizations with an international character.October17, 1940InternalSecurity ActMcCarranActSpecified that present or former membership in the Communist partyor any other “totalitarian” party or its affiliates was a ground forinadmissibility.September23, 1950CommunistControl ActOutlawed the Communist Party of the United States and its affiliates, andprohibited members of Communist organizations from serving incertain representative (government) capacities.August 24,1954Anti-Terrorismand EffectiveDeathPenalty Act[AEDPA]Restricts the possession and use of materials capable of producing catastrophicdamage, increases restrictions on alien terrorists and allows forswift deportation of criminal aliens, regulates and monitors the financialsupport mechanisms of international terrorists, expands the circumstancesunder which foreign governments may be sued for the terrorist acts oftheir citizens, and substantially amends U.S. habeas corpus law in orderto ensure swifter justice for death row inmates.April 24, 1996Uniting andStrengtheningAmericaby ProvidingAppropriateToolsRequired toIntercept andObstruct Terrorism[USAPATRIOT ACTAntiterrorismAct of 2001Provides for more effective deterrence and punishment of terrorist actsin the United States and around the world by coordinating intelligenceagencies and removing many of the barriers to investigating terrorism.Enhances law enforcement investigatory tools against terrorists--bothdomestic and foreign and strengthens the criminal laws against terroristand related acts. Increases protection on America’s borders throughwider surveillance and advanced technology.October26, 2001StatuteChapter 897, 54Stat. 1201Chapter 1024, 64Stat. 1012Chapter 886, 68Stat. 775110 Stat. 1214115 Stat. 272UpdateEnactment repealed by Actof June 25, 1948. Revisedand codified in 18 USC§2386.Revised by Act of March 26,1964; codified at 50 USC§§831-832, 834-835Codified at 50 USC §§841-844Codified at 8 USC § 1189,8 USC § 1531, 8 USC §1532, 8 USC § 1533, 8 USC§ 1534, 8 USC § 1535, 8USC § 1536, 8 USC § 1537,8 USC § 1252c, 18 USC §2332c, 18 USC § 2332b,18 USC § 2332d, 18 USC§ 2339B, 18 USC § 3059B,18 USC § 3295, 18 USC §3613A, 18 USC § 3663A, 22USC § 2377, 22 USC § , 22USC § 262p-4q, 22 USC §2349aa-10, 22 USC § 2781,28 USC § 2261, 28 USC§ 2262, 28 USC § 2263,28 USC § 2264, 28 USC §2265, 28 USC § 2266, 42USC § 10603b, 42 USC §10608.Codified at 50 USC § 403-5d, 50 USC § 1861, 50 USC§ 1862, 18 USC § 2712,31 USC § 5318A, 15 USC§ 1681v, 22 USC § 262p-4r, 31 USC § 310, 31 USC§ 310, 31 USC § 5331, 31USC § 5332, 8 USC § 1379,8 USC § 1226a, 42 USC §3796c-1, 18 USC § 1993,18 USC § 2339, 18 USC §175b, 50 USC § 403-5b,49 USC § 5103a, 42 USC §3714, 42 USC § 5195c52 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Activity IdeaIntelligenceAnalysis:Collecting the Dots/Connecting the DotsBackground Briefing9/11:The Intelligence AngleIt is often said that the role of intelligence is “to speak truth to power.” The function of intelligence is todescribe the world as it is and might be, not as we wish it to be. The 9/11 Commission Report revealedthat various intelligence collection agencies had information pertaining to the 9/11 plot but informationsharing between agencies was flawed; therefore, some information/intelligence was never connectedsufficiently. Effectively, some of the “dots” were collected but not connected. One example of this is thatthe FBI had received reports of Hazmi and Mihdhar (two of the attackers) enrolling in flight school inCalifornia and wanting to learn how to fly but having little interest in learning how to land the aircraft.This one little piece of the intelligence, when fit in with other pieces, forms a pretty clear scenario (at leastin hindsight) of the idea that airplanes might be used as missiles. But these pieces of the puzzle werescattered, not shared, or simply not well analyzed. It is said that 9/11 was not so much an intelligencefailure as it was a failure of imagination: no one imagined that this middle-eastern terrorist group wouldhijack planes as weapons against buildings in major metropolitan areas.9/11 was not the first time in history when intelligence was not properly collected or connected(analyzed). Compare and contrast the case studies of Pearl Harbor, The Cuban Missile Crisis, and 9/11 todetermine the characteristics of an intelligence failure and an intelligence success.September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 53©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Activity Idea20/20 Hindsight9/11:The Intelligence AngleDuring the height of the attacks on the morning of September 11, 2001, there was mass public confusionon many levels. For example, it was difficult to determine who was responsible for the attacks, whoorganized the attacks, and what was their motive(s). By the end of the day on 9/11, however, all thenames of the attackers were known and it was known that the middle-eastern terrorist group, Al Qaeda,was responsible. By 9/12 this information was published in national newspapers. Since 9/11, the GallupOrganization has polled the American public and produced various studies that indicate that despite thefact that it has been definitively established that Al Qaeda was responsible for the 9/11 attacks, todaythere is still a question in some people’s minds about who was responsible.Students can:• Interview members of the public and ask them who they think is responsible for the 9/11 attacks.• Compile and analyze their collected data.• Design and implement an education campaign in which they provide accurate information aboutthe perpetrators if they notice a trend toward misunderstanding or doubt on the part of the public.• Discuss why there are different theories about who was responsible for the attacks.• Find articles and opinion on the internet and discuss them.54 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Gallup Organization Article: September 17, 2001Attack on America: Review of Public OpinionGALLUP NEWS SERVICEPRINCETON, NJ - Here is a rundown on the highlights of American public opinion as measured in the daysfollowing the September 11 attacks, with a particular focus on Gallup’s latest survey completed September14-15, 2001.• Presidential job approval hasrisen faster than any comparable“rally” event in Gallup pollinghistory, from 51% in the weekendjust prior to September 11, to86% September 14-15.• Bush’s current 86% job approvalis just three points below thehighest measured in Galluphistory.• Over nine out of ten Americansapprove of the way Bush ishandling the aftermath of theterrorist attacks.• Gallup’s measure of overallsatisfaction with the way thingsare going in the United States hasgone up, not down, over the pastweek, rising from 43% just priorto the attacks, to 61% now.• Two measures of the economy -one rating the current economyand the other asking aboutthe economy going forward -registered slight increases fromthe weekend before the attacksto this past weekend.• Most stock market investors saythe terrorist attacks will make nodifference in their probability ofinvesting in the market, with littlesign of investor panic.• Americans remain very stronglysupportive of U.S. military actionin reprisal for the attacks.•Support for military actionremains strong even whenAmericans are reminded that itmight take years, might involveground troops, might involveAmerican casualties, mightinvolve a reinstatement of thedraft, and might have a negativeeffect on the economy.• Americans are willing to waituntil those who were responsiblefor the attacks are identifiedrather than launching attacksimmediately.•Over 8 out of 10 Americans saythat Osama bin Laden bears agreat deal of responsibility for theattacks. Sixty-four percent saythe same about Afghanistan.•The significant majority ofAmericans consider that the U.S.is currently at war.•Most Americans are willing to putup with such things as having togo through metal detectors inpublic places and checking in upto three hours before flights inorder to increase security.•At the same time, Americansare not willing to sanction suchthings as allowing police to stoppeople at random on the streetfor searches, or making it easierfor law enforcement to read mailand e-mails.• A majority of Americans favorhaving Arabs, even those whoare U.S. citizens, being subjectedto separate, more intensivesecurity procedures at airports.About half of Americans favorrequiring Arabs, even those whoare citizens of the U.S., to carryspecial ID.• Two thirds of Americans wouldlike to see the World Trade Centertowers rebuilt.•The events of September 11 haveaffected Americans emotionally.Seven out of ten Americans,including almost six out of tenmen, say that they have cried.Many have attended memorialservices and expressed love forfamily in ways they may notusually do, and prayed.• Very few Americans disagree withthe decision to postpone mostmajor sporting events over thispast weekend.• Americans have followed news ofthe terrorist attacks more closelythan any other news story Galluphas measured in its history usingthe “closely followed” question.• About half of Americans remainat least somewhat worried thatthey or a family member willbecome a victim of a terroristattack, down slightly fromTuesday night.September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 55©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

Gallup Organization Article: September 10, 2010Nine Years After 9/11, Few See Terrorism as TopU.S. ProblemOne percent see it as the top problem today, down from 46% in 2001GALLUP NEWS SERVICEby Frank NewportPRINCETON, NJ -- Nine years after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, 1% of Americans mentionterrorism as the most important problem facing the country, down from 46% just after the attacks.Just before the attacks, in aGallup poll conducted Sept. 7-10,2001, less than one-half of 1% ofAmericans mentioned terrorismas the nation’s most importantproblem. One month later, inOctober 2001, 46% namedterrorism, the highest in Gallup’shistory.From that point on, terrorismslowly faded as a response tothis question. At the one-yearanniversary of the attacks,in September 2002, 19% ofAmericans mentioned terrorismas the country’s top problem,already eclipsed by the economyat the top of the list. By the fiveyearanniversary of the attacksin September 2006, 11% ofAmericans mentioned terrorism.Terrorism continued to drop fromthat point, albeit with an uptickto 8% mentions in January of thisyear, reflecting the widespreadnews coverage of the “ChristmasDay bomber” who allegedlyattempted to detonate explosiveson a Northwest Airlines planeheaded for Detroit.As terrorism has faded,other concerns have risen inimportance. Over the past nineyears, Americans have mostcommonly mentioned the war inIraq (from 2003 to early 2008)and the economy or jobs (from2008 to the present) as the topproblem facing the country.Despite the drop in top-of-mindmentions of terrorism, Americansstill say it is an important issuewhen they are reminded of it.Gallup recently asked Americansto rate the importance of anumber of issues to their votein this year’s midterm elections,and 75% rated terrorism as anextremely or very importantissue. Still, Americans ratedeconomic issues such as theeconomy, jobs, and federalspending, as well as corruptionin government and healthcare,even higher. They rated terrorismas more important than56 September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

immigration, Afghanistan, andthe environment.The Sept. 11 attacks took placeduring the Republican Bushadministration, which soonthereafter launched a “war onterrorism.” Republicans haveconsistently been given morecredit than Democrats forhandling terrorism over the yearssince; in an August USA Today/Gallup poll, 55% of Americanssay the Republicans in Congressare better able to handle theissue of terrorism, while 31%choose the Democrats.Bottom LineThe low top-of-mind salienceof terrorism as the top problemfacing the nation no doubtreflects the absence of majorterrorist attacks on U.S. soilin the nine years since 2001,although there have beenoccasional news reports ofthwarted attacks. It may alsoreflect the degree to whicheconomic concerns are crowdingout most other issues at thispoint in the nation’s history.The dramatic jump in perceptionsof terrorism as the mostimportant problem betweenSeptember and October 2001,however, serves as a reminderof the potential for terrorismto reclaim its prominence as aconcern should there be newterrorist incidents in the future.September 11th: The Intelligence Angle | Lesson Plans and Activities 57©2011 International Spy Museum: The House on F Street, LLC All Rights Reserved.

This publication is a work in progress.Check the International Spy Museum Websitefor additions and updates.www.spymuseum.org