featureThe Emergence <strong>of</strong> the “Indeployee”BY NANCY FISH,ASSOCIATION MANAGER AND FORMER AWARD-WINNING ALLSTATE MANAGERDuring the campaign and election <strong>of</strong>the 44th president <strong>of</strong> the UnitedStates, Americans saw unprecedentedevents unfold before their eyes. I watchedthe candidates closely and learned a lotfrom those competing for the highest <strong>of</strong>ficein our land.As the economic situation has worsened,one thing has become abundantlyclear. Our best hope for recovery goingforward is not divisiveness, but unity.Now is not the time to focus on individualinterests, but the needs <strong>of</strong> all citizens.The importance <strong>of</strong> pulling together forthe common good <strong>of</strong> the country cannotbe overstated.This spirit <strong>of</strong> “all for one and one forall” is not unlike the many calls NAPAAhas made for agent unity since its foundingnearly 20 years ago. NAPAA is focusedon the needs <strong>of</strong> the entire agencyforce, not just the narrow interests <strong>of</strong>individual board members or individualagency owners. As an organization, ourpassion is grounded in our sense <strong>of</strong> commonpurpose. Every time an <strong>Allstate</strong>agent’s contract is terminated withoutjust cause, every <strong>Allstate</strong> agent suffers aninjustice. Each time the company rejects,for no apparent reason, a seemingly giltedgedbuyer, with impeccable credentials,a clean background check and a passingscore on the track test, it increases thepossibility that the same thing couldhappen to other sellers. Whenever anagent is forced to attend training sessionsdue to lack <strong>of</strong> production or for otherreasons, then other agents lose some <strong>of</strong>their autonomy.In recent years, we have witnessedunprecedented employee-like controlsfoisted upon agency owners. These controlsinclude the imposition <strong>of</strong> the “ExpectedResults” quota system, mandated<strong>of</strong>fice hours, ever-changing “make upthe rules as you go along” buyer approvalstandards, compulsory call forwarding,and mandatory meetings, just to namea few.Most recently, the company is attemptingto force agents and staff to useits “Good Hands® Coverage Checkup.”We can only assume that the companydoesn’t want agents using their own policyreview methods because <strong>of</strong> its keendesire to follow the lead <strong>of</strong> McDonald’sand other national franchises to createthe same experience for customerswherever they are. This one-size-fits-allapproach might work well for the purveyors<strong>of</strong> Big Macs and Whoppers, butinsurance? Could it be that the companyis gearing up to convert its agencies int<strong>of</strong>ranchisees or is it just trying to act likea franchisor?In addition to telling agents how toperform customer reviews, the companyhas also strongly suggested that agentsbegin “Quoting the lowest price availableevery time.” So now, not only areagents being told how to perform customerreviews, they are being told howto sell auto insurance policies by managersthat have little or no insurance salesexperience. Leaving no stone unturnedin their quest for increased auto production,managers are now counting agentquotes, calculating agent closing ratiosand, in some cases, requiring agents toreport their production on a daily basis.If this isn’t bad enough, some agentshave reported that they’ve been askedto develop and submit a plan to theirmanagers for “approval.” In most casesthis is being requested during the annual“Agency Review” process.The preceding paragraphs <strong>of</strong>fer sev-44 — <strong>Exclusivefocus</strong> Spring 2009
eral examples <strong>of</strong> company practices thatopenly defy the independent contractorguidelines <strong>of</strong> the IRS. These employeelikecontrols have no place in an independentcontractor environment. I findit unimaginable that any principled companywould openly disregard the rules <strong>of</strong>federal and state taxing authorities. Sincereading the article “Deliberately Misclassified?What <strong>Allstate</strong> Has In Common WithFedEx” in the last issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>Exclusivefocus</strong>magazine, I have given this matter agreat deal <strong>of</strong> thought. And so have a lot<strong>of</strong> others, including agents who routinelyexpress a “my company right or wrong”stance. Most agents want to believe thatthe company’s intentions are honorableand aboveboard, but after reading the articleand reviewing the IRS Private LetterRuling, most now question the company’smotives. Many, in fact, are angryabout being subjected to such controlsand by what they perceive as a “we’reabove the law” attitude by the company.Shortly after <strong>Allstate</strong> announced itsPreparing for the Future initiative in 1999,the massive agent conversion plan that allbut eliminated employee agents at <strong>Allstate</strong>in favor <strong>of</strong> so-called “independent contractors,”NAPAA began voicing its concernsabout the company’s employee-like treatment<strong>of</strong> these new Exclusive <strong>Agents</strong>. AsNAPAA pushed back, support for the organizationgrew at an unprecedented rate.<strong>Agents</strong> appreciated the fact that NAPAAleaders were voicing their concerns.NAPAA’s efforts did not go unnoticedby the company, and by 2002 itwould make the decision to terminatetwo <strong>of</strong> NAPAA’s most popular and vocalleaders, Jim Fish and John Bryant. Thefirings came at perhaps the most volatiletime in company history. Outraged bythe company’s actions, a new firestormerupted. Lurking in the backgroundwas a nascent effort to unionize <strong>Allstate</strong>agents, and when Jim Fish was fired forhis alleged “failure to maintain a pr<strong>of</strong>essionalbusiness relationship” with thecompany, all hell broke loose. Thousands<strong>of</strong> angry agents submitted union authorizationcards, catching the company<strong>of</strong>f-guard. NAPAA had clearly struck anerve.The company, stunned by the vastnumber <strong>of</strong> union authorization cards andbeset with a serious agent uprising, beganto back <strong>of</strong>f. Senior management soughtways to stem NAPAA’s growing influenceamong <strong>Allstate</strong> agents. It was duringthis period that the NAB was conceived.It was rolled out amid much fanfare andtouted as a huge step for agents, whichit was. In essence, the company, headedby Ed Liddy, found itself giving in tothe pressures brought on by NAPAA.But rather than give credit where creditwas clearly due, the company declaredthat it didn’t need and wouldn’t recognizeNAPAA, even though its leader hadbeen one <strong>of</strong> the very top <strong>Allstate</strong> agentsin the country and was an ardent advocatefor the agents <strong>of</strong> <strong>Allstate</strong>.NAPAA saw the creation <strong>of</strong> the NABas both a blessing and a curse. While itlauded the company’s decision to givethe agents at least a faint voice in Northbrook,it was disappointed to learn thatit would not be invited to the table. Theproblem NAPAA saw with the NABwas that the company chose only highlysuccessful,“my company right or wrong”board members who were not the typeto rock the corporate boat. There wouldbe no room for dissenters, average agentsor below average agents, even thoughthey comprised the vast majority <strong>of</strong> theagency force.While the NAB still exists, it hasseemingly been rendered impotent. Inthe early years, the NAB was productiveand provided input on some importantissues. The individual members <strong>of</strong> thiselite group <strong>of</strong> hand-picked agents werehonored to be chosen and proud to serve.Surprisingly, however, a number <strong>of</strong> NABmembers have stepped down in recentyears. Could this be because they weredisillusioned or because the issues theywere allowed to discuss were increasinglymundane, unimportant or irrelevant?With the NAB now in check and theunion movement a distant memory, thecompany is, once again, attempting toincrease its control over the daily activities<strong>of</strong> the agency force. This is alarming,but not unexpected. If a company perceivesits work force as weak and unableto defend itself, the possibility forcorporate exploitation increases. Is thishappening at <strong>Allstate</strong>? You be the judge.The company has started firing agentsfor missing production quotas and hassuggested that it could fire more basedthe individual results <strong>of</strong> the new AgencyLoyalty Index. Add this to the lengthylist <strong>of</strong> terminable <strong>of</strong>fenses for <strong>Allstate</strong>agents. What the company is saying, inessence, is that agents had better toe theline or risk termination. But wait a minute,aren’t we supposed to be independentcontractors and free <strong>of</strong> such controls?I’ve concluded that the company’s deliberateefforts to increase control over its‘independent contractor’ agents are not afluke, it is an integral part <strong>of</strong> its masterplan. As I said before, I have thoughtlong and hard about this issue. Followingare a few <strong>of</strong> my theories and thoughts regardingthe company’s inexplicable corporatebehavior:1. Senior managers have no idea howtheir underlings are treating agents.Okay, this is a real stretch, so I’ve alreadydismissed this theory. My thought wasto give senior leaders the benefit <strong>of</strong> thedoubt, but they can’t really be that clueless,can they? Not only has NAPAA hasbeen talking about this issue for years; iteven implemented a program called theInfractor Alert that provided managementwith examples <strong>of</strong> independent contractormistreatment. The bottom line is that seniormanagement cannot feign ignoranceon the independent contractor issue.2. Senior managers have somehowbeen persuaded that the current independentcontractor model has outlivedits usefulness. If true, this would meanthe company is searching for anotherdistribution model such as the Canadianmodel or a franchise model. In both instances,the company would essentiallycontrol the look and feel <strong>of</strong> each agencyand the manner in which policies aresold. It would seem that U.S. managersare being trained to exert more and morecontrol over agents, an important key inthe Canadian model where agents areemployees. To a lesser extent, this wouldalso hold true in a franchise model wherethe franchisor calls most <strong>of</strong> the shots.3. <strong>Allstate</strong>’s Modus Operandi.There can be no doubt that <strong>Allstate</strong> boldlypushes the envelope when it comes toSpring 2009 <strong>Exclusivefocus</strong> — 45