(BAT) Reference Document for the Production of Chlor-alkali ...

Chapter 4
Loading area hazards
Fire due to chlorine/iron
reaction
Fire due to contaminants (oil,
organics)
Internal corrosion
Collision with other rail/road
tanks
Rupture of the filling pipe
Other causes:
- Liquid chlorine in vent
- Back-flow of chlorine
into padding gas system
- Valve leaks
Examples of preventative
measures
Use of appropriate
materials
Avoidance of “hot work”
areas
No flammable liquids or
materials in the
surroundings of loading
areas
-Prohibition of use of
hydrocarbon oils, greases
and solvents
- Use of oil-free
compressors in padding
gas systems
Moisture control system
in chlorine and
avoidance of possible
back-flow
Monitoring procedures
for wet ferric chloride in
valves
Braking the transport
vehicle and blocking the
road or railway track
during loading
Prevention of runaway
rail wagons or tankers
getting into filling area
Alarms linked to rail
retarders
-Containment of the
loading installation
Use of articulated arms
or correctly specified
flexible hoses and coils
for chlorine transfer
Maintenance and
inspection procedures
- Control procedures on
gas supplies system to
avoid over-pressurisation
due to warming
- Avoidance of
possibility of inversion
on the connection
between liquid and
gaseous phases
Examples of corrective or
emergency measures
Emergency shut off
valves on tank and
supply initiated by push
buttons
Emergency shut-off
valves
Connection of dissipated
chlorine gas from the
transport vehicle to the
chlorine destruction unit
- Liquid chlorine in vent
detector (alarm/trip) to
alert operator
- Increasing venting rate
and draining liquid to
vented tanks
- High and low pressure
alarms on padding gas
system
- Padding gas chlorine
detector and differential
pressure control
WORKING DRAFT IN PROGRESS
In the storage area
Some standard safety measures to achieve optimum risk reduction in the storage area
are:
Chlorine detection and location and rapid isolation of sources feeding a leak
Availability of at least one empty tank of sufficient capacity as an emergency spare
220 December 2011 TB/EIPPCB/CAK_Draft_1