chapter 4 - DRK

Strictly under embargo until Wednesday 22 September at 00:01 GMT (02:01 Geneva time)Inequitable treatment of ownersand non-owners. Although housing, landor property owners (many of whom may haveforms of HLP insurance protection) and tenantsand other non-owners are equally affected bydisaster, frequently the latter groups face inequitabletreatment within the HLP sector. Followingthe Pisco earthquake, 78 per cent of the populationthat had title received grants for reconstruction,while tenants and informal dwellersgenerally did not. The same distinctions weremade after the 1995 Kobe earthquake inJapan, where owners were invariably entitledto return to their pre-quake homes, whereas tenantswere often forced to find new housing astheir former neighbourhoods were transformedinto new and more expensive areas. AfterHurricane Katrina, relatively small amounts offinancial assistance were provided to rebuildrental units compared to the considerable sumsprovided to owner-occupiers to rebuild.HLP disputes and secondary occupation.HLP disputes generated by thesecondary occupation of homes and landsare commonplace following disasters. Suchdisputes can occur between many differentparties, such as two poor families strugglingover access to a single piece of land. Moreominously, disputes between poor communitiesand private sector interests, which seek tocontrol the disputed land for development purposes,can seriously undermine broader postdisasterrecovery efforts and cause forced andarbitrary evictions.Insecure tenure. Inadequate or insecureHLP tenure can significantly worsen the HLPprospects of disaster-affected populations, aswell as creating considerable challenges forshelter providers in the aftermath of disasters.Tenure insecurity – or the reduced degree ofprotection against eviction and other threats –can arise through a wide range of pre-existing66CHAPTER 3or post-disaster circumstances. These can relateto structural weaknesses of the HLP rights registrationand record-keeping systems in countriesaffected by disaster, a lack of clarity betweencustomary and formal HLP rights frameworks,systemic bias against non-owners (resultingin far lesser tenure protection) and the loss,damage or manipulation of land registers andother methods of recording HLP rights. Insecuretenure can make people reluctant to flee fromtheir homes and lands when disaster strikes forfear of losing access to them after the event.In the specific context of HLP rights anddisaster, the ‘do no harm’ principle shouldmean that humanitarian actors only supportlocal or national HLP laws and policies thatare consistent with internationally protectedHLP rights. International agencies should buildthese perspectives into their overall activitiesto ensure the broad promotion and protectionof HLP rights. It should also mean that humanitarianinstitutions consciously ensure that theyare not complicit in any approaches to HLPissues pursued by national and local governmentsthat are contrary to international rulesand regulations. In effect, such an approachwould prioritize rights over expediency, striveto remove the pro-ownership bias that still dominatesmany shelter efforts and develop newinternal and external mechanisms to continuallystrengthen HLP rights issues in the contextof shelter programming. Five key principles areworthy of consideration in this respect:Expand beneficiary participation in HLPprocesses and decision-makingDefine ‘building back better’ as ‘lands forthe landless and homes for the homeless’Treat owners, tenants and informal dwellersequally by emphasizing security of tenureOppose openly arbitrariness and disasterdrivenland grabsPrioritize restitution first.