Strictly under embargo until Wednesday 22 September at 00:01 GMT (02:01 Geneva time)fast-growing urban environment created overrecent years due to the absence of strategicplanning and informal development that hasresulted in elevated risk. In 1950, Istanbulhad a population of 1.16 million; today it ishome to 12.5 million people and producesone-quarter of the country’s GDP. Since the1999 Izmit earthquake, which killed more than17,000 people and impacted partly on theeastern edges of Istanbul, the city has been wellaware that another devastating earthquake willhappen and the next time possibly with evengreater impact and closer to Istanbul.In addition to earthquakes, flooding is alsobecoming a problem. Throughout the city, industries,residences and even major transportarteries are located on riverbeds and riverbanks.Small-scale flood events are a regularoccurrence, and local news channels periodicallyreport that one or two people have diedin flash floods. In September 2009, the heaviestrainfall recorded in Istanbul in 80 years causedflash flooding leading to the deaths of at least40 people and to US$ 550 million in damages.The bodies of seven women were discoveredin Bagcilar, a working-class suburb. They haddrowned in a minibus that was taking them tojobs at a textile factory.The vulnerability of Istanbul to multiple hazardstoday, in 2010, is a result of decisionsand actions about urban development madeover the last 60 years. Looking at the exampleof housing production in Istanbul shows us howa vulnerability gap is produced over time.Starting from the first waves of immigrationinto Istanbul in the 1940s and continuingthrough the 1980s, housing was producedthrough informal building, called gecekondu(meaning ‘built overnight’). Different versionsof amnesty laws throughout the years (1949,1953, 1963, 1966, 1976, 1983) effectivelygave many occupiers the ‘right to use’ of theland, and municipalities provided services tothese areas and undertook upgrading of publicinfrastructure. In 1984, a law was passed thatallowed the building of gecekondu areas upto four storeys, which dramatically transformedthe landscape of the city from single-storeygarden plots built by families themselves tomulti-storey apartment buildings built by smallscaledevelopers. Today, it is estimated that70 per cent of the housing stock is either illegalor legalized and much housing has been builtwith no supervision for earthquake buildingcodes. If a 7.5 magnitude earthquake (similarto the one in 1999) were to occur, it is estimatedthat of approximately 800,000 buildingsin Istanbul, 25 per cent would have moderatedamage, 10 per cent would have extensivedamage and 5 per cent could be expected tocollapse completely.In the past ten years, since the great earthquakeof 1999, the government has undertakenseveral initiatives to try and reduce theearthquake risk in Istanbul, including urbanmaster plans for earthquake risk reduction,legislative changes regarding building supervision,mandatory earthquake insurance andmandates for municipalities to undertake urbanregeneration projects to replace vulnerablebuildings. Thus, on one side of the vulnerabilitygap, the political will and the expertise forrisk reduction are now present in Istanbul, yetthe capacity for implementation is still lackingas these government initiatives have had littleimpact on the ground thus far.The other side of the gap – people’s abilityto reduce risk – is limited by many factors,including their perception of risk, their knowledgeof earthquake-safe building techniques,complicated ownership structures and financialconstraints. For example, to make existingbuildings safer, authorities have proposedretro fitting to meet earthquake safety standards.46
Strictly under embargo until Wednesday 22 September at 00:01 GMT (02:01 Geneva time)However, the incentive for owners to retrofit isvery low for an earthquake that may or maynot happen over the next 50 years. The costfor retrofitting is high and amounts to little financialreturn in terms of increased propertyvalue or rental value; furthermore, multipleowners must agree and the building must bevacated for several months.The Greater Municipality of Istanbulhas also started to earmark gecekonduareas for rehabilitation, under the GreaterMunicipalities Law (Law No. 5216, 2004),which gives authority for the “vacating anddemolishing of dangerous buildings and allother ‘non-conforming’ structures”. This hasled to forced evictions and massive threatsof eviction across the city, where gecekonduareas will be bulldozed and rebuilt by theMass Housing Adminstration, leading to thelikely displacement of poor urban dwellers.While relocation into new earthquake-safeareas is planned, the new houses – even thoughsubsidized – are too far away from jobs formost people to afford, so people are left homeless.Thus rehabilitation may physically reducethe vulnerability of the built environment of thecity, yet it is dramatically increasing people’slevel of poverty and exclusion. ConclusionUrban vulnerability is generated differently at the scales of the individual, household,community and city. City-scale investments, for example, in flood drainage may succeedin protecting core functions but can also generate vulnerability for the poor. InDelhi, a lack of foresight has led to the construction of storm drains during a housingcrisis and, not surprisingly, the colonization of drains by landless informal settlers. Thedrains now generate flood risk among the poor while helping protect the wider cityfrom flooding. Identifying and reducing vulnerability is no easy task in an era of rapidurbanization.Historically, the focus at city level has always been on physical over social infrastructure.This is beginning to change as city authorities recognize the importance of socialsafety nets (including support for the elderly and homeless), access to good-qualityhealth and education, and implementation of building standards.The commoditization of urban life means that, in contrast to more rural contexts,money is required to meet even the most basic of needs – water, food and shelter.This restricts the ability of the vulnerable poor to accumulate assets and to protectthemselves from hazard. It also makes it difficult to recover from disaster, magnifyingimpact where the loss of accumulated assets, such as a dwelling, can set back householddevelopment irretrievably.However, looking at the trends for the future, we see that increasing urbanization alsobrings the potential to reduce the losses from disasters in the long term even though itmay increase disaster losses in the short term. Rapid urbanization, of the kind that ishappening in parts of Asia and Africa, will, in the short run, most likely increase lossesWorld Disasters Report 2010 – Focus on urban risk47