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5Conclusionst h i s p a p e r s t a r t e d b y h i g h l i g h t i n g t h e s e r i o u s n e s s with which theinternational community, regional and national governments have attempted toaddress the problem of SALW proliferation. Following the UN Agenda for Peace andmore recently the UNPOA a lot of work has been done to lay the foundation for coordinatedaction. The East African region has also witnessed development of a numberof political, legal and policy frameworks and guidelines in this area. Unfortunatelypractical action at the regional and national level has not always followed.As has been noted, the mandates of the various SALW structures are well articulatedand the criteria for establishing them well developed. The East African structuresanalysed seem to have done well in the areas of stockpile management, as exemplified bythe thousands of SALW collected and destroyed, and the application of best practicesrelated to marking of state-owned firearms. However, most of the commitmentsunder the Kenyan and Ugandan NAPs were not implemented during the first years ofthese plans. Some progress on national policy and legislative development, as well asresearch can be demonstrated. However, success is less clear in other areas of the NAPsin Kenya and Uganda such as institutional development, border management anddeveloping co-operative and practical approaches to arms control in the region.Similarly, RECSA has made important progress in some areas, but also faced significantchallenges in others. In a climate where donors are under more pressure to prove valuefor money to their domestic constituencies, there is currently a danger that donorswill reduce or withdraw funding from those aspects of RECSA and the NFPs that theydon’t deem to be making enough progress. 50National level challengesA number of challenges facing Kenya and Uganda at the national level can be identified:n Limited resources: the NAPs developed by both Kenya and Uganda were quiteambitious and the resources required to implement them have not been forthcoming.Uganda’s NAP for instance required €1,832,205 to fully implement it within a periodof five years (2004–2008). With their governments committing little or nothing at all,NFPs have not been able to fully implement all planned activities and have had to relyon external support, including from non-governmental organisations.n Limited institutional and human capacity: NFPs often contend with staffinglimitations. For instance, NFP co-ordinators are mostly over-stretched and underresourcedas they struggle to execute their mandate locally, nationally, regionally and50 Interviews with, representatives of the Netherlands and UK Embassies in Kenya, January 2011.
16 c o n t r o l l i n g s m a l l a r m s a n d l i g h t w e a p o n s in k e n y a a n d u g a n d a : p ro g re s s s o f a rinternationally. 51 The capacity of sub-national task forces (e.g. RTFs, PTFs and lowerlevel units) also tends to be limited. In many cases even where they have receivedtraining these local structures are still not able to effectively bridge the local andnational level gap or to co-operate smoothly with their peers within peace (e.g. DistrictPeace Committees) or security structures (e.g. District Security Committees). 52 NFPshave mainly been managed by officials seconded from the police or related securityagencies. They have moreover been supplied with a limited number of staff. These staffoften do not have the skills required for the full range of tasks the NFPs are responsiblefor, including conducting research, drafting policy recommendations, projectmanagement and fundraising. Frequent transfers have also hindered continuity.Among other things follow-up and monitoring the work of devolved NFP structureshas not been possible in these circumstances.n Bureaucratic challenges: Bureaucratic procedures often hamper SALW structures.For instance, in the Kenyan case, the KNFP’s finances are channelled through thenational treasury, which means there could be delays in disbursement.n Competing national priorities and limited political support: With many competingnational priorities, SALW control is mainly left as a national security issue to bemanaged by various security agencies with little reference to NFPs. Unfortunatelysince in both Kenya and Uganda the NFPs have not been accorded a high profile orstatus in government circles, this has impeded their efforts to secure funds and otherforms of support from their own governments. In truth while NFPs have beenestablished, they are treated as peripheral departments and often seen by other partsof government as a conduit for external resources.n Superficial ownership by governments: Although the formation and development ofNFPs was led by the governments of the region, the process was also externally drivenin some sense in the wake of many international initiatives for SALW control. Perhapsas a result the Kenyan and Ugandan governments seem to rely more on externalsupport as opposed to directly committing resources and high-level political supportto national initiatives.n Politicisation of SALW issues: The KNFP and UNFP have to their credit developedevidence-based NAPs which, if fully implemented, would yield significant benefits inboth national and human security terms. Unfortunately, disarmament operations andarms reduction initiatives are sometimes political, a fact that is beyond NFPs giventheir status in government. Political leaders sometimes approach SALW issues in asubjective fashion, seeking to protect constituency interests (e.g. through disarmamentof political rivals). The required balancing of regional and ethnic concerns in lawenforcement is simply beyond the NFPs’ mandates and capacities. Such cases can beseen in both Kenya and Uganda. In the case of the disarmament processes in Karamoja,the NFP was marginalised as the UPDF took over what was a high profile operationpolitically, even though the KIDDP was a more fruitful way to conduct the process.Regional level challengesAt the regional level RECSA faces its own challenges:n Resource mobilisation: Until recently when it secured international support from theEU, resourcing was an ongoing problem.n Keeping pace with regional developments: Nowadays there is the challenge of furtherdeveloping RECSA and shifting its focus as others’ capacity increases. RECSA’sadaptation to changing demands on the secretariat in the face of growth of NFPs’capacity will be a major test. With increased regional co-operation and harmonisation51 Maze K, and Rhee H, International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action on Illicit Trade of Small Armsand Light Weapons in all its Aspects: Case Study of East Africa, p 12, www.unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf4-act313.pdf,28 March 2011.52 Interviews with a DTF member in Isiolo on 13 March 2011.
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Page 4 and 5: ContentsAcronyms1. Introduction 12.
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