60 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL <strong>2006</strong>ally like the fighters overhead.” 10 Even withoutthe data, however, the election-support planrepresents a near-perfect blend of multicomponent,operational-level planning withboots-on-the-ground, tactical-level understanding.From battalion to corps to CAOC tocarrier air wing, the joint team came togetherto innovate and set conditions for success on30 January.ScorecardClearly, the integration of MNC-I’s JFECwith the ASOC and corps TACP represents ahuge step forward in the joint application oflethal and nonlethal effects—as does the effectiveworking relationship between MNC-I’sheadquarters and the CAOC. (Although not asubject of this article, the battlefield coordinationdetachment at Al Udeid played a criticalrole, with its commander, Col James Waring,USA, and his key staff representing their parentcomponent as effectively in Qatar as didtheir <strong>Air</strong>man counterparts in Baghdad.) Similarly,the MARDIV/corps/air-component relationship,evidenced in the DASC/ASOCtransparency and teamwork, demonstratedhow effectively our separate service doctrinescan be mined for common ground. Finally,the teamwork of lower-level TACPs and FSEsacross the country replicated the higher-levelrelationships; by election time, air support operationssquadrons had become as totally integratedat brigade and division level as had theparent group with the corps. The ASOG commandertraveled extensively during his tour,visiting Battlefield <strong>Air</strong>men at 21 forwardoperating bases and paying courtesy calls onbattalion and brigade commanders and staffs.Everywhere, commanders and operations officerstold the same story: “I grew up nottrusting CAS because at National TrainingCenter exercises and Warfighters [corps- anddivision-level readiness inspections] it was toohard to coordinate and never where or when Ineeded it. But here, every time I asked theJTAC to get air—every time—you guys answeredthe call.”These great leaps forward did not occurwithout stumbles, however. Joint teamwork atlower levels sometimes took a while to developbecause of the poor integration of CAS intotraining and exercises. As Col Michael Formica,USA, commander of Black Jack Brigade, explained,“In my first few months in country, Irarely put air into my plan—this was becausewe did not understand how it could assist us ina counter insurgency fight—then I saw the incredibleresults in <strong>Fall</strong>ujah and in our followonoperations. After that, in our North Babiloperations and election prep, I never leftwithout my JTAC and always requested air tosupport our operations.” 11 To use a baseballanalogy coined by Col Arden Dahl, formercommander of the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>’s joint air-groundoperations group, Colonel Formica and hispeers used CAS like a relief pitcher but laterrealized they needed CAS in the startinglineup. Future exercise designers must capturethat lesson and ensure that soldiers and airmentogether understand the processes to integrateair effectively from the opening pitch.Those battalion- and brigade-level seamsbecame especially evident inside the close urbanenvironment in <strong>Fall</strong>ujah. The key playersat the 1st MARDIV, MNC-I, and ASOG workedfor weeks to solve the top-level DASC/ASOCproblem, but they failed to identify doctrinaldisconnects between Marine regimental andbattalion air officers and their <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>counterparts, waiting until late in the game toassemble the 29-man <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> team that accompaniedthe heavy Army units into the city.As a result, some members of the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>team did not arrive in <strong>Fall</strong>ujah until after theMARDIV’s air-coordination meeting. Moreimportantly, not understanding the MarineCorps’ reliance on its battalion air officer, theASOG commander allowed one <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> elementto employ without an enlisted battalionair liaison officer (EBALO). In interviews, Marinepilots indicated that they missed the oversightand situational awareness a qualifiedEBALO would have provided during check-inbriefs. Perhaps a few interservice scrimmagegames would have created sufficient familiarityto avoid those misplays; in the future, weshould demand that we practice together.
COUNTERINSURGENCY AIRPOWER 61The aforementioned interservice seamshighlight a final area for improvement: thecollection and study of joint lessons learned.In the weeks after <strong>Fall</strong>ujah, both the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong>and Marine Corps sent teams to record whathad happened—but neither team saw enoughplayers to capture the complete story. The <strong>Air</strong><strong>Force</strong> team traveled primarily to Al Udeid;hampered by travel restrictions, it sent onlytwo interviewers to Baghdad for only one day,thereby missing most of the JTACs, the ASOC,the corps TACP, and the JFEC personnel mostdeeply involved in planning and executing airsupport for the <strong>Fall</strong>ujah operation. The MarineCorps Center for Lessons Learned sentpersonnel to a Marine air wing debrief at AlAsad <strong>Air</strong> Base, where they recorded the aforementioneddisappointment at the lack of anEBALO but spent no time trying to determinethe root cause. Instead, they published an unsupportedanalysis suggesting that some <strong>Air</strong><strong>Force</strong> JTACs’ unfamiliarity with the groundscheme of maneuver proved that the MarineCorps trained its forward air controllers betterthan the <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> trained its JTACs.Unfortunately, as our services move towardinterdependence, neither of these singleserviceapproaches has much utility. To capturethe <strong>Fall</strong>ujah experience accurately, weshould have had a multiservice team interviewkey players from all services simultaneously—players like General Formica, Lieutenant Colonel(promotable) Gallagher, Colonel Kling,and Colonel Johnson, who had common goalsbut differing perspectives and who togethercould have shed light on the foundations ofour joint successes as well as the causes of ourmissteps. In the future, our service-specificlessons-learned teams should pool their efforts,travel together, and blend those differingperspectives into a comprehensive whole.The Way AheadHow can our services perpetuate these successesand correct the missteps? The answer issimple: train the way we fight by exercising thecomplete theater air control system and Armyair-ground system (TACS/AAGS). On paper,the CAOC and ASOC are already connectedwith TACPs, FSEs, and the Army’s commandand control of the air at all levels, as well aswith <strong>Air</strong>borne Warning and Control Systemaircraft and control and reporting centers—but all of them never practice together. Infact, no formal training unit exists for ASOCpersonnel; air operations center (AOC) personnelhave a formal course that does not involveASOC operations in its final exercise;and AOC Blue Flag exercises do not involveASOCs. So AOC personnel have to learn aboutthe ASOC’s robust role after arriving intheater.Similarly, Army personnel see only anAOC response cell in their corps- and divisionlevelexercises. Deconflicting ground- and airdeliveredfires in congested space is trickybusiness, and the impending proliferation ofremotely piloted aircraft will exacerbate theproblem. Future air-ground teams must notapproach this as a pickup game. They mustpractice together, develop the game plan together,and execute together.The first step should involve creating ASOCformal training and nesting it within AOCformal training, so all air-component playerswho influence air-ground integration understandTACS/AAGS interconnections. Next, inthe joint world, we should link AOC Blue Flagexercises with corps-level Warfighter or missionrehearsalexercises. Although doing so wouldrequire innovative scenarios allowing bothservices to blend their training objectives, itwould link three-star component commandersand their staffs in a training environment,thereby building a stronger foundation forjoint success. Later training innovations mightinclude multiservice exercises that fully exploitASOC/DASC/CAOC synergies.To ensure that our services start every jointgame together, perhaps the Army, Marines,and <strong>Air</strong> <strong>Force</strong> should break some joint glassand force some interdependence upon themselves.We require deeper and more effectivecross-component representation at every level(to advocate courses of action, our liaison officersshould have full access to decision makers),and General Formica’s example of trustin MNC-I’s corps ALOs suggests one way toachieve it: trade leadership billets in the AOCs
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Chief of Staff, US Air ForceGen T.
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PIREPsJoint Airspace Management and
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APJInterdependenceKey to Our Common
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APJLT COL PAUL D. B ERG , USAF, CHI
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Clausewitz and the Falkland Islands
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CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
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CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
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CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
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CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
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BOOK REVIEWS 121whose contributions
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BOOK REVIEWS 123Franco: Soldier, Co
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APJAir and Space Power Journal, the
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CONTRIBUTORS 127Col Howard D. “Da
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EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARDGen John A.