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Vol. 6 Num. 1 - GCG: Revista de Globalización, Competitividad y ...

Vol. 6 Num. 1 - GCG: Revista de Globalización, Competitividad y ...

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Melba Falck Reyesexports and jobs in the manufacturing sectors, the sum total invested was still low relative toboth the FDI received by Mexico and Japan’s flows to other countries.45It was in this context that the agreement with Mexico was proposed, and negotiations beganin 2001. The complementary nature of the economies, given their respective availability of resources,ma<strong>de</strong> the approach more attractive through an EPA. For Mexico, the high potentialof the Japanese market, due to the high level of income of its inhabitants, and the high FDIflows that Japan had ma<strong>de</strong> since the mid-eighties were powerful incentives to enter throughthe big gates in Asia. For Japanese firms established in Mexico, 2001 represented a turningpoint because in that year a certain NAFTA clause took effect, which mandated that companiesestablished in Mexico that had been importing inputs from outsi<strong>de</strong> the North Americanregion had to start paying tariffs. Japanese companies started to lose competitiveness infavor of their North American counterparts operating in Mexico. Additionally, Mexico was stillan attractive export platform due to the many agreements in which the country participated,and above all due to its proximity to the US market.5. The Japanese FDI after the EPA with MexicoWhat has been achieved five years after the Mexico-Japan EPA was signed? Given thestrong link between the Japanese FDI and the tra<strong>de</strong> between the two countries, let’s lookfirst to the evolution of tra<strong>de</strong> and then turn to that of FDI.Total tra<strong>de</strong> between the two countries has accelerated, averaging 17.7 billion dollars a year inthe 2005-2010 period, which means that tra<strong>de</strong> more than doubled with respect to the 1993-2004 average. Before the global crisis (2005-2008), exports showed a more acceleratedgrowth (14% a year) as compared to that of imports (7.7%). The global crisis had a negativeeffect on tra<strong>de</strong> growth in 2009, but the next year it started to recover both for tra<strong>de</strong> with Japanand for tra<strong>de</strong> with the world (Table 3).Notwithstanding the improved performance of exports after the agreement, exports continueto represent just 23% of the imports, a fact reflected in the <strong>de</strong>ficit in the tra<strong>de</strong> balance,which tripled as an average with respect to the period prior to the agreement. As was alreadypointed out, this <strong>de</strong>ficit originates in the close relationship between Japanese investmentin Mexico and its <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ncy on the import of inputs, above all parts and components, forthe automobile and electronic industries. In this regard, it is important to notice that un<strong>de</strong>rthe cooperation chapter inclu<strong>de</strong>d in the EPA, JETRO-Mexico and the Ministry of Economyhave put in place a program to <strong>de</strong>velop local suppliers for the Japanese automotive industryestablished in Mexico.<strong>GCG</strong> GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY - UNIVERSIA ENERO-ABRIL 2012 VOL. 6 NUM. 1 ISSN: 1988-7116pp: 36-54

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